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SUMMARY 
 
The government of organizations has been a relevant matter from the very first moment of 
their existence. Nevertheless, it is commonly assumed that issues coming after the diffusion 
of corporations as we now may identify and the atomization of property sowed the grounds of 
early theories that address corporate governance. Hereafter, the study on boards of directors, a 
key element of the governance of organizations, has been at the center of numerous scientific 
publications over the years.  
The importance and impact in business practice, and in society in general, also fostered the 
interest in recent decades, considering a board-centered model of corporate governance and 
searching for the best possible government for the organizations. Many research contributions 
have been made, keeping the focus on the Board of Directors as one of the main topics in the 
debate on Corporate Governance. Concurrently, problems that involved the boards and senior 
executives in deceptive behavior led to a variety of proposals that were often channeled 
through a new regulation or Corporate Governance Codes. These Codes reflected goals, 
spread practices, based on principles that were influenced by contributions, and were 
expressed in recommendations.  
Consequently, we formulated the General Objective for this Thesis: 
The General objective is to analyze the main contributions on the boards of directors in 
research literature in order to observe how the have been reflected in Good Governance Codes 
through the degree of compliance and their impact on performance in Spanish Listed Firms. 
In order to specify this General Objective, we established four specific objectives: 
1. To analyze the studies on Boards of Directors that shape the existing intellectual 
framework. 
2. To analyze the studies on Board of Directors, carrying out this same analysis for the journal 
that has a greater presence in the field. 
3. To verify the evolution and how the codes in Spain have channeled key issues of the 
corporate governance towards listed firms, via the degree of compliance, with special 
attention to those that may refer to human capital. 
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4. To analyze the impact of the degree of compliance in the recommendations of good 
governance on the performance of companies, and determine whether those related to 
human capital have an effect on it. 
We used different methodologies. For the first two objectives, we followed bibliometric 
techniques. They include citation and co-citation analyses, principal component analyses, and 
mapping. In the case of the third objective, we employed descriptive analysis, and the analysis 
of principal components analogously to when they have been used for the validation of 
constructs in indices on this same field of study. In the case of the fourth objective, we 
employed multiple-regression technique in different models. 
Thus, we described, analyzed and mapped the research on the topic realized up to 2017, 
identifying three periods of time. Contributions on the first period would show the initial 
grounding of the topic. The second one would deploy in parallel to the codes progressive 
implementation. In the third period, contributions are built upon the previous seeding and 
grounding stages, spreading the analyses to a broader range of topics as a sign of maturity. 
We confirmed the multidisciplinary interest from the point of view of the editors, in several 
scientific arenas: management, finance, accounting, ethics, psychology, law or sociology. 
Although there are a great number of contributors, only a few of them recurrently produced 
studies over time. Similarly, a small group of them concentrates the citation count and it is 
consistently referred across the literature. Across the quoted references we may note the main 
theories help providing the building blocks for their approaches (Institutional Theory, 
Resource Dependent Theory, Agency Theory), and are focused on the board of directors. We 
also mapped a geographical distribution of research studies. Journals have been co-cited 
mostly based on close research arenas where Corporate Governance and Ethics journals serve 
as a bridge among different areas. The analysis of the keywords shows the most relevant 
topics that were addressed (e.g. gender diversity, board structure, CEO compensation and 
duality, and firm performance). As regards to the cited references, we found five main factors 
grounding the research: the Agency Theory (and related topics), diversity, RDT, strategy and 
other angles on composition, and other theoretical perspectives. The majority of the 
references were originated in the second stage of publications, configuring it period of 
consolidation of groundings and topics. The analysis in the different periods of time supports 
the idea of a maturation process in the literature.  
Then, we utilized the bibliometrics techniques for the leading journal, Corporate Governance 
An International Review, mapping and analyzing the research on the topic from 2000 to 2017, 
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in three different periods and highlighting the growth, maturation, and consolidation of the 
produced literature. Geographical origins and collaboration among research organizations 
show a prevalence of European affiliations with a high degree of institutional diversity that 
leads to matters that are focused on governance beyond local angles. As in other journals, a 
small group of authors account for a significant number of articles. The mapping and analysis 
of co-authorship shows several nodes of collaboration and a diverse community of authors. 
The analysis of the keywords confirms a rising role of codes and indices, and shows the 
recent evolution of research towards disclosure, family firms, or shareholder activism. In spite 
of this, we found a lack of presence of board capital and ethics related studies. The analysis of 
the components showed five pillars: the relationship between the board and the strategy, and 
the impact of diversity; foundations for board composition; ownership structure matters; a 
theoretical bridge; and family firms, ownership structure and indices. Given the analysis of 
the factors, we think that the theoretical foundation of the works has a deep root in Agency 
Theory framework but it is open to new theories. Topics are diverse and wider in scope than 
those of the overall set of journals. The analysis we performed draws an evolution of the 
mentioned pillars of knowledge across the different stages of time. 
Upon intellectual frameworks, codes of good governance build their principles and set 
recommendations for listed firms. We provided a matching of the principles of the Spanish 
Code of Governance and the main theories, and a very useful table to compare 
recommendations topics across different codes, depicting some of the characteristics too. We 
confirmed that Agency Theory related recommendations are highly met by Spanish listed 
companies. Based on the degree of compliance of the recommendations, we confirmed that 
remuneration provisions as well as internal controls are capturing the underlying constructs. 
In this regard, internal controls are gaining presence but, under our view, are likely to be 
incorporated to legislation, especially in Spain, if the situation of deteriorated compliance 
persists. This would be aligned with the explanation on the legal systems and their relation to 
codes, widely discussed in research literature. CSR has evolved towards a higher degree of 
disclosure on policies and implementation. As for human capital-related recommendations, 
we foresee that companies will try to comply, at least formally, but the market will have to 
look at further disclosures to interpret advantages and profits coming out of a certain 
company’s human capital variable. Recommendations on traditional topics based on the 
Agency Theory (e.g. independence, internal controls) provide different outcomes. Human 
capital is present in codes and appears as a key element, especially in the last period of the 
Summary 
	 12 
study. We think that the codes are certainly playing a key role while reflecting intellectual 
foundations, challenging companies, and, as we tested in the validation of constructs, they 
help measuring the corporate governance. This is a convenient step in order to study a 
potential association to performance. 
Finally, we found a positive and significant relationship between the degree of compliance 
and the firm performance of the Spanish firms in the period of our study. As regards to past 
levels of compliance, our research confirms that we can’t take their values into account along 
with the present ones, due to the lack of significance. The positive link between past levels of 
compliance and firm performance considered alone might point to be closely interchangeable 
with present values, which may suggest that it could be a sort of inertia that leans on recent 
degree of compliance but rather prefers the current ones. We tested that there were differences 
in the association depending on the size of the firms considered. We also found the lack of 
statistical significance in subsets of recommendations regarding human capital. In this 
context, going beyond what is required by regulation or by provisions in codes could build 
relevant groundings for long-term government of the firm and gain envision and advantages 
for competing. Also, this is quite interesting in terms of the markets, the need of detailed 
demands of information at disclosures, the future performance, and the future role of the code 
as a useful tool to spread best practices and to achieve its core principles. 
RESUMEN 
El gobierno de las organizaciones ha sido una cuestión relevante desde el primer momento de 
la existencia de las mismas. Sin embargo, se asume normalmente que las cuestiones derivadas 
de la difusión de las corporaciones como las conocemos ahora y la atomización de la 
propiedad sirvieron de base para las primeras teorías que analizaban el gobierno corporativo. 
A partir de aquí, el estudio de los consejos de administración ha estado en el centro de 
numerosas publicaciones científicas a lo largo de los años. 
La importancia y el impacto en la práctica empresarial, y en la sociedad en general, alentaron  
un interés creciente en las últimas décadas, considerando un modelo de gobierno corporativo 
centrado en el consejo de administración y buscando el mejor gobierno posible para las 
organizaciones. Muchas contribuciones en el terreno de la investigación han sido realizadas 
manteniendo el foco en el consejo de administración como uno de los principales puntos de 
discusión sobre el gobierno corporativo. Al mismo tiempo, los problemas que implicaron a 
los consejos y a los directivos en conductas éticamente responsables llevaron a una variedad 
de propuestas que fueron a menudo canalizadas a través de nueva regulación y de códigos de 
buen gobierno. Estos códigos reflejan metas, difunden prácticas y están basados en principios 
que recibieron la influencia de las contribuciones antes referidas, y que fueron expresados en 
recomendaciones. 
Consecuentemente, hemos formulado el objetivo general para esta tesis. 
El objetivo general es analizar las principales contribuciones sobre los consejos de 
administración en la literatura con el fin de observar cómo han sido reflejadas en los códigos 
de buen gobierno a través del grado de cumplimiento y su impacto sobre el Performance de 
las compañías cotizadas en España. 
Con el fin de especificar este objetivo general, hemos establecido cuatro objetivos específicos. 
• Analizar los estudios sobre Consejos de Administración que configuran el marco 
intelectual existente. 
• Analizar los estudios sobre consejos de administración, llevando a cabo este análisis 
para la publicación con mayor presencia en este campo. 
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• Verificar la evolución y cómo los códigos han canalizado los elementos principales 
del gobierno corporativo hacia las empresas cotizadas a través del grado de 
cumplimiento, con especial atención a las que se refieren al capital humano. 
• Analizar el grado de cumplimiento de las recomendaciones de buen gobierno sobre el 
performance de las compañías y determinar si aquellas relacionadas con el capital 
humano tienen efecto sobre ellas. 
Utilizamos distintas metodologías. Para los dos primeros objetivos, seguimos técnicas 
bibliométricas. Éstas incluyen el análisis de citas y co-citas, el análisis de componentes 
principales y técnicas de mapeo. En el caso del tercer objetivo, empleamos análisis  
descriptivo y el análisis de componentes principales de forma análoga a lo que se hace cuando 
se utiliza para la validación de constructos en los índices en el mismo campo de estudio. El 
caso del cuarto objetivo hemos empleado la técnica de la regresión múltiple.  
De esta manera hemos descrito, analizado y mapeado la investigación sobre el tema realizada 
hasta el año 2017, identificando tres periodos de tiempo. Las contribuciones en el primer 
periodo de tiempo mostrarían las fundamentaciones iniciales sobre el tema. El segundo se 
desarrollaría en paralelo a la difusión progresiva de los códigos de buen gobierno. En el tercer 
periodo las contribuciones son construidas sobre los elementos previos que se ha establecido 
en las etapas anteriores, difundiendo los análisis a un ámbito más específico de tópicos como 
signo de madurez. Confirmamos el interés multidisciplinar desde distintos puntos de vista de 
los editores y distintas disciplinas científicas: Management, finanzas, contabilidad, ética, 
psicología, derecho o sociología. Aunque hay un gran número de autores sólo unos pocos de 
ellos producen recurrentemente estudios a largo del tiempo. De manera análoga, un pequeño 
grupo de ellos concentra el número de citas y es referido a lo largo de la literatura. Dentro de 
las referencias citadas podemos destacar las principales teorías formando los pilares 
fundamentales para cada enfoque (Teoría de la Agencia, RDT, etc.), centradas en el consejo 
de administración. Además, hemos mapeado la distribución geográfica de los estudios. Las 
fuentes has sido citadas conjuntamente en terrenos próximos, sirviendo el específico de 
Gobierno Corporativo y la Ética como puentes. El análisis de las palabras clave muestra los 
puntos más relevantes que han sido tratados (p.ej. diversidad, estructura del consejo, dualidad, 
performance). Por lo que se refiere a las referencias citadas , hemos encontrado cinco factores 
principales: la teoría de la Agencia (y temas relacionados), diversidad, RDT, estrategia y otras 
perspectivas sobre la composición, y otros puntos de vista teóricos. La mayoría de las 
referencias tuvieron su origen en el segundo periodo de publicaciones, configurando un 
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periodo de consolidación de los fundamentos y los temas. El análisis de los deferentes 
periodos apoya la idea de este proceso de maduración. 
A continuación, utilizamos las técnicas bibliométricas para analizar la investigación sobre el 
tema en la principal revista, Corporate Governance – An International Review, en 
publicaciones realizadas desde 2000 hasta 2017. Los orígenes geográficos y la colaboración 
entre distintas organizaciones muestra una prevalencia de las instituciones europeas, con un 
alto grado de diversidad institucional que lleva a pensar que están centradas en el gobierno 
más allá de enfoques locales. Como en otras publicaciones, un pequeño grupo de autores 
concentra un número significativo de artículos. El mapa y el análisis de las coautoría 
muestran diversos nodos de colaboración y una comunidad diversa de autores. El análisis de 
las palabras clave confirma el creciente papel de los códigos y los índices, y muestra 
evolución reciente de la investigación hacia temas como la transparencia, el activismo 
accionarial o las empresas familiares. A pesar de esto, encontramos poca presencia de temas 
relacionados con el capital del consejo y de aquellos relacionados con cuestiones éticas. El 
análisis de componentes mostró cinco pilares: la relación entre el consejo y la estrategia y el 
impacto sobre la diversidad, los fundamentos para la composición del consejo, cuestiones 
sobre la estructura de la propiedad un puente teórico y cuestiones relativas a las empresas 
familiares estructura de la propiedad y los índices. Dado el análisis de estos factores, 
pensamos que la fundamentación teórica de las obras tiene una raíz profunda de la Teoría de 
la Agencia pero está abierta a nuevas teorías. Los tópicos son diversos y amplios en alcance 
más allá de lo que sucede en otras publicaciones. El análisis que realizamos muestra una 
evolución de los pilares de conocimiento mencionados a través de los diferentes periodos de 
tiempo. 
Sobre la base de estos marcos intelectuales, los códigos de buen gobierno construyen sus 
principios y establecen las recomendaciones para las empresas cotizadas. Hemos 
proporcionado un cruce entre principios de gobierno y las principales teorías, y una tabla útil 
para comparar las recomendaciones a través de los diferentes códigos, poniendo de manifiesto 
algunas de sus características. Confirmamos que las recomendaciones relacionadas más 
directamente con la Teoría de la Agencia son cumplidas aunque no en su totalidad por las 
empresas cotizadas. Sobre la base del grado de cumplimiento de las recomendaciones, 
confirmamos que los códigos recogen la importancia de tópicos relacionados con la 
remuneración y los controles internos. A este respectos, estos últimos ganan presencia pero, 
bajo nuestro punto de vista, pueden ser pronto incorporados a la regulación en el caso de un 
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deterioro persistente en cumplimiento. Esto estaría alineado con la explicación sobre los 
sistemas legales y su relación con los códigos, ampliamente comentada en la literatura. La 
RSC ha evolucionado hacia un nivel más alto de transparencia sobre políticas e implantación. 
Por lo que se refiere a las recomendaciones relacionadas con el capital humano, prevemos que 
las compañías cumplirán al menso formalmente, pero el mercado tendrá que buscar detalles 
ulteriores para interpretar las ventajas y beneficios derivados de las variables que lo 
componen. Las recomendaciones que tratan temas ‘tradicionales’ basados en el Teoría de la 
Agencia proporcionan resultados diferentes. El capital humano está presente en los códigos y 
aparece como un elemento clave, especialmente en el último periodo de estudio. Pesamos 
que, ciertamente están desempeñando un papel importante reflejando su fundamentación en 
los marcos teóricos, sirviendo de reto para las compañías y, como comprobamos en la 
validación de los constructos anteriores, ayudan a medir el buen gobierno de las mismas. Este 
es un paso conveniente con el fin de poder estudiar una potencial asociación con el 
performance. 
Finalmente, encontramos una relación positiva y significativa entre el grado de cumplimento 
y el performance  de las compañías cotizadas en España en nuestro periodo de estudio. Por lo 
que se refiere a niveles de cumplimiento pasados, nuestra investigación confirma que no 
podemos tener en cuenta los mismos al tiempo que los presentes, por falta de significatividad. 
El carácter positivo y significativo si son considerados aisladamente apunta a que son en 
cierto sentido intercambiables, sugiriendo una suerte de inercia que se apoya en los 
cumplimientos realizados pero prefiere los más recientes. Comprobamos también diferencias 
en la asociación en función del tamaño de las empresas consideradas. Encontramos falta de 
significatividad en el cumplimiento de las recomendaciones relacionadas con el capital 
humano. En este contexto, ir más allá de lo requerido por la regulación o las recomendaciones 
de los códigos puede construir fundamentaciones relevantes para el gobierno a largo plazo de 
las compañías y ganar en visión y en ventajas para competir. Además, esto es bastante 
interesante en términos de los mercados, de la necesidad de demandas detalladas de 
información en las divulgaciones, del desempeño futuro y del rol futuro del código como una 
herramienta útil para difundir las mejores prácticas y alcanzar sus principios fundamentales.  
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The government of organizations has been a relevant matter from the very first moment of 
their existence. Ancient Rome made room for early forms of companies, but issues on their 
government stayed limited to a few topics, mostly related to trade and the res publica. 
Besides, societas, the legal form provided by the law, were usually small, quite localized 
and few people worked in them. Nevertheless, the legal form of societas publicanorum 
(Malmendier, 2005), where there were shares and limited liabilities entering in government 
leases, somehow anticipated the idea of corporations (Malmendier, 2009). Although 
records were scarce for centuries, it allowed us to reckon the rise of big companies, such as 
the merchant banks of Florence (Bardi, Peruzzi, Acciaiouli) in the thirteenth century 
(Gevurtz, 2004; Hunt, 1994). Companies were usually controlled by the families that 
named the company and the conflicts usually intermixed with business ones (Hunt, 1994). 
But in other geographies companies were raised from guilds or in the purpose of a bigger 
trade enterprise, based on the ancient form comenda and the development of compagnia 
concept (e.g. East India Company, La compagnie française des Indes Orientales, 
Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie)(Morck & Steier, 2005; Puga Vial, 2011). Although 
some of these big companies were established with strong political control, links and 
empowerments, there was an opening move towards private initiatives as early as in 1215 
in UK (Magna Carta, 1215), and 1495 in America (Real Provisión 10 de abril, 1495). The 
idea of ‘director’ was introduced prior to the corporate governance itself. It was used by 
the Bank of England and the Bank of Scotland in the seventeenth century, and the main 
work of Adam Smith also utilizes the notion, bringing an early conceptualization of the 
issues rising there was a separation of the ownership and the control: 
“The directors of such companies, however, being the managers rather of other people’s money than 
of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious 
vigilance with which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like the 
stewards of a rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small matters as not for their master’s 
honour, and very easily give themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion, 
therefore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company”. 
Smith, Adam. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776). 
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It is in that period of time when charters of incorporation evolve to companies through new 
regulation (Joint Stock Companies Act in the UK, the Code in France), that established 
basic foundations for companies, corporations, aktiengesellschaft, societá per azioni or 
sociedades anónimas in different countries (Evans, 1908; Puga Vial, 2011). Boards of 
Directors had aristocratic traits and were considered a menace in the early ages of 
democracy. In fact, there were forbidden in France during the period of The Convention. 
Nevertheless, it is commonly assumed that issues coming after the diffusion of 
corporations as we now may identify and the atomization of property sowed the grounds of 
early theories that address corporate governance (Berle & Means, 1932).  
Hereafter, the study on boards of directors, a key part of the governance of organizations 
(Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003), has been at the center of numerous scientific publications 
over the years. These investigations, published in various international journals, have 
focused on the subject from very different points of view, beyond being a central element 
within the government of organizations.  
 
Figure 1: Centrality of the Board in Corporate Governance 
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The importance and impact of their field of study in business practice, and in society in 
general, also fostered the interest in recent decades. The election scheme, the peer 
decision-making model and control-supervision roles built solid pillars for considering a 
board-centered model of corporate governance. Besides, both, the goal of seeking the best 
possible government for the organizations and some corporate failures and scandals at the 
beginning of this century, posed problems that involved the boards and senior executives 
in deceptive behavior (Boivie, Graffin, & Pollock, 2012; Combs, Ketchen, Perryman, & 
Donahue, 2007; Lawal, 2011), and led to a variety of proposals that were often channeled 
through a new regulation. There were also proposals in terms of recommendations that 
were progressively included in the Corporate Governance Codes in many countries. Its 
adoption followed the needs of efficiency and also the pressures of legitimation, showing 
different patterns of adoption according to variables such as the level of rights of 
protection of shareholders (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). 
On the other hand, in addition to the indicated factors, in the field of scientific research, 
performed intellectual contributions have complemented the initial works, which have 
revealed different problems and issues detected in business practice, and that have 
provided consistency to this field of study. This leads to the conclusion that corporate 
governance research is already configured as a discipline in itself (Durisin & Puzone, 
2009). 
Following the basic principles of corporate governance that aim to promote transparency 
and efficiency in markets, protect the rights and roles of shareholders and ensure timely 
and accurate disclosure (Chen, Kao, Tsao, & Wu, 2007), research has been approached 
from different angles. A significant number of these works have focused on the Board of 
Directors as one of the main topics in the debate on Corporate Governance (Ingley & Van 
der Walt, 2001; Kiel & Nicholson, 2003; Pugliese et al., 2009).  
Whereas research on Corporate Governance was providing approaches and analyses on 
various topics, the issuing of Codes somehow reflected goals, spread practices, based on 
principles that were influenced by them. These Codes gave, as well, as central role to the 
Board of Directors, and gravitated most of the recommendations around it. They also were 
very helpful for the aims of any researcher, since they open a window to interesting data 
through the ordinary reporting, at least on a yearly basis. 
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Consequently, these arguments help triggering the research question we wanted to address 
in this Thesis: 
 
Have Good Governance Codes channeled to the Spanish Listed Firms the main 
contributions on the Board of Directors, a key element in Corporate Governance?   
To answer to this question, we formulated the General Objective for this Thesis: 
 
The General objective is to analyze the main contributions on the boards of 
directors in research literature in order to observe how the have been reflected in 
Good Governance Codes through the degree of compliance and their impact on 
performance in Spanish Listed Firms. 
 
In order to specify this General Objective we established four specific objectives: 
 
1. To analyze the studies on Boards of Directors that shape the existing intellectual 
framework. 
By formulating this objective we aimed to review to literature, where the centrality of the 
Board was configured according to the roles that were designed and given as the apex of 
any organization. For this purpose, research works have aimed to understand different 
issues such as the structure and implications of the Board (Rechner & Dalton, 1991; Zahra 
& Pearce II, 1989), its composition and characteristics (Datta, Musteen, & Herrmann, 
2009; Hillman, Nicholson, & Shropshire, 2008; Sherman, Kashlak, & Joshi, 1998), 
processes (Dulewicz, MacMillan, & Herbert, 1995), or roles (Björkman, 1994; Boulton, 
1978; Kim, Burns, & Prescott, 2009; Nicholson & Newton, 2010). Also, a diverse group of 
theories may have been involved in proving a proper intellectual grounding such as the 
Agency Theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), the Stakeholders Theory (Donaldson & 
Preston, 1995), the Resource Dependence Theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) or the 
Stewardship Theory (Donaldson & Davis, 1991) Given the increasing number of 
approaches and topics with which it has been related, there has been a growing number of 
articles in recent decades, and it is convenient to analyze how they are structured, their 
evolution and their contributions.  
Chapter 1: Introduction 
	 21 
By setting this objective, we will try to give a proper answer to the question ‘How are the 
contributions on the board of directors structured, how have they evolved, what is their 
relevance and intellectual framework?’ The answer to this question will also determine 
how future research can fill gaps or use new points of view for the main elements of 
discussion. In our case, we also want to determine to what extent topics are covered by 
literature on the subject. 
In order to respond to the first of the specific objectives proposed, following the available 
literature, we have agreed that the best way to undertake this type of analysis requires the 
introduction of elements that allow an objective evaluation. The bibliometric analysis 
techniques provide the necessary tools for this purpose and so they have been used, with 
some methodological variations, to respond to the objective in question. It was proposed to 
consider for its analysis all those publications classified as articles that were in the 
databases of Clarivate Web Of Science, in this case more than 3,000. 
 
2. To analyze the studies on Board of Directors, carrying out this same analysis for 
the journal that has a greater presence in the field. 
Focusing the analysis on the key sources gives us the opportunity to understand how the 
relevance is configured and strengthens the most relevant developments of the research. 
While there are many journals that show different aspects related to the boards of directors, 
we saw that the Corporate Governance Review - An International Review (CGIR) has the 
greatest number of contributions. This journal has helped significantly in the maturation 
process, addressing many issues and topics from different perspectives. The journal refers 
to a "multidisciplinary conversation" that is, in short, one of its objectives, as well as to 
seek the publication of "research on the phenomena of comparative corporate governance 
in companies of any international geographical scope", on the basis of contributions that 
come from a large variety of areas. 
The second objective will, therefore, lead us to consider answers to the question that may 
be stated as follows: How are the contributions of the most relevant journal structured and 
how have they evolved? 
It is important to focus the focus on that journal that has greater relevance on the subject in 
question, applying the same type of analysis. In our case, we analyzed the 190 articles on 
Boards of Directors that have been published in the Corporate Governance - An 
International Review, from 2000 to 2017. 
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3. To verify the evolution and how the codes in Spain have channeled key issues of 
the corporate governance towards listed firms, via the degree of compliance, with 
special attention to those that may refer to human capital. 
Once we identified intellectual frameworks and topics that were centered on the Board of 
Directors, we are more capable to address the analysis we propose on the Codes. For 
almost three decades, Good Government Codes have been a key tool for improving 
governance in organizations. In order to provide a greater degree of transparency and avoid 
negative governance problems, codes are disseminated in most countries. The Cadbury 
Code (Cadbury, 1992), issued in the United Kingdom in 1992, took the initiative of 
subsequent codes in France (Association Française des Entreprises Privées & Conseil 
National du Patronat Français, 1995), the Netherlands (Peters Committee, 1997) and Spain 
(Comisión Especial para el Estudio de un Código Ético de los Consejos de Administración 
de las Sociedades, 1998). The second moment of great momentum in the dissemination of 
codes was reached after the financial crisis, which led to numerous revisions and the 
issuance of some new ones in other countries (Cuomo, Mallin, & Zattoni, 2016). Although 
there are authors who think of codes as a mere way to protect themselves from governance 
(Carver, 2007), we think of their relevant role in disseminating concepts related to good 
governance, regardless of the subsequent degree of implementation of them. Good 
governance codes have also played a key role in the evolution of research. While tracking 
the code has been voluntary in many countries, a large number of companies began to 
provide information on corporate governance that has been very useful. Market regulators 
adopted specific formats to show such information so that all possible interested parties 
could have access with a certain degree of structure and homogeneity. For this, it was key 
that the issuers of codes establish principles of corporate governance and elaborate, based 
on them, recommendations. Within these recommendations, the Board of Directors was in 
the center, having a relevant role. And that can help us to solve the question: In the case of 
Spain, do the recommendations and their degree of compliance respond to the main issues 
and constructs of corporate governance? Could they serve as a good measure of corporate 
governance ? 
Over the past 20 years there has been an impulse to good Corporate Governance in Spain. 
And it has been channeled through the issuance of different codes of good governance that 
have successively established different principles that had among their main protagonists, 
as a main element in the governance of organizations, the boards of directors (CNMV, 
2013, 2015; Comisión Especial para el Estudio de un Código Ético de los Consejos de 
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Administración de las Sociedades, 1998; Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores, 
2006). The principles have been, in turn, specified in recommendations. Focusing the 
analysis on companies listed in Spain, we have considered the aforementioned 
recommendations, their changes, evolution and degree of compliance across three different 
periods of time to see to what extent they responded to the topics of discussion, emphasis 
and concern of the different theories that have studied the corporate governance of the 
organizations. As a result of this process of validation of various constructs underlying the 
recommendations, after considering a wide period of time, they might serve as an index of 
corporate governance for listed firms. On that point, we have tried to discern the existence 
of substantive elements in the recommendations that point to a relevance of human capital. 
This way, we have undertaken the third of the objectives. 
 
4. To analyze the impact of the degree of compliance in the recommendations of 
good governance on the performance of companies, and determine whether those 
related to human capital have an effect on it. 
Once the previous analyzes have been carried out, we can approach the fourth of the 
objectives. Based on the recommendations of each one of the codes that were issued in 
Spain, and providing their ability to act as an index for corporate governance, we want to 
analyze the relationship between the degree of compliance and the performance in Spanish 
listed firms in period 2007-2016. We aim to enlighten whether the outcomes follow the 
effort made by firms in this respect, in a time span with three different sets of 
recommendations that were originated by successive code of good governance 
modifications, deepening in the relationship through the analysis of past compliance. We’d 
also like considering the size of the firms, and the degree of compliance of 
recommendations related to human capital provisions, that may serve for future code 
developments as well as for companies’ governance policies. These analyses may help us 
to answer and deepen into the question: Does the degree of compliance with good 
governance recommendations relate to the performance of companies? 
Thus, we have analyzed the degree of compliance with the good governance 
recommendations that were in force from 2007 to 2016 for all the companies listed on the 
Spanish markets. For such analysis, we rely on the results of the previous specific 
objective, where the structure, definition and equivalences of the different 
recommendations that each code provided for each period of time were determined.  
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In the following figure, we depict the structure of this Thesis, linking each specific 
objective to the chapter where it has been addressed. 
 
Figure 2: General Structure of the Chapters of The Thesis 
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to when they have been used for the validation of constructs in indices on this same field of 
study. 
In the case of the fourth objective, according to some past research literature on related 
topics, we employed multiple-regression technique in different models so as to validate the 
different proposed hypotheses. 
As a result of the methods we used, we may classify the research of chapters 2 and 3 as 
‘Literature review’, the one of chapter 4 as ‘conceptual and empiric’, and the one of 
chapter 5 as ‘empiric’. 
In order to appropriately structure the answers for each of the objectives that we have set 
out in this research, and aiming to achieve a prompted translation in the future to the 
literature as a whole, we decided to build the present work with the configuration of 
reference publications. Thus, English was adopted as the language for the entire work. In 
addition, each one of the chapters that follows this introduction responds to each one of the 
specific objectives, and is structured as if it were an article. This means that the chapters 
have their own Abstract, Keywords, Introduction, Literature review, Methodology, 
Results, Discussion and Conclusions, References and Appendix. 
 
  
Chapter 1: Introduction 	 	
	26 
REFERENCES 
 
Aguilera, R. V., & Cuervo-Cazurra, A. (2004). Codes of Good Governance Worldwide: 
What is the Trigger? Organization Studies, 25(3), 415–443. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840604040669 
Association Française des Entreprises Privées, & Conseil National du Patronat Français. 
(1995). Le conseil d’administration des sociétés cotees (Vienot Report). 
Berle, A. A., & Means, G. C. (1932). The Modern Corporation and Private Property. New 
York: Macmillan. 
Björkman, I. (1994). Managing Swedish and Finnish multinational corporations: the role 
of the board of directors in French and Norwegian subsidiaries. International 
Business Review, 3(1), 47–69. https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0969-
5931(94)90014-0 
Boivie, S., Graffin, S. D., & Pollock, T. G. (2012). Time for Me to Fly: Predicting Director 
Exit at Large Firms. Academy of Management Journal, 55(6), 1334–1359. 
https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2010.1083 
Boulton, W. R. (1978). The Evolving Board: A Look at the Board’s Changing Roles and 
Information Needs. Academy of Management Review, 3(4), 827–836. 
https://doi.org/10.5465/AMR.1978.4289291 
Cadbury, A. Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance 
(1992). 
Carver, J. (2007). The Promise of Governance Theory: beyond codes and best practices1. 
Corporate Governance: An International Review, 15(6), 1030–1037. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2007.00628.x 
Chen, A., Kao, L., Tsao, M., & Wu, C. (2007). Building a Corporate Governance Index 
from the Perspectives of Ownership and Leadership for Firms in Taiwan. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, 15(2), 251–261. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2007.00572.x 
CNMV. Código Unificado de buen gobierno de las sociedades cotizadas (2013). 
CNMV. Good Governance Code of Listed Companies (2015). 
Combs, J. G., Ketchen, D. J., Perryman, A. A., & Donahue, M. S. (2007). The Moderating 
Effect of CEO Power on the Board Composition–Firm Performance Relationship*. 
Journal of Management Studies, 44(8), 1299–1323. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
6486.2007.00708.x 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
	 27 
Comisión Especial para el Estudio de un Código Ético de los Consejos de Administración 
de las Sociedades. El gobierno de las sociedades cotizadas (1998). 
Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores. Unified Good Governance Code of Listed 
Companies (2006). 
Cuomo, F., Mallin, C., & Zattoni, A. (2016). Corporate Governance Codes: A Review and 
Research Agenda. Corporate Governance : An International Review, 24(3, SI), 222–
241. https://doi.org/10.1111/corg.12148 
Datta, D. K., Musteen, M., & Herrmann, P. (2009). Board Characteristics, Managerial 
Incentives, and the Choice Between Foreign Acquisitions and International Joint 
Ventures. Journal of Management. https://doi.org/10.1177/0149206308329967 
Donaldson, L., & Davis, J. H. (1991). Stewardship Theory or Agency Theory: CEO 
Governance and Shareholder Returns. Australian Journal of Management, 16(1), 49–
64. https://doi.org/10.1177/031289629101600103 
Donaldson, T., & Preston, L. E. (1995). The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation : 
Concepts, Evidence, and Implications. The Academy of Management Review, 20(1), 
65–91. 
Dulewicz, V., MacMillan, K., & Herbert, P. (1995). Appraising and developing the 
effectiveness of boards and their directors. Journal of General Management, 20, 1–
19. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1177/030630709502000301 
Durisin, B., & Puzone, F. (2009). Maturation of corporate governance research, 1993-
2007: An assessment. Corporate Governance, 17(3), 266–291. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2009.00739.x 
Evans, F. (1908). The Evolution of the English Joint-Stock Limited Trading Company . 
VII . Trading Companies Incorporated under General Act of Parliament. Columbia 
Law Review, 8(6), 461–480. 
Gevurtz, F. A. (2004). The Historical and Political Origins of the Corporate Board of 
Directors. Hofstra Law Review, 33(1), 89–173. 
Hermalin, B. E., & Weisbach, M. S. (2003). Boards Of Directors As An Endogenously 
Determined Institution: A Survey Of The Economic Literature. Economic Policy 
Review, 9, 7–26. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.233111 
Hillman, A. J., Nicholson, G., & Shropshire, C. (2008). Directors’ Multiple Identities, 
Identification, and Board Monitoring and Resource Provision. Organization Science, 
19(3), 441-456-495. 
Hunt, E. S. (1994). The medieval super-companies: a study of the Peruzzi Company of 
Chapter 1: Introduction 	 	
	28 
Florence. Cambridge University Press. 
Ingley, C. B., & Van der Walt, N. T. (2001). The Strategic Board: the changing role of 
directors in developing and maintaining corporate capability. Corporate Governance: 
An International Review, 9(3), 174–185. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8683.00245 
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Cost and ownership struture. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305–360. 
Kiel, G. C., & Nicholson, G. J. (2003). Board Composition and Corporate Performance: 
how the Australian experience informs contrasting theories of corporate governance. 
Corporate Governance, 11(3), 189–205. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8683.00318 
Kim, B. ., Burns, M. L. ., & Prescott, J. E. . (2009). The strategic role of the board: The 
impact of board structure on top management team strategic action capability. 
Corporate Governance, 17(6), 728–743. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-
8683.2009.00775.x 
Lawal, B. (2011). Board Dynamics and Corporate Performance: Review of Literature, and 
Empirical Challenges. International Journal of Economics and Finance, 4(1), 22–35. 
https://doi.org/10.5539/ijef.v4n1p22 
Magna Carta (1215). 
Malmendier, U. (2005). Roman Shares. The Origins of Value. The Financial Innovations 
That Created Modern Capital Markets, 31–42. 
Malmendier, U. (2009). Law and Finance “at the Origin.” Journal of Economic Literature, 
47(4), 1076–1108. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.47.4.1076 
Morck, R. K., & Steier, L. (2005). The Global History of Corporate Governance : An 
Introduction. A history of corporate governance around the world: Family business 
groups to professional managers. https://doi.org/10.3386/w11062 
Nicholson, G. J., & Newton, C. J. (2010). The role of the board of directors: Perceptions of 
managerial elites. Journal of Management and Organization, 16(2), 204–218. 
https://doi.org/10.5172/jmo.16.2.204 
Peters Committee. Corporate Governance in the Netherlands: the 40 Recommendations 
(1997). 
Pfeffer, J., & Salancik, G. R. (1978). The external control of organizations: A resource 
dependence approach. NY: Harper and Row Publishers. 
Puga Vial, J. E. (2011). La Sociedad Anónima y otras sociedades por acciones en el 
Derecho chileno y comparado. Editorial Jurídica de Chile. 
Pugliese, A., Bezemer, P., Zattoni, A., Huse, M., Van den Bosch, F. A. J., & Volberda, H. 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
	 29 
W. (2009). Boards of Directors’ Contribution to Strategy: A Literature Review and 
Research Agenda. Corporate Governance: An International Review, 17(3), 292–306. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8683.2009.00740.x 
Real Provisión 10 de abril (1495). 
Rechner, P. L., & Dalton, D. R. (1991). CEO Duality and Organizational Performance : A 
Longitudinal Analysis. Strategic Management Journal, 12(2), 155–160. 
Sherman, H. D., Kashlak, R. J., & Joshi, M. P. (1998). The effect of the board and 
executive committee characteristics on the degree of internationalization. Journal of 
International Management, 4(4), 311–335. 
Zahra, S. A., & Pearce II, J. A. (1989). Boards Of Directors And Corporate Financial 
Performance: A Review and Integrative Model. Journal of Management, 15(2), 291–
334. 
 
  
Chapter 1: Introduction 	 	
	30 
 
 CHAPTER 2 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS: A 
BIBLIOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Research on the board of directors produced a significant number of articles. This study 
aims to investigate which are the main topics in board of directors’ scientific literature and 
how it has been approached from different perspectives. We also seek to depict and 
analyze the intellectual structure that has been built upon them. We analyzed 3,021 articles 
and their bibliographic references in academic journals up to 2017 using bibliometrics 
methods. The work identifies which are the main studies in terms of influence, the relevant 
authors, the approaches that have been elaborated, the dominant topics that have been 
targeted, and the way they related. This way we may show the map and the structure of the 
intellectual frameworks that studied the board of directors.  We identified three period of 
time in the maturation of the research on the topic, and we provide the analysis on the 
evolution across them. Through our contribution, there is a clearer map for approaching the 
topic of the board of directors from new points of view, those that were missing or less 
considered in the research studies. In his sense, there is room for more deepening in the 
relation digitalization, training or ethics, among other matters. This study points out new 
areas for future development in the research on the board of directors, and serves as a solid 
starting point to perform meta-analyses or literature reviews. 
 
KEYWORDS 
Corporate Governance, Board of Directors, Bibliometrics, Citation and Co-citation 
Analysis, Knowledge Mapping. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Although the research works on management have a long track in scientific literature, the 
study of Corporate Governance is relatively recent. Nevertheless, the importance and 
impact of its field of study in business practice, and in society in general, have led to a 
significant and rising interest over the last years. With the aim of pursuing the best possible 
government for organizations, several initiatives took place worldwide. Some corporate 
failures and scandals in the beginning of this century – such as the Enron, Tyco, Parmalat 
or WorldCom cases – came out as problems that involved boards and top executives in 
misleading behaviors (Boivie, Graffin, & Pollock, 2012; Combs, Ketchen, Perryman, & 
Donahue, 2007; Lawal, 2011), and triggered a great variety of proposals that were very 
often channeled through new regulation. There were also proposals in terms of 
recommendations that were progressively included in Codes of Corporate Governance in 
many countries. Efficiency needs and legitimation pressures appeared as key supporting 
rationales for code adoption, and showed different patterns according to variables such as 
the level of shareholder protection rights (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004).  
Therefore, multiple factors converged in the making of intellectual contributions, which 
increased and evolved over these years, complementing initial works and providing 
consistency to this field of study. Providing this degree of maturation, corporate 
governance research is already configured as a discipline itself (Durisin & Puzone, 2009), 
addressing many matters and topics from diverse perspectives. 
Following basic principles of corporate governance that aim to promote transparency and 
efficiency in markets, to protect the rights and roles of shareholders, and to secure timely 
an accurate disclosure (Chen, Kao, Tsao, & Wu, 2007), the research on corporate 
governance has been approached from different angles. A significant number of these 
research works were focused on the board of directors as one of the main topics in the 
debate on Corporate Governance (Ingley & Van der Walt, 2001; Kiel & Nicholson, 2003; 
Pugliese et al., 2009). The board centrality was configured upon the roles that were 
designed and given as the apex of any organization. For that purpose, researches aimed to 
understand different issues such as the structure and implications of the board (Rechner & 
Dalton, 1991; Zahra & Pearce II, 1989), its composition and characteristics (Datta, 
Musteen, & Herrmann, 2009; A. J. Hillman, Nicholson, & Shropshire, 2008; Sherman, 
Kashlak, & Joshi, 1998), the processes (Dulewicz, MacMillan, & Herbert, 1995), or the 
roles (Björkman, 1994; Boulton, 1978; Kim, Burns, & Prescott, 2009; Nicholson & 
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Newton, 2010). Given the still increasing number of approaches and the issues they faced, 
a growing number of works were produced over last decades, and it is convenient to 
question how they are structured, whether there are signs of possible evolution, and, 
providing what has been already studied, which way future researches may take to cover 
gaps or new points of view.  
The main objective of this article is to obtain a general view and assess the published 
researches on the board of directors. The study does so through the analysis of the 
literature that has been published in leading journals, using bibliometrics methods. We aim 
to identify and weight the relationships and influence of the main articles and contributors 
on this topic, which shapes the existing intellectual framework. Thus, we will show the 
result of previous research on the topic that has been performed until now. As result, we 
will be able to detect potential themes, lacking angles, or matters with a low degree of 
development. Future research literature that wants to investigate the topic can benefit from 
this analysis and address the gaps we identified or new unexplored ones, such as deepen in 
aspects that relate human capital, strategy, or digitization to the board of directors. Also, it 
might set a fair basis for further meta-analysis studies. In order to achieve these goals, we 
will analyze the research articles, the keywords they employed, and the citations that the 
authors use in their works, with the help of bibliometric analyses such as impact indicators, 
citation, co-citation, and mapping. Whereas some researches aimed to analyze corporate 
governance as a discipline (Durisin & Puzone, 2009; Huang & Ho, 2011), we focused on 
the board of directors, a key topic to understand many analyses of issues related to 
corporate governance. We analyzed articles written until 2017 on this respect, whose data 
is stored in the Web of Science (WoS) main collection database.  
This work is composed of three sections after this introduction. In the first one, we review 
some literature on bibliometrics methods and describe the methodology we adopted to 
analyze the intellectual structure of the research on the board of directors. In the second 
section, we show and discuss the results obtained from the performing of bibliometric 
techniques. Finally, we state some conclusions and suggestions for future research.  
 
2. METHODOLOGY 
In this section, we review the groundings of bibliometrics techniques and explain the 
empirical research methods we used for this work. Bibliometrics is a group tools the 
researchers may use for analyzing publications data. It is also a field of research itself that 
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uses mathematical and statistical techniques to study publishing patterns in the distribution 
of information (McCain, 1996), that was conceptualized in the late 1960s (Groos & 
Pritchard, 1969). Of all these techniques, we will use impact indicators, citation and co-
citation analysis, and bibliometric mapping.  
The citation analysis poses that authors cite the reference documents they think they are 
meaningful for the purpose of their research. Consequently, the frequency of citation of 
these articles may emerge linked to the influence on the topic (Culnan, 1987). By gathering 
data from databases and applying analytical and graphic display techniques, co-citation 
analysis studies the articles that cite a certain pair of references (McCain, 1990). This way 
of citation may reflect some similarities and connections in the contents, and, therefore, 
help identifying groups of topics, frameworks and authors, and how they can be related 
(Pilkington & Liston-Heyes, 1999; Ramos-Rodriguez & Ruiz-Navarro, 2004). We will use 
data and results obtained throughout the analysis to perform a bibliometric mapping using 
VOSviewer approach and software (van Eck, Waltman, Dekker, & van den Berg, 2010). 
This is specially appropriate when we are handling sources coming from multidisciplinary 
fields (Börner, Chen, & Boyack, 2005) as it is in this case. Compared to other techniques, 
bibliometrics methods have the advantages of presenting quantified data that lead to a 
more objective discussion on the results (Durisin & Puzone, 2009). They have been used 
for years to map and study the knowledge on disciplines of science that vary significantly, 
such as biotechnology (Dalpé, 2002), sociology (Keshava, Hittalamani, & Gowda, 2008), 
psychology (Guilera, Barrios, & Gómez-Benito, 2013) or chemistry (Zibareva, Vedyagin, 
& Bukhtiyarov, 2014). 
Several areas of research have already been analyzed in the management field using these 
methods: management (Tahai & Meyer, 1999), strategic management (Nerur, Rasheed, & 
Natarajan, 2008; Ramos-Rodriguez & Ruiz-Navarro, 2004), finance (Alexander & Mabry, 
1994; Merigó, Yang, & Xu, 2015), operations management (Pilkington & Liston-Heyes, 
1999; Pilkington & Meredith, 2009), organizational behavior (Culnan, O’Reilly III, & 
Chatman, 1990), human resources management (Fernandez-Alles & Ramos-Rodríguez, 
2009), supply chain management (Charvet, Cooper, & Gardner, 2008) or innovation 
(Fagerberg, Fosaas, & Sapprasert, 2012).  
The use of these techniques for the study of specific topics or subfields within the 
management arena has also been employed. Thus, amongst those works, we may find 
studies on corporate social responsibility (De Bakker, Groenewegen, & Den Hond, 2005), 
family business (Casillas & Acedo, 2007), entrepreneurship (Etemad & Lee, 2003; 
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Landström, Harirchi, & Åström, 2012; Schildt, Zahra, & Sillanpää, 2006), environmental 
management accounting (Schaltegger, Gibassier, & Zvezdov, 2013), or science parks and 
incubators (Diez-Vial & Montoro-Sanchez, 2017). Besides, theories and intellectual 
frameworks have been the objective of these methods too. That is the case of the resource-
based theory (Acedo, Barroso, & Galan, 2006), the Dynamic Capability View (Vogel & 
Güttel, 2012), the Transaction Cost Theory (Martins, Serra, Leite, Ferreira, & Li, 2010), or 
the Institutional Theory (Weerakkody, Dwivedi, & Irani, 2009).  
 
2.1. Unit of Analysis 
For the purpose of our research, we decided to use articles published in journals as 
legitimate sources. They are considered ‘certified knowledge’, because they come from a 
qualification process and provide reliability to the results (Callon, Courtial, & Penan, 1993; 
Ramos-Rodriguez & Ruiz-Navarro, 2004). Therefore, the unit of analysis is granular and 
we took each publication as a possible contribution to the research in this arena. This 
approach is, therefore, consistent with the goal of mapping which works configure the 
contributions to the research on board of directors from different perspectives. 
We utilized citation analysis and co-occurrence citation analysis. Citation analysis is based 
on the importance that researchers give to a publication when they refer to it as a source. 
Consequently, we may think that the more cited, the more influential it will be for the 
research community in the development of that specific arena (Ramos & Ruiz, 2008). 
Besides, we consider helpful to visualize some quantitative analyses through maps. Based 
on the last references, we elaborated some steps to perform or methodology. 
 
2.2. Methodology stages 
Our research has been designed in stages so as to apply bibliometric techniques properly. 
Between the research design and the conclusions elaboration, it is agreed that it is 
necessary to perform a group of tasks that include steps like data retrieval, cleaning, 
analysis and visualization (Zupic & Cater, 2015). The Figure 1 shows the different stages 
we followed to perform the data analysis.  
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Figure 1: Methodology Stages 
 
 
2.3. Data retrieval from source 
For the purpose of this paper, accordingly with the majority of bibliometric studies in this 
realm (Zupic & Cater, 2015), we collected articles’ data from journals stored at the Web of 
Science main collection website database. The articles we obtained were published up to 
2017. Since we wanted to examine the different approaches and the structure of 
contributions, we limited the initial search to those articles that included the words ‘board’ 
and ‘director’, in the title, the keywords or the abstract. We realize that there were some 
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combinations of words that studied our field (board, boards, boardroom, board of directors, 
directorate). Thus, we included all of them in our initial step of the search and retrieval 
process. The starting group accounted for over 5,200 registers. Then, we excluded those 
that not were properly articles, documents that were not into the unit of analysis, and, 
following a continuous checking processes, we also filtered articles taking out those whose 
contents and classification under unrelated categories were out of the scope. Once said this, 
we should mention that we look at the articles within each category to secure they properly 
worked filtering the aimed information (a detailed list of categories/articles excluded as 
well as the steps followed in selecting the final set may be checked in the Appendix Table 
1). Besides, we checked every remaining article so as to filter those related to the topic. 
Once we performed data preparation tasks, as previously stated, we obtained 3,021 articles. 
Those articles were published between 1958 and 2017.  
 
2.4. Data preprocessing and cleaning 
Above-mentioned research works, as well as many others, have pointed out the need for a 
data pre-processing and cleaning due to raw data condition. Data cleaning included capital 
letters homogenization, authors’ initials checking, removal of duplicities in cited 
references, data completion, management of anonymous authorship, etc. Articles up to mid 
80s included multiple references to same sources, incomplete data, and frequent referral to 
books. Despite some bibliometric studies recommend to keep just the first authors initial, 
we decided to keep the initials that were provided as raw data (at least to preserve the 
nature of the analysis), because we identified authors that differ just in the middle name 
(we found up to four different authors for the same surname and a sample of them can be 
checked in the Appendix Table 2). That led us to check each author and reference in the 
original raw data to prevent duplicates, clean data and standardize references as to 
minimize the possibilities of failure in their homogenization. We were helped by specific 
software we developed in python coding language for data pre-processing of misspellings 
in authors, initials, etc. 
Once the dataset was produced, we used several software packages to explore it. For the 
specific bibliometrics data management, we employed BibExcel software to analyze the 
data and attain indicators, classify items, etc. (Åström, Danell, Larsen, & Schneider, 2009). 
We utilized classical software for basic treatment of data, such as MS Word and MS Excel, 
to support tasks of data cleaning and sorting, and figures designing. In order to obtain the 
correlation matrices and to perform factor analysis, which is convenient to point out 
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intellectual nodes (factors) based on joint appearance of articles at cited references, we 
utilized SPSS v.25. We also applied VOSviewer software as a tool to build and visualize 
relationships graphically, and to perform analyses based on the networks underneath the 
research on the topic (van Eck & Waltman, 2010). 
 
2.5. Descriptive and relational bibliometric analysis 
For the purpose of our study, we decided to use descriptive and relational bibliometric 
indicators and tools. The publishing year frequency will help to visualize and set up stages 
in the history of researching this topic. The country of origin will highlight the main 
geographical centers of contribution, sometimes linked to the institutional affiliation. The 
language used to write the articles also shows the origins and the goals of spreading the 
knowledge of the authors. Through the main contributors and journals we will show who 
has researched the most and which publication served to collect the majority of those 
studies. The mapping and analysis of the organizations the author belong to will help to 
provide a different picture of the institutional collaboration and contribution to this topic. 
The keywords help to understand the self-assessment of how the concepts and the 
researches are classified and related in this context, and which among them have not been 
studied enough. Co-occurrence in cited journals provides a clearer picture of the 
concentration of the research main streams. Co-occurrence in authors gives a structure of 
research communities and co-occurrence in citations lead to understand the intellectual 
framework. Finally, maps provided a clearer picture of what has been done, the 
communities, and what could be developed in future research. This way, we could obtain 
the main figures and the global configuration of the research on board of directors before 
deepening in certain core intellectual nodes, subtopics or publications. As a result, the final 
step of the methodology provides our conclusions based on the findings of this analysis, 
the limitations we faced on this study and some possible lines for future research. 
 
 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
3.1. Descriptive analysis 
We start showing some descriptive figures that help the initial understanding on the matter. 
As the Figure 2 shows, we may observe different periods we could establish for a better 
analysis and discussion.  
Chapter 2: Board of Directors: A Bibliometric Analysis 
 
	
39 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Published articles per year 
 
 
The first segment of time finishes in 1991, and it is characterized by the small number of 
publications (avg. 3.8) at a small rhythm of growth (CAGR 8.55%). This is presenting a 
seeding stage in the study of the topic. The following year, fostered by the Cadbury Report, 
Codes of Governance start appearing in different countries, pursuing to improve the 
corporate governance of the firms. The second period shows a fairly significant increase of 
publications compared to the previous one (CAGR 15.14%), and it might be driven by new 
journals, a greater incorporation of the topic to management journals, or the spreading of 
governance principles. This period finishes in 2005 when there have been some years after 
corporate scandals, new codes (by then, more than 60 countries have at least one version, 
including all big economies) and regulation flourished (i.e. SOA), and yet there were not 
results of the impulse of the recommendation issued by OECD in 2004. The third period 
we identify starts, just after the first implementations of those principles, the new released 
codes and their modifications, and when is plausible to perceive more outcomes from the 
implementation. During the third period, the number of publications is still growing but at 
a lower rate (CAGR 8.39%), suggesting the start of a maturation period. It is noticeable 
that it has not a significant relationship with economic cycle and ends in 2017. 
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As the figure shows, the majority of articles on the topic have been published since 2006 
(74.1%). Besides, from that year on the number of published articles per year doubles the 
previous decade. 2007 was the year with more published articles (3.37% of the total 
amount). Thus, it is clear that the interest on this topic increased right after great corporate 
failures, mainly in the US but soon reaching other countries, and under the spreading of 
new codes of corporate governance in developing countries.   
Some reasons may be behind abnormal changes in the trends we have detected. First, there 
were an increase of 23 sources between 2004 and 2005. Second, we notice that the impact 
of journals like Corporate Governance: An International Review might be accountable for 
the curve behavior since 2000, and especially between 2004 and 2007, where near half of 
the increases/decreases of the overall publications are due to it. In the case of this Journal, 
there is an increase in the number of issues in 2005, from 4 to 6, and a change in the 
editorial board in July 2007. Besides, the Journal of Corporate Finance included on 
additional issue in 2005 and reduced one in 2006. Similarly, the Journal of Business Ethics 
reduced 12 articles between those two years and prior to set a sharp increase from 2007. 
We think that a further analysis of every stage, setting the focus in the above-mentioned 
journal, would be interesting to deepen in the analysis. 
As regards the language, the vast majority of the articles, almost 98%, were written in 
English. Articles in German, Spanish and French languages follow with a small number of 
contributions, aiming local impact. There are also articles in other seven languages. A 
significant amount of articles is originated in the US. There are author coming from more 
than 60 nationalities, but only 15 of them reached 1% of the total. The analysis of the 
information by periods, shows that English is consistently the first language and there is an 
increasing though scant number in other languages starting in the second stage. 
A visualization of the co-authorship in terms of countries is congruent to the previous 
statement. As Figure 3 shows, co-authorship is mainly distributed in clear geographical 
areas. Authors’ collaboration is centered in the US, but there are other big areas. England 
appears detached, and it has his own role probably due to the early impulse of Cadbury 
Code. Other countries with related regulation and governance traditions (Canada, 
Australia) are close to the previous referred countries. In fact, this is consistent with the 
common stakeholders orientation in those countries, and the push for academic 
collaboration especially in the US (Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004; Huse, 2005). There is also a 
smaller group of European countries where Spain plays a significant role. We might say 
that there is cooperation between different countries, that this cooperation has relevant 
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poles, and that the data sources for research might be helping to foster this situation. Early 
codes, transparency, regulation requirements of detailed detached data, publicity of data, 
number and size of companies in these areas is significantly bigger. 
 
Figure 3: Countries co-authorship map 
 
 
 
 
The articles were published in 567 journals, but just 41 of them, the 7.2%, accounted for 
52% of all published researches. The Table 1 shows these journals ranked by the number 
of articles they published on the subject. They ranged from 15 to 189 published articles. 
The remaining 526 sources published up to 14 articles each one, adding up the remaining 
half of the sample. 
 
Table 1: Number of Published Articles per Journal 
Rank Journal Number of articles % Ac % 
1 Corporate Governance-An International Review 190 6.25% 6.25% 
2 Journal Of Business Ethics 139 4.60% 10.85% 
3 Journal Of Corporate Finance 122 4.04% 14.89% 
4 Strategic Management Journal 84 2.78% 17.66% 
5 Journal Of Financial Economics 82 2.71% 20.38% 
6 Academy Of Management Journal 55 1.82% 22.20% 
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Rank Journal Number of articles % Ac % 
7 Journal Of Banking & Finance 55 1.82% 24.02% 
8 Journal Of Business Research 48 1.59% 25.60% 
9 Business Lawyer 45 1.49% 27.09% 
10 Harvard Business Review 42 1.39% 28.48% 
11 Journal Of Business Finance & Accounting 40 1.32% 29.80% 
12 Financial Management 34 1.12% 30.93% 
13 British Journal Of Management 31 1.03% 31.96% 
14 Journal Of Management Studies 30 0.99% 32.95% 
15 Journal Of Management 29 0.96% 33.91% 
16 Contemporary Accounting Research 29 0.96% 34.87% 
17 Journal Of Finance 29 0.96% 35.83% 
18 Management Decision 28 0.93% 36.75% 
19 Accounting Review 28 0.93% 37.68% 
20 Accounting And Finance 28 0.93% 38.60% 
21 Review Of Financial Studies 28 0.93% 39.53% 
22 Journal Of Accounting & Economics 26 0.86% 40.39% 
23 Journal Of Financial And Quantitative Analysis 25 0.83% 41.22% 
24 International Review Of Financial Analysis 24 0.79% 42.01% 
25 Journal Of Accounting And Public Policy 23 0.76% 42.77% 
26 Journal Of Management & Organization 22 0.73% 43.50% 
27 Australian Accounting Review 21 0.69% 44.19% 
28 Nonprofit And Voluntary Sector Quarterly 20 0.66% 44.86% 
29 Administrative Science Quarterly 20 0.66% 45.52% 
30 Emerging Markets Finance And Trade 20 0.66% 46.18% 
31 Management Science 19 0.63% 46.81% 
32 Auditing-A Journal Of Practice & Theory 18 0.60% 47.40% 
33 Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 18 0.60% 48.00% 
34 Organization Science 17 0.56% 48.56% 
35 Nonprofit Management & Leadership 17 0.56% 49.12% 
36 Journal Of Family Business Strategy 16 0.53% 49.65% 
37 Long Range Planning 16 0.53% 50.18% 
38 European Accounting Review 16 0.53% 50.71% 
39 African Journal Of Business Management 16 0.53% 51.24% 
40 European Financial Management 15 0.50% 51.74% 
41 Business Horizons 15 0.50% 52.23% 
 
 
As a first, quick analysis to the figures above, they show that there have been different 
approaches to the board of directors, since the articles have been published in a wide 
variety of management, accounting, finance or law journals. The largest number of 
publications corresponds to a specialized journal in corporate governance, Corporate 
Governance: An International Review, which gives the board a key role in the research 
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works and centers all its publications. The Journal of Business Ethics has a relevant 
position, congruently with the interests that triggered many corporate governance studies. 
Law and finance focused journals account for a significant share of publications. That is 
the case of the Journal of Corporate Finance, the Journal of Financial Economics, 
Business Lawyer or the Journal of Business Finance and Accounting. Management 
Journals such as the Strategic Management Journal, the Academy of Management Journal 
or the Journal of Management Studies have also a relevant position.  
The evolution across the periods of time is shown in Table 2. The second and the third 
period of time present a change in the orientation of the top ranked sources: there is an 
increase in the publications in specific journals (CGIR), or ethics (JBE), management 
(SMJ, AMJ).  There are still finance related journals at the top (JCF, JFE), whereas law 
focused journals loose prevalent positions. The number of sources, as we mentioned, 
increases in every step, and the number of publications follows the same path. There are 
also changes on publishing policies affecting these figures (e.g. CGIR increased the 
number of issues per year, and in other occasion changes the policy to fewer and longer 
articles). 
 
Chapter 2: Board of Directors: A Bibliometric Analysis	
	44 
Table 2: Number of Published Articles per Journal per Period 
1958 - 1991 1992 - 2005 2006 - 2017 
Journal Articles Journal Articles Journal Articles 
California management review 7 Corporate Governance-An International Review 52 Corporate governance-an international review 138 
Conference board record 4 Journal Of Business Ethics 29 Journal of business ethics 110 
Management international review 4 Business Lawyer 29 Journal of corporate finance 108 
Harvard business review 4 Journal Of Financial Economics 27 Strategic management journal 56 
Administrative science quarterly 4 Strategic Management Journal 27 Journal of financial economics 53 
Academy of management journal 4 Harvard Business Review 23 Journal of banking & finance 44 
Business lawyer 3 Academy Of Management Journal 16 Journal of business research 40 
Betrieb 3 Journal Of Corporate Finance 14 Journal of business finance & accounting 35 
Academy of management review 3 Financial Management 12 Academy of management journal 35 
Journal of voluntary action research 3 Administrative Science Quarterly 12 Management decision 28 
Journal of international business studies 2 Journal Of Management 11 Accounting and finance 28 
Journal of financial economics 2 Journal Of Finance 11 Review of financial studies 27 
Journal of general management 2 Journal Of Banking & Finance 11 Contemporary accounting research 25 
Compensation review 2 Journal Of Management Studies 10 International review of financial analysis 24 
Business horizons 2 British Journal Of Management 9 Journal of accounting and public policy 22 
Boston university law review 2 Long Range Planning 8 British journal of management 22 
Institutional investor 2 Journal Of Business Research 7 Journal of management & organization 22 
American journal of sociology 2 Auditing-A Journal Of Practice & Theory 7 Australian accounting review 21 
Organization science 2 Journal Of Accounting & Economics 7 Financial management 21 
New york university law review 1 Journal Of Business 7 Accounting review 21 
Long range planning 1 Accounting Review 7 Emerging markets finance and trade 20 
Law quarterly review 1 Securities Regulation Law Journal 7 Journal of management studies 19 
New statesman & society 1 Journal Of Financial And Quantitative Analysis 7 Journal of accounting & economics 19 
Michigan law review 1 Nonprofit And Voluntary Sector Quarterly 6 Journal of finance 18 
Social policy 1 Administration In Social Work 6 Journal of financial and quantitative analysis 18 
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Social casework-journal of contemporary 
social work 1 Academy Of Management Executive 5 Pacific-basin finance journal 18 
Strategic management journal 1 Journal Of Accounting Research 5 Management science 17 
University of chicago law review 1 Public Administration 5 Nonprofit management & leadership 17 
Temple law review 1 Journal Of Business Finance & Accounting 5 Journal of management 17 
Real estate review 1 Academy Of Management Review 5 African journal of business management 16 
Pacific sociological review 1 Journal Of Law & Economics 4 Journal of family business strategy 16 
Notre dame lawyer 1 Contemporary Accounting Research 4 European accounting review 16 
Political studies 1 Mit Sloan Management Review 4 Harvard business review 15 
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Considering the main taxonomy used by the WoS, articles were classified mainly under 
Business (21.95%), and other categories like Finance (21.68%), Management (20.97%), 
Economics (11.2%), Law (4.48%), Ethics (3%), Public Administration (1.88), Sociology 
(1.32%), or Applied Psychology (1.2%) (We mentioned the categories with at least 1% of 
the publications on them. They add up to the 87.49% of the total. There are journals 
classified under other 57 WoS categories). The variety of classification categories for the 
articles indicates that the issues affect a broad set of disciplines in social sciences, 
consistently with the typology of publishing journals we studied. 
From the overall 6,965 authors of the publications, there were 4,804 unique authors across 
all the articles of the sample. Following the same pattern of other scientific arenas, just a 
small group of them concentrates most publications.  The most prolific authors are 
presented in Table 3 (and Table 4 per period). We calculated the Hirsch-index for each one 
of them (Hirsch, 2005), taking into account the articles under scope, and ranked them 
according to that parameter. This way, we used a commonly established measure to 
understand the relevance of their contributions. These authors account for more than 52% 
of the references and are mentioned at least in the 11% of the articles. Besides, some of 
them are also quoted for other works, what makes them even more relevant.  
 
Table 3: Most prolific authors with h-index 
Author h-index Citation sum within h-core No. citations 
No. 
articles 
Dalton DR 14 1413 1457 18 
Huse M 13 787 801 15 
Westphal JD 12 1562 1566 13 
Filatotchev I 11 520 528 14 
Zajac EJ 11 2181 2181 11 
Cannella AA 10 1244 1247 11 
Aguilera RV 10 620 620 10 
Daily CM 10 1297 1297 10 
Hillman AJ 9 1943 1966 13 
Minichilli A 9 273 273 10 
Zattoni A 8 256 257 9 
Shivdasani A 8 1673 1678 9 
Boivie S 8 401 402 9 
Adams RB 8 1664 1673 10 
Garciasanchez IM 8 281 312 19 
Bebchuk LA 8 1237 1237 9 
Zahra SA 7 1144 1144 7 
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Author h-index Citation sum within h-core No. citations 
No. 
articles 
Conyon MJ 7 271 279 9 
Certo ST 7 904 904 7 
Dalton CM 7 322 322 7 
Garciameca E 7 186 200 14 
Hoskisson RE 6 1273 1276 7 
Hambrick DC 6 1039 1039 6 
Weisbach MS 6 1299 1299 6 
Wright M 6 261 273 10 
Yeh YH 6 315 315 6 
Heemskerk EM 6 95 99 7 
Voordeckers W 6 202 203 8 
Davidson WN 6 799 801 7 
Sharma VD 6 111 111 7 
Jiraporn P 6 200 209 13 
Semadeni M 6 132 137 8 
Dahya J 6 508 508 6 
Kesner IF 6 218 218 6 
Larcker DF 6 1807 1807 6 
Johnson RA 6 1343 1343 6 
	
Note: Table showing author with h-index above 6. They account for 10% of the total of articles considered. 
 
Table 4: Most Prolific Authors per period ranked by H-Index 
1958 - 1991 1992 - 2005 2006 - 2017 
h-index Author h-index Author h-index Author 
3 Chitayat G 10 Daily CM 10 Huse M 
3 Pfeffer J 10 Dalton DR 8 Garcia-Sanchez IM 
2 Zald MN 8 Zajac EJ 8 Adams RB 
2 Boeker W 6 Shivdasani A 8 Filatotchev I 
2 Stern RN 5 Westphal JD 8 Minichilli A 
2 Dalton DR 5 Vafeas N 8 Aguilera RV 
2 Goodstein J 5 Hillman AJ 8 Zattoni A 
2 Kesner IF 5 Bebchuk LA 7 Garcia-Meca E 
1 Lynk WJ 5 Davidson WN 7 Westphal JD 
1 Mace ML 4 Johnson RA 7 Boivie S 
1 Macleod BV 4 Johnson JL 6 Hillman AJ 
1 Makhija AK 4 Certo ST 6 Heemskerk EM 
1 Mizruchi MS 4 Veasey EN 6 Jiraporn P 
1 Molz R 4 Farrell KA 6 Voordeckers W 
1 Mandelker GN 4 Shen W 6 Semadeni M 
1 Miller LE 4 Whidbee DA 6 Dalton DR 
1 Kriger MP 4 Dahya J 6 Cannella AA 
1 Labatt S 4 Conyon MJ 6 Wright M 
1 Kosnik RD 4 Cannella AA 5 Nordqvist M 
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1958 - 1991 1992 - 2005 2006 - 2017 
h-index Author h-index Author h-index Author 
1 Hoskisson RE 3 Rosenstein S 5 Wincent J 
1 Kerr J 3 Bilimoria D 5 Post C 
1 Levinthal DA 3 Beasley MS 5 Ferreira D 
1 Lindgren U 3 Ellstrand AE 5 Hoitash U 
1 Leksell L 3 Battiston S 5 Krause R 
1 Lagges JG 3 Hoskisson RE 5 Dalton CM 
1 Leduc RF 3 Filatotchev I 5 Masulis RW 
1 Murray VV 3 Mehran H 5 Sharma VD 
1 Wade J 3 Huse M 5 Bednar MK 
1 Weiss EJ 3 Mizruchi MS 5 Chen HL 
1 Tashakori A 3 Roberts J 5 Walters BA 
1 Solomon LD 3 Hambrick DC 5 Mobbs S 
1 Stewart R 3 Fich EM 5 Rose JM 
1 Wood DD 3 Wang J 5 Zhu DH 
1 Wyatt JG 3 Weir C 5 Sanchez-Ballesta JP 
1 Widmer C 3 Hermalin BE 5 Zona F 
1 Weiss RM 3 Cornett MM 4 Jiang W 
1 White TH 3 Zenner M 4 Wang MZ 
1 Soderquist LD 3 Hitt MA 4 Locke S 
1 Rich PJJ 3 Weisbach MS 4 Lee JH 
1 Zahra SA 3 Alexander M 4 Fields LP 
1 Phillips RM 3 Yeh YH 4 Zahra SA 
1 Oreilly CA 3 Daveni RA 4 Zaman M 
1 Pearce JA 3 Parrino R 4 Rose AM 
1 Sheehan DP 3 Coates JC 4 Mcnulty T 
Note: Table showing author with h-index threshold varies depending on the period so as to show the top 
ranked. 
 
If we analyze co-authorship in terms of authors, using fractional counting, we only reckon 
47 authors closely linked in their collaborations. If we map this relationship (Figure 4), we 
may distinguish several groups around authors (e.g. Weisbach, Hermalin, Adams, and 
Bebchuk; Hoskisson, Johnson and Hitt; Huse, and Minichilli). Daily, Dalton, Johnson and 
Ellstrand, for instance, have published together in many occasions some reviews and meta-
analyses (Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand, & Dalton, 1998; Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 
1999). Many of them appeared in the above-mentioned classification, what leads us to 
think that they built a strong, highly renowned contribution to the topic while collaborating 
in their research works.  
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Figure 4: Co-authorship map 
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The organization behind the author is other relevant variable that is useful to analyze how 
the articles have shaping the knowledge. We identified 1,653 research institutions. Among 
them, 310 contributed in at least 5 articles. A visualization of their collaboration shows 
four major geographical areas: the US, UK-Commonwealth, Continental Europe and Asia. 
US universities are highly represented and related, and they are placed at the center of the 
overall research organizational landscape (Figure 5). The map below shows the core of the 
co-authoring institutions with at least 5 articles (310) and how close they are in their 
collaborations. The size of the circles has been linked to the number of articles. 
Institutional collaboration shows a certain parallelism to co-authorship. That is the case 
Daily and Dalton at Indiana University; García-Sánchez at Salamanca University; 
Sanchez-Marin Baixauli-Soler and Lucas-Perez at Murcia University. In some cases, 
contributors from different universities are in the same state (Cannella at Arizona State 
University, Jones at Sam Houston State University and Withers at Texas A&M 
University). Therefore, there is more room for cross-institutional and cross-country 
collaboration in research on this topic.   
 
Figure 5: Research Institutions Co-authorship Map 
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Map generated with VOSviewer 
If we analyze the co-citation of the sources in the cited references, we may show whether 
the intellectual foundation is being built upon similar scientific arenas based on the focus 
of the journals. In our case, we may observe several groups: the first one could be defined 
as the finance group, and the second one claims to gather management related journals. 
Smaller groups are focused on Accounting or Law studies. There are multiple connections 
between them and with others. The Figure 6 only shows 113 journals that are co-cited in at 
least 1% of the references, but the number of co-citations and the proximities strengthen 
the idea of a maturation staging that is focused on those great areas of knowledge. That 
would lead to cite more articles from journals that deepen in approaches, topics, subtopics 
and points of view where they are more proficient. The fact that the journals Corporate 
Governance An International Review or the Journal of Business Ethics are less prominent 
though playing a ‘bridging’ role is plausible, since they are more recent in the spreading of 
their studies and are related to different matters that not necessarily have to be included in 
those specific research arenas but categorized according to their embedded contributions. It 
could also be determined by the evolution of the research on the topic and has to be studied 
in further analyses.   
 
Figure 6: Co-citation references' sources map 
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Through the analysis of authors’ keywords we may describe directions of research, main 
areas of interest and help to know trends and future lines of investigation.  The analysis of 
the keywords of the sample of our work shows that there were 21,414 keywords. They 
accounted for 2,845 unique words of group of words, which were built upon 3,310 
different concepts. It is worth saying that these keywords are composed by different words 
and, also, we may establish some equivalence for the purpose of our research (e.g. we 
merged frequencies for the keywords Gender/Gender diversity/Diversity/Board gender 
diversity/Women/Women directors/Women on boards). Amongst them, 3,210 appeared 
less than eight times. The Table 5 shows the 50 most cited keywords and their frequencies. 
They account for half of the total of keywords mentioned. 
 
Table 5: Most cited keywords 
	
Term 
Times 
Cited 
Performance 1623 
Corporate Governance 1225 
Ownership 1097 
Directors 1010 
Compensation 603 
Boards 512 
Firm 490 
Agency 418 
Management 328 
Empirical-Analysis 296 
Determinants 263 
Composition 250 
Gender Diversity 227 
Size 201 
Incentives 192 
Market 179 
Earnings Management 176 
Impact 157 
Ceo 114 
Market Valuation 114 
Consequences 111 
Power 111 
Audit Committees 109 
Information 106 
Perspective 104 
Diversity 103 
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Term 
Times 
Cited 
Shareholder Wealth 99 
Independence 94 
Turnover 88 
Strategy 87 
Ceo Turnover 86 
Valuation 77 
Behavior 73 
 
 
Since we established a clear criteria for searching articles’ data, keywords like Corporate 
Governance or Board of Directors are obviously at the top of the list. From that point, the 
terms show some relevant aspects. First, they show the interest in the gender diversity 
matters. Second, the prevalence of the Agency theory amongst the intellectual frameworks 
utilized by the authors is well defined, also in non-explicit terms. It may be observed in the 
number subtopics that are based on this theory, which relate to control, costs, supervision, 
etc. Regarding specific geographies, countries like China, Spain or UK introduce certain 
diversity in the targeted firms. Finally, human capital approaches are a minority in the 
research topic. The capital of the board, when appeared, is more often approached from the 
social perspective. We may visualize the relationship in Figure 7 (and Figures 8, 9 and 10 
per period). 
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Figure 7: Map of keywords 
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Figure 8: Keywords co-citation map. 1958 - 1991 
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Figure 9: Keywords co-citation map. 1992 - 2005. 
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Figure 10: Keywords co-citation map. 2006 - 2017 
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Besides, we may analyze and visualize the words utilized in the abstracts so as to reinforce 
the arguments we found analyzing the keywords. As the Figure 11 shows, there has been a 
great focus on performance (over 15% of the articles include that term). Different 
approaches or theories are also mentioned: agency, resource dependence, institutional or 
stewardship. Human capital is referred in only 1% of the abstracts of publications. The 
figure shows a map of the most relevant terms that appear in the abstracts (best 60% of 
those appearing more than ten times). The circles size shows the number of occurrences. 
Terms are organized in clusters showing proximities. We used colored bubbles to show 
these terms lined to years. That way we may notice that there is also an evolution in the 
research, from law-related and grounding terms towards subtopics like diversity. The 
source titles and the keywords that are provided by the authors could be used as a guideline 
and indicate the subject of an article in particular. Then bibliometrics methodology can use 
them to analyze the trend shown in the research (Huang & Ho, 2011).  
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Figure 11: Map of relevant words found in the abstracts 
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In order to study the references, firstly we will provide the overall picture, analyzing the 
whole sample. This way, we will obtain a view on the current status of the research. In a 
second step, we will show the same type of analysis for each one of the identified periods 
of time, showing the evolution in the items of analysis. 
 
3.2. References Analysis. Final Picture. 
The articles included almost 170,000 bibliographic references. Over 80,000 of them were 
unique. The Table 6 (and Table 7 per period) shows the 101 works that account for the 
highest number of citations, all of them with more than 90 citations, that add up to more 
than 18,969 references of the total amount. In any research arena it is clear that those 
works published in the first decades of study pursuit, or resulted, to be seminal and set in 
many cases the main theories for approaching the topic, and there are some that are 
permanently quoted as a signal of consolidated knowledge or intellectual framework. That 
is the case of (Fama, 1980; Jensen & Ruback, 1983). As a matter of fact, those articles 
recently published tend to receive fewer citations. This is also a motive that leads us to 
think of the need of a research agenda that includes the evolution of the framework across 
different periods of time.   
 
Table 6: Most Cited Articles 
Reference 
Times 
cited 
 
Reference 
Times 
cited 
 
Reference 
Times 
cited 
Fama E, 1983, V26 869 
 
Demsetz H, 1985, V93 197 
 
Mizruchi M, 1996, V22 122 
Jensen M, 1976, V3 835 
 
Hermalin B, 1991, V20 193 
 
Erhardt N, 2003, V11 121 
Yermack D, 1996, V40 558 
 
Boone A, 2007, V85 186 
 
Davis J, 1997, V22 119 
Jensen M, 1993, V48 519 
 
Baysinger B, 1985, V1 184 
 
Claessens S, 2000, V58 116 
Weisbach M, 1988, V20 407 
 
Hermalin B, 1988, V19 183 
 
Pearce J, 1992, V29 115 
Fama E, 1980, V88 369 
 
Carpenter M, 2001, V44 179 
 
Rechner P, 1991, V12 112 
Shleifer A, 1997, V52 331 
 
Eisenberg T, 1998, V48 174 
 
Gilson S, 1990, V27 111 
Hermalin B, 1998, V88 304 
 
Jensen M, 1990, V98 173 
 
Yermack D, 2004, V59 111 
Hillman A, 2003, V28 300 
 
Baysinger B, 1990, V15 170 
 
Finkelstein S, 1992, V35 107 
Core J, 1999, V51 273 
 
Ferris S, 2003, V58 170 
 
Walsh J, 1990, V15 106 
Dalton D, 1998, V19 262 
 
Hillman A, 2000, V37 168 
 
Terjesen S, 2009, V17 106 
Morck R, 1988, V20 259 
 
Adams R, 2010, V48 166 
 
La P, 2000, V58 105 
Zahra S, 1989, V15 258 
 
Daily C, 2003, V28 165 
 
Judge W, 1992, V35 104 
Gompers P, 2003, V118 252 
 
Raheja C, 2005, V40 163 
 
Bebchuk L, 2009, V22 102 
Jensen M, 1986, V76 248 
 
Dalton D, 1999, V42 161 
 
Anderson R, 2003, V58 101 
Coles J, 2008, V87 246 
 
Agrawal A, 1996, V31 161 
 
Petersen M, 2009, V22 101 
Beasley M, 1996, V71 234 
 
Bhagat S, 2002, V27 161 
 
Goodstein J, 1994, V15 101 
Klein A, 2002, V33 232 
 
La P, 1998, V106 159 
 
Xie B, 2003, V9 101 
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Reference 
Times 
cited 
 
Reference 
Times 
cited 
 
Reference 
Times 
cited 
Weisbach M, 2003, V9 232 
 
Klein A, 1998, V41 159 
 
Warner J, 1988, V20 101 
Adams R, 2007, V62 215 
 
Hambrick D, 1984, V9 158 
 
Kosnik R, 1987, V32 101 
Byrd J, 1992, V32 214 
 
Mcconnell J, 1990, V27 155 
 
Davis G, 1991, V36 99 
Linck J, 2008, V87 212 
 
Westphal J, 1999, V42 154 
 
Cotter J, 1997, V43 98 
Forbes D, 1999, V24 211 
 
Dechow P, 1996, V13 152 
 
Harris M, 2008, V21 98 
Pfeffer J, 1972, V17 209 
 
Shivdasani A, 1999, V54 151 
 
Claessens S, 2002, V57 98 
Lipton M, 1992, V48 206 
 
Brickley J, 1994, V35 148 
 
Farrell K, 2005, V11 98 
Adams R, 2009, V94 205 
 
Westphal J, 1995, V40 145 
 
La P, 2002, V57 96 
La P, 1999, V54 205 
 
Finkelstein S, 1994, V37 141 
 
Rediker K, 1995, V16 96 
Carter D, 2003, V38 202 
 
Vafeas N, 1999, V53 141 
 
Pettigrew A, 1992, V13 96 
Eisenhardt K, 1989, V14 201 
 
White H, 1980, V48 134 
 
Kaplan S, 1990, V27 95 
Rosenstein S, 1990, V26 201 
 
Bhagat S, 1999, V54 127 
 
Boyd B, 1995, V16 95 
Shleifer A, 1986, V94 200 
 
Dimaggio P, 1983, V48 127 
 
Westphal J, 1998, V43 92 
Johnson J, 1996, V22 200 
 
Shivdasani A, 1993, V16 127 
 
Donaldson L, 1991, V16 91 
Fich E, 2006, V61 200 
 
Brickley J, 1997, V3 127 
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Table 7: Most Cited References per period 
1958 - 1991 1992 - 2005 2006 - 2017 
Reference N Reference N Reference N 
Mace ML, 1971, Directors Myth Reali 25 Fama EF, 1983, V26, P301, J Law Econ 166 Fama EF, 1983, V26, P301, J Law Econ 696 
Pfeffer J, 1972, V17, P218, Admin Sci Quart 15 Jensen MC, 1976, V3, P305, J Financ Econ 137 Jensen MC, 1976, V3, P305, J Financ Econ 693 
Koontz H, 1967, Board Directors Effe 10 Weisbach MS, 1988, V20, P431, J Financ Econ 131 Yermack D, 1996, V40, P185, J Financ Econ 487 
Zald MN, 1969, V75, P97, Am J Sociol 8 Fama EF, 1980, V88, P288, J Polit Econ 96 Jensen MC, 1993, V48, P831, J Financ 422 
Berle AA, 1932, Modern Corporation P 8 Lorsch J, 1989, Pawns Potentates Rea 80 Pfeffer J, 1978, External Control Org 303 
Herman ES, 1981, Corporate Control Co 8 Jensen MC, 1993, V48, P831, J Financ 77 Hillman AJ, 2003, V28, P383, Acad Manage Rev 298 
Vance SC, 1983, Corporate Leadership 8 Yermack D, 1996, V40, P185, J Financ Econ 71 Shleifer A, 1997, V52, P737, J Financ 290 
Brown CC, 1976, Putting Corporate Bo 7 Baysinger BD, 1985, V1, P101, J Law Econ Organ 69 Weisbach MS, 1988, V20, P431, J Financ Econ 276 
Fama EF, 1983, V26, P301, J Law Econ 7 Pfeffer J, 1978, External Control Org 67 Hermalin BE, 1998, V88, P96, Am Econ Rev 271 
Fama EF, 1980, V88, P288, J Polit Econ 7 Hermalin BE, 1988, V19, P589, Rand J Econ 64 Fama EF, 1980, V88, P288, J Polit Econ 266 
Mizruchi MS, 1983, V8, P426, Acad Manage Rev 7 Jensen MC, 1990, V98, P225, J Polit Econ 63 Coles JL, 2008, V87, P329, J Financ Econ 243 
Vance SC, 1964, Boards Directors Str 7 Rosenstein S, 1990, V26, P175, J Financ Econ 62 Core JE, 1999, V51, P371, J Financ Econ 239 
Vance SC, 1968, Corporate Director C 5 Zahra SA, 1989, V15, P291, J Manage 60 Gompers P, 2003, V118, P107, Q J Econ 234 
Jensen MC, 1976, V3, P305, J Financ Econ 5 Byrd JW, 1992, V32, P195, J Financ Econ 60 Dalton DRR, 1998, V19, P269, Strategic Manage J 224 
Stone CD, 1975, Where The Law Ends 5 Mace ML, 1971, Directors Myth Reali 60 Weisbach MS, 2003, V9, P7, Ec Policy Rev 215 
Mace ML, 1976, V54, P48, Harv Bus Rev 5 Morck R, 1988, V20, P293, J Financ Econ 59 Adams RB, 2007, V62, P217, J Financ 213 
Selznick P, 1949, Tva Grass Roots 5 Berle AA, 1932, Modern Corporation P 56 Klein A, 2002, V33, P375, J Account Econ 212 
Pfeffer J, 1973, V18, P349, Admin Sci Quart 5 Kosnik RD, 1987, V32, P163, Admin Sci Quart 55 Linck JS, 2008, V87, P308, J Financ Econ 209 
Juran JM, 1966, Corporate Director 5 Shivdasani A, 1993, V16, P167, J Account Econ 53 Adams RB, 2009, V94, P291, J Financ Econ 203 
Walkling RA, 1984, V15, P54, Rand J Econ 4 Brickley JA, 1994, V35, P371, J Financ Econ 52 Beasley MS, 1996, V71, P443, Account Rev 203 
Galbraith JK, 1967, New Ind State 4 Hermalin BE, 1991, V20, P101, Financ Manage 49 Jensen MC, 1986, V76, P323, Am Econ Rev 202 
Zald MN, 1967, V73, P261, Am J Sociol 4 Pfeffer J, 1972, V17, P218, Admin Sci Quart 47 Fich EM, 2006, V61, P689, J Financ 196 
Kesner IF, 1986, V29, P789, Acad Manage J 4 Demsetz H, 1985, V93, P1155, J Polit Econ 47 Carter DA, 2003, V38, P33, Financial Rev 193 
Zeitlin M, 1974, V79, P1073, Am J Sociol 4 Baysinger BD, 1990, V15, P72, Acad Manage Rev 47 Zahra SA, 1989, V15, P291, J Manage 193 
Pfeffer J, 1978, External Control Org 4 Shleifer A, 1986, V94, P461, J Polit Econ 45 Morck R, 1988, V20, P293, J Financ Econ 192 
Waldo CN, 1985, Boards Directors 3 Kosnik RD, 1990, V33, P129, Acad Manage J 41 Forbes DP, 1999, V24, P489, Acad Manage Rev 189 
Salancik GR, 1980, V23, P653, Acad Manage J 3 Gilson SC, 1990, V27, P355, J Financ Econ 40 Boone AL, 2007, V85, P66, J Financ Econ 182 
Thompson JD, 1967, Org Action 3 Vance SC, 1983, Corporate Leadership 40 LaPorta R, 1999, V54, P471, J Financ 181 
Wagner WG, 1984, V29, P74, Admin Sci Quart 3 Eisenhardt KM, 1989, V14, P57, Acad Manage Rev 39 Berle AA, 1932, Modern Corporation P 166 
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The first approximation to the analysis of the intellectual framework can be performed 
visualizing a map of co-cited references (Figure 12). At first sight, this map shows the 
centrality of a few works in the global landscape of references. This articles set an 
intellectual framework around the Agency Theory for many analyses (Fama, 1980; Fama 
& Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and, consistently, are a reference as we found 
previously amongst most cited references. The map also describes significant groups of 
contributions pivoting around other seminal works. 
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Figure 12: Co-citation references map 
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Once we have an overall picture, it is necessary to identify the big areas that have been 
configured via the above-mentioned co-citations. We show a list of the first 50 co-cited 
references in Table 8. Thus, we performed an exploratory factor analysis for the top 250 
works in the rank of co-cited references with principal components analysis as extraction 
method. We specify factors with an eigenvalue over 1, and varimax rotation to fit the 
references to the factors. The analysis provided five factors that explain over 96% of the 
variance. For the analysis if the factors and references, we considered those loadings above 
0.7 as core contributors to the factor, whereas those below 0.32 were taken into account 
(Diez-Vial & Montoro-Sanchez, 2017; Vogel & Güttel, 2012). We weighted the 
contribution of the references according to their loadings in each factor. For the 
characterization of the factor, we took those references clearly linked to one of the factors 
extracted, and examined the group of references for every factor to find similarities in 
theories, topics or approaches. Since this process may lead to some subjectivity bias, we 
double-checked this process with a parallel examination (See Total Variance Explained 
and Rotated Component Matrix in Appendix Tables 3 and 4). 
 
Table 8: Top co-cited references  
Reference A Reference B Times co-cited 
Fama E, 1983, V26 Jensen M, 1976, V3 593 
Fama E, 1983, V26 Jensen M, 1993, V48 319 
Fama E, 1983, V26 Yermack D, 1996, V40 314 
Fama E, 1980, V88 Fama E, 1983, V26 308 
Jensen M, 1993, V48 Yermack D, 1996, V40 294 
Fama E, 1980, V88 Jensen M, 1976, V3 239 
Fama E, 1983, V26 Weisbach M, 1988, V20 237 
Jensen M, 1976, V3 Yermack D, 1996, V40 222 
Jensen M, 1993, V48 Jensen M, 1976, V3 218 
Fama E, 1983, V26 Shleifer A, 1997, V52 194 
Jensen M, 1976, V3 Shleifer A, 1997, V52 183 
Weisbach M, 1988, V20 Yermack D, 1996, V40 179 
Dalton D, 1998, V19 Fama E, 1983, V26 168 
Jensen M, 1976, V3 Weisbach M, 1988, V20 162 
Fama E, 1983, V26 Morck R, 1988, V20 159 
Fama E, 1983, V26 Hermalin B, 1998, V88 159 
Eisenberg T, 1998, V48 Yermack D, 1996, V40 158 
Fama E, 1983, V26 Zahra S, 1989, V15 158 
Jensen M, 1993, V48 Weisbach M, 1988, V20 154 
Fama E, 1983, V26 Hillman A, 2003, V28 151 
Jensen M, 1993, V48 Lipton M, 1992, V48 151 
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Reference A Reference B Times co-cited 
Jensen M, 1976, V3 Morck R, 1988, V20 150 
Dalton D, 1998, V19 Jensen M, 1976, V3 143 
Lipton M, 1992, V48 Yermack D, 1996, V40 142 
Beasley M, 1996, V71 Fama E, 1983, V26 142 
Fama E, 1983, V26 Weisbach M, 2003, V9 140 
Hillman A, 2003, V28 Jensen M, 1976, V3 139 
Core J, 1999, V51 Fama E, 1983, V26 137 
Jensen M, 1986, V76 Jensen M, 1976, V3 135 
Jensen M, 1976, V3 Zahra S, 1989, V15 135 
Morck R, 1988, V20 Yermack D, 1996, V40 135 
Baysinger B, 1985, V1 Fama E, 1983, V26 134 
Eisenhardt K, 1989, V14 Fama E, 1983, V26 134 
Coles J, 2008, V87 Fama E, 1983, V26 134 
Fama E, 1983, V26 Jensen M, 1986, V76 132 
Coles J, 2008, V87 Yermack D, 1996, V40 131 
Core J, 1999, V51 Yermack D, 1996, V40 130 
Coles J, 2008, V87 Linck J, 2008, V87 130 
Eisenhardt K, 1989, V14 Jensen M, 1976, V3 129 
Baysinger B, 1990, V15 Fama E, 1983, V26 127 
Hermalin B, 1998, V88 Yermack D, 1996, V40 126 
Fama E, 1983, V26 Lipton M, 1992, V48 124 
Byrd J, 1992, V32 Weisbach M, 1988, V20 124 
Boone A, 2007, V85 Linck J, 2008, V87 122 
Fama E, 1983, V26 Shleifer A, 1986, V94 122 
Fama E, 1983, V26 Pfeffer J, 1972, V17 121 
Fama E, 1980, V88 Jensen M, 1993, V48 121 
Fama E, 1983, V26 Johnson J, 1996, V22 120 
Fama E, 1983, V26 Linck J, 2008, V87 120 
Demsetz H, 1985, V93 Fama E, 1983, V26 120 
 
 
The first factor explains 20.129% of the variance. The top loadings point to references that 
refer to two main elements: agency theory issues, and theoretical or integrative models. 
The independence, outside directors (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998; Klein, 2002; Weisbach, 
1988; Westphal, 1998), ownership (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; Morck, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988), composition (Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003; Yermack, 1996) 
and compensation (Murphy, 1999) are subjects of study with high weight in this factor, and 
have been largely discussed in literature, with a clear impact on codes and regulation. 
Besides these issues, an agency-stewardship integrative model is also provided (Zahra & 
Pearce II, 1989). It is interesting that the willingness to provide and integrate different 
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theories approaching the board of directors is at the core and for decades in the research 
literature, despite most of the works commonly opted for a unique way. 
The second factor is mostly composed of groundings for the intellectual approach given by 
the Agency Theory. Thus, managerial behavior and ownership structure are depicted 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), on the basis of the assessment of the 
theory and their problems (Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama, 1980). CEO duality (Boyd, 1995; 
Finkelstein & D’aveni, 1994) and compensation (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989; Tosi & 
Gomez-mejia, 1989; Zajac & Westphal, 1994) have been addressed as classical subtopics 
and paradigmatic questions on the grounds of this theoretical context. We think that this 
factor weights high because it provides the theoretical basis for the great amount of works 
that deal with agency theory issues, whose particularization is better explained in factor 1. 
Besides, the existence of two factors whose content, in terms of weight elements, is that 
close, may indicate that these nuclei have been formed in different periods of time. This 
would manifest itself in small differences, in approach or in treated topics that would 
require slightly different intellectual support. 
The third factor explains 19.47% of the total variance and the top contributors centered 
their works in topics related to diversity, in terms of gender or ethnic. Women on board are 
approached considering critical mass (what it can be considered as a quota) and innovation 
(Torchia, Calabrò, & Huse, 2011), in connection to Corporate Social Responsibility and 
firm reputation (Bear, Rahman, & Post, 2010), or related to size and strategic change 
(Goodstein, Gautam, & Boeker, 1994). Predictors of their presence in boardrooms are also 
studied (Hillman, Shropshire, & Cannella, 2007). But we found groundings for diversity in 
a wider perspective as well. Board diversity, including ethnic diversity, is analyzed in 
relation to firm value, including a human capital view (Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003), 
or from a signaling and behavioral theories (Miller & Del Carmen Triana, 2009). This is 
consistent with the analysis we made out of the keywords, where gender in particular and 
diversity in general ranked high. The great number of articles referring to diversity related 
topics is corresponded with a proper and strong grounding factor in terms of supporting 
references. In this factor is included relevant work for multi-directorship issues (Fich & 
Shivdasani, 2006), experience, CEO selection and change in corporate strategy (Westphal 
& Fredrickson, 2001). 
The fourth factor has is centered in the board composition (Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; 
Bebchuk & Cohen, 2005; Certo, 2003; Daily & Dalton, 1994; Mallette & Fowler, 1992), 
but in includes the references supporting the resource dependence model (Boyd, 1990; 
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Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000), what suggest a new orientations for ‘classical’ 
problems in literature on board of directors. That might be behind the analysis of the size 
of the boards (Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2008), where there is also room for a join analysis 
with some human capital variables (tenure, experience).    
The fifth factor open the theoretical scope to other perspectives such as the stewardship 
theory (Bebchuk, Fried, & Walker, 2002; Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997), 
property rights view (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985), an integrative theory (Lynall, Golden, & 
Hillman, 2003) or institutional perspectives (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992). Board 
characteristics where human capital and diversity play a relevant role (Kesner, 1988), 
experience considered along with board independence (Kosnik, 1987), and transparency, 
information and interlocks (Gul, Srinidhi, & Ng, 2011; Haunschild & Beckman, 1998) are 
also relevant in this factor. Issues regarding transparency have been recently addressed 
through additional disclosures in companies’ reporting on recommendations compliance, 
and they involve other areas of governance like general meetings. As a result, we might 
say that this factor gathers other theoretical landscapes whereas studying classical issues. 
Providing the year of publication, they stood in the research backlog for as much as many 
years as other researches framed under the agency theory, but further developments did not 
pay the same attention. 
As it may be checked, the majority of references that weight the most in these factors have 
been written in the second stage we identified at the beginning of our analysis. This 
reinforces the idea of a ‘foundations stage’ in the evolution of the literature on boards that 
should be addressed in the future. Regarding the theories, it is clear the prevalence of 
Agency Theory, but this field is already open to deepen in new approaches.  
 
3.3. References Analysis per period 
As we previously mentioned, in order to provide a detailed view of the evolution of the 
research across the different periods of time, we performed the same technique for each 
one of the periods we identified. In each period, we choose those works that were cited in 
at list the 5% of the sample (since the number of journals varies significantly among 
periods, we utilized that threshold to secure the possibility of making this kind of 
performance and, at the same time, to address the core of the co-cited references). 
Period until 1991 
There are three factors that explained the 94.88% of the variance (Total Variance 
Explained and Rotated Component Matrix in Appendix Figure 2, Appendix Tables 5 and 
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6). The first of them sets the frame in the ‘modern’ corporation (Berle & Means, 1932) 
where responsibility has to go beyond what the law is proposing to channel these 
organizations (Stone, 1975). In this context the board is configured as the main instrument 
and characterized for this purpose (Brown, 1976; Mace, 1976). This factor contains 
theoretical foundations for approaching corporation in a context where the institutional 
configuration, personalized in the board, has to provide answers to new typologies of 
issues.  
The second factor accounts for the 37.65% of the variance. The second factor deepens in 
the Board, by giving a theoretical foundation to support its power and functions (Zald, 
1969), studying its size and composition in the context of organizations that consider their 
environment (Pfeffer, 1972), as a way to exercise the corporate leadership (Vance, 1983), 
and establishing a role for corporate directors where is possible to identify a different kind 
of issues that might affect the organizations such as board meetings functioning and 
regularity or directors absenteeism (Vance, 1968).   
The third factor explained the 10.53% of the variance of the references considered. Based 
on the Agency Theory, the separation of owner and control (Fama & Jensen, 1983) leads to 
agency problems in the firms (Fama, 1980), and is theorized around the potential conflict 
and costs that may come out of managerial behavior given a certain ownership structure 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In this context, size, composition and functions of the board 
(Pfeffer, 1973) serve to exert control and power at corporations (Herman, 1981; Mizruchi, 
1983). 
These factors characterize the references of these periods, and the articles, around three 
pillars: the characteristics of the corporation, where there is an increasing separation of 
ownership and management, the institutionalization of the board as the key element in this 
situation, and the theoretical foundation of the Agency Theory. From a formal point of 
view, in this period there are a high proportion of books among cited references, and, 
although there are a number of examples, the contents has a high loading of theoretical 
contribution. Visualizing the co-cited references (Figure 13), we observe that they relate in 
a quite close relationship, accordingly with the bonds that tight the factors of this period. 
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Figure 13: Cited References co-citation map 1958 - 1991 
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Period 1992 – 2005 
As in the previous period of time, we found three factors with an eigenvalue over 1 that 
explained 95.87% of the variance (See Total Variance Explained and Rotated Component 
Matrix in Appendix Tables 7 and 8). The first factor is mainly based on theoretical and 
review works to bring some key issues like the board composition. Again, the reckoning of 
a modern corporation (Berle & Means, 1932), seeds the fields for the need of a proper 
corporate governance (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), where the board of directors plays a key 
role, is the core theme of the literature and aims to an ambitious research agenda (Dalton, 
Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; Johnson, Daily, & Ellstrand, 1996), in the context 
framed by the Agency Theory (Eisenhardt, 1989). Under this view, some of the main 
problems such as the board composition (B. Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Kosnik, 1990), 
the CEO duality (Finkelstein & D’aveni, 1994), and, generally speaking, the relationship 
between the board and the management (Mizruchi, 1983) are addressed.  
The second factor explains 41.54% of the variance. Founded in the theory that gives 
relevance to the agency costs occurring in the firm (Jensen, 1986), the board composition 
(Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991) and formation (Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 1998), it centers the question of board independence through outside directors 
in the monitoring role (Byrd & Hickman, 1992) and before special circumstances such as 
tender offers (Cotter, Shivdasani, & Zenner, 1997) or the adoption of poison pills 
(Brickley, Coles, & Terry, 1994). 
The third factor explains 10.63% of the variance. The references included in this group 
give the core intellectual structure to support Agency issues. From the basic understanding 
of the separation between ownership and control (Fama & Jensen, 1983) and the Agency 
problems that the firm faces in that situation (Fama, 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), the 
boards (Vance, 1983), the directors (Mace, 1971), their power (Lorsch, 1989), and their 
size and composition (Pfeffer, 1972; Yermack, 1996) are studied and related to firm 
performance (Zahra & Pearce II, 1989). Besides, there is a small room for human capital 
through the experience of directors (Kosnik, 1987). 
We may summarize that the factors give the Agency Theory as the founding to address the 
main identified problems in this realm. Thus, in this period there is a great presence of the 
board composition and a concern for the independence of the boards, given a determined 
ownership structure. Human capital barely appears, and, if so, their usual variables, such as 
directors’ experience, are approached from the mentioned intellectual background. We 
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may visualize how the previous core founding for this topic deepens in the main concepts, 
which is depicted in close relationships, and, at the same time, in keeping the theoretical 
vision on the basis of traditional Agency-influenced works, now placed at the center of the 
network of the main co-cited references. The fact of nodes connecting to many other 
nodes, shows the closeness of the group of articles in a determined framework (Figure 14). 
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Figure 14: Cited References co-citation map 1992 – 2005 
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Period 2006-2017 
In the last period of time of our research, 2006-2017, we found five factors with an 
eigenvalue over 1, explaining 93.55% of the total variance (See Total Variance Explained 
and Rotated Component Matrix in Appendix Tables 9 and 10). 
The first factor explains 23.01% of the variance. This factor is offers the framework of the 
Agency Theory in the context of the corporate world, and where the board plays a key role. 
In the firms, given the ownership structure (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999), 
the separation of the ownership and control (Fama & Jensen, 1983) originates agency costs 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976), failures in control (Jensen, 1993), that the Board of Directors 
should approach efficiently (Yermack, 1996) and independently (Weisbach, 1988), to 
deliver performance within an integrative perspective of its roles (Zahra & Pearce II, 
1989). This integrative view includes perspectives of Resource Dependence Theory (A. 
Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). 
The second factor explains 19.75% of the variance of the references of this period. It is 
centered in the board structure. Thus, the determinants of the board structure are analyzed 
(Linck, Netter, & Yang, 2008), considering the potential problem of endogeneity 
(Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998) and the role of the CEO (Shivdasani & Yermack, 1999) in 
the process of election of the directors, where the characterization and structuration of the 
board and the audit committee through independence give better results (Klein, 2002). 
The third factor explains 17.65% of the variance in this period. It is based on the discussion 
on the size of the boards, compensation and the ownership structure. Again, the grounding 
if the agency problems already described (Jensen, 1986), the topic of the size a board 
should have and what are its determinants is studied (Coles et al., 2008; Eisenberg, 
Sundgren, & Wells, 1998). Also, the importance of the remuneration issue, on a given 
board composition, is brought up here (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991). Finally, diversity in 
a broader perspective helps to build the board composition needed to deliver firm value 
(Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003; Erhardt, Werbel, & Shrader, 2003). 
The fourth factor explains 16.82% of the variance and is centered in the processes and 
effectiveness within the board. Thus, based on the Agency problems faced by the firms 
(Fama, 1980), the authors discuss dedication (Ferris, Jagannathan, & Pritchard, 2003; Fich 
& Shivdasani, 2006) in the context of the board as a strategic decision-making group 
(Forbes & Milliken, 1999), where cognitive bases and values determine choices (Hambrick 
& Mason, 1984) and interlocks might have a direct effect (Mizruchi, 1996). 
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The last factor of this period explains 16.31% of the variance and deals with the board 
independence (Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1990) in the context of corporate control (La Porta, 
Lopez‐de‐Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986).  
Within this period we found three main elements. The first, Agency Theory framework 
still prevails in foundation and in the topics subject to analysis. The second, new 
perspectives gain track, i.e. Resource Dependence. Third, subtopics like diversity, 
effectiveness and, slightly, human capital related ones such as experience, are addressed. 
We already perceived this in the analysis of the keywords, and here we find the reference 
foundation for those studies. Therefore, as we foresee in the global picture of the topic of 
study, the last stage of time we identified can be considered as maturation phase, when the 
intellectual backgrounds diversify and a new variety of themes happen to be investigated.  
Consistently with this analysis and the one performed for the keywords, the visualization 
of the co-cited references of this period shows that there are new topics and approaches 
making distanced groups of articles (Figure 15). 
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Figure 15: References co-citation map. 2006 - 2017 
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4. CONCLUSIONS 
The board of directors has been a key topic in the research field of corporate governance 
for years. Many articles addressed the main themes surrounding this topic: performance, 
board composition, board size, etc. In this article, we described and mapped the research 
on the topic realized up to 2017 in 3,021 research articles.  
Based on the year of publication, we can identify several periods of time, probably 
triggered or influenced by major events like the Cadbury Report, the spreading of Codes of 
Governance, or the impulse of Regulators and International Organizations and the 
incorporation of new journals to the study of the topic. These periods would be: up to 
1991, from 1992 to 2005, and 2006 onwards. The first would show the initial grounding of 
the topic. The second one would deploy in parallel to the codes implementation in many 
countries and the raising interest on corporate governance. The third one would be built 
upon the previous seeding and grounding stages, spreading the analyses to a broader range 
of topics as a sign of maturity. 
The topic of the board of directors has been addressed in journals of several scientific 
disciplines, and that includes management or finance, but also accounting ethics, 
psychology, law or sociology. That shows a multidisciplinary interest from the point of 
view of the editors. Despite the number of published works, 41 of these journals 
concentrate 52% of the total. Distribution of articles is consistent with the variety of 
approaches and the presumed evolution of the studies. 
As in other research arenas, although there are a great number of contributors, only a few 
of them recurrently produced studies during all these years. Similarly, a small group of 
them concentrates citation count. That is the case of Dalton, Westphal, Daily, Zajac, or 
Zahra amongst others. Nevertheless, is remarkable the way this group is consistently 
referred across the literature. These conform a true nuclear set of knowledge or reference 
point for the topic. 
Across the references quoted we may note the main theories behind their approaches. 
Despite several theories, such as the institutional theory or the Resource Dependent theory, 
framed the investigation of the articles, the Agency Theory constitutes the core intellectual 
framework for many works on the board of directors. We mapped a geographical 
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distribution of researches where US, UK-Commonwealth, Continental Europe and Asia 
group investigations, and US research institutions are highly represented.  
Journals have been co-cited mostly based on close research arenas. We may identify four 
big groups. The first one groups business and management journals, the second pivots 
around finance, the third is centered in accounting, and the fourth on law studies. 
Corporate Governance and Ethics journals serve as a bridge among different areas. 
The analysis of the abstracts and the keywords provides some facts. Regarding the topics 
related to the board of directors, gender diversity in all its forms is at the top of the ranks. 
Although it relatively recent in the literature it is clearly a trending issue for research. 
Board structure, CEO compensation and duality, and firm performance are commonly 
approached to check different hypotheses as well. 
As regards to the cited references, we provided two analyses: First, the overall picture, and 
second, the study of each period. The principal component analysis of 250 top ranked co-
cited references provides a clear picture of the intellectual framework and is consistent 
with the topics and angles detected in the process of our methodology. This way, we found 
five main factors that build most of the research on board of directors: the agency theory, 
main topics based on that (CEO duality, ownership structure, boards’ independence, 
compensation), diversity (setting the focus on gender), resource dependence views, 
strategy and other angles on composition, and other theoretical perspectives. The majority 
of the references were originated in the second stage of publications, configuring it period 
of consolidation of groundings and topics. Despite the prevalence of Agency related 
matters, there is also room for new or integrative approaches. Thus, stewardship, 
institutional, or resource dependence models provide are drawn in this context, supporting 
a number of articles. The detail provided by performing the analysis in the different 
periods of time supports the idea of a maturation process in the literature, and confirms the 
previous findings. The first period is characterized by early foundations of the discipline of 
corporate governance, where it is reckoned the separation of ownership and control, in the 
context of so-called ‘modern organizations’. The Agency Theory gives the Board a central 
role solving the conflicts described at that time. Some of the issues raised are developed 
during the second stage. Thus, board composition, independence, ownership structure, etc., 
configure a solid basis of references for the second period. Finally, the third period shows 
that maturation in the topic comes through a broadening in the intellectual perspective, 
including integrative ways for different theories, and the addressing of recent subtopics 
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such as diversity. Human capital related topics, although at a slight approximation, have a 
new vision, but they are still under a huge influence of Agency Theory.  
The Codes of Governance have an underlying presence in the research. First, they 
triggered interest, investigation. Second, the measures and recommendations gathered in 
most of them are very often studied in the articles, and, reversely, may impact on their 
evolution. That is the case of CEO duality, independence, or compensation, among others. 
Although the study of the influence of human capital in boards has been pursued under 
different aspects, it is still very limited in terms of the number of articles, themes or 
subtopics (e.g. experience categorization, government skills missing).  
The mapping of the intellectual structure and quantitative study of the topic we made has 
some implications for future research. Besides being a good starting point to cover gaps 
and new angles of investigation, it provides the necessary weight to perform further meta-
analyses. For the practice of corporate governance, this study gives ideas to incorporate in 
the work of board of directors, considering the main and relevant empirical works that 
influence the research, codes and regulation. 
Our contribution provides a solid basis to perform a meta-analysis on the board of directors 
since it delivers a deeper understanding of the qualified contributions identified that shaped 
the investigation over the years. As the main angles and approaches to the analysis of the 
board have been identified throughout this article, the gaps and the lack of deep 
understanding from other points of view, and some topics related for further research 
appear clearer for scholars. Amongst them we may identify some related to human capital 
and codes relationship, or human capital and the board, diversity human capital. 
Experience, knowledge, tenure, skills have already been approached but there are 
perspectives still low developed. We also would like to mention training, combined with 
digital strategies or ethics as themes to be included in future studies. All of them could lean 
also in qualitative information or configurational comparative techniques to a greater 
extent, helping to increase the variety in approaches and topics that would be shown in the 
core references of upcoming publications. We acknowledge the difficulties to obtain 
information suitable for research in issues regarding actual inside board dynamics, their 
relation to market and nonmarket strategy definition or selection-evaluation processes 
relationship, but we think that it would be worthwhile as to analyze and improve 
government of organizations beyond their corporate governance. It can be interesting for 
future researches to employ bibliographic coupling technique to assess potential trends in 
recent research. 
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Likewise in most researches of this kind, our techniques did not link the references to 
places where they were mentioned within the articles (e.g. introduction, methodology, 
results). Although their position within the articles could drive a deeper understanding, a 
natural language processing software should be utilized so as to analyze the actual meaning 
in a sample of articles as big as ours, while reducing the level of subjectivity. Despite that, 
this sort of study could be approached when performing a meta-analysis of a reduced, 
meaningful number of articles. Although we followed existing literature in the 
methodological steps to obtain and process the source of data, we concede that limiting to 
one database could let some articles out of the analysis. To avoid a significant number of 
issues that might appear in such a case, we chose the one that was utilized alone in the vast 
majority of the studies. Finally, it may be interesting to analyze the role and characteristics 
of the published works in leading journals, considering their impact on the evolution of the 
research topic.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix Table 1: List of Web of Sciences categories that were filtered due to 
unrelated contents of their articles 
 
Dermatology Reproductive Biology Infectious Diseases 
Health Care Sciences Services Toxicology Computer Science Theory Methods 
Endocrinology Metabolism Surgery Information Science Library Science 
Genetics Heredity Optics Developmental Biology 
Medicine General Internal Chemistry Multidisciplinary Ergonomics 
Ophthalmology Critical Care Medicine Geochemistry Geophysics 
Anesthesiology Nuclear Science Technology Instruments Instrumentation 
Nutrition Dietetics Biology Materials Science Ceramics 
Respiratory System Biotechnology Applied Microbiology Mathematical Computational Biology 
Clinical Neurology Criminology Penology Medical Laboratory Technology 
Health Policy Services Entomology Mineralogy 
Nursing Substance Abuse Mining Mineral Processing 
Pediatrics Engineering Biomedical Oceanography 
Education Educational Research Food Science Technology Physics Fluids 
Radiology Nuclear Medicine Medical 
Imaging Forestry Engineering Aerospace 
Gerontology Gastroenterology Hepatology Astronomy Astrophysics 
Oncology Geosciences Multidisciplinary Biodiversity Conservation 
Emergency Medicine Hematology Polymer Science 
Orthopedics Horticulture Soil Science 
Urology Nephrology Materials Science Multidisciplinary Psychology Mathematical 
Dentistry Medical Ethics Psychology Psychoanalysis 
Oral Surgery Medicine Microbiology Mathematics 
Geriatrics Gerontology Pharmacology Pharmacy Psychiatry 
Metallurgy Metallurgical Engineering Plant Sciences Cardiac Cardiovascular Systems 
Medicine Legal Rheumatology Psychology 
Veterinary Sciences Thermodynamics Materials Science Paper Wood 
Pathology Acoustics Telecommunications 
Zoology Agriculture Dairy Animal Science Psychology Educational 
Medicine Research Experimental Archaeology Neurosciences 
Chemistry Physical Immunology Education Scientific Disciplines 
Otorhinolaryngology Materials Science Characterization Testing Family Studies  
Rehabilitation Public Environmental Occupational Health  
Obstetrics Gynecology Computer Science Hardware Architecture  
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Appendix Table 2: Examples of corrections of authors' misspelling in registers 
 
BERLE A,Berle AA Wang J,Wang J Zhang J,Zhang J 
BERLE AA,Berle AA Wang J.,Wang J Zhang J.,Zhang J 
BERLE ADOLF A.,Berle AA Wang JC,Wang JC Zhang JH,Zhang JH 
BERLE ADOLPH A.,Berle AA Wang JE,Wang JE Zhang JJ,Zhang JJ 
BERLE JR ADOLF A.,Berle AA Wang JL,Wang JL Zhang JQ,Zhang JQ 
BERLE JR. ADOLF A.,Berle AA Wang JS,Wang JS Zhang JY,Zhang JY 
BERLE,Berle AA Wang JW,Wang JW 
 Berle A,Berle AA Wang JY,Wang JY ALEXANDER C,Alexander C 
Berle A. A,Berle AA 
 
ALEXANDER CA,Alexander CA 
Berle A. A.,Berle AA Williamson O,Williamson OE ALEXANDER CR,Alexander CR 
Berle A.,Berle AA Williamson O. E,Williamson OE 
 Berle A.A.,Berle AA Williamson O. E.,Williamson OE AGUILERA R,Aguilera RV 
Berle AA,Berle AA Williamson O.,Williamson OE AGUILERA RV,Aguilera RV 
Berle Adolf A,Berle AA Williamson O.E.,Williamson OE AGUILERA VR,Aguilera RV 
Berle Adolf Augustus,Berle AA Williamson O.H.,Williamson OH 
 Berle Jr A. A,Berle AA Williamson OE,Williamson OE ADAMS RB,Adams RB 
Berle Jr A. A.,Berle AA Williamson Oliver E.,Williamson OE ADAMS RENEE B.,Adams RB 
Berle Jr A.A.,Berle AA Williamson Oliver,Williamson OE ADAMS RJ,Adams RJ 
Berle Jr Adolf A,Berle AA Williamson QE,Williamson OE ADAMS RL,Adams RL 
Berle Jr Adolf A.,Berle A 
  Berle,Berle AA 
   
Some authors were misspelled at references. Others give different alternatives. There were some that lead to 
keep the second initial. In this list we show some of the cases we found. 
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Appendix Table 3: Cited References - Total Variance Explained 
Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
 Total % of Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 50,322 20,129 20,129 50,322 20,129 20,129 50,035 20,014 20,014 
2 48,904 19,562 39,690 48,904 19,562 39,690 48,709 19,483 39,497 
3 48,675 19,470 59,160 48,675 19,470 59,160 48,477 19,391 58,888 
4 47,820 19,128 78,288 47,820 19,128 78,288 47,968 19,187 78,075 
5 45,538 18,215 96,504 45,538 18,215 96,504 46,071 18,428 96,504 
6 0,647 0,259 96,762       
7 0,608 0,243 97,006       
8 0,591 0,236 97,242       
9 0,557 0,223 97,465       
10 0,544 0,218 97,682       
11 0,507 0,203 97,885       
12 0,490 0,196 98,081       
13 0,476 0,191 98,272       
14 0,409 0,163 98,435       
15 0,402 0,161 98,596       
16 0,376 0,150 98,746       
17 0,352 0,141 98,887       
18 0,335 0,134 99,021       
19 0,314 0,125 99,147       
20 0,226 0,091 99,237       
21 0,061 0,024 99,262       
22 0,059 0,024 99,285       
23 0,057 0,023 99,308       
24 0,055 0,022 99,330       
25 0,051 0,020 99,351       
26 0,050 0,020 99,371       
27 0,048 0,019 99,390       
28 0,048 0,019 99,409       
29 0,047 0,019 99,428       
30 0,045 0,018 99,445       
31 0,041 0,016 99,462       
32 0,040 0,016 99,478       
33 0,039 0,016 99,493       
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Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
 Total % of Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
34 0,039 0,015 99,509       
35 0,036 0,014 99,523       
36 0,034 0,014 99,537       
37 0,033 0,013 99,550       
38 0,032 0,013 99,563       
39 0,031 0,012 99,575       
40 0,030 0,012 99,587       
41 0,029 0,012 99,599       
42 0,029 0,012 99,611       
43 0,027 0,011 99,622       
44 0,027 0,011 99,632       
45 0,026 0,010 99,643       
46 0,024 0,010 99,652       
47 0,024 0,010 99,662       
48 0,021 0,008 99,670       
49 0,020 0,008 99,679       
50 0,018 0,007 99,686       
51 0,015 0,006 99,692       
52 0,014 0,006 99,697       
53 0,013 0,005 99,703       
54 0,013 0,005 99,708       
55 0,012 0,005 99,713       
56 0,012 0,005 99,717       
57 0,012 0,005 99,722       
58 0,011 0,005 99,726       
59 0,011 0,004 99,731       
60 0,011 0,004 99,735       
61 0,011 0,004 99,739       
62 0,010 0,004 99,743       
63 0,010 0,004 99,747       
64 0,010 0,004 99,751       
65 0,010 0,004 99,755       
66 0,009 0,004 99,759       
67 0,009 0,004 99,763       
68 0,009 0,004 99,766       
69 0,009 0,004 99,770       
70 0,009 0,003 99,773       
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Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
 Total % of Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
71 0,009 0,003 99,777       
72 0,008 0,003 99,780       
73 0,008 0,003 99,783       
74 0,008 0,003 99,787       
75 0,008 0,003 99,790       
76 0,008 0,003 99,793       
77 0,008 0,003 99,796       
78 0,008 0,003 99,799       
79 0,007 0,003 99,802       
80 0,007 0,003 99,805       
81 0,007 0,003 99,808       
82 0,007 0,003 99,810       
83 0,007 0,003 99,813       
84 0,007 0,003 99,816       
85 0,007 0,003 99,818       
86 0,006 0,003 99,821       
87 0,006 0,002 99,823       
88 0,006 0,002 99,826       
89 0,006 0,002 99,828       
90 0,006 0,002 99,831       
91 0,006 0,002 99,833       
92 0,006 0,002 99,835       
93 0,006 0,002 99,838       
94 0,006 0,002 99,840       
95 0,005 0,002 99,842       
96 0,005 0,002 99,844       
97 0,005 0,002 99,846       
98 0,005 0,002 99,848       
99 0,005 0,002 99,850       
100 0,005 0,002 99,852       
101 0,005 0,002 99,854       
102 0,005 0,002 99,856       
103 0,005 0,002 99,858       
104 0,005 0,002 99,860       
105 0,005 0,002 99,862       
106 0,005 0,002 99,864       
107 0,004 0,002 99,866       
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Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
 Total % of Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
108 0,004 0,002 99,867       
109 0,004 0,002 99,869       
110 0,004 0,002 99,871       
111 0,004 0,002 99,872       
112 0,004 0,002 99,874       
113 0,004 0,002 99,876       
114 0,004 0,002 99,877       
115 0,004 0,002 99,879       
116 0,004 0,002 99,881       
117 0,004 0,002 99,882       
118 0,004 0,002 99,884       
119 0,004 0,002 99,885       
120 0,004 0,002 99,887       
121 0,004 0,002 99,888       
122 0,004 0,002 99,890       
123 0,004 0,002 99,891       
124 0,004 0,001 99,893       
125 0,004 0,001 99,894       
126 0,004 0,001 99,896       
127 0,004 0,001 99,897       
128 0,004 0,001 99,899       
129 0,003 0,001 99,900       
130 0,003 0,001 99,901       
131 0,003 0,001 99,903       
132 0,003 0,001 99,904       
133 0,003 0,001 99,905       
134 0,003 0,001 99,907       
135 0,003 0,001 99,908       
136 0,003 0,001 99,909       
137 0,003 0,001 99,911       
138 0,003 0,001 99,912       
139 0,003 0,001 99,913       
140 0,003 0,001 99,914       
141 0,003 0,001 99,916       
142 0,003 0,001 99,917       
143 0,003 0,001 99,918       
144 0,003 0,001 99,919       
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Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
 Total % of Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
145 0,003 0,001 99,921       
146 0,003 0,001 99,922       
147 0,003 0,001 99,923       
148 0,003 0,001 99,924       
149 0,003 0,001 99,925       
150 0,003 0,001 99,926       
151 0,003 0,001 99,928       
152 0,003 0,001 99,929       
153 0,003 0,001 99,930       
154 0,003 0,001 99,931       
155 0,003 0,001 99,932       
156 0,003 0,001 99,933       
157 0,003 0,001 99,934       
158 0,003 0,001 99,935       
159 0,003 0,001 99,936       
160 0,003 0,001 99,937       
161 0,003 0,001 99,938       
162 0,003 0,001 99,939       
163 0,003 0,001 99,940       
164 0,003 0,001 99,941       
165 0,003 0,001 99,942       
166 0,002 0,001 99,943       
167 0,002 0,001 99,944       
168 0,002 0,001 99,945       
169 0,002 0,001 99,946       
170 0,002 0,001 99,947       
171 0,002 0,001 99,948       
172 0,002 0,001 99,949       
173 0,002 0,001 99,950       
174 0,002 0,001 99,951       
175 0,002 0,001 99,952       
176 0,002 0,001 99,953       
177 0,002 0,001 99,954       
178 0,002 0,001 99,955       
179 0,002 0,001 99,956       
180 0,002 0,001 99,956       
181 0,002 0,001 99,957       
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Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
 Total % of Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
182 0,002 0,001 99,958       
183 0,002 0,001 99,959       
184 0,002 0,001 99,960       
185 0,002 0,001 99,961       
186 0,002 0,001 99,962       
187 0,002 0,001 99,962       
188 0,002 0,001 99,963       
189 0,002 0,001 99,964       
190 0,002 0,001 99,965       
191 0,002 0,001 99,966       
192 0,002 0,001 99,966       
193 0,002 0,001 99,967       
194 0,002 0,001 99,968       
195 0,002 0,001 99,969       
196 0,002 0,001 99,970       
197 0,002 0,001 99,970       
198 0,002 0,001 99,971       
199 0,002 0,001 99,972       
200 0,002 0,001 99,973       
201 0,002 0,001 99,973       
202 0,002 0,001 99,974       
203 0,002 0,001 99,975       
204 0,002 0,001 99,976       
205 0,002 0,001 99,976       
206 0,002 0,001 99,977       
207 0,002 0,001 99,978       
208 0,002 0,001 99,978       
209 0,002 0,001 99,979       
210 0,002 0,001 99,980       
211 0,002 0,001 99,980       
212 0,002 0,001 99,981       
213 0,002 0,001 99,982       
214 0,002 0,001 99,982       
215 0,002 0,001 99,983       
216 0,002 0,001 99,984       
217 0,002 0,001 99,984       
218 0,002 0,001 99,985       
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Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
 Total % of Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
219 0,002 0,001 99,986       
220 0,002 0,001 99,986       
221 0,001 0,001 99,987       
222 0,001 0,001 99,987       
223 0,001 0,001 99,988       
224 0,001 0,001 99,989       
225 0,001 0,001 99,989       
226 0,001 0,001 99,990       
227 0,001 0,001 99,990       
228 0,001 0,001 99,991       
229 0,001 0,001 99,991       
230 0,001 0,001 99,992       
231 0,001 0,001 99,992       
232 0,001 0,001 99,993       
233 0,001 0,001 99,993       
234 0,001 0,000 99,994       
235 0,001 0,000 99,994       
236 0,001 0,000 99,995       
237 0,001 0,000 99,995       
238 0,001 0,000 99,996       
239 0,001 0,000 99,996       
240 0,001 0,000 99,997       
241 0,001 0,000 99,997       
242 0,001 0,000 99,998       
243 0,001 0,000 99,998       
244 0,001 0,000 99,998       
245 0,001 0,000 99,999       
246 0,001 0,000 99,999       
247 0,001 0,000 99,999       
248 0,001 0,000 100,000       
249 0,000 0,000 100,000       
250 
-
6,060E
-16 
-2,424E-
16 100,000       
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Appendix Table 4: Cited References - Rotated Component Matrix 
Reference 1 2 3 4 5 
FamaE1983V26 0,14 0,872 0,28 0,312 0,071 
JensenM1976V3 0,272 0,886 0,216 0,056 -0,23 
YermackD1996V40 0,846 -0,38 -0,152 -0,126 0,254 
JensenM1993V48 0,663 0,684 0,099 0,035 -0,205 
WeisbachM1988V20 0,935 -0,105 -0,149 0,07 0,223 
FamaE1980V88 0,401 0,724 0,081 -0,042 0,525 
ShleiferA1997V52 0,852 0,222 -0,4 0,168 0,026 
HermalinB1998V88 0,861 0,038 0,283 0,314 -0,207 
HillmanA2003V28 0,423 0,422 0,387 0,357 -0,579 
CoreJ1999V51 0,359 0,561 0,044 0,719 0,007 
DaltonD1998V19 0,418 0,613 0,516 0,377 -0,065 
MorckR1988V20 0,857 0,347 -0,188 -0,087 0,26 
ZahraS1989V15 0,832 -0,141 -0,343 -0,013 0,364 
GompersP2003V118 0,756 0,345 -0,145 0,488 -0,123 
JensenM1986V76 0,784 0,552 -0,15 0,122 0,093 
ColesJ2008V87 0,338 0,046 0,152 0,902 -0,089 
BeasleyM1996V71 -0,296 -0,051 -0,691 0,633 -0,005 
WeisbachM2003V9 0,829 -0,432 -0,292 -0,019 0,066 
KleinA2002V33 0,842 -0,315 -0,003 0,261 -0,301 
AdamsR2007V62 -0,884 0,213 0,322 -0,052 -0,172 
ByrdJ1992V32 -0,056 0,511 -0,147 0,823 0 
LinckJ2008V87 -0,694 0,076 0,494 0,381 -0,294 
ForbesD1999V24 0,457 0,162 0,71 0,357 -0,315 
PfefferJ1972V17 0,827 0,347 0,291 0,013 0,274 
LiptonM1992V48 0,64 0,018 0,576 0,31 0,355 
LaP1999V54 0,902 -0,071 0,327 0,026 0,194 
AdamsR2009V94 -0,542 0,185 0,644 -0,338 0,329 
CarterD2003V38 -0,391 -0,004 0,835 -0,193 0,286 
EisenhardtK1989V14 0,405 0,722 0,386 -0,27 0,241 
RosensteinS1990V26 0,595 -0,074 0,584 -0,168 0,488 
ShleiferA1986V94 0,595 0,02 0,3 -0,304 0,655 
FichE2006V61 -0,477 0,054 0,826 0,119 -0,192 
JohnsonJ1996V22 0,543 0,495 0,573 0,064 -0,299 
DemsetzH1985V93 0,151 0,355 0,262 -0,193 0,841 
HermalinB1991V20 0,417 0,234 0,732 -0,242 0,382 
BooneA2007V85 -0,79 -0,052 0,511 0,258 0,087 
BaysingerB1985V1 -0,607 -0,098 -0,227 0,661 0,309 
HermalinB1988V19 -0,438 0,334 -0,029 0,525 0,622 
CarpenterM2001V44 0,031 0,328 0,674 0,581 -0,256 
EisenbergT1998V48 -0,372 -0,223 0,43 0,383 0,668 
JensenM1990V98 0,425 0,576 -0,097 0,245 0,623 
BaysingerB1990V15 -0,383 -0,066 -0,214 0,801 0,352 
FerrisS2003V58 -0,445 -0,127 0,681 0,531 -0,073 
HillmanA2000V37 -0,13 -0,134 0,662 0,7 0,042 
AdamsR2010V48 -0,702 0,507 0,094 -0,374 0,26 
DailyC2003V28 -0,196 0,251 0,471 0,796 0,081 
RahejaC2005V40 -0,847 -0,005 0,424 0,02 0,254 
DaltonD1999V42 -0,441 0,148 0,393 0,468 0,613 
AgrawalA1996V31 -0,328 0,439 0,013 -0,707 -0,407 
BhagatS2002V27 -0,827 0,214 -0,027 -0,47 -0,11 
LaP1998V106 0,132 0,191 0,01 -0,952 0,055 
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KleinA1998V41 -0,668 -0,099 -0,119 -0,69 -0,14 
HambrickD1984V9 -0,183 0,619 0,596 0,27 0,351 
McconnellJ1990V27 -0,177 0,082 -0,398 -0,876 -0,042 
WestphalJ1999V42 -0,279 -0,447 0,035 0,189 0,804 
DechowP1996V13 -0,72 -0,071 -0,651 -0,05 0,124 
ShivdasaniA1999V54 -0,457 0,16 0,206 -0,828 -0,048 
BrickleyJ1994V35 -0,657 0,404 -0,452 -0,311 0,264 
WestphalJ1995V40 0,121 -0,361 0,389 0,482 0,66 
FinkelsteinS1994V37 -0,476 0,727 -0,028 0,257 0,382 
VafeasN1999V53 -0,409 -0,407 0,054 -0,786 -0,114 
WhiteH1980V48 0,104 -0,349 -0,186 -0,861 0,228 
DimaggioP1983V48 0,502 0,122 0,345 0,485 0,589 
BrickleyJ1997V3 -0,528 0,59 -0,258 -0,507 -0,127 
ShivdasaniA1993V16 -0,305 -0,23 -0,483 -0,752 0,138 
BhagatS1999V54 -0,706 0,307 -0,497 -0,297 -0,195 
MizruchiM1996V22 0,664 -0,495 0,49 0,205 0,025 
ErhardtN2003V11 -0,435 -0,246 0,465 -0,435 0,562 
DavisJ1997V22 0,311 0,06 0,157 0,019 0,916 
ClaessensS2000V58 0,404 -0,022 -0,35 -0,809 -0,161 
PearceJ1992V29 -0,168 -0,028 -0,446 -0,525 0,676 
RechnerP1991V12 -0,253 0,435 -0,578 -0,465 0,401 
YermackD2004V59 0,096 -0,602 0,11 -0,744 0,163 
GilsonS1990V27 -0,138 0,284 -0,561 -0,304 0,674 
FinkelsteinS1992V35 0,502 0,598 0,49 0,042 0,337 
WalshJ1990V15 0,334 -0,304 -0,553 0,299 0,606 
TerjesenS2009V17 -0,028 -0,218 0,651 -0,541 0,453 
LaP2000V58 0,305 -0,396 -0,285 -0,742 0,283 
JudgeW1992V35 -0,208 0,233 -0,102 0,168 0,909 
BebchukL2009V22 -0,333 0,453 0,267 -0,744 0,154 
PetersenM2009V22 -0,065 -0,097 0,376 -0,9 -0,021 
WarnerJ1988V20 0,046 -0,78 -0,237 -0,407 0,358 
AndersonR2003V58 -0,37 0,119 0,139 0,227 -0,862 
XieB2003V9 0,434 -0,35 0,301 -0,749 -0,047 
GoodsteinJ1994V15 0,21 0,194 0,892 -0,08 -0,28 
KosnikR1987V32 0,244 0,218 -0,253 0,346 0,821 
DavisG1991V36 0,013 0,448 0,301 0,609 0,552 
HarrisM2008V21 -0,655 0,114 0,454 -0,482 -0,294 
CotterJ1997V43 0,114 0,163 -0,639 -0,646 -0,323 
ClaessensS2002V57 0,306 0,136 -0,317 -0,324 -0,805 
FarrellK2005V11 -0,401 -0,101 0,667 -0,547 0,232 
PettigrewA1992V13 0,632 -0,398 -0,165 0,342 0,516 
LaP2002V57 0,402 -0,078 0,223 -0,626 -0,595 
RedikerK1995V16 0,219 0,605 -0,556 -0,473 -0,153 
BoydB1995V16 0,48 0,798 -0,005 -0,305 -0,065 
KaplanS1990V27 0,107 -0,397 -0,751 -0,474 0,059 
WestphalJ1998V43 0,766 0,105 -0,23 -0,542 -0,141 
DonaldsonL1991V16 0,339 0,649 -0,273 -0,468 -0,369 
AndersonR2004V37 -0,796 0,023 -0,074 -0,016 0,572 
SmithC1992V32 0,295 -0,499 -0,682 -0,346 0,201 
HeckmanJ1979V47 0,106 -0,103 0,709 -0,227 -0,626 
BebchukL2002V69 -0,455 -0,119 -0,171 0,374 0,759 
VillalongaB2006V80 -0,103 -0,349 0,018 0,116 -0,907 
SrinivasanS2005V43 -0,093 -0,925 0,217 -0,22 -0,031 
AgrawalA2005V48 -0,812 0,076 -0,476 0,257 0,057 
CoughlanA1985V7 0,141 0,474 -0,742 -0,193 0,367 
Chapter 2: Board of Directors: A Bibliometric Analysis	
	106 
Reference 1 2 3 4 5 
BeattyR1994V39 -0,241 0,645 -0,659 0,153 0,188 
MehranH1995V38 -0,233 0,044 -0,828 -0,449 -0,152 
DefondM2005V43 -0,823 -0,42 -0,25 0,126 0,178 
LynallM2003V28 0,596 -0,276 0,144 -0,179 0,695 
McnultyT1999V20 0,575 -0,564 -0,298 0,476 0,024 
DuchinR2010V96 -0,875 -0,166 0,122 -0,332 0,207 
MizruchiM1983V8 0,131 0,099 -0,453 0,224 0,824 
BebchukL2003V17 0,327 0,488 0,115 -0,765 0,153 
KesnerI1988V31 -0,112 -0,383 0,133 0,283 0,839 
DailyC1994V37 -0,075 0,318 -0,127 0,814 0,423 
FichE2005V78 -0,725 -0,334 0,323 0,058 -0,466 
HusonM2001V56 0,051 -0,8 -0,018 -0,498 -0,269 
RobertsJ2005V16 0,522 -0,672 0,213 0,037 0,443 
LarckerD2007V82 -0,466 -0,685 -0,181 -0,339 0,359 
CampbellK2008V83 -0,316 -0,431 0,681 -0,124 0,453 
HartzellJ2003V58 0,518 0,064 -0,25 -0,657 0,448 
AndersonR2004V49 -0,088 0,262 0,266 0,066 -0,904 
RyanH2004V73 0,202 -0,805 -0,29 -0,222 0,376 
HillmanA2002V28 -0,234 -0,633 0,611 0,089 0,359 
FaccioM2002V65 0,066 -0,246 0,258 -0,19 -0,894 
WestphalJ2000V45 0,132 -0,608 0,447 0,044 0,614 
BearS2010V97 0,165 -0,328 0,84 0,1 0,346 
AgrawalA2001V44 -0,05 0,274 -0,321 -0,859 -0,218 
BoydB1990V11 0,277 0,14 -0,14 0,842 -0,37 
ParrinoR1997V46 -0,117 -0,927 0,163 0,121 -0,215 
HwangB2009V93 -0,735 -0,465 0,339 -0,229 -0,197 
HillmanA2007V50 -0,017 -0,513 0,835 0,068 -0,021 
HimmelbergC1999V53 0,083 -0,241 -0,08 -0,777 -0,54 
KosnikR1990V33 0,137 0,002 -0,294 0,727 0,578 
HaunschildP1993V38 0,527 -0,093 0,616 0,54 0,087 
AguileraR2003V28 -0,478 0,176 0,174 0,027 -0,821 
DenisD1999V52 0,026 0,213 -0,247 -0,471 -0,798 
WadeJ1990V35 0,215 -0,528 -0,373 0,66 -0,251 
MillikenF1996V21 0,075 -0,744 0,573 -0,001 0,276 
MeyerJ1977V83 0,591 -0,18 0,243 0,494 -0,531 
JohnsonR1993V14 -0,026 -0,021 -0,027 0,98 0,02 
GoldenB2001V22 0,23 -0,198 0,445 0,663 -0,487 
CarterD2010V18 -0,303 -0,315 0,814 -0,308 -0,137 
MalletteP1992V35 0,113 0,294 -0,54 0,758 0,032 
FichE2007V86 -0,577 -0,615 0,197 0,263 -0,375 
ArellanoM1991V58 -0,135 0,341 0,025 -0,379 -0,828 
PearceJ1991V12 0,44 -0,008 -0,651 0,531 0,265 
AbbottL2004V23 -0,78 0,067 -0,385 0,441 0,088 
WestphalJ1997V42 -0,067 -0,636 -0,572 0,468 0,106 
FamaE1997V43 -0,42 -0,612 -0,285 0,094 0,57 
WiersemaM1992V35 0,257 -0,844 0,051 0,144 0,403 
BebchukL2005V78 -0,399 0,13 -0,864 0,053 -0,195 
BrickleyJ1988V20 0,299 0,434 -0,821 -0,021 -0,105 
BoydB1994V15 -0,029 0,606 -0,396 0,31 -0,589 
DechowP1995V70 -0,381 -0,571 -0,528 0,407 -0,224 
HallockK1997V32 -0,064 -0,198 -0,9 0,316 -0,095 
AhernK2012V127 -0,074 0,219 0,44 -0,728 0,434 
LinckJ2009V22 -0,875 -0,431 -0,071 -0,029 0,065 
PfefferJ1973V18 0,541 -0,639 -0,466 -0,224 -0,007 
KaramanouI2005V43 -0,23 -0,625 -0,642 0,134 0,305 
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BainbridgeS2002V55 -0,038 0,045 0,138 0,553 -0,8 
HolmstromB1979V10 0,703 0,099 -0,474 -0,424 0,239 
ZajacE1996V41 0,15 -0,707 -0,081 0,595 0,288 
BedardJ2004V23 -0,512 -0,364 -0,604 0,399 0,222 
ChengS2008V87 -0,459 -0,707 -0,065 0,069 -0,49 
YoungM2008V45 0,361 -0,275 0,209 -0,05 -0,845 
HausmanJ1978V46 -0,412 -0,627 0,071 0,493 -0,393 
RoseC2007V15 0,163 -0,328 0,497 -0,685 0,345 
MurphyK1999V3B 0,78 -0,173 0,091 -0,4 -0,397 
HuseM2005V16 0,395 -0,604 0,276 0,277 -0,541 
FredricksonJ1988V13 0,522 0,316 -0,122 0,728 0,218 
KrollM2008V29 0,077 -0,345 0,536 0,378 -0,644 
BrickleyJ1987V30 0,089 0,324 -0,901 -0,043 -0,187 
JohnK1998V22 -0,217 -0,509 -0,542 -0,494 -0,348 
GoyalV2002V8 -0,203 -0,872 -0,169 0,256 0,267 
BakerM2003V46 -0,424 0,274 -0,241 -0,418 -0,692 
MurphyK1985V7 0,571 0,087 -0,677 -0,067 0,413 
AdamsR2005V18 -0,101 0,731 -0,032 -0,598 0,256 
NielsenS2010V18 0,309 -0,519 0,696 -0,307 0,15 
ConyonM1998V41 0,462 0,636 0,029 -0,217 -0,546 
LaportaR1997V52 0,274 -0,624 -0,211 -0,375 -0,56 
ManneH1965V73 0,078 -0,085 -0,713 0,231 0,625 
ShraderC1997V9 -0,172 -0,631 0,502 -0,525 0,109 
ZaldM1969V75 0,406 -0,732 -0,349 0,369 0,073 
FinkelsteinS2003V17 0,296 -0,399 0,483 0,482 -0,503 
HarfordJ2003V69 0,246 -0,442 -0,838 0,086 -0,011 
BaysingerB1991V34 -0,327 -0,342 -0,236 0,781 0,273 
MillerT2009V46 0,239 -0,303 0,77 -0,474 0,002 
WangJ1992V11 0,422 -0,77 0,377 -0,225 -0,053 
StulzR1988V20 0,531 -0,181 -0,441 -0,379 -0,561 
BlackF1973V81 0,506 0,097 -0,821 -0,081 -0,135 
JohnsonR1999V42 0,266 -0,775 0,219 0,48 -0,124 
BorokhovichK1996V31 0,252 -0,447 -0,385 -0,578 -0,468 
GunerA2008V88 -0,729 -0,359 -0,114 -0,26 0,47 
HermalinB2003V9 -0,656 -0,51 -0,345 -0,322 -0,226 
BebchukL2005V118 0,461 -0,407 -0,195 0,74 -0,009 
KleinA2002V77 -0,474 -0,43 -0,734 0,129 0,023 
JonesJ1991V29 -0,148 -0,801 -0,451 0,012 -0,311 
PengM2004V25 0,461 -0,288 -0,11 -0,101 -0,804 
BaligaB1996V17 -0,119 0,318 -0,001 -0,101 -0,916 
BlundellR1998V87 0,111 0,087 0,557 -0,692 -0,395 
SandersW1998V41 0,512 -0,002 -0,317 0,504 -0,59 
DenisD1995V50 0,692 0,43 -0,386 -0,336 -0,198 
BrickI2006V12 -0,1 -0,061 -0,951 -0,116 -0,174 
GranovetterM1985V91 0,917 0,121 0,112 -0,033 -0,307 
SchulzeW2001V12 0,233 0,02 -0,101 0,201 -0,929 
ChagantiR1985V22 0,041 0,237 -0,848 0,242 0,364 
BhagatS2008V14 -0,351 -0,22 -0,341 -0,451 -0,69 
SundaramurthyC2003V28 0,582 -0,098 -0,25 0,231 -0,708 
AmihudY1981V12 -0,276 0,887 -0,214 0,222 0,062 
JensenM1983V11 -0,058 0,878 -0,29 0,316 0,054 
WintokiM2012V105 0,084 0,821 -0,344 -0,104 0,397 
CertoS2003V28 -0,015 -0,161 -0,073 0,706 -0,661 
ShenW2002V45 0,342 0,709 -0,458 0,301 0,213 
DenisD1997V45 0,113 0,826 -0,386 0,26 0,226 
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BrickleyJ1999V52 0,07 -0,48 -0,575 0,196 -0,601 
FaccioM2006V96 0,671 -0,545 0,257 -0,379 -0,097 
BantelK1989V10 -0,164 0,194 0,669 -0,223 0,637 
HaunschildP1998V43 -0,016 0,405 0,495 -0,24 0,706 
MyersS1984V13 0,227 0,805 -0,492 0,038 0,148 
ZajacE1994V15 -0,041 0,831 0,022 -0,001 0,523 
BlairM1999V85 0,15 -0,371 -0,342 0,555 -0,615 
BeasleyM2000V14 -0,738 0,111 -0,104 0,622 0,09 
FarberD2005V80 -0,656 -0,077 -0,09 0,714 0,088 
BarneyJ1991V17 -0,176 0,183 0,157 0,553 -0,757 
GordonJ2007V59 -0,524 -0,391 -0,173 0,681 0,208 
LehnK2009V38 -0,406 -0,396 0,058 -0,394 -0,697 
GulF2011V51 0,017 0,021 0,599 -0,273 0,731 
BathalaC1995V16 -0,282 0,379 -0,266 -0,783 -0,242 
DemsetzH2001V7 -0,098 0,249 0,307 -0,857 0,248 
SinghH1989V32 -0,264 0,648 0,12 -0,157 0,661 
BusheeB1998V73 -0,419 0,541 -0,426 -0,206 -0,523 
FinkelsteinS1989V10 -0,145 0,777 0,451 -0,274 0,251 
TosiH1989V34 -0,151 0,948 -0,091 -0,065 -0,171 
OcasioW1994V39 -0,112 0,617 0,756 0,019 0,018 
CarcelloJ2000V75 -0,793 0,136 -0,544 0,127 0,033 
DaltonD2007V1 -0,103 0,663 0,562 0,204 -0,396 
KesnerI1986V29 -0,171 0,874 -0,086 -0,332 -0,235 
MasulisR2007V62 -0,514 0,384 0,254 0,686 -0,136 
KorY2009V35 -0,142 0,156 0,623 0,355 -0,641 
VafeasN2003V30 -0,424 0,521 0,095 0,266 -0,659 
TorchiaM2011V102 0,001 0,073 0,978 -0,02 0,054 
KielG2003V11 -0,814 0,233 0,416 -0,172 0,205 
DenisD2003V38 -0,566 0,113 -0,375 0,069 -0,699 
DaltonD2003V46 -0,339 0,737 0,209 0,488 -0,159 
DailyC1999V20 -0,104 0,076 0,956 0,024 -0,175 
SuchmanM1995V20 -0,577 0,423 -0,425 0,31 -0,421 
WestphalJ2001V46 -0,09 0,39 0,744 0,2 -0,458 
RomanoR2005V114 -0,759 0,106 0,245 0,217 -0,52 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
Rotation converged in 15 iterations. 
 
Note: Values over 0.7 are in green cell background. Values between 0.3 and 0.699 are in 
yellow cell background 
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Appendix Table 5: Cited References - Total Variance Explained 1958 - 1991 
Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
 Total % of Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 8,872 46,694 46,694 8,872 46,694 46,694 7,200 37,893 37,893 
2 7,154 37,654 84,348 7,154 37,654 84,348 6,949 36,576 74,469 
3 2,001 10,533 94,881 2,001 10,533 94,881 3,878 20,412 94,881 
4 0,338 1,778 96,659       
5 0,264 1,387 98,047       
6 0,072 0,378 98,425       
7 0,067 0,350 98,775       
8 0,051 0,269 99,045       
9 0,046 0,243 99,288       
10 0,025 0,132 99,420       
11 0,025 0,130 99,549       
12 0,020 0,105 99,654       
13 0,016 0,086 99,740       
14 0,014 0,074 99,814       
15 0,011 0,060 99,874       
16 0,010 0,051 99,925       
17 0,009 0,046 99,971       
18 0,006 0,029 100,000       
19 
-
2,170E-
17 
-1,142E-
16 100,000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Appendix Table 6: Cited References - Rotated Component Matrix 1958 - 1991 
 Component 
Reference 1 2 3 
MaceML1971DirectorsMythReali 0,114 0,968 -0,103 
PfefferJ1972V17P218AdminSciQuart -0,153 0,951 -0,189 
KoontzH1967BoardDirectorsEffe -0,800 0,545 -0,101 
ZaldMN1969V75P97AmJSociol -0,191 0,900 -0,320 
BerleAA1932ModernCorporationP 0,758 -0,397 0,456 
HermanES1981CorporateControlCo -0,500 -0,299 0,785 
VanceSC1983CorporateLeadership -0,437 0,878 -0,063 
BrownCC1976PuttingCorporateBo 0,953 -0,001 0,184 
FamaEF1983V26P301JLawEcon 0,426 -0,639 0,592 
FamaEF1980V88P288JPolitEcon -0,296 -0,693 0,614 
MizruchiMS1983V8P426AcadManageRev 0,086 -0,245 0,952 
VanceSC1964BoardsDirectorsStr -0,909 0,207 0,264 
VanceSC1968CorporateDirectorC 0,473 0,826 -0,211 
JensenMC1976V3P305JFinancEcon 0,015 -0,750 0,615 
StoneCD1975WhereTheLawEnds 0,739 0,596 -0,203 
MaceML1976V54P48HarvBusRev 0,917 0,324 0,024 
SelznickP1949TvaGrassRoots -0,940 0,225 -0,009 
PfefferJ1973V18P349AdminSciQuart 0,673 -0,015 0,709 
JuranJM1966CorporateDirector -0,717 -0,486 0,429 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
Rotation converged in 4 iterations. 
Note: Values over 0.7 are in green cell background.  
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Appendix Table 7: Cited References - Total Variance Explained 1992 - 2005 
Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
 Total % of Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 20,100 43,695 43,695 20,100 43,695 43,695 17,445 37,924 37,924 
2 19,111 41,545 85,241 19,111 41,545 85,241 14,172 30,808 68,732 
3 4,890 10,630 95,870 4,890 10,630 95,870 12,484 27,138 95,870 
4 0,678 1,474 97,345       
5 0,597 1,298 98,642       
6 0,111 0,242 98,884       
7 0,094 0,204 99,088       
8 0,083 0,179 99,268       
9 0,074 0,161 99,428       
10 0,037 0,081 99,509       
11 0,030 0,066 99,575       
12 0,028 0,061 99,636       
13 0,025 0,054 99,691       
14 0,016 0,035 99,725       
15 0,014 0,031 99,756       
16 0,012 0,025 99,781       
17 0,011 0,023 99,804       
18 0,009 0,019 99,824       
19 0,008 0,018 99,842       
20 0,007 0,016 99,857       
21 0,007 0,014 99,872       
22 0,006 0,013 99,885       
23 0,005 0,010 99,895       
24 0,004 0,010 99,904       
25 0,004 0,009 99,913       
26 0,004 0,008 99,922       
27 0,004 0,008 99,929       
28 0,003 0,007 99,936       
29 0,003 0,007 99,943       
30 0,003 0,006 99,949       
31 0,002 0,005 99,954       
32 0,002 0,005 99,959       
33 0,002 0,005 99,964       
34 0,002 0,005 99,969       
35 0,002 0,004 99,973       
36 0,002 0,004 99,977       
37 0,002 0,004 99,980       
38 0,002 0,003 99,984       
39 0,001 0,003 99,987       
40 0,001 0,003 99,989       
41 0,001 0,003 99,992       
42 0,001 0,002 99,994       
43 0,001 0,002 99,996       
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Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
 Total % of Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
44 0,001 0,002 99,998       
45 0,001 0,002 100,000       
46 
-
5,523E-
16 
-1,201E-
15 100,000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Appendix Table 8: Cited References - Rotated Component Matrix 1992 – 2005 
 
 Component 
 1 2 3 
FamaEF1983V26P301JLawEcon -0,043 -0,344 0,921 
JensenMC1976V3P305JFinancEcon 0,044 -0,450 0,873 
WeisbachMS1988V20P431JFinancEcon 0,098 -0,667 0,707 
FamaEF1980V88P288JPolitEcon -0,581 0,130 0,785 
LorschJ1989PawnsPotentatesRea -0,244 -0,455 0,834 
JensenMC1993V48P831JFinanc -0,645 -0,203 0,710 
YermackD1996V40P185JFinancEcon -0,116 -0,629 0,738 
BaysingerBD1985V1P101JLawEconOrgan 0,206 0,953 -0,134 
PfefferJ1978ExternalControlOrg -0,242 -0,544 0,776 
HermalinBE1988V19P589RandJEcon -0,719 0,542 0,393 
JensenMC1990V98P225JPolitEcon -0,765 0,066 0,604 
RosensteinS1990V26P175JFinancEcon -0,790 -0,001 0,573 
ZahraSA1989V15P291JManage -0,437 -0,444 0,756 
ByrdJW1992V32P195JFinancEcon -0,470 0,832 -0,212 
MaceML1971DirectorsMythReali -0,441 -0,252 0,843 
MorckR1988V20P293JFinancEcon -0,823 0,196 0,484 
BerleAA1932ModernCorporationP 0,777 0,428 -0,407 
KosnikRD1987V32P163AdminSciQuart 0,644 -0,311 0,677 
ShivdasaniA1993V16P167JAccountEcon -0,841 0,312 0,380 
BrickleyJA1994V35P371JFinancEcon -0,063 0,878 -0,427 
HermalinBE1991V20P101FinancManage -0,253 0,943 -0,120 
PfefferJ1972V17P218AdminSciQuart 0,337 -0,651 0,646 
DemsetzH1985V93P1155JPolitEcon 0,608 0,645 -0,413 
BaysingerBD1990V15P72AcadManageRev 0,970 0,000 -0,130 
ShleiferA1986V94P461JPolitEcon -0,300 0,747 0,567 
KosnikRD1990V33P129AcadManageJ 0,919 -0,069 0,343 
GilsonSC1990V27P355JFinancEcon -0,258 0,894 -0,305 
VanceSC1983CorporateLeadership 0,208 0,099 0,959 
EisenhardtKM1989V14P57AcadManageRev 0,867 -0,411 0,172 
WarnerJB1988V20P461JFinancEcon -0,835 0,440 0,245 
WalshJP1990V15P421AcadManageRev 0,509 -0,601 0,579 
BrickleyJA1987V30P161JLawEcon 0,334 0,745 -0,533 
JensenMC1986V76P323AmEconRev 0,659 0,710 -0,165 
McconnellJJ1990V27P595JFinancEcon -0,566 0,801 0,059 
MizruchiMS1983V8P426AcadManageRev 0,751 -0,468 0,418 
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 Component 
 1 2 3 
LiptonM1992V48P59BusLawyer -0,739 0,638 0,051 
CoughlanAT1985V7P43JAccountEcon 0,545 0,615 -0,522 
KaplanSN1990V27P389JFinancEcon -0,596 0,765 -0,124 
HambrickDC1984V9P193AcadManageRev 0,719 -0,559 0,347 
FinkelsteinS1994V37P1079AcadManageJ 0,937 -0,268 0,047 
DaltonDRR1998V19P269StrategicManageJ 0,903 0,179 -0,327 
JohnsonJL1996V22P409JManage 0,963 -0,137 -0,086 
HermalinBE1998V88P96AmEconRev 0,174 0,824 -0,494 
ShleiferA1997V52P737JFinanc 0,864 0,354 -0,293 
CotterJF1997V43P195JFinancEcon -0,225 0,857 -0,412 
SinghH1989V32P7AcadManageJ 0,965 0,125 0,144 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization 
Rotation converged in 9 iterations. 
Note: Values over 0.7 are in green cell background.  
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Appendix Table 9: Cited References - Total Variance Explained 2006 - 2017 
Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
 Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 14,272 23,019 23,019 14,272 23,019 23,019 13,627 21,980 21,980 
2 12,249 19,756 42,775 12,249 19,756 42,775 11,831 19,082 41,062 
3 10,943 17,650 60,424 10,943 17,650 60,424 11,120 17,936 58,998 
4 10,429 16,822 77,246 10,429 16,822 77,246 10,873 17,537 76,535 
5 10,112 16,310 93,556 10,112 16,310 93,556 10,553 17,021 93,556 
6 0,557 0,898 94,454       
7 0,281 0,453 94,907       
8 0,259 0,418 95,325       
9 0,225 0,363 95,688       
10 0,215 0,347 96,035       
11 0,194 0,313 96,348       
12 0,189 0,304 96,652       
13 0,174 0,281 96,934       
14 0,158 0,255 97,189       
15 0,148 0,239 97,427       
16 0,132 0,212 97,640       
17 0,131 0,212 97,851       
18 0,107 0,172 98,024       
19 0,097 0,157 98,181       
20 0,088 0,143 98,323       
21 0,049 0,079 98,402       
22 0,046 0,074 98,476       
23 0,044 0,071 98,547       
24 0,043 0,069 98,616       
25 0,040 0,065 98,681       
26 0,039 0,063 98,744       
27 0,038 0,061 98,805       
28 0,037 0,059 98,864       
29 0,036 0,058 98,922       
30 0,033 0,053 98,975       
31 0,032 0,052 99,027       
32 0,031 0,050 99,078       
33 0,031 0,049 99,127       
34 0,030 0,048 99,175       
Chapter 2: Board of Directors: A Bibliometric Analysis	
	116 
Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
 Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
35 0,028 0,046 99,221       
36 0,027 0,044 99,265       
37 0,026 0,043 99,307       
38 0,026 0,042 99,349       
39 0,025 0,040 99,389       
40 0,023 0,037 99,427       
41 0,023 0,037 99,464       
42 0,023 0,037 99,501       
43 0,022 0,035 99,536       
44 0,021 0,033 99,569       
45 0,020 0,032 99,601       
46 0,019 0,031 99,632       
47 0,019 0,030 99,662       
48 0,018 0,030 99,692       
49 0,018 0,029 99,721       
50 0,018 0,029 99,750       
51 0,017 0,028 99,778       
52 0,017 0,027 99,805       
53 0,016 0,026 99,831       
54 0,016 0,025 99,856       
55 0,015 0,025 99,881       
56 0,015 0,024 99,905       
57 0,015 0,024 99,928       
58 0,014 0,023 99,951       
59 0,014 0,022 99,973       
60 0,013 0,022 99,995       
61 0,003 0,005 100,000       
62 5,156E
-17 
8,316E-
17 
100,000       
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Appendix Table 10: Cited References - Rotated Component Matrix 2006 - 2017 
 Component 
 1 2 3 4 5 
FamaEF1983V26P301JLawEcon 0,887 0,263 -0,011 0,213 0,145 
JensenMC1976V3P305JFinancEcon 0,926 0,210 0,043 0,105 0,132 
YermackD1996V40P185JFinancEcon 0,816 -0,060 0,148 0,485 0,115 
JensenMC1993V48P831JFinanc 0,828 0,375 0,305 -0,113 -0,103 
PfefferJ1978ExternalControlOrg 0,658 0,118 -0,557 -0,383 0,204 
HillmanAJ2003V28P383AcadManageRev 0,468 -0,081 -0,766 0,119 0,337 
ShleiferA1997V52P737JFinanc 0,883 0,274 -0,161 -0,212 -0,139 
WeisbachMS1988V20P431JFinancEcon 0,749 0,238 -0,014 -0,382 0,436 
HermalinBE1998V88P96AmEconRev 0,225 0,759 -0,002 -0,550 0,048 
FamaEF1980V88P288JPolitEcon 0,257 0,129 0,011 0,903 -0,203 
ColesJL2008V87P329JFinancEcon -0,071 -0,039 0,897 0,326 0,108 
CoreJE1999V51P371JFinancEcon -0,248 0,408 0,415 0,459 0,579 
GompersP2003V118P107QJEcon 0,213 0,508 0,457 0,659 -0,028 
DaltonDRR1998V19P269StrategicManageJ -0,205 -0,476 -0,538 0,262 -0,549 
WeisbachMS2003V9P7EcPolicyRev 0,558 0,423 -0,091 0,395 0,533 
AdamsRB2007V62P217JFinanc -0,695 0,183 -0,082 -0,227 -0,590 
KleinA2002V33P375JAccountEcon 0,302 0,867 0,225 0,163 0,140 
LinckJS2008V87P308JFinancEcon 0,265 0,814 -0,258 -0,028 -0,359 
AdamsRB2009V94P291JFinancEcon -0,243 -0,729 0,260 -0,267 -0,455 
BeasleyMS1996V71P443AccountRev -0,779 0,158 0,220 0,095 0,500 
JensenMC1986V76P323AmEconRev 0,199 0,492 0,767 -0,195 0,163 
FichEM2006V61P689JFinanc -0,248 0,278 0,125 0,852 0,247 
CarterDA2003V38P33FinancialRev -0,031 -0,884 0,310 -0,253 -0,036 
ZahraSA1989V15P291JManage 0,802 -0,366 -0,272 -0,259 0,158 
MorckR1988V20P293JFinancEcon 0,318 0,008 0,630 0,079 0,654 
ForbesDP1999V24P489AcadManageRev 0,177 -0,570 0,035 0,759 -0,083 
BooneAL2007V85P66JFinancEcon -0,601 0,244 -0,359 -0,610 0,089 
LaPortaR1999V54P471JFinanc 0,630 -0,348 0,542 -0,304 0,182 
BerleAA1932ModernCorporationP -0,614 -0,153 -0,700 -0,048 0,183 
LiptonM1992V48P59BusLawyer -0,010 0,696 0,104 -0,130 0,650 
FerrisSP2003V58P1087JFinanc -0,513 -0,210 0,263 0,736 0,131 
JohnsonJL1996V22P409JManage 0,462 -0,318 -0,608 0,489 -0,137 
AdamsRB2010V48P58JEconLit -0,364 -0,352 -0,304 -0,392 -0,654 
HillmanAJ2000V37P235JManageStud 0,170 -0,850 -0,419 -0,083 -0,039 
RahejaCG2005V40P283JFinancQuantAnal 0,153 0,324 -0,083 -0,879 -0,126 
EisenbergT1998V48P35JFinancEcon -0,308 -0,413 0,754 -0,217 -0,233 
DailyCM2003V28P371AcadManageRev -0,210 -0,798 -0,039 0,384 -0,324 
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 Component 
 1 2 3 4 5 
ShleiferA1986V94P461JPolitEcon 0,089 0,283 -0,227 -0,234 0,859 
ByrdJW1992V32P195JFinancEcon -0,844 0,147 -0,303 0,237 0,218 
DemsetzH1985V93P1155JPolitEcon -0,224 -0,129 0,199 -0,907 0,044 
BhagatS2002V27P231JCorpLaw -0,809 0,002 0,160 -0,489 0,086 
LorschJ1989PawnsPotentatesRea -0,085 -0,299 -0,664 0,394 0,487 
DaltonDRR1999V42P674AcadManageJ -0,638 -0,671 0,102 0,154 0,178 
HermalinBE1991V20P101FinancManage -0,478 -0,054 0,726 -0,318 0,275 
LaPortaR1998V106P1113JPolitEcon 0,038 -0,360 0,248 -0,563 0,655 
RosensteinS1990V26P175JFinancEcon -0,357 -0,008 0,046 -0,193 0,875 
PfefferJ1972V17P218AdminSciQuart 0,106 -0,742 0,022 0,128 0,592 
WestphalJD1999V42P7AcadManageJ 0,531 -0,681 -0,132 0,329 0,260 
AgrawalA1996V31P377JFinancQuantAnal 0,152 0,059 0,174 0,204 -0,915 
CarpenterMA2001V44P639AcadManageJ -0,237 0,356 -0,788 -0,272 -0,254 
EisenhardtKM1989V14P57AcadManageRev -0,072 0,013 -0,679 -0,056 -0,682 
VafeasN1999V53P113JFinancEcon 0,525 0,055 0,339 -0,180 -0,710 
DechowP1996V13P1ContempAccountRes -0,741 0,548 0,203 0,155 0,155 
ShivdasaniA1999V54P1829JFinanc -0,328 0,875 -0,046 0,044 -0,218 
WestphalJD1995V40P60AdminSciQuart 0,020 0,147 -0,876 -0,317 0,215 
HambrickDC1984V9P193AcadManageRev -0,258 -0,161 -0,192 0,828 -0,355 
ErhardtNL2003V11P102CorpGov 0,057 -0,663 0,099 -0,683 -0,147 
McconnellJJ1990V27P595JFinancEcon 0,173 0,354 0,728 0,058 -0,500 
FamaEF1983V26P327JLawEcon 0,063 -0,052 0,105 -0,625 -0,729 
MizruchiMS1996V22P271AnnuRevSociol -0,086 0,206 -0,787 0,505 -0,111 
HermalinBE1988V19P589RandJEcon -0,387 0,360 0,203 -0,023 -0,783 
KleinA1998V41P275JLawEcon -0,409 0,227 0,647 0,287 -0,463 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
 Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization 
Rotation converged in 8 iterations. 
Note: Values over 0.7 are in green cell background.  
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ABSTRACT 
The research on the board of directors produced a significant number of articles in business 
literature. The Corporate Governance International Review (CGIR) is the Journal that 
contributes the most to this research field. This study aims to investigate which are the 
main issues on board of directors scientific that have been published by the journal and 
how it has been approached from different points of view. In our objectives want to 
identify and analyze the intellectual structure that has been built upon them. We analyzed 
190 articles and their bibliographic references that were published in the CGIR Journal 
from 2000 to 2017 using bibliometrics methods. The work identifies which are the most 
relevant studies in terms of influence, the impact authors, the approaches they utilized, the 
topics that have been targeted, and the way they established relationship. We support those 
findings through descriptive statistics as well as factor analysis over the three periods we 
identified in that time span. Thus, we may map the structure of the intellectual framework 
that studied the board of directors in this Journal. There is a clearer map for approaching 
the topic of the board of directors in a key journal in terms of significance of contributions, 
highlighting different points of view and pointing out some missing or less considered ones 
in the research studies. Future development of them might be addressed to strengthen the 
relevance of the journal in the topic.  
KEYWORDS 
Corporate Governance, Board of Directors, Bibliometrics, Citation and Co-citation 
Analysis, Knowledge Mapping.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There is no doubt in referring Corporate Governance as one of the most relevant fields in 
business practice, in research and in society in general. This relevance comes after a 
significant rising interest over the last years. Aiming to achieve the best possible 
government for organizations, and to fix many problems in corporate performance, several 
initiatives took place in companies and in markets institutional configuration. Some 
corporate failures in the beginning of this century triggered more proposals that were very 
often channeled through new regulation (Bennington, 2010; Schmidt & Brauer, 2006) such 
as the Sarbanes Oxley Act. New propositions, raised under the pressure from market 
players, were routed through recommendations that were progressively included in Codes 
of Corporate Governance in many countries, in spite of some criticism that highlighted the 
‘checklist approach’ that might affect boards functioning through overstandarization 
(Ingley & Van der Walt, 2001; Schmidt & Brauer, 2006). Efficiency needs and 
legitimation pressures appeared as key supporting rationales for code adoption, and 
showed different patterns according to variables such as the level of shareholder protection 
rights (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004).  
In the aim of providing a proper foundation, multiple factors triggered intellectual 
contributions from academia, which increase and evolve over these years, complementing 
initial works and providing consistency to this field of study. Although there were many 
journals showing different aspects regarding the board of directors, the Journal Corporate 
Governance – An International Review (CGIR) is the greatest contributor to the studies on 
Corporate Governance. This journal has significantly helped in the process of maturation 
that builds a discipline itself (Durisin & Puzone, 2009), addressing many matters and 
topics from diverse perspectives. The ‘multidisciplinary conversation’ is, eventually, one 
of the goals of the Journal, looking for publishing ‘cutting-edge international business 
research on the phenomena of comparative corporate governance’ based on the 
contributions of a great variety of academic arenas. 
Researchers on this discipline produced a substantial number of works that were focused 
on the board of directors as one of the main topics, since it has been at the core of the 
governance mechanisms(Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Carver, 2010; Kim & 
Cannella, 2008). These works aimed to understand different issues such as the structure 
and implications of the board (Rechner & Dalton, 1991; Zahra & Pearce II, 1989), its 
composition and characteristics (Datta, Musteen, & Herrmann, 2009; Hillman, Nicholson, 
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& Shropshire, 2008; Sherman, Kashlak, & Joshi, 1998), the processes (Dulewicz, 
MacMillan, & Herbert, 1995), or the roles (Björkman, 1994; Boulton, 1978; Kim, Burns, 
& Prescott, 2009; Nicholson & Newton, 2010). Then, in this context, CGIR addressed the 
Board of Directors among the main editorial objectives since its very early stages, and, as 
for 2017, accounts for 6,25% of all the papers that has been produced on the topic. Given 
the increasing variety of approaches the issues they faced, and the number of works, it is 
convenient to understand the structure, the evolution and future arenas of study. This work 
does not intend to make a contribution on any of the topics related to corporate 
governance, but to the research on boards of directors from a broad notion and point of 
view. 
Thus, the objective of this work is to assess the referred publications on the Board of 
Directors in CGIR, the foundations for their relevance, and the evolution in the maturation 
process of the discipline. We aim to identify and weight the relationships and influence of 
the main articles and contributors on this topic, which shapes the existing intellectual 
framework. The study does so through an analysis of the literature using bibliometrics 
methods. Thus, the assessment can be conducted through the articles and the citations that 
the researches use in their works, with the help of bibliometric analyses. Compared to other 
techniques, bibliometrics methods have the advantages of presenting quantified data that 
lead to a more objective discussion on the results (Cobo, López-Herrera, Herrera-Viedma, 
& Herrera, 2011; Durisin & Puzone, 2009; Garfield, 1979). We addressed the period from 
2000 to 2017. At the beginning of the century, the Journal began to be a reference in the 
indices of publications, and led the biggest growth in the research on the topic until now. 
For a better understanding of the evolution over this time, we split the research in different 
periods. .  
This work is composed of three sections. Following this introduction, we review the 
literature on bibliometrics, and describe the methodology we adopted to analyze the 
intellectual structure of the research on the board of directors in the journals from CGIR. In 
the second section, we show and discuss the results obtained from the application of 
bibliometric techniques. Finally, we state some conclusions and suggestions for future 
research.  
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2. LITERATURE ON BIBLIOMETRICS AND METHODOLOGY 
2.1. Literature on Bibliometrics 
Bibliometrics is a group tools the researchers may use for analyzing publication data. It is 
also a field of research that uses mathematical and statistical techniques to study publishing 
patterns in the distribution of information (McCain, 1996), that were conceptualized in the 
late 1960s (Groos & Pritchard, 1969). Amongst these techniques, we will use impact 
indicators, citation and co-citation analysis, and bibliometric mapping. Citation analysis 
states that authors cite the documents they think significant for the purpose of their 
research. Consequently, the frequency of citation of these articles may appear linked to the 
influence on the topic (Culnan, 1987). Gathering data from databases and applying 
analytical and graphic display techniques, co-citation analysis studies the articles that cite a 
certain pair of references (McCain, 1990). This way of citation may show some similarity 
of content, and, therefore, help identifying groups of topics and authors, and how they can 
be related (Pilkington & Liston-Heyes, 1999; Ramos-Rodriguez & Ruiz-Navarro, 2004). 
We will use data and results obtained to perform a bibliometric mapping using VOS 
approach (van Eck, Waltman, Dekker, & van den Berg, 2010). This is especially relevant 
when we are handling sources coming from multidisciplinary fields (Börner, Chen, & 
Boyack, 2005). 
Bibliometrics techniques have been used for years to map and study the knowledge on 
disciplines of science that vary significantly: from Biotechnology (Dalpé, 2002) to  
Sociology (Keshava, Hittalamani, & Gowda, 2008), Psychology (Haslam et al., 2008) or 
Management (Ramos-Rodriguez & Ruiz-Navarro, 2004). Within management, there were 
more specific studies in areas like finance, operations management, organizational 
behavior, human resources management, supply chain management or innovation that were 
studied through these techniques.   
The bibliometric analysis of specific topics or subfields within the management arena has 
also been widely employed. Thus, amongst those works, we may find studies on corporate 
social responsibility (De Bakker, Groenewegen, & Den Hond, 2005), family business 
(Casillas & Acedo, 2007), entrepreneurship (Etemad & Lee, 2003; Landström, Harirchi, & 
Åström, 2012; Schildt, Zahra, & Sillanpää, 2006), environmental management accounting 
(Schaltegger, Gibassier, & Zvezdov, 2013), or business incubators (Diez-Vial & Montoro-
Sanchez, 2017), etc. 
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Besides, theories and intellectual frameworks, such as the resource-based theory (Acedo, 
Barroso, & Galan, 2006), Dynamic Capability View (Vogel & Güttel, 2012), Transaction 
Cost Theory (Martins, Serra, Leite, Ferreira, & Li, 2010), and Institutional Theory 
(Weerakkody, Dwivedi, & Irani, 2009) have been the objective of these methods too. 
 
2.2. Methodology 
We used articles published in journals as legitimate sources since they are considered 
‘certified knowledge’. The qualification process provides reliability to the results (Callon, 
Courtial, & Penan, 1993; Ramos-Rodriguez & Ruiz-Navarro, 2004) and sets this kind of 
documents as relevant for these research methods. We considered each publication as a 
possible contribution to the research in this arena. This approach is, therefore, consistent 
with the goal of mapping which works configure the contributions to the research on board 
of directors from different perspectives 
We utilized citation analysis and co-occurrence citation analysis. Citation analysis is based 
on the importance that researchers give to a publication when they refer to it as a source. 
Consequently, we may think that the more cited, the more influential it will be for the 
research community in the development of that specific arena (Ramos-Rodriguez & Ruiz-
Navarro, 2008).  The use of co-occurrence leads to establish potential communities in 
terms of contributions. 
Our research has been designed in different stages so as to apply bibliometric techniques 
properly. Between the research design and the conclusions elaboration, it is agreed that it is 
necessary to perform a group of tasks that include steps like data retrieval, cleaning, 
analysis and visualization (Zupic & Cater, 2015). The Figure 1 below shows the different 
stages we followed to perform the data analysis.  
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Figure 1: Methodology Stages 
 
For the purpose of this paper, accordingly with the majority of bibliometric studies in this 
realm (Zupic & Cater, 2015), we collected articles’ data from registers stored at the Web of 
Science main collection website database. We search for board* director* in the journal 
Corporate Governance: An International Review. The articles we obtained, 258, were 
published from 2000 to 2017. Since we wanted to examine the different approaches and 
the structure of contributions, we limited the initial search to those articles that included 
the words ‘board’ and ‘director’, in the title, the keywords or the abstract. We realize that 
there were some combinations of words that studied our field: board, boards, boardroom, 
board of directors. Thus, we included all of them in our search and retrieval process. Then, 
we checked all the resulting articles so as to keep only those related to the topic. We 
excluded those that were classified as proceedings papers (68) and performed the analysis 
on the remaining 190 articles. 
Above-mentioned research works, as well as many others, have pointed out the need for a 
data pre-processing and cleaning due to raw data condition. Data cleaning included capital 
letters homogenization, authors’ initials checking, removal of duplicities in cited 
references, data completion, removal of anonymous authorship (except in cited references), 
etc. Despite some bibliometric studies recommend to keep just the first authors initial, we 
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decided to keep the initials that were provided as raw data, because we identified authors 
that differ just in the middle name (we found up to four different authors for the same 
surname). That led us to check each author and reference in the original raw data to 
prevent duplicates, clean data and standardize references as to minimize the possibilities of 
failure in their homogenization. We were helped by specific software we developed for 
data pre-processing in Python programming language. 
Once the dataset was produced, we used several software packages to explore it. For the 
specific bibliometrics data management, we employed BibExcel software to analyze the 
data and attain indicators, classify items, etc. (Åström, Danell, Larsen, & Schneider, 2009). 
We utilized standardized software for basic treatment of data, such as MS Word and MS 
Excel, to support tasks of data cleaning and sorting, and figures designing. In order to 
obtain the correlation matrices and to perform factor analysis, we utilized SPSS v.25. We 
also applied VOSviewer software as a tool to build and visualize relationships graphically, 
and to perform analyses based on the networks underneath the research on the topic (van 
Eck & Waltman, 2010). 
For the purpose of our study, we decided to use descriptive and relational bibliometric 
indicators and tools. The publishing year frequency will help to visualize and set up stages 
in the history of researching this topic. The country of origin will highlight the main 
geographical centers of contribution. The mapping and analysis of the organizations the 
author belong to will help to provide a different picture of the institutional collaboration 
and contribution to this topic. Through the main contributors and journals we will show 
who has researched the most and which publication served to collect the majority of those 
studies. The keywords help to understand the self-assessment of how the concepts and the 
researches are classified and related in this context, and which among them have not been 
studied enough. Co-occurrence in cited journals provides a clearer picture of the 
concentration of the research main streams. Co-occurrence in authors gives a structure of 
research communities and co-occurrence in citations lead to understand the intellectual 
framework. Finally, maps provided a clearer picture of what has been done, the 
communities, and what could be developed in new studies. 
This way, we could obtain the main figures and the global configuration of the research on 
board of directors before deepening in certain core intellectual nodes, subtopics or 
publications. As a result, the final step of the methodology provides our conclusions based 
on the findings of this analysis, the limitations we faced on this study and some possible 
lines for future research. 
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3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Between 2000 and 2017, CGIR published 485 articles in their journals. The total amount of 
registers was 913. We excluded items categorized under proceedings papers (158), 
editorial materials (110), book reviews (104), reviews (50), corrections (3) and 
biographical items (2). By applying the selection criteria, we retrieved 190 articles that 
account for 39.17% of the publications. Descriptive figures showing frequencies of 
publications by year may help the initial understanding of the matter. As the Figure 2 
shows, there are not clear ex-ante distinctions in terms of periods of time in publications. 
The average number of articles was 10.55 and the standard deviation 4.287. But there are 
three sharp peaks in 2005, 2007, and 2011 (in those years, there were 16, 16 and 18 articles 
respectively) that might lead to split in subperiods. We establish the periods span based on 
the changes in the Editor in Chief. Therefore, we came up with three periods: 2000–2007, 
2008–2013, and 2014–2017. We performed calculations for each one of them. In the first 
period, the average of articles is 9.625 and the standard deviation 4.627. In the period of 
time between 2008 and 2013, the average grows until 13.5 per year and the standard 
deviation diminishes and sets at 3.72. In the last period, the average of published articles is 
8 and the standard deviation is 1.63. Therefore, we might say that the second period gives 
the board of director even more relevance. The comparisons between the total number of 
articles and those on boards, and the one between boards and the total number of 
documents published, also support that suggestion. The second time span experienced an 
increase of the relative presence of the topic in both indicators (See Table 1).  
Table 1: Descriptive statistics on published articles by period 
 2000 - 2007 2008 - 2013 2014 - 2017 
 
Mean Std. Deviation Mean 
Std. 
Deviation Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Total Published 
Documents (TPD) 61,63 28,799 47,50 5,050 36,25 2,500 
Articles excluding 
Proceedings & 
Revisions (TA) 
25,75 14,390 30,83 4,622 23,50 2,082 
Articles on Boards 
(AoB) 9,63 4,627 13,50 3,728 8,00 1,633 
AoB / TPD 15,51%  28,42%  21,92%  
AoB / TA 38,93%  43,34%  33,95%  
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Figure 2: Number of Published Articles in CGIR per Year (BoD vs Total Articles vs 
Total Published Documents) 
 
 
During the whole period, publications on the board evolve similarly to the total amount of 
publications. In fact, there is a positive (0.825) and significant (0.000) correlation between 
the total number of articles and those on boards. Nevertheless, once we considered the 
three periods the correlation between the total count of articles and those related to the 
board behaves differently (Table 2). Despite the correlation is still positive, it is not 
significant in the second period. This behavior points to a progressive inclusion of a variety 
of topics amongst the themes in the second period, addressing a broad range of governance 
mechanisms, while keeping the baseline relevance of the board. 
Table 2: Correlations: total documents, total articles and articles on Board of 
Directors 
2000 - 2007 2008 - 2013 2014 - 2017 
  
TPD TA AoB TPD TA AoB TPD TA AoB 
TPD Pearson Correlation 1,000 0,965** 0,904** 1,000 0,767 0,356 1,000 0,544 0,980* 
 
Sig. (2-tailed)  0,000 0,002  0,075 0,489  0,456 0,020 
TA Pearson Correlation 0,965** 1 0,902** 0,767 1,000 0,760 0,544 1,000 0,588 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,000  0,002 0,075  0,079 0,456  0,412 
AoB Pearson Correlation 0,904** 0,902** 1 0,356 0,760 1,000 0,980* 0,588 1,000 
 
Sig. (2-tailed) 0,002 0,002  0,489 0,079  0,020 0,412  
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
      * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
       TPD: Total Published Documents; TA: Total number of Articles; AoB: Articles on Board of Directors 
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The analysis of year 2005 might provide some light. The journal published a special issue 
focused on comparative corporate governance in UK and China, in terms of legal 
development, ownership structure, stakeholder’s vision, and local adoption of international 
practices. The second issue combines contributions from practitioners and the academia. 
The contents show a great variety of topics in terms of topics (OCDE Principles evolution, 
disclosure and transparency, compliance, succession planning, size, board structure, 
ownership concentration, executive remuneration, strategic diversification) and 
geographies analyzed (US, UK, Germany, Australia, Hungary, Turkey, Singapore, China, 
Japan, Taiwan, OECD) and it was meant to be a reflection of the key developments on 
corporate governance at that time. The third issue was devoted to compare different topics 
in to countries: Germany and Japan. The fourth issue gathers articles from the Conference 
held in Birmingham on the previous year and some papers that were characterized as “hot 
topics”. The fifth gathers in a special issue some of the papers from the Conference held at 
Henley in 2004, daringly labeled under the title “Leading the Boardroom Revolution”. 
Considering all of them, we think that the publications of this year set a milestone in terms 
of broadness of themes, geographies and angles, which anticipates a period of maturation 
of the discipline inside the journal. 
The journal had several editors during the whole time span. From 2000 to July 2007, Chris 
Martin was the Editor-in-Chief. During that time there was an increase in the number of 
issues, from four to six, which partially explains the evolution on number of publications 
during that time. In fact, the first year with six issues was 2005, one of the peaks we 
analyzed. William Judge succeeded Chris Martin for six years. It is remarkable that the 
number of articles on board of directors stayed as the number of total articles intentionally 
decreased during that time, and got open to more author geographical diversity (Judge, 
2013). In the last period of time, from 2013, Zattoni and Peevar took the leading position 
in the Journal. CGIR stats on JCR and SCIMAGO rankings also show an increase in the 
impact factor while keeping the status at Q1 and Q2 in three categories: business, business 
and finance, and management. Then, the Journal go over these periods maintaining those 
contributions on the board of directors at the top level in terms of impact and relevance 
amongst all contributors. 
These publications might be placed in the context of the overall contribution on the topic 
coming from all journals during that time. We found that CGIR came before, and somehow 
anticipated, a significant increase in the publication of articles in other journals regarding 
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the topic. If we compare the series with the total amount of articles in other journals during 
those years (3,021), they are the 6.2% of the total. The correlation is slightly positive but 
not significant across the 18 years. If we look at the second period, the correlation is 
positive (0.707) but still not significant enough (0.076). Therefore, although we can’t make 
decisive and conclusive statements just upon these figures, a noticeable fostering in board 
publishing articles was made at that time, and the relationship with the role of CGIR 
Journal was positive.  
After considering subjects related to periodic publication patterns we address how different 
geographical areas and institutions combine to deliver the articles. The nationalities and 
organizations of the published articles lead to a better understanding of demographic 
characteristics of the authors and their degree of collaboration.  
The authors of the journals come from 33 nationalities. US, English, Italian, Taiwanese, 
Spanish and Australian authors concentrate most of the production. Despite this 
concentration, it is diverse enough if it is compared to the whole set of publications on this 
topic. It shown continental diversity and relevance, and a more groups connected in their 
contributions. Five of them are not connected to others. That is the case of authors from 
Indonesia, Ireland, Cyprus, Colombia and Turkey. We mapped the co-authorship and 
showed how authors from 28 countries relate one each other in Figure 3. In the figure, the 
size of the nodes indicates the relative number of documents. Accordingly, the thickness of 
lines shows the relative strength of the relationship between authors of two countries. 
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Figure 3: Countries co-authorship map 
 
 
 
The organizations behind the authors may help us to understand the way the author related 
within and across institutions in their collaborations. We identified 260 sourcing research 
organizations. We visualize that the vast majority of them are low related, even in the case 
when they play a key role in terms of nationality, such in many US institutions. We also 
notice a core built upon Italian organizations (e.g. Bocconi University, University of 
Padua), English institutions (e.g. Liverpool University or Leeds University), and a group of 
diverse north European organizations (e.g. Copenhagen University, Norwegian University, 
Lund University, or Aalto University), provide a higher degree of collaboration. Figure 4 
shows the latest referred institutions. The size of the bubble is related to the number of co-
occurrences. Thus, the bigger the size, the more contributions they have. And the closer 
they are, the higher the degree of collaboration between organizations.  
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Figure 4: Co-authorship Organizations Map 
 
 
It is perceptible that the diversity of authors, as regards to the institutions and countries 
they belong, can be improved but, if we compare that to the overall contributions on board 
of directors, the CGIR is leading the way. 
Although articles on board of directors have been published in management, accounting, 
finance or law journals, the contribution of CGIR is the more meaningful, since it accounts 
for the 7% of them and it is at the top of the rank according to the number of published 
researches on the topic. 
Once we have studied the evolution in publication, and the collaboration between 
organizations, the analysis should aim to the authors of the journal. There are 377 unique 
authors across all the articles we studied. Following the same pattern of other scientific 
arenas, just a small group of them concentrates most publications. We should remind that 
we just considered articles type of document as a unit of analysis. There were a number of 
proceedings papers such as those authored by Kiel and Johnson that were highly cited 
since it study board effectiveness, composition and financial performance, and analyzed 
the impact of directors from the point of view of three theories (agency, stewardship and 
resource dependence). But, in order to keep constant criteria in the analysis, we decided 
not to include them. 
We calculated the Hirsch-index for each one of the authors (Hirsch, 2005) and utilized this 
criteria to rank them in Table 3. This index is commonly used to rank and analyze the 
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relevance of their contributions. These 26 authors account for the 30% of the articles and 
wrote at least two articles. The remaining 351 authors published just once in the journal. 
 
Table 3: Top authors ranked by h-index 
Author h-index 
Citation sum 
within h-core 
All 
citations All articles 
Huse M 5 300 300 5 
Yeh YH 3 164 164 3 
Garcia-Meca E 2 73 73 2 
McNulty T 2 55 55 2 
Wan D 2 51 51 2 
Gabrielsson J 2 106 106 2 
Samra-Fredericks D 2 90 90 2 
Machold S 2 57 57 2 
Brammer S 2 128 128 2 
Ward AJ 2 58 58 2 
Gonzalez M 2 15 15 2 
Chen AL 2 46 46 2 
Hagendorff J 2 28 28 2 
Nordqvist M 2 68 68 2 
Chen HL 2 37 37 2 
Ong CH 2 51 51 2 
Hung JH 2 15 15 2 
Minichilli A 2 57 57 3 
Guedri Z 2 21 21 2 
Carver J 2 25 25 2 
Randoy T 2 29 29 2 
Aguilera RV 2 160 160 2 
Phan PH 2 30 30 2 
Yoshikawa T 2 36 36 2 
Keasey K 2 23 23 2 
Pye A 2 36 36 2 
 
 
The analysis of gender diversity on boards (Iannotta, Gatti, & Huse, 2016; Nielsen & Huse, 
2010), boards involvement in strategy (Machold, Huse, Minichilli, & Nordqvist, 2011), the 
behavioral theory of boards (van Ees, Gabrielsson, & Huse, 2009), and the evaluation of 
the board (Minichilli, Gabrielsson, & Huse, 2007) give Huse, and coauthors like 
Gabrielsson or Nordqvist, a top ranking position. The themes he studied, along with the 
other collaborators, provide support to one of the main topics of research on boards, gender 
diversity, as well as differential approaches to the analysis. The articles authored by Yeh 
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investigate the independence at committees with a cross-country perspective (Yeh, Chung, 
& Liu, 2011), the effect of control and ownership of controlling shareholders on corporate 
valuation in Taiwanese listed companies (Yeh, 2005), and the relationship between board 
characteristics, with special focus in the ownership structure, and financial distress (Lee & 
Yeh, 2004). The contributions coauthored by Garcia-Meca studied the board committees 
the reporting quality (Pucheta-Martínez & García-Meca, 2014), and provided a meta-
analysis of 35 articles on earnings management in relationship with ownership structure 
(García-Meca & Sánchez-Ballesta, 2009). Aguilera has an important rank and count of 
citations mainly due to the study of Codes of Good Governance (Aguilera & Cuervo-
Cazurra, 2009). According to this ranking, the Journal’s contributors support their 
researches on authors that provide grounding for issues regarding ownership structure, 
often in a context of financial crisis, gender diversity, codes of good governance and new 
theoretical approaches on the board. The use of meta-analysis is also relevant and 
convenient while dealing with developments on issues related to the main topic. 
A different ranking could be produce so as to remark the overall amount of citations and 
detect collaborations. Table 4 shows top authors ranked by citations. These 26 authors 
were cited over 100 times and represent 36.5% of all citations (12,370). Huse is still at the 
top group of authors but we reckon collaborations among Werbel, Shrader and Erhart; 
Simkins, Simpson, D'Souza, and Carter; Barako, Izan, and Hancock; or de Andrés, Azofra, 
and López, that have been widely spread.  The first group of authors studied board 
diversity and firm financial performance in 127 US companies and found a positive 
association (Erhardt, Werbel, & Shrader, 2003). The second identified group of authors 
brought the analysis of diversity to the gender and ethnics of boards and their committees, 
also for the case of US companies. These authors did not find any positive nor negative 
effect of diversity on firm financial performance, and pointing to different criteria for 
heterogeneity (Carter, D’Souza, Simkins, & Simpson, 2010). The group of Barako 
investigates on the factors leading to voluntary disclosure (Barako, Hancock, & Izan, 
2006). Finally, we highlight the article on the size, composition, functioning and 
effectiveness of boards in OECD countries (De Andres, Azofra, & Lopez, 2005). This 
article combines classical subtopics on boards of directors, mostly related to the agency 
theory, with a cross-country analysis. The board structure is also approached in the work of 
Jackling and Johl (2009) but in this case using two theoretical angles, the agency theory 
and resource dependence theory (Jackling & Johl, 2009). The contents of these works 
should have a corresponding relation to the keywords and topics studied. 
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Table 4: Top authors ranked by citations 
Author h-index 
Citation sum 
within h-core 
All 
citations 
All 
articles 
Werbel JD 1 332 332 1 
Shrader CB 1 332 332 1 
Erhardt NL 1 332 332 1 
Huse M 5 300 300 5 
Simkins BJ 1 205 205 1 
Simpson WG 1 205 205 1 
D'Souza F 1 205 205 1 
Carter DA 1 205 205 1 
Rose C 1 181 181 1 
Yeh YH 3 164 164 3 
Aguilera RV 2 160 160 2 
Nielsen S 1 154 154 1 
Barako DG 1 152 152 1 
Izan HY 1 152 152 1 
Hancock P 1 152 152 1 
Brammer S 2 128 128 2 
Jackling B 1 128 128 1 
Johl S 1 128 128 1 
Cheng M 1 121 121 1 
Kang H 1 121 121 1 
Gray SJ 1 121 121 1 
Cuervo-Cazurra A 1 115 115 1 
Lopez F 1 108 108 1 
de Andres P 1 108 108 1 
Azofra V 1 108 108 1 
Gabrielsson J 2 106 106 2 
 
 
The map of co-authorship may help us to detect and analyze other groups of collaboration. 
Some of the groups we visualize were also well referred in terms of impact, suggesting a 
positive relationship. That is the case of Huse, Garcia-Meca, Aguilera, Brammer or 
Hagendorf (Figure 5). 
In the figure, the size of the nodes shows the relative degree of collaboration and articles’ 
production. Given the number of authors, only some of them appear depending on the 
group, number of collaborations, and strength of the link they have in common. We realize 
that there is, at the same time, a certain degree of collaboration, which was previously 
detected in among institutions (e.g. Italian or Northern Europe Universities), and a great 
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variety of small groups. We think that, despite the need of collaboration, the diversification 
of authors, geographies, etc. enriches the contents and potential impact of researches. 
 
Figure 5: Co-authorship Authors' Map 
 
 
 
Through the analysis of authors’ keywords we may analyze the key contents of the works 
and the relationship as primary intention of the authors, providing this is entirely a self-
assessment. It might also describe directions of research, main areas of interest and help to 
know trends and future lines of investigation.  The analysis of the keywords of the sample 
of our work presented 787 keywords made out of 428 different terms. Only 78 of them are 
shown at least twice as keywords. It is worth saying that keywords are composed by 
different words and, also, we may establish some equivalence for the purpose of our 
research (e.g. we merged frequencies for the keywords Gender/Gender 
diversity/Diversity/Board gender diversity/Women/Women directors/Women on boards). 
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As a result, we reduced the terms to 392. Since we filtered articles considering their 
relationship with the board in corporate governance, these words appear in, at least, 62% of 
the articles. They were not considered for further analysis and were not shown at the 
Figure 6. As regards to the theoretical backgrounds, the Agency theory plays a central role 
and is strongly related to topics like composition, ownership, compensation or 
independence. Other theories appear in the landscape, such as the stewardship, resource-
dependence or institutional theories, but they have a secondary role. In addition to the 
mentioned topics, Diversity and Gender diversity are also amongst the most frequent. This 
is consistent with the analysis of cited authors and references, and traces a road of research 
that has been followed in other journals. The relationship to performance is commonly 
used, although it adopts different shapes (value, financial, stock). Codes and indices also 
are shown. Industries are not clearly specified with the exception of banking. The 
visualization of the mentioned terms is shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6: Keywords co-occurrence map 
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If we count the average citation year of each term and visualize it in a color-scaled map 
(Figure 7), we may notice that the theories remain at the center of the sample. More recent 
evolutions come from industry specific analysis (banking), disclosure, shareholder 
activism, corporate social responsibility, board mechanisms and effectiveness at boards or 
family firms.  
 
Figure 7: Keywords co-occurrence map. Overlay visualization of years. 
	
Darkest color indicates average citation close to the time origin. Yellow colored pointed to the more recent 
average citation. 
 
In our opinion is still remarkable the low relevance of ethics (2 appearances in keywords), 
board capital (1), or social capital (1). The Table 5 shows the 38 most cited keywords that 
account for 50% of the total appearances. 
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Table 5: Most cited keywords (grouped) 
Term Frequency 
Corporate Governance 132 
Board 39 
Agency Theory 23 
Composition 23 
Compensation 14 
Structure 14 
gender diversity 13 
Ownership 12 
Diversity 11 
Firm Performance 11 
Directors 8 
Audit Committee 7 
Independence 7 
Banking 5 
China 5 
Mechanisms 5 
non-executive directors 5 
performance 5 
Processes 5 
Codes 4 
family firms 4 
outside directors 4 
Resource Dependence Theory 4 
stewardship theory 4 
Australia 3 
Board of Directors Issues 3 
Board Policy Issues 3 
Canada 3 
Compensation Committee 3 
Corporate Governance indices 3 
Effectiveness 3 
financial performance 3 
institutional investors 3 
Institutional Theory 3 
Leadership 3 
shareholder value 3 
Sweden 3 
Taiwan 3 
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In order to understand the intellectual framework, we analyzed the cited references. We 
made it in two steps. In the first, we had the view of the whole set of articles. In the second 
we spitted the sample in three periods of time: 2000–2007, 2008–2013, and 2014–2017.  
 
Period: 2000-2017 
The articles included 11,451 bibliographic references. 8,124 of them were unique. 7,360 
met the criteria and, finally, 4,895 include year and volume. The Table 6 shows the 255 
works that account for the highest number of citations. They account for more than 52% of 
the total number of valid references. Although the descriptive results establish a 
consolidated track in theories and alluded topics, we will perform additional techniques to 
analyze the results. 
 
Table 6: Most cited references 
Article Citations Article Citations Article Citations 
Fama, 1983 77 Walsh, 1990 13 Daily, 1999 8 
Jensen, 1976 71 Brickley, 1997 13 Laporta, 1997 8 
Dalton, 1998 39 Hermalin, 1991 13 Anderson, 2004 8 
Jensen, 1993 36 Hermalin, 1998 13 Murphy, 1999 8 
Shleifer, 1997 36 Eisenberg, 1998 12 Xie, 2003 8 
Yermack, 1996 36 Westphal, 1999 12 Minichilli, 2009 8 
Forbes, 1999 34 John, 1998 12 Bilimoria, 1994 8 
La Porta, 1999 29 Goodstein, 1994 12 van, 2003 8 
Zahra, 1989 29 Judge, 1992 12 Jensen, 1990 8 
Fama, 1980 27 Westphal, 1995 12 Denis, 2003 8 
Daily, 2003 26 Fich, 2006 11 Shivdasani, 1999 8 
La Porta, 1998 26 Rosenstein, 1990 11 Winlund, 2000 8 
Johnson, 1996 25 Boyd, 1995 11 Hartzell, 2003 8 
Hillman, 2003 24 Weisbach, 2003 11 Klapper, 2004 8 
Weisbach, 1988 23 Pearce, 1991 11 Adams, 2010 7 
Pettigrew, 1992 23 Hermalin, 1988 11 Bathala, 1995 7 
Eisenhardt, 1989 22 Claessens, 2000 11 Lynall, 2003 7 
Jensen, 1986 21 Kang, 2007 11 Carleton, 1998 7 
Klein, 2002 21 Beatty, 1994 11 Zattoni, 2008 7 
Beasley, 1996 21 Linck, 2008 11 Pugliese, 2009 7 
Shleifer, 1986 20 Davis, 1997 11 Haunschild, 1993 7 
Demsetz, 1985 20 Conyon, 1998 10 Pfeffer, 1973 7 
Baysinger, 1985 19 Coles, 2008 10 Bhagat, 2008 7 
La Porta, 2000 19 Westphal, 1998 10 Gedajlovic, 1998 7 
Erhardt, 2003 19 Hillman, 2002 10 Mehran, 1995 7 
Morck, 1988 18 Demsetz, 2001 10 Rindova, 1999 7 
Carpenter, 2001 18 Pettigrew, 1995 10 Aguilera, 2008 7 
Carter, 2003 18 Roberts, 2005 10 Aguilera, 2004 7 
Faccio, 2002 18 Klein, 1998 10 Peasnell, 2000 7 
Core, 1999 18 Dechow, 1996 10 Beekes, 2004 7 
Pearce, 1992 17 Claessens, 2002 10 Samra-fredericks, 2000 7 
Dalton, 1999 17 Bhagat, 2002 10 Westphal, 2000 7 
Gompers, 2003 17 Sundaramurthy, 2003 10 Leblanc, 2007 7 
Mcnulty, 1999 17 Kosnik, 1987 9 Ajinkya, 2005 7 
Pfeffer, 1972 17 Dharwadkar, 2000 9 Mizruchi, 1996 7 
Hillman, 2000 16 Finkelstein, 2003 9 Zona, 2007 7 
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Article Citations Article Citations Article Citations 
Huse, 2005 16 Kesner, 1988 9 Daily, 1994 7 
La Porta, 2002 15 Hambrick, 1984 9 Johnson, 2000 7 
Mcconnell, 1990 15 Young, 2008 9 Peasnell, 2005 7 
Byrd, 1992 15 Judge, 2010 9 van, 2008 7 
Lipton, 1992 15 Bhagat, 1999 9 Peng, 2004 7 
Donaldson, 1991 14 Baysinger, 1990 9 Singh, 2004 7 
Dimaggio, 1983 14 Golden, 2001 9 Westphal, 1997 6 
Finkelstein, 1994 14 Villalonga, 2006 9 Kroll, 2008 6 
Agrawal, 1996 14 Vafeas, 1999 9 Gillan, 2000 6 
Terjesen, 2009 14 Anderson, 2003 9 Meyer, 1977 6 
Rechner, 1991 14 Milliken, 1996 9 Boyd, 1990 6 
Aguilera, 2003 13 Shivdasani, 1993 9 Karamanou, 2005 6 
Rediker, 1995 13 Conger, 1998 9 Oxelheim, 2003 6 
Ferris, 2003 13 Donaldson, 1998 8 Weimer, 1999 6 
Bushee, 1998 6 Singh, 2001 5 Yeh, 2005 5 
Sonnenfeld, 2002 6 Schulze, 2001 5 Hendry, 2004 5 
Donaldson, 1990 6 Conyon, 1997 5 Lubatkin, 2005 5 
Kaplan, 1994 6 Shrader, 1997 5 Almazan, 2005 5 
Pathan, 2009 6 Chung, 1994 5 Mizruchi, 1994 5 
Williams, 1998 6 Carter, 2010 5 
  Kiel, 2003 6 Boyd, 1994 5 
  Zajac, 1994 6 Terjesen, 2015 5 
  Johnson, 1993 6 Tosi, 1989 5 
  Davis, 1991 6 Thomsen, 2000 5 
  Baliga, 1996 6 Terjesen, 2008 5 
  Chaganti, 1985 6 Vafeas, 1998 5 
  Larcker, 2007 6 Vafeas, 2003 5 
  Jackson, 2005 6 Burgess, 2002 5 
  Boone, 2007 6 Carcello, 2000 5 
  Schellenger, 1989 6 Pettigrew, 1998 5 
  Conyon, 2000 6 Dulewicz, 2004 5 
  Daily, 1992 6 Djankov, 2008 5 
  Daily, 1993 6 Donaldson, 1994 5 
  Wiersema, 1992 6 Durnev, 2005 5 
  Chen, 2009 6 Barclay, 1989 5 
  Smith, 1996 6 Westphal, 1994 5 
  Van, 2004 6 Pelled, 1999 5 
  Smith, 1992 6 Eisenhardt, 1989 5 
  Kim, 2009 6 Pye, 2004 5 
  Baysinger, 1991 6 Wan, 2005 5 
  Adams, 2009 6 Dalton, 2007 5 
  Gilson, 1990 6 Ruigrok, 2006 5 
  Pye, 2005 6 Cotter, 1997 5 
  Raheja, 2005 6 Rhoades, 2000 5 
  Himmelberg, 1999 6 Deangelo, 1981 5 
  Bebchuk, 2003 6 Dechow, 1995 5 
  Hillman, 2007 6 Davis, 1994 5 
  Yermack, 2004 6 Ravasi, 2006 5 
  Filatotchev, 2002 5 Gaver, 1993 5 
  Farrell, 2005 5 Healy, 2001 5 
  Finkelstein, 1992 5 Adams, 2007 5 
  Murphy, 1985 5 Kang, 1995 5 
  Franks, 2001 5 Heckman, 1979 5 
  Fich, 2005 5 Haunschild, 1998 5 
  Gabrielsson, 2004 5 Hall, 1998 5 
  Westphal, 2005 5 Gulati, 1999 5 
  Westphal, 2001 5 Anderson, 2004 5 
  Nadler, 2004 5 Hambrick, 2008 5 
  Westphal, 2003 5 Judge, 2008 5 
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Article Citations Article Citations Article Citations 
Westphal, 2001 5 Zahra, 2004 5 
  Singh, 2008 5 Jackling, 2009 5 
  Chan, 2008 5 Jensen, 1983 5 
  Solomon, 2003 5 Letendre, 2004 5 
  Bethel, 1998 5 Holderness, 1988 5 
   
 
In any research arena there are works considered as seminal, and they set, in many cases, 
the main theories for approaching the topic. Some of them are permanently quoted, 
especially in combination with other articles, as a signal of consolidated knowledge or 
intellectual framework. That is the case of Jensen and Meckling (1976) or Fama and 
Jensen (1983). It’s also evident that those articles recently published very often receive a 
lower number of citations. In order to assess the construction of the intellectual framework 
upon the cited references properly, we performed a co-citation analysis. 
As a first step to visualize the core contributions and how they are related we draw a map 
included above-mentioned 255 top ranked references. The main co-cited referenced could 
be visualized in Figure 8. This maps shows the centrality of a few works at the first stage. 
This articles set an intellectual framework around the Agency Theory for many analyses. 
That is the case of (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976) and, 
consistently, they are a reference as we found previously amongst most cited references. 
The map also describes significant groups of contributions pivoting around other seminal 
works. For a better understanding of the foundations, we performed a factor analysis of the 
referred articles. 
We performed a factor analysis with varimax extraction for the upper 255 works in the 
rank. This way we may quantitatively obtain a clearer picture of the framework depicted. 
The analysis provides five factors that explain over 96.422% of the variance. As is 
recommended, for the analysis if the factors and references, we considered those loadings 
above 0.7 as core contributors to the factor, whereas those below 0.32 were taken into 
account (Diez-Vial & Montoro-Sanchez, 2017; Vogel & Güttel, 2012). Besides, we 
weighted the contribution of the references based on their loadings in each factor. For the 
characterization of the factor, we took those references clearly linked to one of the factors 
extracted, and examined the group of references for every factor to find similarities in 
theories, topics or approaches. Since this process may lead to some subjectivity bias, we 
double-checked this process with a parallel examination (See Appendix Table 1). 
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The first extracted component covers the relationship between the board and the strategy. 
Thus, it is analyzed through a cognitive perspective (Forbes & Milliken, 1999a; Rindova, 
1999), the influence of the appointments of new directors (Carpenter & Westphal, 2001), 
the presence of strategists on the board (McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999), the influence on 
strategy (Golden & Zajac, 2001), and also providing a review and research agenda 
(Pugliese et al., 2009) or a new theoretical perspective integrating organizational and 
agency theories (Hendry & Kiel, 2004). This factor also contains the integrative 
propositions of agency and resource dependence theories (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). It 
also points to the topic of gender diversity (Conyon & Mallin, 1997; Farrell & Hersch, 
2005), female director experience and bias for board committees memberships (Bilimoria 
& Piderit, 1994) or diversity including demographic, ethnic or professional background 
types (van der Walt & Ingley, 2003; Westphal & Milton, 2000b). 
The second component approaches board composition in its relation to corporate strategy 
(Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990), its effects on firm performance (Baysinger & Butler, 
1985; Bhagat, Black, Bhagat, & Black, 1999; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991), the 
determinants (Boone, Casares Field, Karpoff, & Raheja, 2007), or highlighting the topics 
of board independence (Rosenstein & Wyatt, 1990). These works may be used to provide 
support for researches involving board composition issues. 
The third component includes three meta-analysis on board composition and financial 
performance (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & 
Ellstrand, 1999; Rhoades, Rechner, & Sundaramurthy, 2000), the topic of the ownership 
structure in general (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; Thomsen & Pedersen, 
2000), in relation to R&D Strategy (Baysinger, Kosnik, & Turk, 1991), or corporate value 
(McConnell & Servaes, 1990), facing the management ownership effect in market 
valuation (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988). Then we may assume that this factor 
primarily aims to provide support regarding composition and ownership structure in their 
relation to corporate valuation. 
The fourth component contains works that refer to director characteristics, such as the 
experience (Kroll, Walters, & Wright, 2008), tenure of directors (Vafeas, 2003), as well as 
type and gender (Kesner, 1988; Terjesen, Sealy, & Val, 2009). The tenure of directors is 
also studied in the context of CEO succession (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988). Besides, 
there are articles that refer to board control (Conyon & Peck, 1998; Sundaramurthy & 
Lewis, 2003). In the case of Sundaramurthy, it appears the proposition of integrating 
Agency Theory and Stewardship Theory, which is in line with other works of the author 
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related to experience-based human capital and social capital at the board. We suggest that 
this factor is a bridge between theories. It deals with issues like board characteristics, 
composition, size, etc. but there are elements trying to introduce new angles such as the 
stewardship theory.  
In the fifth component, the study of family firms (Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Claessens, 
Djankov, & Lang, 2000; Faccio & Lang, 2002; Villalonga & Amit, 2006) is set in a 
context of works related to ownership structure (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Filatotchev & 
Bishop, 2002; Yeh, 2005). This factor is also accompanied by the classic work  regarding 
the agency problems and the theory of the firm (Fama, 1980). Then, with think of this 
factor as the one supporting researches that aim to, or include, family ownership of firms, 
from the agency theory perspective. 
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Figure 8: Co-citation references map 
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Aiming to analyze how this intellectual framework evolved over different periods of time, 
we carried out the same technique for the three stages we identified. (Matrices of rotated 
components may be found in the Appendix) 
 
Period 2000 – 2007 
In this period, there are three components explaining 96.24% of the variance (See 
Appendix Table 2). Works studying basic issues on agency problems such as ownership 
structure, remuneration, independence or CEO power supports the first component. 
Ownership structure is studied for UK (Ezzamel & Watson, 1993), in a comparison among 
different countries (Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998),  in the case of majority or large 
shareholders (Holderness & Sheehan, 1988; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986), or related to board 
composition and independence before tender offers or hostile takeovers (Cotter, 
Shivdasani, & Zenner, 1997; Shivdasani, 1993). Remuneration topics are depicted in 
different angles: executive (Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997), directors’ compensation 
(Greenbury, 1995), or CEO compensation (Boyd, 1994). The power of the CEO is also 
studied in terms of the concentration that occurs when holding at the same time the 
President position (Boyd, 1995; Brickley, Coles, & Jarrell, 1997; Finkelstein & D’aveni, 
1994) and his relative power under different circumstances (Pearce II & Zahra, 1991). 
There is also room for stewardship points of view (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 
1997), to analyze topics on the CEO (Boyd, 1995; Donaldson & Davis, 1991), which 
suggest a broader perspective to address ‘traditional agency issues’. 
The second component represents the backbone for Agency theory, with the help of review 
articles, and the role of the directors, with special focus in the strategy. Thus, the firm in 
the context of the separation of ownership and control, and the problems it triggers are at 
the core of the works (Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Reviews on the Agency Theory (Eisenhardt, 1989), the Board of 
Directors (Johnson, Daily, & Ellstrand, 1996) or the board composition and the financial 
performance (Dalton et al., 1998) help defining the grounds of agency problems.  Long-
term, strategic envisioning of the directors (Forbes & Milliken, 1999a; McNulty & 
Pettigrew, 1999) induces, despite their limitations (Lorsch, 1989) and through board 
involvement (Zahra & Pearce II, 1990), effects on strategy formulation (Tricker, 1994) and 
the organization as a whole (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1997). Therefore, the agency theory 
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is complemented with a view from strategy, providing a perspective that is not entirely 
centered on regulation, law and finance.  
In the third component, the board is approached from the Agency Theory perspective and 
the Resource Dependence view, where diversity raises as a key factor. Here we found 
studies on the board composition (Barnhart, Rosenstein, & Marr, 1994; Pfeffer, 1972), its 
determinants (Bathala & Rao, 1995; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988), and its effects 
(Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Beasley, 1996; Kosnik, 1987). The control of organizations is 
approached from the Resource Dependence Theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), and 
integrated with the Agency Theory (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). In this context, human 
capital variables like experience, background, skills in general (Kesner, 1988), and social 
capital variables such as network (Pennings, 1980) and credibility are pointed out as main 
causes for directors contribution (Pettigrew & McNulty, 1995). And, besides, diversity has 
a key role connected to the network ties (Westphal & Milton, 2000a), linked to firm value 
(Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003), strategic change (Goodstein, Gautam, & Boeker, 
1994), or organizations groups (Milliken & Martins, 1996), and where women directors 
contribution to the board are relevant (Burgess & Tharenou, 2002; Burke, 1997; Conyon & 
Mallin, 1997; Singh, Vinnicombe, & Johnson, 2001). The fourth and the fifth components 
didn’t provide any reference with a loading above 0.32 and, therefore, they were not 
considered for the analysis. 
The components of this period show that the authors addressed classical issues of corporate 
governance not only under the Agency Theory but also utilizing other perspectives such as 
RDT and Stewardship Theory. This openness in the intellectual framework  
 
Period 2008 – 2013 
For the second stage of time there are three components where the total variance explained 
is 96.37% (See Appendix Table 3). In the first component the board composition frames 
matters related to remuneration. The board composition topic is addressed jointly with the 
size in the context of the environment of the firm (Pfeffer, 1972), showing the importance 
of independence through outside directors in the context of financial fraud (Beasley, 1996), 
and considering the performance effects of changes on it (Baysinger & Butler, 1985). The 
topics of remuneration, compensation, and incentives and are, in turn, related to firm 
performance, ownership, top management, chief executive and outside directors (Bebchuk 
& Fried, 2003; Bebchuk & Fried, 2004; Conyon & Peck, 1998; Core, Holthausen, & 
Larcker, 1999; Hartzell & Starks, 2003; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991; Mehran, 1995; 
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Yermack, 2004). The intellectual framework is set in the Agency Theory (Eisenhardt, 
1989; Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983) and the governance mechanisms to solve 
potential issues (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Rediker & Seth, 1995). 
The second component combines intellectual frameworks of Stewardship Theory 
(Donaldson & Davis, 1991; Muth & Donaldson, 1998; Van den Berghe & Levrau, 2004), 
Agency Theory (Jensen, 1993; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986). These views 
frame the board composition determinants (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988; Raheja, 2005), 
strategic adaption in response to environmental changes (Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 
2000) or certain situation the firm may face in financial markets such as bankruptcy, IPOs, 
or hostile takeovers (Daily & Dalton, 1994; Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002; Shivdasani, 
1993). Besides, in this context, the ownership structure is analyzed when is the case of 
family firms (Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 2003; Anderson & Reeb, 2003, 2004; Claessens 
et al., 2000; Villalonga & Amit, 2006), large shareholders (Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & 
Lang, 2002; La Porta et al., 1999; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986) or management (Morck et al., 
1988). As a result, we may name this component as multiple views on board composition 
and ownership structure. 
Along with seminal works on separation of ownership and control, and the role of the 
president and the board of directors (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Lorsch, 1989; Mace, 1972), the 
third component provides integrative approaches for the board of directors (Hillman & 
Dalziel, 2003) and a clear direction to open the foundations to the resource dependence 
approach (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978), to consider the behavioral perspectives (Gabrielsson 
& Huse, 2004; Huse, 2005) and to establish a relationship with the strategy (Pugliese et al., 
2009). As a result, topics like behavior at the board (Gabrielsson & Winlund, 2000; van 
Ees, van der Laan, & Postma, 2008; Westphal, 1999) and the strategic orientation of the 
board (Forbes & Milliken, 1999b; Golden & Zajac, 2001; Judge Jr & Zeithaml, 1992; 
McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999) have a relevant place. Jointly, provide a solid basis where 
board demography (Westphal & Zajac, 1995; Williams & O’Reilly III, 1998; Zona & 
Zattoni, 2007) and topics on board human and social capital configure new areas of 
research in diversity (Carter et al., 2003; Farrell & Hersch, 2005; Ruigrok, Peck, & 
Tacheva, 2007) and interlocks (Haunschild & Beckman, 1998; Mizruchi, 1996; Pettigrew 
& McNulty, 1995; Ravasi & Zattoni, 2006). 
 
Period 2014 – 2017 
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For the last period we considered, we found three components explaining 96.2% of the 
total variance (See Appendix Table 4). The first component is clearly focused on gender 
diversity on the board. Based on solid works on qualitative methods for the field of 
corporate governance (Mcnulty, Zattoni, & Douglas, 2013; Zattoni, Douglas, & Judge, 
2013), this component gives the background for a research agenda (Terjesen et al., 2009). 
References included in this component offer studies on the presence of women at the board 
for a single country (Nielsen & Huse, 2010; Singh & Vinnicombe, 2004) and from an 
international perspective (Terjesen & Singh, 2008), given the need for more cross-national 
researches (Adams, de Haan, Terjesen, & van Ees, 2015).  Some important issues are 
brought here, such as the discussion on tokenism vs. critical mass approaches (Torchia, 
Calabrò, & Huse, 2011), the impact on valuation under a mandate of changing the board to 
meet quotas (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012), or the organizational predictors (Hillman, 
Shropshire, & Cannella, 2007). The relationship with family firms is also pointed out, 
since some works studying the topic (Anderson & Reeb, 2003) and its link to performance 
(Schulze et al., 2001).  
The second component focuses on two elements: effectiveness in monitoring (Ferris, 
Jagannathan, & Pritchard, 2003; Fich & Shivdasani, 2006) and the board diversity (Adams 
& Ferreira, 2009; Carter et al., 2003; Erhardt et al., 2003; Kang, Cheng, & Gray, 2007; 
Terjesen, Aguilera, & Lorenz, 2015). The presence of works on resource dependence 
theories (Hillman et al., 2000) clear the way to a broader avenue for researches based on 
social capital, human capital and demographics at the board (Johnson, Schnatterly, & Hill, 
2013).   
The last component we identified for this period basically encompasses works providing 
theoretical backgrounds. From classic articles on the firm, the separation of ownership and 
control, and the appearance of the agency issues and costs (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen, 
1986, 1993; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), to resource dependence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978), to integrative approaches of the former theories (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Zahra & 
Pearce II, 1989), or to organizational approaches, key articles provide a grounding for 
deepening in usual and new topics. Investor protection is linked to the former (Djankov, La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2008; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer, & 
Vishny, 2002; La Porta, Lopez‐de‐Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997), and it is considered in the context of governance mechanisms (Walsh & Seward, 
1990) as well as the circumstances set by the ownership structure of the firms (Faccio & 
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Lang, 2002). Finally, we should highlight the relevance of earnings management in this 
component  
As it happened in the analysis of the previous periods, fourth and fifth components don’t 
include significant loadings for the references and, therefore, they are not included in the 
analysis. We summarized the analysis of every period in the following table. 
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Table 7:  Components per period comparison 
 Components 
 1 2 3 
2000 - 
2007 
• Board composition and independence before 
tender offers or hostile takeovers: Cotter, 
Shivdasani, & Zenner (1997); Shivdasani (1993) 
• Remuneration and compensation executive 
Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman (1997), Greenbury 
(1995),	Boyd (1994) 
• Ownership structure Ezzamel & Watson (1993), 
Gedajlovic & Shapiro (1998), Holderness & 
Sheehan (1988); Shleifer & Vishny (1986) 
• Agency Theory ‘basics’: Fama 
(1980); Fama & Jensen (1983); 
MC Jensen & Meckling (1976) 
• Literature Reviews: Eisenhardt, 
(1989), Johnson, Daily, & 
Ellstrand (1996), Dalton et al. 
(1998) 
• Strategic envisioning: Forbes & 
Milliken, (1999); McNulty & 
Pettigrew (1999), Lorsch (1989), 
Zahra & Pearce II (1990), Tricker 
(1994) 
• Resource Dependence Theory: Pfeffer & Salancik  (1978) 
• Integration RDT-AT: Hillman & Dalziel (2003) 
• Board Composition, determinants and effects: Barnhart, 
Rosenstein, & Marr, 1994; Pfeffer, 1972), Bathala & Rao, 1995; 
Hermalin & Weisbach (1988), Baysinger & Butler (1985), 
Beasley (1996); Kosnik (1987) 
• Human Capital, Social capital and Directors contribution: 
Kesner, 1988), Pennings (1980), Pettigrew & McNulty (1995). 
• Diversity: Westphal & Milton, (2000), Carter, Simkins, & 
Simpson (2003), Goodstein, Gautam, & Boeker (1994), Milliken 
& Martins (1996), Burgess & Tharenou (2002); Burke (1997); 
Conyon & Mallin (1997); Singh, Vinnicombe, & Johnson (2001) 
Ownership and control issues Agency Theory and Strategy Resource Dependence Theory and issues on governance 
2008-
2013 
• Remuneration, compensation and incentives: 
Bebchuk & Fried (2003); Bebchuk & Fried, 
(2004); Conyon & Peck (1998); Core, 
Holthausen, & Larcker (1999); Hartzell & Starks 
(2003); Hermalin & Weisbach (1991); Mehran 
(1995); Yermack (2004). 
• Board composition, size, independence and 
effects of changes: Pfeffer, 1972), Beasley, 1996, 
Baysinger & Butler, (1985) 
• AT and governance mechanisms: Eisenhardt 
(1989); Fama (1980); Fama & Jensen (1983), 
Agrawal & Knoeber (1996); Rediker & Seth 
(1995) 
• Ownership structure, family firms, 
large stakeholders and 
management: family firms 
Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, (2003); 
Anderson & Reeb, 2003, 2004; 
Stijn Claessens et al. (2000); 
Villalonga & Amit (2006), 
Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang 
(2002); La Porta, Lopez-De-
Silanes, & Shleifer (1999); 
Shleifer & Vishny (1986), Morck, 
Shleifer, & Vishny (1988). 
• Board composition determinants, 
strategic adaption: Hermalin & 
Weisbach (1988); Raheja (2005), 
Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 
2000), (Daily & Dalton, 1994; 
Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002; 
Shivdasani, 1993) 
• Stewardship Theory: Donaldson & 
• RDT: Hillman & Dalziel, 2003), Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) 
• Behavioral perspectives: Jonas Gabrielsson & Huse, 2004; Huse, 
2005), Gabrielsson & Winlund, 2000; Hans van Ees, van der 
Laan, & Postma, 2008; Westphal, 1999 
• Relationship with the strategy: Pugliese et al., 2009), Forbes & 
Milliken, 1999b; Golden & Zajac, 2001; Judge Jr & Zeithaml, 
1992; McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999 
• Board demography, human and social capital: Westphal & Zajac, 
1995; Williams & O’Reilly III (1998); Zona & Zattoni, 2007, 
Carter et al. (2003); Farrell & Hersch (2005); Ruigrok, Peck, & 
Tacheva (2007), Haunschild & Beckman (1998); Mizruchi, 
(1996); Pettigrew & McNulty (1995); Ravasi & Zattoni (2006) 
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 Components 
 1 2 3 
Davis, 1991; Muth & Donaldson, 
1998; Van den Berghe & Levrau, 
2004), Agency Theory: Jensen, 
1993; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Jensen, 1986 
 
Board composition and remuneration Board composition and ownership 
structure 
RDT, behavior and strategy at the board 
2014-
2017 
• Research agenda Terjesen et al., 2009). 
• Women at the board Nielsen & Huse (2010); 
Singh & Vinnicombe (2004), Terjesen & Singh 
(2008), Adams, de Haan, Terjesen, & van Ees 
(2015). Tokenism vs. critical mass approaches: 
Torchia, Calabrò, & Huse (2011) 
• The impact on valuation under a mandate of 
changing the board to meet quotas: Ahern & 
Dittmar, 2012) 
• The organizational predictors: Hillman, 
Shropshire, & Cannella (2007).  
• Effectiveness in monitoring: 
Ferris, Jagannathan, & Pritchard 
(2003); Fich & Shivdasani (2006) 
• Board diversity: Adams & Ferreira 
(2009); Carter et al. (2003); 
Erhardt et al. (2003); Kang, Cheng, 
& Gray (2007); Terjesen, Aguilera, 
& Lorenz (2015) 
• Theories: agency issues and costs: Fama & Jensen, (1983); 
Jensen, (1993); Jensen & Meckling, (1976); Michael Jensen, 
(1986); resource dependence: Pfeffer & Salancik, (1978); 
integrative approaches: Hillman & Dalziel (2003); Zahra & 
Pearce II (1989) 
• Classical issues: Investor protection Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, & Shleifer (2008); La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, (2002); La Porta, Lopez de‐Silanes, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, (1998); Shleifer & Vishny (1997) 
• Context of governance mechanisms: Walsh & Seward (1990)  
• Ownership structure of the firms: Faccio & Lang (2002). 
Diversity Effectiveness in monitoring and 
diversity 
Theoretical backbone for investor protection 
 
Chapter 3: Board of Directors in Corporate Governance International Review Journal: A 
Bibliometric Analysis 
 
	
152 
 
Comparing the three periods, we found that the ratio unique authors / total number of 
authors is quite close to one in all periods. This shows a low concentration of authors or, 
on other words, it shows that the Journal contributors are highly diversified. This fact is 
consistent with the aim of pursuing a wide range of perspectives and topics while keeping 
the overall quality of the published research.  
The Agency Theory has a relevant place in all periods, but the journal is open to a greater 
variety of groundings and topics. This is noticeable in the components analyzed in each 
period, where that theory, although it has a significant role due to the presence of classic 
references and issues, leaves the leading position to other topics (e.g. diversity) and views, 
depicting maturation traits in the research literature. We suggest that the openness of 
theoretical background make a proper frame to trigger researches where Human Capital 
and Board Capital appear as relevant.  
Diversity, a term that clearly appear as a keyword in many journals, in general or 
specifically focused on gender, has a deep founding already in the first period of our study. 
It is interesting because it constitutes an explanatory component, showing a solid basis for 
a whole set of researches, specially in the last period of time. Sometimes a topic may 
appear in literature but without being considered central or key. In this case, it occurs the 
opposite, consistently with previous analyses that showed variety in topics, the role of this 
item, and the ambitious aims of the Journal. 
Besides, the concentration of different theories in components, noticeable in the last period 
of time, suggests that authors are comparing approaches, exploring new ones or 
introducing new related topics in traditional frameworks. This is also a sign of maturation 
in the research of the field.  
 
4. CONCLUSIONS 
The board of directors has been a key topic in the research field of corporate governance 
for years. Many articles addressed main themes surrounding this topic: performance, board 
composition, board size, etc. in vast number of journals, but the leading contributor was the 
Journal Corporate Governance An International Review. In this article, we described, 
mapped and analyzed the research on the topic realized from 2000 to 2017 in 190 research 
articles that were published in that journal.  
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The frequency of publications shows the topic is relevant and constant element amongst 
the articles published in that period. We identified three different periods 2000-2004, 2005-
2011 and 2012-2017. In those periods we reckon the growth, maturation, and consolidation 
of the produced literature. Different number of articles, issues, and length evolved 
accordingly to the expressed goals of the different editors-in-chief in every stage. The 
combination of these elements positively affected the impact of the journal according to 
different rankings, and the overall amount of contributions on the topic. 
Geographical origins and collaboration among research organizations show a prevalence of 
European affiliations in a context of a high degree of institutional diversity. The field of 
Corporate Governance always demands a growing collaboration among diverse countries 
and institutions. There is a need of spreading knowledge and practice, and also different 
cultures, societal and legal backgrounds give the opportunity of face issues in a different 
way. Besides, that kind of collaboration, especially when it is international, leads to 
matters that are focused on governance beyond local regulation. 
The analysis of the 377 unique contributors give as a first rationale for the intellectual 
framework they built. As in other journals, a small group of authors account for a 
significant number of articles, although it is wide enough not to be considered as 
endogamic. The variety of authors is also supported by a ratio unique authors to total 
authors that it is close to 1. Besides, the mapping and analysis of co-authorship shows, at 
same time, several nodes of collaboration and a diverse community of authors. Both, the 
analysis of the impact through Hirch index and the number of citations of their articles in 
this sample shows the need of supporting traditional agency issue, like board independence 
or ownership structure, as well as diversity approaches. In that sense, the analysis of the 
keywords agrees with these statements, confirms a rising role of codes and indices, and 
shows recent evolution of research towards disclosure, family firms, or shareholder 
activisms. In spite of this, we found a lack of presence of board capital and ethics related 
studies.  
Although the study of the influence of human capital in boards has been pursued under 
different aspects, it is still very limited in terms of the number of articles, themes or 
subtopics. Thus, the factor analysis of the top ranked references shows that it’s been 
mentioned but at a relatively low relevant level. Nevertheless, the relevant presence in the 
components suggests strong foundation and open theoretical frameworks that support new 
researches related to this topic. 
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The factor analysis provides us with the main grounds the articles used in aims. We 
identify five great factors that were mapped and analyzed. The first factor focuses on the 
relationship between the board and the strategy, and the impact of diversity. The second 
factor contents foundation for board composition researches. The third factor gives support 
for ownership structure matters. We suggest that the fourth factor is set to be a bridge 
trying to introduce other theories, such as the stewardship theory, and new angles on board 
and characteristics, such as experience or tenure. The fifth factor focuses on the family 
firms as regards to the composition (Anderson & Reeb, 2004) or ownership structure 
(Faccio & Lang, 2002), or their impact on firm value (Villalonga & Amit, 2006). The 
construction of a corporate governance index out of the provision so as to check the impact 
on equity prices (Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003) as well as other works, is congruent 
with the analysis on keywords we made. Indices play a key role as for the governance 
matters, spreading practices, getting information based on recommendations, fostering 
transparency, accountability and giving signals to investors and markets in general.   
Given the analysis of the factors, we think that the theoretical foundation of the works has 
a deep root in Agency Theory framework and issues but, at the same time, it is open to new 
theories, such as the Resource Dependence or the Stewardship Theory. Likewise, the 
presence of studies aiming to strategy topics provides a wider scope to the field. In this 
sense, we think that it sets new tracks, far from the original law or financial oriented 
researches. Accordingly with this rationale, the journal ranks high in the indices in those 
arenas. Regarding the topics, we think that they are diverse and wider in scope, if we 
compare with the overall published articles, and set a mark in the most relevant ones: 
composition, structure, diversity, family ownership, board capital, etc. The foundation for 
diversity studies grows over time and it reaches a prevalent position in the last of the 
periods we analyzed.  
The Board of Directors is a central element in Corporate Governance and it should be 
faced taking into account different perspectives, studying various topics, and relating to 
other disciplines that might enlighten that reality. We think that the kind of coverage CGIR 
makes conveys to a leading position amongst other journals.  
Our work shows a quantitative basis to assert the relevance of works, authors and topics in 
the literature on board of directors, which is a proper starting point to quote researches in 
any literature review and meta-analysis on the topic. At the same time, this study shows the 
less studied subjects or points of view, serving as a way to identify future lines of 
investigation. 
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Although we studied the topic of board of directors in the journal that contributes the most, 
it would be appropriate to apply the same type of analysis to other top journals on this 
field, and compare the results to improve the research. This angle would show how 
different journals are approaching the topic and the way they are impacting and 
configuring the intellectual framework as top performers in the arena. 
A meta-analysis on the board of directors would have a solid basis in these studies since it 
would explain and explore the qualified contributions that shaped the investigation over the 
years and were quantitatively identified using bibliometric techniques. Besides, as the main 
angles and approaches to the analysis of the board have been identified throughout this 
article, the gaps and the lack of deep understanding from other points of view or topics 
related for further research appear clearer for scholars. Amongst them we may identify 
some related to human capital and codes relationship, or human capital and the board, 
which, in our opinion, are underrepresented in research studies.  As a relevant element of 
the board capital, it should be studied more in depth. It can be also interesting for future 
researches to employ bibliographic coupling technique to assess potential trends in recent 
research. 
Finally, we should mention that we did not link the references to places or sections where 
they were mentioned within the articles (e.g. introduction, methodology, results). Although 
their position within the articles could drive a deeper understanding, a natural language 
processing software should be utilized so as to analyze the actual meaning of the citation in 
a sample of articles as big as ours. Despite that, this sort of study could be approached 
when performing a meta-analysis of a reduced, meaningful number of articles. Although 
we followed existing literature in the methodological steps to obtain and process the source 
of data, we concede that limiting to one database could let some articles out of the analysis. 
To avoid a significant number of issues that might appear in such a case, we chose the one 
that was utilized alone in the vast majority of the studies.  
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix Table 1: Components - Total variance explained 
Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
 Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 52,142 20,448 20,448 52,142 20,448 20,448 
2 49,841 19,546 39,993 49,841 19,546 39,993 
3 49,317 19,340 59,334 49,317 19,340 59,334 
4 48,508 19,023 78,356 48,508 19,023 78,356 
5 46,067 18,065 96,422 46,067 18,065 96,422 
6 0,696 0,273 96,694    
7 0,638 0,250 96,945    
8 0,624 0,245 97,189    
9 0,612 0,240 97,429    
10 0,555 0,218 97,647    
11 0,539 0,211 97,858    
12 0,495 0,194 98,053    
13 0,473 0,186 98,238    
14 0,457 0,179 98,417    
15 0,428 0,168 98,585    
16 0,404 0,159 98,744    
17 0,372 0,146 98,890    
18 0,355 0,139 99,029    
19 0,279 0,110 99,138    
20 0,263 0,103 99,242    
21 0,065 0,025 99,267    
22 0,064 0,025 99,292    
23 0,062 0,024 99,317    
24 0,057 0,022 99,339    
25 0,053 0,021 99,360    
26 0,051 0,020 99,380    
27 0,050 0,020 99,400    
28 0,049 0,019 99,419    
29 0,047 0,019 99,437    
30 0,047 0,018 99,456    
31 0,045 0,018 99,473    
32 0,044 0,017 99,491    
33 0,043 0,017 99,507    
34 0,041 0,016 99,524    
35 0,040 0,016 99,539    
36 0,039 0,015 99,554    
37 0,036 0,014 99,568    
38 0,034 0,013 99,582    
39 0,034 0,013 99,595    
40 0,031 0,012 99,607    
41 0,030 0,012 99,619    
42 0,028 0,011 99,630    
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Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
 Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
43 0,026 0,010 99,640    
44 0,026 0,010 99,650    
45 0,024 0,009 99,660    
46 0,022 0,009 99,668    
47 0,021 0,008 99,676    
48 0,020 0,008 99,684    
49 0,017 0,007 99,691    
50 0,017 0,006 99,697    
51 0,015 0,006 99,703    
52 0,013 0,005 99,708    
53 0,013 0,005 99,713    
54 0,012 0,005 99,718    
55 0,012 0,005 99,723    
56 0,012 0,005 99,728    
57 0,012 0,005 99,732    
58 0,011 0,004 99,737    
59 0,011 0,004 99,741    
60 0,011 0,004 99,745    
61 0,011 0,004 99,750    
62 0,010 0,004 99,754    
63 0,010 0,004 99,758    
64 0,010 0,004 99,762    
65 0,010 0,004 99,765    
66 0,009 0,004 99,769    
67 0,009 0,004 99,773    
68 0,009 0,004 99,776    
69 0,009 0,003 99,780    
70 0,009 0,003 99,783    
71 0,008 0,003 99,786    
72 0,008 0,003 99,790    
73 0,008 0,003 99,793    
74 0,008 0,003 99,796    
75 0,008 0,003 99,799    
76 0,008 0,003 99,802    
77 0,008 0,003 99,805    
78 0,007 0,003 99,808    
79 0,007 0,003 99,811    
80 0,007 0,003 99,814    
81 0,007 0,003 99,816    
82 0,007 0,003 99,819    
83 0,007 0,003 99,822    
84 0,007 0,003 99,824    
85 0,006 0,003 99,827    
86 0,006 0,002 99,829    
87 0,006 0,002 99,832    
88 0,006 0,002 99,834    
89 0,006 0,002 99,836    
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Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
 Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
90 0,006 0,002 99,839    
91 0,006 0,002 99,841    
92 0,006 0,002 99,843    
93 0,006 0,002 99,845    
94 0,005 0,002 99,847    
95 0,005 0,002 99,849    
96 0,005 0,002 99,851    
97 0,005 0,002 99,853    
98 0,005 0,002 99,855    
99 0,005 0,002 99,857    
100 0,005 0,002 99,859    
101 0,005 0,002 99,861    
102 0,005 0,002 99,863    
103 0,005 0,002 99,865    
104 0,005 0,002 99,866    
105 0,004 0,002 99,868    
106 0,004 0,002 99,870    
107 0,004 0,002 99,872    
108 0,004 0,002 99,873    
109 0,004 0,002 99,875    
110 0,004 0,002 99,877    
111 0,004 0,002 99,878    
112 0,004 0,002 99,880    
113 0,004 0,002 99,881    
114 0,004 0,002 99,883    
115 0,004 0,002 99,885    
116 0,004 0,002 99,886    
117 0,004 0,002 99,888    
118 0,004 0,002 99,889    
119 0,004 0,001 99,891    
120 0,004 0,001 99,892    
121 0,004 0,001 99,893    
122 0,004 0,001 99,895    
123 0,004 0,001 99,896    
124 0,004 0,001 99,898    
125 0,003 0,001 99,899    
126 0,003 0,001 99,900    
127 0,003 0,001 99,902    
128 0,003 0,001 99,903    
129 0,003 0,001 99,904    
130 0,003 0,001 99,906    
131 0,003 0,001 99,907    
132 0,003 0,001 99,908    
133 0,003 0,001 99,909    
134 0,003 0,001 99,911    
135 0,003 0,001 99,912    
136 0,003 0,001 99,913    
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Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
 Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
137 0,003 0,001 99,914    
138 0,003 0,001 99,915    
139 0,003 0,001 99,917    
140 0,003 0,001 99,918    
141 0,003 0,001 99,919    
142 0,003 0,001 99,920    
143 0,003 0,001 99,921    
144 0,003 0,001 99,922    
145 0,003 0,001 99,923    
146 0,003 0,001 99,925    
147 0,003 0,001 99,926    
148 0,003 0,001 99,927    
149 0,003 0,001 99,928    
150 0,003 0,001 99,929    
151 0,003 0,001 99,930    
152 0,003 0,001 99,931    
153 0,003 0,001 99,932    
154 0,003 0,001 99,933    
155 0,003 0,001 99,934    
156 0,003 0,001 99,935    
157 0,003 0,001 99,936    
158 0,003 0,001 99,937    
159 0,002 0,001 99,938    
160 0,002 0,001 99,939    
161 0,002 0,001 99,940    
162 0,002 0,001 99,941    
163 0,002 0,001 99,942    
164 0,002 0,001 99,943    
165 0,002 0,001 99,944    
166 0,002 0,001 99,944    
167 0,002 0,001 99,945    
168 0,002 0,001 99,946    
169 0,002 0,001 99,947    
170 0,002 0,001 99,948    
171 0,002 0,001 99,949    
172 0,002 0,001 99,950    
173 0,002 0,001 99,951    
174 0,002 0,001 99,951    
175 0,002 0,001 99,952    
176 0,002 0,001 99,953    
177 0,002 0,001 99,954    
178 0,002 0,001 99,955    
179 0,002 0,001 99,955    
180 0,002 0,001 99,956    
181 0,002 0,001 99,957    
182 0,002 0,001 99,958    
183 0,002 0,001 99,959    
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Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
 Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
184 0,002 0,001 99,959    
185 0,002 0,001 99,960    
186 0,002 0,001 99,961    
187 0,002 0,001 99,962    
188 0,002 0,001 99,962    
189 0,002 0,001 99,963    
190 0,002 0,001 99,964    
191 0,002 0,001 99,965    
192 0,002 0,001 99,965    
193 0,002 0,001 99,966    
194 0,002 0,001 99,967    
195 0,002 0,001 99,967    
196 0,002 0,001 99,968    
197 0,002 0,001 99,969    
198 0,002 0,001 99,969    
199 0,002 0,001 99,970    
200 0,002 0,001 99,971    
201 0,002 0,001 99,972    
202 0,002 0,001 99,972    
203 0,002 0,001 99,973    
204 0,002 0,001 99,973    
205 0,002 0,001 99,974    
206 0,002 0,001 99,975    
207 0,002 0,001 99,975    
208 0,002 0,001 99,976    
209 0,002 0,001 99,977    
210 0,002 0,001 99,977    
211 0,002 0,001 99,978    
212 0,002 0,001 99,979    
213 0,002 0,001 99,979    
214 0,002 0,001 99,980    
215 0,002 0,001 99,980    
216 0,002 0,001 99,981    
217 0,002 0,001 99,982    
218 0,002 0,001 99,982    
219 0,002 0,001 99,983    
220 0,001 0,001 99,983    
221 0,001 0,001 99,984    
222 0,001 0,001 99,985    
223 0,001 0,001 99,985    
224 0,001 0,001 99,986    
225 0,001 0,001 99,986    
226 0,001 0,001 99,987    
227 0,001 0,001 99,987    
228 0,001 0,001 99,988    
229 0,001 0,001 99,988    
230 0,001 0,001 99,989    
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Total Variance Explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
 Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
Total % of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
231 0,001 0,001 99,990    
232 0,001 0,001 99,990    
233 0,001 0,001 99,991    
234 0,001 0,001 99,991    
235 0,001 0,001 99,992    
236 0,001 0,001 99,992    
237 0,001 0,001 99,993    
238 0,001 0,000 99,993    
239 0,001 0,000 99,994    
240 0,001 0,000 99,994    
241 0,001 0,000 99,995    
242 0,001 0,000 99,995    
243 0,001 0,000 99,996    
244 0,001 0,000 99,996    
245 0,001 0,000 99,996    
246 0,001 0,000 99,997    
247 0,001 0,000 99,997    
248 0,001 0,000 99,998    
249 0,001 0,000 99,998    
250 0,001 0,000 99,999    
251 0,001 0,000 99,999    
252 0,001 0,000 99,999    
253 0,001 0,000 100,000    
254 0,001 0,000 100,000    
255 2,273E-16 8,915E-17 100,000    
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
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Appendix Table 2: Rotated Component Matrix 
Article 1 2 3 4 5 
Fama, 1983 0,231 0,045 0,648 0,207 0,662 
Jensen, 1976 -0,020 0,141 0,774 0,333 0,478 
Dalton, 1998 0,468 0,214 0,818 -0,145 0,091 
Jensen, 1993 -0,455 -0,179 0,679 0,361 -0,370 
Shleifer, 1997 -0,217 -0,264 0,526 0,269 0,706 
Yermack, 1996 -0,031 -0,721 0,072 0,616 0,239 
Forbes, 1999 0,751 -0,026 0,558 -0,049 0,290 
La Porta, 1999 -0,244 -0,248 0,726 0,040 0,560 
Zahra, 1989 -0,092 -0,888 0,048 0,267 0,304 
Fama, 1980 0,167 0,352 0,082 0,297 0,849 
Daily, 2003 0,714 0,213 0,472 -0,192 -0,386 
La Porta, 1998 -0,562 -0,343 0,432 -0,037 0,584 
Johnson, 1996 0,558 -0,470 0,557 0,035 -0,346 
Hillman, 2003 0,681 0,125 0,534 0,065 -0,439 
Weisbach, 1988 -0,432 -0,732 -0,104 0,335 0,345 
Pettigrew, 1992 0,595 -0,603 -0,150 0,425 0,214 
Eisenhardt, 1989 0,295 -0,455 0,417 -0,031 -0,704 
Jensen, 1986 -0,691 -0,141 0,300 0,345 0,507 
Klein, 2002 -0,503 -0,603 0,492 0,147 -0,291 
Beasley, 1996 -0,476 -0,175 0,842 -0,026 -0,029 
Shleifer, 1986 -0,486 -0,633 0,425 -0,027 0,383 
Demsetz, 1985 -0,412 0,416 0,245 0,157 0,736 
Baysinger, 1985 0,454 0,735 0,232 0,405 0,044 
La Porta, 2000 0,113 -0,172 0,845 0,264 0,370 
Erhardt, 2003 0,407 0,103 0,493 0,315 -0,667 
Morck, 1988 0,047 -0,365 0,876 0,030 -0,254 
Carpenter, 2001 0,851 0,017 0,242 0,093 0,417 
Carter, 2003 0,306 0,181 0,577 0,038 -0,709 
Faccio, 2002 -0,305 0,192 0,385 0,094 0,827 
Core, 1999 0,067 -0,360 0,588 0,519 0,464 
Pearce, 1992 0,476 0,035 0,853 -0,029 -0,090 
Dalton, 1999 0,265 0,115 0,723 0,067 0,591 
Gompers, 2003 -0,151 -0,424 -0,096 0,053 0,868 
Mcnulty, 1999 0,832 -0,440 0,208 0,175 -0,073 
Pfeffer, 1972 0,641 -0,310 0,674 0,053 0,003 
Hillman, 2000 0,613 0,273 0,578 0,377 -0,202 
Huse, 2005 0,870 -0,188 0,368 0,125 -0,149 
La Porta, 2002 -0,312 -0,367 0,040 0,403 0,757 
Mcconnell, 1990 -0,221 -0,552 0,752 -0,123 -0,183 
Byrd, 1992 0,219 -0,651 0,401 0,195 0,540 
Lipton, 1992 0,248 -0,194 0,902 0,205 -0,112 
Donaldson, 1991 0,327 0,205 0,330 0,685 0,486 
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Dimaggio, 1983 -0,091 -0,705 0,086 0,222 0,633 
Finkelstein, 1994 0,529 -0,439 0,318 0,038 0,621 
Agrawal, 1996 -0,351 0,866 -0,117 -0,004 -0,274 
Terjesen, 2009 0,221 -0,608 -0,117 0,728 0,013 
Rechner, 1991 -0,383 0,217 -0,154 0,427 -0,752 
Aguilera, 2003 -0,063 0,370 -0,035 -0,904 0,068 
Rediker, 1995 -0,330 0,657 0,221 -0,503 -0,350 
Ferris, 2003 -0,307 0,635 0,585 -0,002 0,352 
Walsh, 1990 -0,167 -0,037 -0,640 -0,126 -0,709 
Brickley, 1997 0,038 0,410 -0,168 0,820 0,300 
Hermalin, 1991 -0,075 0,814 0,444 0,316 0,006 
Hermalin, 1998 -0,147 0,576 -0,335 0,356 -0,612 
Eisenberg, 1998 0,225 0,423 -0,020 0,768 0,375 
Westphal, 1999 0,081 0,092 -0,786 0,081 -0,562 
John, 1998 0,183 0,766 0,238 0,015 -0,537 
Goodstein, 1994 0,471 0,087 0,459 -0,334 0,641 
Judge, 1992 0,485 0,646 0,283 -0,044 -0,479 
Westphal, 1995 0,430 -0,795 -0,238 -0,176 0,249 
Fich, 2006 0,036 -0,524 0,249 -0,507 0,608 
Rosenstein, 1990 0,066 0,758 0,052 0,417 -0,463 
Boyd, 1995 -0,669 0,514 0,299 -0,364 0,168 
Weisbach, 2003 -0,010 0,563 -0,573 -0,351 -0,436 
Pearce, 1991 0,821 -0,051 -0,472 -0,043 0,254 
Hermalin, 1988 0,066 0,519 0,405 0,676 0,256 
Claessens, 2000 -0,130 -0,056 -0,515 0,184 0,804 
Kang, 2007 -0,467 0,470 -0,077 -0,684 0,225 
Beatty, 1994 0,003 0,923 0,229 -0,246 0,045 
Linck, 2008 0,342 -0,345 0,093 -0,422 0,734 
Davis, 1997 0,499 -0,154 -0,375 -0,194 0,716 
Conyon, 1998 -0,042 -0,070 0,022 0,844 0,495 
Coles, 2008 0,043 0,664 0,179 0,289 0,639 
Westphal, 1998 -0,074 0,220 -0,899 -0,013 0,314 
Hillman, 2002 0,536 -0,120 0,264 -0,752 -0,166 
Demsetz, 2001 -0,315 0,750 -0,173 0,521 0,072 
Pettigrew, 1995 0,254 -0,520 -0,751 -0,105 -0,224 
Roberts, 2005 0,650 -0,619 -0,389 -0,019 -0,097 
Klein, 1998 -0,247 0,539 0,511 0,467 -0,369 
Dechow, 1996 -0,361 -0,224 0,580 -0,604 0,293 
Claessens, 2002 -0,730 -0,041 0,000 -0,297 0,587 
Bhagat, 2002 -0,083 0,690 0,117 -0,565 -0,384 
Sundaramurthy, 2003 0,430 0,178 0,322 0,738 -0,315 
Kosnik, 1987 0,272 -0,586 0,667 0,086 -0,309 
Dharwadkar, 2000 -0,223 0,119 0,421 -0,551 0,651 
Finkelstein, 2003 0,817 -0,033 0,260 -0,452 -0,158 
Kesner, 1988 0,440 -0,279 -0,294 0,771 -0,103 
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Hambrick, 1984 0,319 0,491 -0,393 -0,463 -0,502 
Young, 2008 0,039 -0,683 -0,312 0,575 0,259 
Judge, 2010 -0,304 0,229 0,193 -0,615 -0,635 
Bhagat, 1999 -0,447 0,740 0,448 -0,119 0,037 
Baysinger, 1990 0,247 0,930 -0,158 -0,040 0,114 
Golden, 2001 0,784 -0,273 0,231 0,472 0,030 
Villalonga, 2006 -0,281 -0,130 -0,326 0,356 0,799 
Vafeas, 1999 -0,108 0,414 0,271 0,667 -0,513 
Anderson, 2003 -0,512 0,830 -0,110 0,019 -0,009 
Milliken, 1996 0,231 -0,719 0,351 0,421 -0,309 
Shivdasani, 1993 -0,322 0,367 -0,253 0,734 0,349 
Conger, 1998 0,434 0,381 -0,349 0,556 -0,449 
Donaldson, 1998 -0,316 0,498 0,202 0,314 -0,693 
Daily, 1999 0,484 -0,498 -0,059 -0,247 -0,644 
Laporta, 1997 -0,662 0,309 0,183 -0,576 0,249 
Anderson, 2004 -0,788 0,072 0,366 0,245 0,372 
Murphy, 1999 -0,191 -0,674 -0,585 0,323 -0,164 
Xie, 2003 -0,771 -0,375 -0,274 0,373 -0,117 
Minichilli, 2009 0,631 -0,620 0,135 -0,349 -0,206 
Bilimoria, 1994 0,700 0,663 0,120 -0,054 0,127 
van, 2003 0,858 0,151 -0,448 0,069 0,020 
Jensen, 1990 -0,512 -0,604 -0,436 -0,382 -0,003 
Denis, 2003 0,245 0,186 0,336 -0,841 -0,225 
Shivdasani, 1999 -0,711 0,102 -0,091 0,593 0,290 
Winlund, 2000 0,707 -0,190 -0,112 0,620 0,181 
Hartzell, 2003 -0,430 -0,393 -0,305 -0,322 0,655 
Klapper, 2004 -0,640 0,574 -0,115 -0,142 0,438 
Adams, 2010 0,238 -0,553 -0,124 -0,372 -0,667 
Bathala, 1995 -0,051 0,068 0,037 0,534 -0,819 
Lynall, 2003 0,627 -0,539 0,151 0,497 -0,101 
Carleton, 1998 0,540 0,064 0,102 0,691 -0,428 
Zattoni, 2008 -0,258 -0,153 -0,203 -0,913 0,018 
Pugliese, 2009 0,768 -0,203 -0,571 -0,081 -0,010 
Haunschild, 1993 0,411 -0,640 0,316 -0,028 0,530 
Pfeffer, 1973 0,912 -0,202 0,060 -0,287 -0,084 
Bhagat, 2008 -0,316 0,650 0,235 0,612 0,106 
Gedajlovic, 1998 -0,564 0,312 0,646 -0,349 0,100 
Mehran, 1995 -0,243 0,079 -0,192 0,746 -0,555 
Rindova, 1999 0,949 0,046 0,154 -0,179 0,089 
Aguilera, 2008 -0,434 -0,344 -0,004 -0,620 0,523 
Aguilera, 2004 0,112 0,304 -0,147 -0,890 0,212 
Peasnell, 2000 -0,479 -0,368 0,171 0,669 -0,354 
Beekes, 2004 -0,598 -0,415 0,608 0,213 0,141 
Samra-fredericks, 2000 0,426 -0,154 -0,629 -0,519 -0,307 
Westphal, 2000 0,848 0,249 -0,342 0,255 -0,062 
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Leblanc, 2007 0,190 -0,311 -0,535 -0,739 0,035 
Ajinkya, 2005 -0,705 -0,319 0,325 -0,012 -0,508 
Mizruchi, 1996 0,378 -0,598 0,361 -0,522 -0,241 
Zona, 2007 0,707 -0,115 -0,294 -0,594 -0,119 
Daily, 1994 -0,208 0,444 0,292 -0,152 -0,785 
Johnson, 2000 -0,705 0,383 0,440 0,338 0,101 
Peasnell, 2005 -0,807 -0,387 0,073 0,295 -0,263 
van, 2008 0,742 0,336 -0,073 -0,521 0,155 
Peng, 2004 -0,461 0,473 -0,488 -0,268 0,464 
Singh, 2004 0,478 0,710 -0,215 -0,428 -0,059 
Westphal, 1997 -0,686 -0,155 -0,398 -0,264 -0,486 
Kroll, 2008 0,100 -0,116 0,254 0,823 -0,445 
Gillan, 2000 -0,788 -0,267 0,180 0,103 -0,474 
Meyer, 1977 -0,395 0,136 -0,169 -0,797 0,353 
Boyd, 1990 0,279 -0,223 0,355 -0,822 -0,189 
Karamanou, 2005 -0,438 -0,702 -0,440 0,155 0,249 
Oxelheim, 2003 -0,134 -0,320 -0,008 0,758 -0,522 
Weimer, 1999 0,299 0,199 -0,340 -0,850 0,023 
Bushee, 1998 -0,580 -0,321 0,568 -0,228 0,388 
Sonnenfeld, 2002 0,669 -0,257 -0,427 0,519 -0,023 
Donaldson, 1990 0,491 -0,552 0,290 0,483 -0,318 
Kaplan, 1994 -0,508 0,243 0,467 -0,256 -0,605 
Pathan, 2009 -0,312 0,018 0,351 -0,731 -0,460 
Williams, 1998 0,056 -0,780 -0,445 -0,395 -0,004 
Kiel, 2003 0,106 0,030 0,495 0,676 -0,498 
Zajac, 1994 -0,296 0,549 -0,520 -0,285 -0,466 
Johnson, 1993 -0,161 -0,202 0,557 0,398 -0,657 
Davis, 1991 0,417 0,346 0,135 -0,452 0,670 
Baliga, 1996 -0,453 0,272 -0,763 0,308 0,060 
Chaganti, 1985 -0,413 -0,708 0,358 -0,233 -0,332 
Larcker, 2007 -0,583 0,267 0,380 0,452 -0,454 
Jackson, 2005 -0,630 0,214 -0,483 -0,369 -0,379 
Boone, 2007 0,513 0,748 -0,224 0,222 0,210 
Schellenger, 1989 -0,148 -0,677 0,591 -0,033 -0,368 
Conyon, 2000 -0,598 -0,220 -0,567 0,299 0,383 
Daily, 1992 -0,238 0,068 -0,708 -0,277 0,567 
Daily, 1993 -0,115 -0,658 -0,030 -0,573 -0,435 
Wiersema, 1992 0,241 0,206 -0,704 -0,038 -0,598 
Chen, 2009 -0,584 -0,008 0,331 0,309 -0,646 
Smith, 1996 -0,284 -0,328 -0,483 0,636 -0,373 
Van, 2004 0,104 0,593 -0,567 0,429 -0,313 
Smith, 1992 -0,436 -0,757 -0,265 0,352 -0,086 
Kim, 2009 0,347 0,436 0,142 -0,568 -0,557 
Baysinger, 1991 0,060 0,417 0,790 -0,348 0,202 
Adams, 2009 -0,284 -0,771 -0,065 0,004 -0,537 
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Gilson, 1990 0,124 0,344 -0,196 0,474 0,755 
Pye, 2005 0,484 -0,461 -0,648 -0,179 0,257 
Raheja, 2005 0,002 0,588 -0,467 0,554 0,312 
Himmelberg, 1999 -0,954 0,121 -0,016 0,158 0,098 
Bebchuk, 2003 -0,436 0,029 -0,726 0,435 0,228 
Hillman, 2007 0,467 0,635 0,058 -0,458 -0,360 
Yermack, 2004 -0,487 0,012 -0,480 0,519 -0,478 
Filatotchev, 2002 -0,150 0,016 -0,169 -0,370 0,883 
Farrell, 2005 0,788 -0,191 -0,129 -0,223 -0,494 
Finkelstein, 1992 -0,703 0,233 0,120 -0,246 -0,584 
Murphy, 1985 -0,275 -0,202 -0,743 0,510 -0,187 
Franks, 2001 -0,808 0,356 -0,332 0,265 0,053 
Fich, 2005 0,200 0,375 -0,278 0,706 -0,458 
Gabrielsson, 2004 0,615 0,321 -0,552 -0,412 0,095 
Westphal, 2005 0,717 0,180 -0,296 -0,566 0,089 
Westphal, 2001 0,163 -0,145 -0,533 -0,503 0,616 
Nadler, 2004 0,631 -0,273 -0,646 -0,050 -0,262 
Westphal, 2003 -0,214 -0,621 -0,569 -0,362 -0,277 
Westphal, 2001 0,512 -0,061 -0,454 -0,697 0,083 
Singh, 2008 -0,036 0,132 0,702 -0,665 -0,117 
Chan, 2008 0,122 0,223 -0,444 0,555 -0,628 
Solomon, 2003 -0,790 -0,015 -0,111 0,262 -0,508 
Bethel, 1998 -0,536 0,456 -0,439 0,523 0,059 
Singh, 2001 0,369 0,504 -0,718 0,038 -0,237 
Schulze, 2001 -0,791 0,267 0,152 0,448 0,191 
Conyon, 1997 0,681 0,410 -0,555 0,153 -0,022 
Shrader, 1997 0,653 0,084 -0,285 0,665 0,104 
Chung, 1994 0,234 0,112 -0,716 0,599 -0,168 
Carter, 2010 0,370 -0,345 -0,673 0,473 -0,179 
Boyd, 1994 -0,400 0,135 -0,600 0,325 0,564 
Terjesen, 2015 -0,310 -0,297 0,100 -0,867 -0,140 
Tosi, 1989 -0,614 -0,156 -0,647 -0,221 -0,302 
Thomsen, 2000 -0,069 0,320 0,903 -0,162 0,113 
Terjesen, 2008 0,023 0,322 0,191 -0,860 -0,293 
Vafeas, 1998 -0,258 0,444 0,774 -0,100 -0,307 
Vafeas, 2003 0,280 -0,375 -0,337 0,786 0,103 
Burgess, 2002 0,565 0,670 0,283 -0,009 0,340 
Carcello, 2000 0,038 -0,835 0,095 0,308 -0,408 
Pettigrew, 1998 -0,223 -0,489 -0,312 -0,757 -0,061 
Dulewicz, 2004 -0,483 0,331 -0,530 -0,040 -0,578 
Djankov, 2008 -0,698 -0,027 -0,328 -0,515 0,320 
Donaldson, 1994 0,769 0,487 0,026 0,363 -0,081 
Durnev, 2005 -0,220 0,584 -0,645 -0,042 0,393 
Barclay, 1989 -0,244 0,945 -0,086 -0,005 0,055 
Westphal, 1994 -0,239 -0,451 -0,568 -0,258 0,561 
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Pelled, 1999 -0,607 -0,274 -0,561 0,330 -0,309 
Eisenhardt, 1989 -0,117 0,088 0,788 -0,471 -0,321 
Pye, 2004 0,317 -0,367 -0,448 -0,672 -0,280 
Wan, 2005 0,808 0,489 0,114 0,152 -0,197 
Dalton, 2007 -0,445 0,051 -0,444 -0,664 -0,352 
Ruigrok, 2006 -0,093 -0,055 0,138 -0,314 -0,914 
Cotter, 1997 0,325 -0,092 -0,355 0,541 0,661 
Rhoades, 2000 0,022 -0,004 0,938 -0,194 -0,220 
Deangelo, 1981 -0,345 -0,882 0,099 -0,019 -0,241 
Dechow, 1995 -0,215 -0,038 0,918 -0,241 0,128 
Davis, 1994 -0,438 -0,355 -0,449 -0,641 -0,174 
Ravasi, 2006 0,161 -0,649 -0,591 -0,196 -0,356 
Gaver, 1993 -0,461 -0,830 0,207 0,148 0,002 
Healy, 2001 -0,292 -0,751 -0,545 0,062 -0,116 
Adams, 2007 0,239 -0,083 -0,062 -0,113 0,939 
Kang, 1995 -0,382 0,799 -0,242 0,092 -0,337 
Heckman, 1979 0,099 -0,036 0,357 -0,244 0,876 
Haunschild, 1998 0,079 -0,701 0,273 -0,604 -0,166 
Hall, 1998 0,140 -0,563 -0,584 0,524 -0,109 
Gulati, 1999 0,023 -0,487 0,461 -0,644 -0,317 
Anderson, 2004 0,198 -0,169 -0,223 -0,028 0,919 
Hambrick, 2008 0,062 -0,119 -0,356 -0,903 -0,096 
Judge, 2008 -0,105 0,437 -0,530 -0,602 0,348 
Zahra, 2004 0,690 0,446 -0,115 -0,026 0,526 
Jackling, 2009 0,209 0,501 -0,588 -0,115 0,558 
Jensen, 1983 -0,524 -0,581 0,091 -0,563 -0,170 
Letendre, 2004 0,365 -0,223 -0,792 -0,102 -0,371 
Holderness, 1988 -0,205 0,619 -0,150 0,007 0,722 
Yeh, 2005 -0,094 0,321 -0,148 -0,031 0,914 
Hendry, 2004 0,727 0,394 0,089 0,333 0,405 
Lubatkin, 2005 -0,369 0,400 -0,500 -0,581 -0,281 
Almazan, 2005 0,095 0,448 0,078 -0,813 0,298 
Mizruchi, 1994 -0,153 0,322 0,877 0,132 -0,233 
Note: Cells with green background color show values over 0.7.  Cells with values between 0.3 and 0.7 have 
yellow background color. 
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Appendix Table 3: Total Variance Explained. 2000 - 2007 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
 Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 56,583 43,193 43,193 56,583 43,193 43,193 55,361 42,26 42,26 
2 54,843 41,865 85,058 54,843 41,865 85,058 36,496 27,86 70,12 
3 14,651 11,184 96,241 14,651 11,184 96,241 32,908 25,121 95,24 
4 1,797 1,372 97,613 1,797 1,372 97,613 3,063 2,338 97,578 
5 1,719 1,312 98,925 1,719 1,312 98,925 1,764 1,347 98,925 
6 0,291 0,222 99,147       
7 0,262 0,2 99,347       
8 0,178 0,136 99,483       
9 0,147 0,112 99,595       
10 0,09 0,069 99,664       
11 0,077 0,059 99,723       
12 0,071 0,054 99,777       
13 0,036 0,028 99,805       
14 0,03 0,023 99,827       
15 0,028 0,021 99,849       
16 0,026 0,02 99,869       
17 0,013 0,01 99,879       
18 0,013 0,01 99,888       
19 0,011 0,009 99,897       
20 0,011 0,008 99,905       
21 0,01 0,008 99,913       
22 0,009 0,007 99,92       
23 0,008 0,006 99,926       
24 0,007 0,005 99,931       
25 0,006 0,005 99,936       
26 0,005 0,004 99,94       
27 0,005 0,004 99,944       
28 0,005 0,003 99,947       
29 0,004 0,003 99,95       
30 0,004 0,003 99,953       
31 0,003 0,002 99,955       
32 0,003 0,002 99,958       
33 0,003 0,002 99,96       
34 0,002 0,002 99,962       
35 0,002 0,002 99,963       
36 0,002 0,002 99,965       
37 0,002 0,002 99,967       
38 0,002 0,002 99,968       
39 0,002 0,001 99,97       
40 0,002 0,001 99,971       
41 0,001 0,001 99,972       
42 0,001 0,001 99,973       
43 0,001 0,001 99,974       
44 0,001 0,001 99,975       
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Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
 Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
45 0,001 0,001 99,976       
46 0,001 0,001 99,977       
47 0,001 0,001 99,978       
48 0,001 0,001 99,979       
49 0,001 0,001 99,98       
50 0,001 0,001 99,98       
51 0,001 0,001 99,981       
52 0,001 0,001 99,982       
53 0,001 0,001 99,982       
54 0,001 0,001 99,983       
55 0,001 0,001 99,984       
56 0,001 0,001 99,984       
57 0,001 0,001 99,985       
58 0,001 0,001 99,986       
59 0,001 0,001 99,986       
60 0,001 0,001 99,987       
61 0,001 0 99,987       
62 0,001 0 99,987       
63 0,001 0 99,988       
64 0,001 0 99,988       
65 0,001 0 99,989       
66 0,001 0 99,989       
67 0,001 0 99,99       
68 0,001 0 99,99       
69 0,001 0 99,99       
70 0 0 99,991       
71 0 0 99,991       
72 0 0 99,991       
73 0 0 99,992       
74 0 0 99,992       
75 0 0 99,992       
76 0 0 99,993       
77 0 0 99,993       
78 0 0 99,993       
79 0 0 99,993       
80 0 0 99,994       
81 0 0 99,994       
82 0 0 99,994       
83 0 0 99,994       
84 0 0 99,995       
85 0 0 99,995       
86 0 0 99,995       
87 0 0 99,995       
88 0 0 99,995       
89 0 0 99,996       
90 0 0 99,996       
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Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
 Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
91 0 0 99,996       
92 0 0 99,996       
93 0 0 99,996       
94 0 0 99,997       
95 0 0 99,997       
96 0 0 99,997       
97 0 0 99,997       
98 0 0 99,997       
99 0 0 99,997       
100 0 0 99,997       
101 0 0 99,998       
102 0 0 99,998       
103 0 0 99,998       
104 0 0 99,998       
105 0 0 99,998       
106 0 0 99,998       
107 0 0 99,998       
108 0 0 99,998       
109 0 0 99,999       
110 0 0 99,999       
111 0 9,77E-05 99,999       
112 0 9,03E-05 99,999       
113 0 8,98E-05 99,999       
114 0 8,94E-05 99,999       
115 0 8,22E-05 99,999       
116 0 7,85E-05 99,999       
117 9,62E-05 7,34E-05 99,999       
118 9,53E-05 7,28E-05 99,999       
119 9,41E-05 7,19E-05 99,999       
120 9,29E-05 7,09E-05 99,999       
121 9,25E-05 7,06E-05 100       
122 8,66E-05 6,61E-05 100       
123 7,50E-05 5,72E-05 100       
124 7,43E-05 5,67E-05 100       
125 7,10E-05 5,42E-05 100       
126 6,88E-05 5,25E-05 100       
127 5,80E-05 4,43E-05 100       
128 5,01E-05 3,83E-05 100       
129 4,78E-05 3,65E-05 100       
130 4,20E-05 3,21E-05 100       
131 9,82E-16 7,49E-16 100       
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Appendix Table 4: PCA Components 2000 - 2007 
Reference 1 2 3 4 5 
FamaEF1983V26P301JLAWECON -0,080 0,976 -0,104 0,111 -0,013 
JensenMC1976V3P305JFINANCECON -0,239 0,948 -0,123 0,114 -0,049 
DaltonDR1998V19P269STRATEGICMANAGEJ 0,134 0,938 -0,299 -0,003 0,050 
JohnsonJL1996V22P409JMANAGE -0,345 0,854 -0,364 -0,006 -0,104 
LaPortaR1999V54P471JFINANC -0,339 0,828 -0,422 -0,037 -0,105 
ZahraSA1989V15P291JMANAGE -0,828 0,456 -0,197 0,184 -0,146 
ForbesDP1999V24P489ACADMANAGEREV -0,229 0,897 -0,359 -0,021 -0,067 
BerleAA1932MODERNCORPORATIONP 0,675 0,644 -0,293 0,054 0,182 
YermackD1996V40P185JFINANCECON 0,666 -0,375 0,608 0,027 -0,192 
FinkelsteinS1996STRATEGICLEADERSHIP 0,199 0,937 -0,256 0,024 0,064 
PettigrewAM1992V13P163STRATEGICMANAGEJ 0,535 0,692 -0,435 -0,040 0,180 
WeisbachMS1988V20P431JFINANCECON 0,520 -0,485 0,670 -0,050 -0,180 
ShleiferA1986V94P461JPOLITECON 0,846 0,407 -0,266 0,100 0,168 
PearceJA1992V29P411JMANAGESTUD 0,271 0,831 -0,455 -0,090 0,111 
FamaEF1980V88P288JPOLITECON 0,018 0,886 -0,443 -0,091 0,019 
BaysingerBD1985V1P101JLAWECONORGAN 0,083 -0,369 0,919 -0,012 -0,039 
CarterDA2003V38P33FINANCIALREV 0,001 -0,514 0,845 -0,109 -0,018 
LaPortaR1998V106P1113JPOLITECON -0,105 -0,514 0,839 -0,103 0,021 
ErhardtNL2003V11P102CORPGOV -0,627 0,682 -0,309 0,086 -0,167 
EisenhardtKM1989V14P57ACADMANAGEREV 0,378 0,788 -0,447 -0,074 0,145 
DailyCM2003V28P371ACADMANAGEREV -0,123 -0,146 0,966 0,123 0,017 
HampelR1998COMMITTEECORPORATE 0,759 0,553 -0,265 0,083 0,181 
JensenMC1993V48P831JFINANC -0,491 0,765 -0,377 0,019 -0,145 
LorschJ1989PAWNSPOTENTATESREA -0,174 0,924 -0,324 -0,005 -0,047 
ShleiferA1997V52P737JFINANC 0,935 0,253 -0,123 0,161 0,104 
JensenMC1986V76P323AMECONREV -0,202 0,847 -0,470 -0,080 -0,059 
McnultyT1999V20P47ORGANSTUD 0,342 0,917 -0,079 0,119 0,075 
PfefferJ1978EXTERNALCONTROLORG 0,007 -0,263 0,956 0,054 -0,013 
PfefferJ1972V17P218ADMINSCIQUART 0,352 -0,441 0,809 -0,048 -0,130 
MorckR1988V20P293JFINANCECON -0,053 0,862 -0,484 -0,103 -0,006 
ByrdJW1992V32P195JFINANCECON 0,426 -0,502 0,725 -0,073 -0,159 
HermalinBE1991V20P101FINANCMANAGE 0,516 -0,359 0,756 0,014 -0,158 
KesnerIF1988V31P66ACADMANAGEJ 0,204 -0,539 0,797 -0,117 -0,093 
BrickleyJ1997V3P189JCORPFINANC 0,909 0,316 -0,164 0,148 0,129 
AgrawalA1996V31P377JFINANCQUANTANAL -0,844 0,062 0,441 0,275 0,067 
DavisJH1997V22P20ACADMANAGEREV 0,831 0,424 -0,287 0,088 0,173 
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ChagantiRS1985V22P400JMANAGESTUD 0,599 -0,450 0,624 -0,020 -0,193 
JensenMC1990V98P225JPOLITECON 0,503 0,716 -0,436 -0,048 0,175 
JohnK1998V22P371JBANKFINANC 0,423 0,687 0,498 0,285 0,014 
SchellengerMH1989V15P457JMANAGE -0,125 0,871 -0,455 -0,086 -0,033 
DemsetzH1985V93P1155JPOLITECON 0,492 0,748 -0,399 -0,032 0,170 
KosnikRD1987V32P163ADMINSCIQUART 0,278 0,012 0,932 0,180 -0,051 
PettigrewA1995V48P845HUMRELAT -0,360 0,307 0,818 0,295 0,023 
LaPortaR2000V58P3JFINANCECON -0,454 -0,392 0,785 0,019 0,126 
VanDWN2003V11P218CORPGOV -0,602 0,689 -0,349 0,061 -0,163 
DaltonDR1999V42P674ACADMANAGEJ 0,815 0,445 0,262 0,230 0,034 
DailyCM1999V20P93STRATEGICMANAGEJ -0,588 -0,400 0,677 0,042 0,158 
BeasleyMS1996V71P443ACCOUNTREV -0,204 -0,536 0,804 -0,102 0,055 
GreenburyR1995DIRECTORSREMUNERATI 0,974 0,053 0,066 0,186 -0,006 
DonaldsonL1991V16P49AUSTRJMANAGEMENT 0,920 0,274 -0,184 0,137 0,122 
HiggsD2003REVROLEEFFECTIVENE 0,727 -0,376 0,529 0,038 -0,198 
BilimoriaD1994V37P1453ACADMANAGEJ 0,303 -0,540 0,761 -0,106 -0,123 
DailyCM1993V17P65ENTREPTHEORYPRACT 0,898 0,363 -0,112 0,162 0,122 
WalshJP1990V15P421ACADMANAGEREV 0,243 0,827 -0,476 -0,101 0,102 
DailyCM2003V24P8JBUSSTRAT -0,787 0,516 -0,227 0,164 -0,158 
ShivdasaniA1993V16P167JACCOUNTECON 0,764 0,205 0,550 0,228 -0,050 
BurkeRJ1997V5P118CORPORATEGOVERNANCE -0,290 -0,524 0,785 -0,083 0,084 
BhagatS1999V54P921BUSLAWYER -0,925 0,226 0,077 0,279 -0,042 
DailyCM1992V7P375JBUSVENTURING 0,744 0,598 -0,203 0,105 0,164 
LiptonM1992V48P59BUSLAWYER 0,460 -0,311 0,813 0,035 -0,134 
UseemMT1996INVESTORCAPITALISM 0,903 -0,222 0,298 0,126 -0,143 
BathalaCH1995V16P59MANAGERIALDECISION 0,034 -0,470 0,873 -0,080 -0,028 
BurgessZ2002V37P39JBUSETHICS -0,740 -0,296 0,559 0,131 0,160 
RedikerKJ1995V16P85STRATEGICMANAGEJ -0,015 0,966 0,092 0,195 0,001 
RosensteinS1990V26P175JFINANCECON -0,598 0,718 -0,290 0,088 -0,160 
RechnerPL1991V12P155STRATEGICMANAGEJ -0,441 -0,217 0,851 0,115 0,093 
CadburyA1992REPORTCOMMITTEEFIN 0,974 -0,036 0,091 0,170 -0,040 
BaysingerBD1991V34P205ACADMANAGEJ -0,857 0,323 0,243 0,301 -0,022 
BeattyRP1994V39P313ADMINSCIQUART -0,671 -0,076 0,692 0,208 0,104 
Oecd1999OecdPRINCCORPGOV 0,652 0,619 -0,380 0,009 0,194 
BaysingerB1990V15P72ACADMANAGEREV -0,762 0,546 0,157 0,282 -0,067 
MurphyKJ1985V7P11JACCOUNTECON 0,100 0,853 -0,488 -0,110 0,051 
GompersP2003V118P107QJECON -0,890 0,009 0,350 0,269 0,071 
DimaggioPJ1983V48P147AMSOCIOLREV -0,536 0,616 0,462 0,318 -0,017 
MillikenFJ1996V21P402ACADMANAGEREV -0,090 -0,550 0,815 -0,119 0,014 
WestphalJD2000V45P366ADMINSCIQUART -0,212 -0,409 0,881 -0,024 0,054 
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HillmanAJ2000V37P235JMANAGESTUD -0,827 0,482 -0,069 0,234 -0,122 
HartOD1983V14P366BELLJECON 0,706 0,565 -0,366 0,028 0,193 
HillmanAJ2003V28P383ACADMANAGEREV -0,415 -0,485 0,752 -0,042 0,122 
KleinA1998V41P275JLAWECON -0,847 0,430 -0,156 0,206 -0,138 
SundaramurthyC2003V28P397ACADMANAGEREV 0,329 0,862 -0,356 -0,028 0,115 
DavisGF1991V36P583ADMINSCIQUART 0,805 -0,340 0,431 0,066 -0,186 
EisenbergT1998V48P35JFINANCECON -0,664 -0,305 0,649 0,108 0,156 
EzzamelMA1993V4P161BRITJMANAGE 0,942 -0,134 0,223 0,156 -0,103 
McnultyT.1996V4P160CORPORATEGOVERNANCE 0,950 0,054 0,214 0,197 -0,040 
MizruchiMS1994V39P118ADMINSCIQUART 0,674 -0,423 0,563 0,006 -0,199 
HilmerFG1993STRICTLYBOARDROOMI 0,955 -0,131 0,170 0,150 -0,088 
DailyCM1994V37P1603ACADMANAGEJ -0,672 0,142 0,659 0,275 0,060 
TrickerRI1994INTCORPORATEGOVERN 0,086 0,884 -0,439 -0,090 0,044 
PearceJA1991V12P135STRATEGICMANAGEJ 0,715 -0,062 0,657 0,160 -0,115 
BlakeA1999DYNAMICDIRECTORSAL -0,867 -0,190 0,381 0,200 0,124 
LaportaR1997V52P1131JFINANC -0,852 0,428 -0,119 0,222 -0,130 
UseemM2003V7P241JMANAGEMENTGOVERNA -0,862 0,406 0,056 0,273 -0,080 
CongerJA1998V76P136HARVARDBUSREV -0,797 -0,259 0,489 0,160 0,151 
CadburyA1999V32P12LONGRANGEPLANN 0,386 0,759 -0,485 -0,084 0,143 
BarnhartS1994V15P329MANAGERIALDECISION -0,499 -0,468 0,708 -0,014 0,141 
HermalinBE1988V19P589RANDJECON 0,102 -0,553 0,809 -0,126 -0,056 
CotterJF1997V43P195JFINANCECON 0,871 -0,282 0,340 0,097 -0,161 
BoydBK1995V16P301STRATEGICMANAGEJ 0,902 -0,193 0,320 0,138 -0,139 
BoydBK1994V15P335STRATEGICMANAGEJ 0,915 0,317 0,085 0,203 0,056 
BradburyME1990V9P19JACCOUNTPUBLICPOL -0,907 -0,044 0,307 0,257 0,079 
KleinA2002V33P375JACCOUNTECON 0,544 -0,103 0,805 0,137 -0,107 
MaceM1971DIRECTORSMYTHREALI 0,956 0,179 -0,112 0,156 0,079 
DonaldsonL1998V6P5CORPORATEGOVERNANCE -0,937 0,092 0,165 0,278 0,013 
FaccioM2002V65P365JFINANCECON -0,916 -0,096 0,278 0,235 0,085 
RobertsJ2005V16pS5BRITJMANAGE -0,408 0,874 0,068 0,213 -0,061 
FamaEF1983V26P327JLAWECON 0,949 0,224 0,010 0,192 0,058 
GoodsteinJ1994V15P241STRATEGICMANAGEJ -0,073 0,545 0,758 0,321 0,000 
McconnellJJ1990V27P595JFINANCECON -0,593 -0,284 0,727 0,104 0,139 
PengMW2004V25P453STRATEGICMANAGEJ 0,815 -0,177 0,506 0,131 -0,148 
WestphalJD1999V42P7ACADMANAGEJ -0,705 0,603 -0,294 0,113 -0,167 
ZahraSA1990V23P109LONGRANGEPLANN -0,725 0,605 -0,223 0,151 -0,162 
ConyonMJ1997V5P112CORPORATEGOVERNANCE -0,553 -0,444 0,680 0,011 0,152 
PenningsJM1980INTERLOCKINGDIRECTO 0,185 -0,522 0,815 -0,110 -0,085 
SinghV2001V9P206CORPGOV -0,305 -0,478 0,812 -0,058 0,090 
HoldernessCG1988V20P317JFINANCECON 0,781 0,497 -0,307 0,070 0,186 
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BurkeRJ2000WOMENCORPORATEBOAR -0,869 -0,154 0,388 0,217 0,119 
ConyonMJ2000V110P640ECONJ -0,909 0,303 -0,065 0,242 -0,093 
JohnsonS2000V58P141JFINANCECON -0,947 0,138 0,063 0,264 -0,023 
BhagatS2002V27P231JCORPLAW 0,889 -0,144 0,375 0,152 -0,130 
BethelJE1998V53P605JFINANC -0,690 -0,367 0,588 0,083 0,162 
BurkeRJ2000P97WOMENCORPORATEBOAR -0,935 -0,030 0,218 0,252 0,056 
DulewiczV1995V20P1JGENMANAGE -0,815 -0,265 0,455 0,159 0,146 
FinkelsteinS1994V37P1079ACADMANAGEJ 0,773 -0,363 0,468 0,051 -0,193 
LaPortaR2002V57P1147JFINANC -0,948 0,061 0,130 0,263 0,013 
DemsetzH2001V7P209JCORPFINANC -0,932 0,226 -0,005 0,257 -0,061 
GomezmejiaL1997V23P291JMANAGE 0,975 0,090 -0,031 0,170 0,032 
KesnerIF1986V29P789ACADMANAGEJ 0,672 0,700 -0,112 0,128 0,133 
MehranH1995V38P163JFINANCECON -0,569 0,767 -0,221 0,114 -0,139 
GedajlovicER1998V19P533STRATEGICMANAGEJ 0,978 -0,010 0,054 0,169 -0,022 
ClaessensS2000V58P81JFINANCECON -0,386 0,792 -0,446 -0,034 -0,113 
Note: Cells with green background color show values over 0.7.  Cells with values between 0.3 and 0.7 have 
yellow background color. 
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Appendix Table 5: Total Variance Explained. 2008 - 2013 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
 Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 80,288 42,706 42,706 80,288 42,706 42,706 68,982 36,693 36,693 
2 76,055 40,455 83,161 76,055 40,455 83,161 62,546 33,269 69,962 
3 24,836 13,211 96,372 24,836 13,211 96,372 46,184 24,566 94,528 
4 2,452 1,304 97,676 2,452 1,304 97,676 4,855 2,582 97,11 
5 2,356 1,253 98,929 2,356 1,253 98,929 3,419 1,819 98,929 
6 0,369 0,196 99,125 
      7 0,364 0,194 99,319 
      8 0,289 0,154 99,472 
      9 0,245 0,13 99,603 
      10 0,154 0,082 99,685 
      11 0,1 0,053 99,738 
      12 0,091 0,048 99,786 
      13 0,057 0,03 99,817 
      14 0,047 0,025 99,842 
      15 0,036 0,019 99,861 
      16 0,033 0,018 99,878 
      17 0,02 0,01 99,889 
      18 0,016 0,008 99,897 
      19 0,015 0,008 99,905 
      20 0,015 0,008 99,913 
      21 0,014 0,008 99,921 
      22 0,014 0,007 99,928 
      23 0,012 0,007 99,935 
      24 0,008 0,004 99,939 
      25 0,007 0,004 99,943 
      26 0,007 0,004 99,947 
      27 0,006 0,003 99,95 
      28 0,006 0,003 99,953 
      29 0,005 0,003 99,956 
      30 0,004 0,002 99,958 
      31 0,004 0,002 99,96 
      32 0,004 0,002 99,962 
      33 0,003 0,002 99,964 
      34 0,003 0,002 99,966 
      35 0,003 0,002 99,967 
      36 0,003 0,002 99,969 
      37 0,003 0,001 99,97 
      38 0,003 0,001 99,972 
      39 0,002 0,001 99,973 
      40 0,002 0,001 99,974 
      41 0,002 0,001 99,975 
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Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
 Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
42 0,002 0,001 99,976 
      43 0,002 0,001 99,977 
      44 0,002 0,001 99,978 
      45 0,002 0,001 99,979 
      46 0,001 0,001 99,979 
      47 0,001 0,001 99,98 
      48 0,001 0,001 99,981 
      49 0,001 0,001 99,981 
      50 0,001 0,001 99,982 
      51 0,001 0,001 99,983 
      52 0,001 0,001 99,983 
      53 0,001 0,001 99,984 
      54 0,001 0 99,984 
      55 0,001 0 99,985 
      56 0,001 0 99,985 
      57 0,001 0 99,985 
      58 0,001 0 99,986 
      59 0,001 0 99,986 
      60 0,001 0 99,987 
      61 0,001 0 99,987 
      62 0,001 0 99,987 
      63 0,001 0 99,988 
      64 0,001 0 99,988 
      65 0,001 0 99,988 
      66 0,001 0 99,989 
      67 0,001 0 99,989 
      68 0,001 0 99,989 
      69 0,001 0 99,99 
      70 0,001 0 99,99 
      71 0 0 99,99 
      72 0 0 99,99 
      73 0 0 99,991 
      74 0 0 99,991 
      75 0 0 99,991 
      76 0 0 99,991 
      77 0 0 99,992 
      78 0 0 99,992 
      79 0 0 99,992 
      80 0 0 99,992 
      81 0 0 99,992 
      82 0 0 99,993 
      83 0 0 99,993 
      84 0 0 99,993 
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Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
 Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
85 0 0 99,993 
      86 0 0 99,993 
      87 0 0 99,993 
      88 0 0 99,994 
      89 0 0 99,994 
      90 0 0 99,994 
      91 0 0 99,994 
      92 0 0 99,994 
      93 0 0 99,994 
      94 0 0 99,994 
      95 0 0 99,995 
      96 0 0 99,995 
      97 0 0 99,995 
      98 0 0 99,995 
      99 0 0 99,995 
      100 0 0 99,995 
      101 0 0 99,995 
      102 0 0 99,995 
      103 0 0 99,996 
      104 0 0 99,996 
      105 0 0 99,996 
      106 0 0 99,996 
      107 0 0 99,996 
      108 0 0 99,996 
      109 0 0 99,996 
      110 0 0 99,996 
      111 0 9,78E-05 99,996 
      112 0 9,67E-05 99,997 
      113 0 9,31E-05 99,997 
      114 0 9,14E-05 99,997 
      115 0 9,05E-05 99,997 
      116 0 8,83E-05 99,997 
      117 0 8,68E-05 99,997 
      118 0 8,35E-05 99,997 
      119 0 8,32E-05 99,997 
      120 0 8,21E-05 99,997 
      121 0 8,03E-05 99,997 
      122 0 7,83E-05 99,997 
      123 0 7,66E-05 99,997 
      124 0 7,50E-05 99,998 
      125 0 7,44E-05 99,998 
      126 0 7,37E-05 99,998 
      127 0 7,28E-05 99,998 
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Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
 Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
128 0 7,06E-05 99,998 
      129 0 6,87E-05 99,998 
      130 0 6,52E-05 99,998 
      131 0 6,28E-05 99,998 
      132 0 6,17E-05 99,998 
      133 0 6,08E-05 99,998 
      134 0 5,99E-05 99,998 
      135 0 5,96E-05 99,998 
      136 0 5,85E-05 99,998 
      137 0 5,82E-05 99,998 
      138 9,96E-05 5,30E-05 99,998 
      139 9,89E-05 5,26E-05 99,998 
      140 9,71E-05 5,17E-05 99,999 
      141 9,64E-05 5,13E-05 99,999 
      142 9,39E-05 4,99E-05 99,999 
      143 9,38E-05 4,99E-05 99,999 
      144 9,12E-05 4,85E-05 99,999 
      145 8,92E-05 4,75E-05 99,999 
      146 8,78E-05 4,67E-05 99,999 
      147 8,07E-05 4,29E-05 99,999 
      148 8,02E-05 4,27E-05 99,999 
      149 7,86E-05 4,18E-05 99,999 
      150 7,71E-05 4,10E-05 99,999 
      151 7,64E-05 4,07E-05 99,999 
      152 7,61E-05 4,05E-05 99,999 
      153 7,49E-05 3,98E-05 99,999 
      154 7,42E-05 3,95E-05 99,999 
      155 7,36E-05 3,91E-05 99,999 
      156 7,31E-05 3,89E-05 99,999 
      157 7,16E-05 3,81E-05 99,999 
      158 6,58E-05 3,50E-05 99,999 
      159 6,49E-05 3,45E-05 99,999 
      160 6,33E-05 3,37E-05 99,999 
      161 6,13E-05 3,26E-05 99,999 
      162 6,11E-05 3,25E-05 99,999 
      163 6,08E-05 3,23E-05 99,999 
      164 6,06E-05 3,22E-05 100 
      165 5,93E-05 3,16E-05 100 
      166 5,70E-05 3,03E-05 100 
      167 5,70E-05 3,03E-05 100 
      168 5,56E-05 2,96E-05 100 
      169 5,17E-05 2,75E-05 100 
      170 5,06E-05 2,69E-05 100 
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Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
 Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
171 4,98E-05 2,65E-05 100 
      172 4,94E-05 2,63E-05 100 
      173 4,87E-05 2,59E-05 100 
      174 4,86E-05 2,58E-05 100 
      175 4,55E-05 2,42E-05 100 
      176 4,48E-05 2,38E-05 100 
      177 4,40E-05 2,34E-05 100 
      178 4,15E-05 2,21E-05 100 
      179 3,79E-05 2,02E-05 100 
      180 3,71E-05 1,97E-05 100 
      181 3,53E-05 1,88E-05 100 
      182 3,41E-05 1,81E-05 100 
      183 2,79E-05 1,49E-05 100 
      184 2,70E-05 1,44E-05 100 
      185 1,96E-05 1,04E-05 100 
      186 1,17E-05 6,23E-06 100 
      187 2,81E-06 1,50E-06 100 
      
188 -4,46E-16 
-2,38E-
16 100 
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Appendix Table 6: PCA Components 2008 - 2013 
Reference 1 2 3 4 5 
JensenMC1976V3P305JFINANCECON 0,127 0,736 0,626 0,179 0,023 
FamaEF1983V26P301JLAWECON 0,237 0,359 0,878 0,148 0,058 
YermackD1996V40P185JFINANCECON -0,795 0,322 0,352 0,355 -0,058 
DaltonDR1998V19P269STRATEGICMANAGEJ 0,415 0,212 0,863 0,104 0,087 
JensenMC1993V48P831JFINANC 0,599 0,770 0,165 0,022 -0,058 
ShleiferA1997V52P737JFINANC -0,530 0,799 0,087 0,246 0,071 
ForbesDP1999V24P489ACADMANAGEREV -0,184 -0,069 0,967 0,104 0,017 
DailyCM2003V28P371ACADMANAGEREV -0,105 -0,284 0,945 0,012 0,052 
LaPorta1999V54P471JFINANC 0,171 0,968 0,118 0,055 -0,015 
HillmanAJ2003V28P383ACADMANAGEREV -0,155 -0,134 0,967 0,076 0,027 
DemsetzH1985V93P1155JPOLITECON 0,658 0,661 -0,278 -0,108 -0,180 
BerleAA1932MODERNCORPORATIONP 0,345 0,908 -0,177 -0,082 -0,088 
CoreJE1999V51P371JFINANCECON 0,983 -0,097 0,096 0,043 0,058 
LorschJ1989PAWNSPOTENTATESREA 0,181 0,178 0,947 0,126 0,070 
PfefferJ1978EXTERNALCONTROLORG -0,390 0,459 0,739 0,275 -0,007 
FamaEF1980V88P288JPOLITECON 0,796 0,492 0,322 0,047 -0,014 
ZahraSA1989V15P291JMANAGE -0,600 -0,150 0,756 0,160 -0,111 
KleinA2002V33P375JACCOUNTECON 0,955 -0,244 0,080 0,043 0,109 
PettigrewAM1992V13P163STRATEGICMANAGEJ -0,096 -0,456 0,874 -0,067 0,076 
BeasleyMS1996V71P443ACCOUNTREV 0,990 0,062 -0,071 0,029 -0,045 
LiptonM1992V48P59BUSLAWYER 0,969 0,200 0,068 0,026 -0,034 
WeisbachMS1988V20P431JFINANCECON -0,286 -0,580 0,748 -0,111 0,024 
McconnellJJ1990V27P595JFINANCECON 0,675 -0,597 0,311 -0,053 0,282 
MaceM1971DIRECTORSMYTHREALI 0,542 -0,047 0,815 0,048 0,136 
JensenMC1986V76P323AMECONREV 0,261 0,910 -0,274 -0,116 -0,085 
JudgeWQ1992V35P766ACADMANAGEJ 0,472 -0,390 0,754 -0,038 0,204 
FerrisSP2003V58P1087JFINANC 0,707 0,653 -0,179 -0,074 -0,157 
MorckR1988V20P293JFINANCECON 0,288 0,947 -0,059 -0,028 -0,056 
LaPorta2000V58P3JFINANCECON 0,987 0,013 0,107 0,040 0,026 
BaysingerBD1985V1P101JLAWECONORGAN 0,791 0,516 -0,248 -0,074 -0,182 
HermalinBE1998V88P96AMECONREV 0,952 0,227 -0,147 -0,001 -0,113 
JohnsonJL1996V22P409JMANAGE -0,204 0,100 0,952 0,161 0,010 
WeisbachMS2003V9P7ECPOLICYREV 0,610 -0,311 0,691 -0,011 0,198 
LinckJS2008V87P308JFINANCECON -0,064 0,916 0,333 0,167 0,022 
EisenhardtKM1989V14P57ACADMANAGEREV 0,800 -0,487 0,239 -0,006 0,238 
GoodsteinJ1994V15P241STRATEGICMANAGEJ -0,169 0,972 0,048 0,108 0,039 
McnultyT1999V20P47ORGANSTUD -0,286 -0,414 0,859 -0,032 0,001 
CarpenterMA2001V44P639ACADMANAGEJ -0,615 0,582 0,403 0,333 0,006 
DaltonDR1999V42P674ACADMANAGEJ -0,262 0,948 -0,128 0,067 0,061 
HillmanAJ2000V37P235JMANAGESTUD -0,317 0,889 0,228 0,208 0,047 
WestphalJD1995V40P60ADMINSCIQUART -0,608 0,153 0,720 0,270 -0,076 
FamaEF1983V26P327JLAWECON 0,943 -0,297 -0,044 0,040 0,096 
AgrawalA1996V31P377JFINANCQUANTANAL 0,648 0,608 -0,377 -0,133 -0,205 
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GompersP2003V118P107QJECON 0,975 0,057 -0,178 0,020 -0,080 
FichEM2006V61P689JFINANC 0,896 0,391 -0,127 -0,023 -0,133 
ErhardtNL2003V11P102CORPGOV 0,154 0,966 -0,172 -0,058 -0,040 
ShleiferA1986V94P461JPOLITECON -0,145 0,979 -0,102 0,041 0,038 
HuseM2007BOARDSGOVERNANCEVA 0,304 -0,626 0,655 -0,134 0,244 
AguileraRV2003V28P447ACADMANAGEREV 0,931 0,053 0,326 0,043 0,068 
FaccioM2002V65P365JFINANCECON 0,729 0,504 -0,384 -0,113 -0,211 
PfefferJ1972V17P218ADMINSCIQUART 0,730 -0,119 0,641 0,029 0,153 
LaPorta1998V106P1113JPOLITECON 0,804 -0,512 0,163 -0,005 0,235 
LaPorta2002V57P1147JFINANC 0,849 0,406 -0,264 -0,057 -0,182 
DimaggioPJ1983V48P147AMSOCIOLREV 0,031 -0,697 0,662 -0,179 0,176 
PearceJA1991V12P135STRATEGICMANAGEJ -0,438 -0,303 0,838 0,049 -0,061 
PearceJA1992V29P411JMANAGESTUD 0,526 0,832 -0,074 -0,049 -0,102 
DemsetzH2001V7P209JCORPFINANC 0,788 0,426 -0,369 -0,091 -0,207 
ByrdJW1992V32P195JFINANCECON 0,878 0,449 -0,041 -0,013 -0,110 
ColesJL2008V87P329JFINANCECON 0,361 0,832 -0,358 -0,154 -0,132 
EisenbergT1998V48P35JFINANCECON 0,450 0,766 -0,385 -0,159 -0,163 
RedikerKJ1995V16P85STRATEGICMANAGEJ 0,941 -0,171 0,242 0,037 0,118 
FinkelsteinS1994V37P1079ACADMANAGEJ 0,693 -0,546 0,373 -0,044 0,270 
RechnerPL1991V12P155STRATEGICMANAGEJ 0,577 -0,575 0,497 -0,076 0,276 
SundaramurthyC2003V28P397ACADMANAGEREV -0,497 0,113 0,821 0,227 -0,055 
VanEH2008V26P84EuropeanManagementJournal 0,017 -0,344 0,927 -0,021 0,095 
LeblancR2007V15P843CORPGOV -0,203 -0,597 0,756 -0,132 0,061 
BeattyRP1994V39P313ADMINSCIQUART 0,930 0,188 -0,265 -0,015 -0,145 
GoldenBR2001V22P1087STRATEGICMANAGEJ -0,111 -0,626 0,744 -0,152 0,104 
KangH2007V15P194CORPGOV 0,938 -0,306 0,033 0,041 0,122 
WestphalJD1999V42P7ACADMANAGEJ 0,185 -0,255 0,933 0,006 0,123 
RosensteinS1990V26P175JFINANCECON 0,761 0,586 -0,188 -0,068 -0,163 
ClaessensS2000V58P81JFINANCECON -0,681 0,655 0,085 0,295 0,046 
FinkelsteinS2003V17P101ACADMANAGEEXEC 0,181 -0,677 0,649 -0,166 0,225 
HiggsD2003REVROLEEFFECTIVENE 0,468 -0,697 0,427 -0,123 0,293 
WinlundH2000V12P311ENTREPREGIONDEV -0,307 -0,217 0,918 0,064 -0,015 
DechowP1996V13P1CONTEMPACCOUNTRES -0,093 -0,677 0,693 -0,165 0,123 
YermackD2004V59P2281JFINANC 0,862 -0,336 0,313 0,015 0,189 
PuglieseA2009V17P292CORPGOV -0,148 -0,555 0,802 -0,116 0,075 
DenisDK2003V38P1JFINANCQUANTANAL -0,738 0,543 0,190 0,336 0,012 
CarterDA2003V38P33FINANCIALREV -0,593 -0,346 0,707 0,069 -0,112 
DharwadkarR2000V25P650ACADMANAGEREV -0,575 0,774 -0,010 0,232 0,075 
BoydBK1995V16P301STRATEGICMANAGEJ -0,782 0,395 0,306 0,357 -0,036 
ZonaF2007V15P852CORPGOV -0,322 -0,386 0,859 -0,013 -0,016 
BebchukLA2003V17P71JECONPERSPECT 0,964 -0,191 -0,145 0,033 0,022 
HambrickDC1984V9P193ACADMANAGEREV -0,737 0,435 0,361 0,358 -0,027 
AndersonRC2004V37P315JACCOUNTECON 0,674 0,559 -0,404 -0,129 -0,208 
BooneAL2007V85P66JFINANCECON 0,570 0,667 -0,399 -0,150 -0,194 
MizruchiMS1996V22P271ANNUREVSOCIOL -0,263 -0,541 0,787 -0,099 0,026 
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AndersonRC2004V49P209ADMINSCIQUART -0,636 0,708 0,058 0,276 0,061 
CongerJA1998V76P136HARVARDBUSREV 0,464 0,816 -0,277 -0,125 -0,140 
AndersonRC2003V58P1301JFINANC -0,071 0,940 -0,311 -0,063 0,002 
DonaldsonL1991V16P49AUSTRJMANAGEMENT 0,190 0,906 -0,334 -0,131 -0,075 
VafeasN2003V30P1043JBUSINESSFINANCEA -0,467 0,826 0,169 0,244 0,060 
VafeasN1999V53P113JFINANCECON 0,007 0,969 -0,223 -0,052 -0,006 
ChanKC2008V16P16CORPGOV 0,895 0,230 -0,326 -0,039 -0,167 
VanDBL2004V12P461CORPGOV -0,174 0,962 -0,186 0,013 0,042 
RindovaVP1999V36P953JMANAGESTUD -0,304 0,746 0,516 0,260 0,023 
ConyonMJ1998V41P146ACADMANAGEJ 0,879 -0,428 0,049 0,020 0,175 
RahejaCG2005V40P283JFINANCQUANTANAL 0,338 0,846 -0,352 -0,151 -0,124 
HuseM2005V16pS65BRITJMANAGE 0,115 -0,707 0,632 -0,179 0,209 
KlapperLF2004V10P703JCORPFINANC -0,179 0,945 -0,252 -0,010 0,036 
KrollM2008V29P363STRATEGMANAGEJ -0,477 0,849 -0,035 0,185 0,082 
CadburyA1992REPORTCOMMITTEEFIN 0,833 -0,493 0,095 0,001 0,210 
HuseM2005V16P65BRITJMANAGE -0,314 -0,294 0,896 0,030 -0,016 
WalshJP1990V15P421ACADMANAGEREV -0,007 -0,621 0,751 -0,151 0,144 
WanD2005V13P277CORPGOV -0,558 0,559 0,511 0,322 -0,003 
BhagatS2002V27P231JCORPLAW 0,954 0,059 -0,254 0,005 -0,104 
KleinA1998V41P275JLAWECON 0,971 0,030 -0,200 0,019 -0,079 
BebchukLA.2004PAYPERFORMANCEUNFU 0,944 0,069 -0,284 -0,006 -0,111 
HermalinBE1988V19P589RANDJECON -0,084 0,952 -0,274 -0,049 0,013 
KimB2009V17P728CORPGOVOXFORD 0,495 -0,658 0,464 -0,110 0,292 
WiersemaMF1992V35P91ACADMANAGEJ -0,679 0,559 0,317 0,344 0,007 
JacklingB2009V17P492CORPGOVOXFORD -0,386 0,899 -0,110 0,121 0,079 
MinichilliA2009V20P55BRITJMANAGE 0,224 -0,705 0,595 -0,169 0,245 
HermalinBE1991V20P101FINANCMANAGE 0,798 0,404 -0,373 -0,087 -0,204 
WestphalJD2003V48P361ADMINSCIQUART -0,502 -0,427 0,741 0,005 -0,079 
PettigrewA1995V48P845HUMRELAT -0,216 -0,620 0,732 -0,136 0,061 
WestphalJD2005V50P262ADMINSCIQUART -0,391 0,742 0,452 0,275 0,026 
ShivdasaniA1993V16P167JACCOUNTECON 0,440 0,772 -0,386 -0,160 -0,161 
ShivdasaniA1999V54P1829JFINANC 0,864 0,352 -0,293 -0,054 -0,184 
AjinkyaB2005V43P343JACCOUNTINGRES 0,914 -0,368 -0,024 0,026 0,130 
ClaessensS2002V57P2741JFINANC -0,552 0,795 -0,052 0,207 0,075 
GabrielssonJ2004V34P11INTSTUDIESMANAGEME 0,181 -0,640 0,694 -0,151 0,214 
RuigrokW2006V43P1201JMANAGESTUD -0,724 0,323 0,491 0,346 -0,059 
ZattoniA2008V16P1CORPGOV -0,610 -0,092 0,752 0,187 -0,108 
HeckmanJJ1979V47P153ECONOMETRICA -0,348 0,909 -0,177 0,081 0,069 
TerjesenS2009V17P320CORPGOVOXFORD 0,370 -0,694 0,523 -0,144 0,279 
XieB2003V9P295JCORPFINANC 0,007 -0,703 0,659 -0,177 0,167 
HartzellJC2003V58P2351JFINANC 0,972 -0,111 -0,175 0,031 -0,019 
JohnK1998V22P371JBANKFINANC 0,543 0,707 -0,373 -0,149 -0,184 
YoungMN2008V45P196JMANAGESTUD -0,378 0,900 -0,135 0,108 0,077 
HaunschildPR1993V38P564ADMINSCIQUART 0,079 -0,680 0,674 -0,174 0,191 
KosnikRD1987V32P163ADMINSCIQUART 0,961 -0,239 -0,063 0,044 0,067 
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MinichilliA2007V11P5JMANAGGOV 0,489 -0,627 0,518 -0,105 0,283 
JudgeWQ2008V34P765JMANAGE 0,120 0,915 -0,347 -0,123 -0,056 
ZahraSA2004V41P885JMANAGESTUD -0,495 0,828 0,066 0,226 0,074 
AdamsRB2010V48P58JECONLIT 0,586 -0,669 0,325 -0,089 0,290 
JohnsonRA1993V14P33STRATEGICMANAGEJ -0,739 0,516 0,240 0,348 0,002 
BaysingerB1990V15P72ACADMANAGEREV -0,656 -0,278 0,670 0,119 -0,128 
DonaldsonL1998V6P5CORPORATEGOVERNANCE 0,159 0,896 -0,372 -0,133 -0,073 
JudgeWQ2010V18P258CORPGOV 0,772 -0,534 0,216 -0,017 0,252 
SolomonJF2003V11P235CORPGOV 0,639 -0,635 0,301 -0,069 0,287 
VillalongaB2006V80P385JFINANCECON 0,008 0,940 -0,315 -0,088 -0,018 
ArthursJD2008V51P277ACADMANAGEJ -0,627 0,724 0,016 0,257 0,063 
JohnsonS2000V90P22AMECONREV -0,285 0,927 -0,210 0,044 0,058 
WilliamsKY1998V20P77RESORGANBEHAV -0,509 -0,368 0,767 0,033 -0,087 
FarrellKA2005V11P85JCORPFINANC -0,482 -0,472 0,727 -0,018 -0,063 
JacksonG2005V13P351CORPGOV 0,494 -0,699 0,396 -0,116 0,293 
BrickleyJ1997V3P189JCORPFINANC 0,710 -0,603 0,221 -0,046 0,267 
RavasiD2006V43P1671JMANAGESTUD -0,576 -0,319 0,734 0,076 -0,111 
AguileraRV2008V19P475ORGANSCI -0,798 0,372 0,297 0,351 -0,042 
BhagatS2008V14P257JCORPFINANC 0,868 0,276 -0,352 -0,055 -0,179 
DailyCM1994V37P1603ACADMANAGEJ 0,265 0,854 -0,394 -0,151 -0,109 
WeimerJ1999V7P152CORPORATEGOVERNANCE 0,969 -0,191 -0,106 0,042 0,034 
FilatotchevI2002V23P941STRATEGICMANAGEJ -0,510 0,827 -0,077 0,182 0,079 
HampelR1998COMMITTEECORPORATE 0,968 -0,077 -0,211 0,021 -0,042 
AguileraRV2004V25P415ORGANSTUD -0,775 -0,024 0,548 0,261 -0,134 
LynallMD2003V28P416ACADMANAGEREV -0,656 0,347 0,573 0,329 -0,050 
AguileraRV2009V17P376CORPGOV -0,806 0,114 0,463 0,312 -0,111 
WestphalJD2001V46P717ADMINSCIQUART -0,762 0,291 0,445 0,350 -0,069 
WestphalJD2001V22P1113STRATEGICMANAGEJ -0,089 0,458 0,848 0,214 0,025 
HealyPM2001V31P405JACCOUNTECON 0,801 -0,527 0,129 -0,011 0,229 
DavisGF1994V39P141ADMINSCIQUART -0,799 0,124 0,472 0,317 -0,110 
KaramanouI2005V43P453JACCOUNTRES 0,868 -0,419 0,157 0,018 0,198 
LaportaR1997V52P1131JFINANC 0,752 0,497 -0,353 -0,102 -0,209 
PeasnellKV2005V32P1311JBUSFINANACCOUNT -0,779 0,230 0,454 0,342 -0,085 
WestphalJD1998V43P127ADMINSCIQUART -0,649 0,661 0,181 0,314 0,042 
HambrickDC2008V19P381ORGANSCI -0,753 -0,001 0,579 0,266 -0,132 
WestphalJD1998V43P511ADMINSCIQUART -0,525 0,320 0,725 0,287 -0,038 
MillarC2005V59P163JBUSETHICS 0,365 -0,716 0,493 -0,147 0,279 
PfefferJ1973V18P349ADMINSCIQUART -0,713 -0,089 0,638 0,221 -0,137 
RuigrokW2007V15P546CORPGOV -0,408 -0,498 0,756 -0,052 -0,037 
DembA1992CORPORATEBOARDCONF -0,783 0,029 0,527 0,283 -0,128 
LelandHE1977V32P371JFINANC 0,096 0,934 -0,310 -0,108 -0,042 
HarrisIC2004V41P775JMANAGESTUD 0,528 0,695 -0,412 -0,155 -0,185 
MehranH1995V38P163JFINANCECON 0,937 0,125 -0,280 -0,009 -0,131 
HaunschildPR1998V43P815ADMINSCIQUART -0,379 -0,546 0,736 -0,075 -0,016 
DavisGF2005V31P143ANNUREVSOCIOL -0,703 -0,195 0,638 0,170 -0,138 
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DavisJH1997V22P20ACADMANAGEREV -0,808 0,237 0,395 0,342 -0,082 
SonnenfeldJA2002V80P106HARVARDBUSREV -0,409 -0,460 0,780 -0,035 -0,044 
KatzR1982V27P81ADMINSCIQUART -0,696 0,611 0,164 0,323 0,033 
FinkelsteinS1996STRATEGICLEADERSHIP -0,743 -0,103 0,597 0,222 -0,140 
AndersonRC2003V68P263JFINANCECON -0,135 0,939 -0,296 -0,036 0,017 
UseemM2006V14P2CORPGOVOXFORD -0,662 -0,231 0,678 0,142 -0,134 
PyeA2005V16P27BRITJMANAGE 0,321 -0,588 0,688 -0,117 0,235 
OxelheimL2003V27P2369JBANKFINANC 0,930 -0,331 0,004 0,039 0,124 
NadlerDA2004V82P102HARVARDBUSREV -0,686 -0,059 0,672 0,224 -0,126 
PettigrewA1998V7P197EUROPEANJWORKORG 0,204 -0,726 0,577 -0,173 0,239 
Note: Cells with green background color show values over 0.7.  Cells with values between 0.3 and 0.7 have 
yellow background color. 
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Appendix Table 7: Total Variance Explained. 2014 - 2017 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
 Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 40,594 43,185 43,185 40,594 43,185 43,185 39,16 41,66 41,66 
2 39,074 41,568 84,753 39,074 41,568 84,753 27,645 29,41 71,07 
3 10,761 11,448 96,201 10,761 11,448 96,201 22,309 23,733 94,802 
4 1,303 1,386 97,587 1,303 1,386 97,587 2,505 2,665 97,468 
5 1,199 1,276 98,863 1,199 1,276 98,863 1,311 1,395 98,863 
6 0,199 0,212 99,075       
7 0,196 0,208 99,283       
8 0,135 0,143 99,426       
9 0,126 0,134 99,56       
10 0,071 0,076 99,635       
11 0,057 0,061 99,696       
12 0,048 0,051 99,746       
13 0,027 0,028 99,775       
14 0,026 0,028 99,803       
15 0,02 0,021 99,824       
16 0,019 0,02 99,845       
17 0,011 0,012 99,857       
18 0,011 0,011 99,868       
19 0,01 0,011 99,879       
20 0,009 0,01 99,888       
21 0,008 0,009 99,897       
22 0,008 0,008 99,905       
23 0,006 0,006 99,912       
24 0,005 0,005 99,917       
25 0,005 0,005 99,922       
26 0,004 0,005 99,927       
27 0,004 0,005 99,932       
28 0,004 0,004 99,936       
29 0,003 0,004 99,94       
30 0,003 0,003 99,943       
31 0,003 0,003 99,946       
32 0,003 0,003 99,949       
33 0,003 0,003 99,952       
34 0,003 0,003 99,954       
35 0,002 0,002 99,957       
36 0,002 0,002 99,959       
37 0,002 0,002 99,961       
38 0,002 0,002 99,963       
39 0,002 0,002 99,965       
40 0,002 0,002 99,967       
41 0,002 0,002 99,969       
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 Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
42 0,001 0,002 99,97       
43 0,001 0,001 99,972       
44 0,001 0,001 99,973       
45 0,001 0,001 99,974       
46 0,001 0,001 99,975       
47 0,001 0,001 99,977       
48 0,001 0,001 99,978       
49 0,001 0,001 99,979       
50 0,001 0,001 99,98       
51 0,001 0,001 99,981       
52 0,001 0,001 99,982       
53 0,001 0,001 99,982       
54 0,001 0,001 99,983       
55 0,001 0,001 99,984       
56 0,001 0,001 99,985       
57 0,001 0,001 99,986       
58 0,001 0,001 99,986       
59 0,001 0,001 99,987       
60 0,001 0,001 99,988       
61 0,001 0,001 99,988       
62 0,001 0,001 99,989       
63 0,001 0,001 99,99       
64 0,001 0,001 99,99       
65 0,001 0,001 99,991       
66 0,001 0,001 99,991       
67 0,001 0,001 99,992       
68 0 0,001 99,992       
69 0 0 99,993       
70 0 0 99,993       
71 0 0 99,994       
72 0 0 99,994       
73 0 0 99,995       
74 0 0 99,995       
75 0 0 99,996       
76 0 0 99,996       
77 0 0 99,996       
78 0 0 99,997       
79 0 0 99,997       
80 0 0 99,997       
81 0 0 99,998       
82 0 0 99,998       
83 0 0 99,998       
84 0 0 99,998       
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Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
 Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
85 0 0 99,999       
86 0 0 99,999       
87 0 0 99,999       
88 0 0 99,999       
89 0 0 99,999       
90 0 0 100       
91 0 0 100       
92 0 0 100       
93 4,90E-05 5,21E-05 100       
94 1,37E-15 1,46E-15 100        
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Appendix Table 8: PCA Components 2014 - 2017 
Reference 1 2 3 4 5 
JensenMC1976V3P305JFINANCECON 0,187 -0,360 0,904 0,001 -0,082 
FamaEF1983V26P301JLAWECON -0,164 -0,266 0,940 0,067 0,016 
TerjesenS2009V17P320CORPGOVOXFORD 0,855 -0,333 0,338 0,060 -0,175 
LaPortaR1998V106P1113JPOLITECON 0,480 0,166 0,825 0,198 -0,041 
PfefferJ1978EXTERNALCONTROLORG 0,136 -0,490 0,847 -0,079 -0,092 
ShleiferA1997V52P737JFINANC -0,082 -0,584 0,790 -0,134 -0,029 
JensenMC1993V48P831JFINANC -0,228 -0,046 0,947 0,177 0,030 
ZahraSA1989V15P291JMANAGE 0,201 -0,611 0,731 -0,147 -0,137 
FaccioM2002V65P365JFINANCECON 0,565 -0,207 0,775 0,080 -0,124 
ForbesDP1999V24P489ACADMANAGEREV -0,509 0,683 0,391 0,320 -0,020 
HillmanAJ2003V28P383ACADMANAGEREV -0,635 -0,069 0,722 0,224 0,100 
KleinA2002V33P375JACCOUNTECON -0,198 0,229 0,903 0,265 0,022 
GompersP2003V118P107QJECON 0,483 -0,567 0,616 -0,095 -0,210 
AdamsRB2009V94P291JFINANCECON 0,599 0,694 -0,330 -0,041 0,198 
CarterDA2003V38P33FINANCIALREV 0,367 0,858 -0,315 -0,058 0,134 
KangH2007V15P194CORPGOV 0,384 0,811 -0,391 -0,093 0,150 
TerjesenS2015V128P233JBUSETHICS 0,545 0,707 -0,388 -0,072 0,192 
YermackD1996V40P185JFINANCECON -0,336 0,358 0,802 0,305 0,027 
BeasleyMS1996V71P443ACCOUNTREV -0,820 0,459 0,064 0,315 -0,070 
VillalongaB2006V80P385JFINANCECON -0,423 0,873 -0,156 0,124 -0,098 
FamaEF1980V88P288JPOLITECON 0,250 0,947 -0,142 0,036 0,077 
HillmanAJ2002V28P747JMANAGE 0,824 0,464 -0,243 0,039 0,192 
BusheeBJ1998V73P305ACCOUNTREV -0,842 0,349 0,207 0,343 -0,018 
YoungMN2008V45P196JMANAGESTUD -0,443 0,842 -0,260 0,079 -0,115 
JensenMC1986V76P323AMECONREV -0,434 -0,509 0,727 -0,046 0,100 
LaPortaR2000V58P3JFINANCECON 0,284 -0,573 0,735 -0,124 -0,159 
AikenLS1991MULTIPLEREGRESSION 0,335 -0,543 0,739 -0,102 -0,167 
MaugE1998V53P65JFINANC -0,778 0,368 0,359 0,346 0,005 
WalshJP1990V15P421ACADMANAGEREV -0,043 -0,591 0,786 -0,140 -0,044 
ErhardtNL2003V11P102CORPGOV 0,424 0,780 -0,408 -0,094 0,162 
AguileraRV2003V28P447ACADMANAGEREV 0,756 -0,438 0,426 0,006 -0,211 
FinkelsteinS1994V37P1079ACADMANAGEJ -0,337 -0,558 0,742 -0,087 0,065 
McnultyT2013V21P183CORPGOVOXFORD 0,987 0,013 -0,009 0,125 0,022 
AndersonRC2003V58P1301JFINANC 0,914 -0,257 0,251 0,089 -0,136 
ClaessensS2002V57P2741JFINANC -0,261 0,890 -0,354 -0,015 -0,071 
FamaEF1983V26P327JLAWECON -0,107 0,909 -0,383 -0,062 -0,024 
FeloA2003WORKINGPAPER -0,861 0,375 0,060 0,319 -0,056 
MacholdS2013V21P147CORPGOVOXFORD -0,909 0,036 0,261 0,299 0,067 
FerrisSP2003V58P1087JFINANC -0,138 0,927 -0,332 -0,035 -0,035 
JohnsonSG2013V39P232JMANAGE -0,307 0,928 -0,017 0,162 -0,054 
FichEM2006V61P689JFINANC -0,106 0,949 -0,281 -0,011 -0,023 
RechnerPL1991V12P155STRATEGICMANAGEJ -0,614 0,738 0,011 0,244 -0,095 
CarterDA2010V18P396CORPGOV 0,675 0,596 -0,365 -0,038 0,208 
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JohnsonJL1996V22P409JMANAGE -0,258 -0,532 0,795 -0,089 0,041 
BhagatS2008V14P257JCORPFINANC -0,753 -0,250 0,555 0,171 0,149 
LaPortaR2002V57P1147JFINANC -0,389 -0,488 0,769 -0,044 0,087 
HausmanJA1978V46P1251ECONOMETRICA 0,700 -0,387 0,558 0,018 -0,198 
SinghV2004V12P479CORPGOV 0,756 0,518 -0,326 -0,006 0,207 
GillanS2003V13P4JAPPLFINANCE -0,893 0,152 0,246 0,330 0,036 
LarckerDF2007V82P963ACCOUNTREV -0,656 -0,354 0,635 0,092 0,148 
LaPortaR1999V54P471JFINANC 0,918 -0,089 0,339 0,128 -0,087 
TorchiaM2011V102P299JBUSETHICS 0,933 0,283 -0,121 0,100 0,130 
BebchukL2009V22P783REVFINANCSTUD -0,888 0,326 0,023 0,301 -0,050 
HambrickDC1984V9P193ACADMANAGEREV 0,870 0,428 0,122 0,143 0,087 
GroveH2011V19P418CORPGOVOXFORD 0,200 0,932 -0,274 -0,036 0,076 
BellRG2014V57P301ACADMANAGEJ -0,917 0,178 0,138 0,313 0,008 
TerjesenS2008V83P55JBUSETHICS 0,955 -0,191 0,151 0,105 -0,091 
HillmanAJ2000V37P235JMANAGESTUD 0,039 0,919 -0,373 -0,079 0,027 
WestphalJD1999V42P7ACADMANAGEJ -0,292 -0,383 0,870 0,011 0,051 
KahnC1998V53P99JFINANC -0,838 -0,088 0,445 0,262 0,121 
SchulzeWS2001V12P99ORGANSCI 0,742 -0,166 0,616 0,101 -0,129 
HillmanAJ2008V19P441ORGANSCI -0,863 -0,076 0,392 0,269 0,114 
HillmanAJ2007V50P941ACADMANAGEJ 0,839 0,415 -0,279 0,031 0,190 
FreemanRE1984STRATEGICMANAGEMENT -0,760 0,570 -0,108 0,245 -0,120 
KangJK1995V38P29JFINANCECON 0,701 -0,442 0,507 -0,004 -0,216 
ShivdasaniA1999V54P1829JFINANC 0,224 0,875 -0,395 -0,098 0,095 
ShleiferA1986V94P461JPOLITECON -0,752 -0,062 0,587 0,252 0,113 
BrickleyJ1997V3P189JCORPFINANC -0,798 -0,251 0,485 0,177 0,145 
GarciacastroR2013V21P390CORPGOVOXFORD -0,532 -0,483 0,675 -0,008 0,124 
WeisbachMS1988V20P431JFINANCECON 0,640 0,727 0,113 0,137 0,102 
DesenderKA2013V34P823STRATEGICMANAGEJ 0,972 -0,157 0,078 0,103 -0,060 
XieB2003V9P295JCORPFINANC -0,865 0,159 0,323 0,334 0,046 
AdamsRB2015V23P77CORPGOVOXFORD 0,933 0,231 -0,202 0,077 0,134 
DeAP2008V32P2570JBANKFINANC 0,840 -0,392 0,311 0,031 -0,180 
AguileraRV2006V14P147CORPGOV 0,491 -0,584 0,593 -0,100 -0,209 
DechowP1996V13P1CONTEMPACCOUNTRES -0,719 0,619 -0,168 0,207 -0,129 
DonaldsonL1991V16P49AUSTRJMANAGEMENT -0,819 0,479 -0,073 0,269 -0,099 
MeyerJW1977V83P340AMJSOCIOL 0,926 0,160 0,277 0,157 -0,002 
DailyCM2003V28P371ACADMANAGEREV -0,874 -0,116 0,369 0,248 0,115 
DaltonDR1999V42P674ACADMANAGEJ -0,586 0,740 -0,254 0,128 -0,132 
DaltonDR1998V19P269STRATEGICMANAGEJ 0,963 0,158 -0,129 0,105 0,100 
PeasnellKV2005V32P1311JBUSFINANACCOUNT -0,670 0,685 -0,092 0,224 -0,121 
PathanS2009V33P1340JBANKFINANC -0,129 0,939 0,186 0,214 -0,006 
ZattoniA2013V21P119CORPGOVOXFORD 0,984 0,048 0,057 0,135 0,016 
PeasnellKV2000V32P415BRITACCOUNTREV -0,092 -0,469 0,871 -0,062 -0,014 
NielsenS2010V18P136CORPGOV 0,762 0,593 -0,161 0,052 0,174 
AhernKR2012V127P137QJECON 0,987 -0,048 -0,026 0,107 0,004 
ColesJL2008V87P329JFINANCECON 0,687 0,619 -0,305 -0,015 0,207 
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PostC2011V50P189BUSSOC 0,625 -0,505 0,540 -0,044 -0,222 
DjankovS2008V88P430JFINANCECON 0,129 -0,639 0,724 -0,156 -0,113 
AdamsRB2010V48P58JECONLIT 0,031 0,890 -0,432 -0,093 0,028 
AguileraRV2008V19P475ORGANSCI -0,642 -0,413 0,617 0,056 0,144 
AhmedK2006V14P418CORPGOVOXFORD -0,448 0,815 -0,327 0,054 -0,112 
EisenhardtKM1989V14P57ACADMANAGEREV 0,973 0,104 -0,121 0,104 0,080 
Note: Cells with green background color show values over 0.7.  Cells with values between 0.3 and 0.7 have 
yellow background color. 
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CHAPTER 4 
BOARD OF DIRECTORS AND 
CODES OF GOOD GOVERNANCE 
IN SPAIN: FRAMEWORK, 
VALIDITY AND EVOLUTION 
ABSTRACT 
Codes of Good Governance have been created in many countries, spreading best practices 
among a great number of firms. The topics they usually address are centered on the Board 
of Directors, and channeled their principles through recommendations. Prior to analyze 
possible implications on a firm level, it is necessary to study those provisions validating 
the existence I underlying constructs which may lead them to be considered as a sort of 
index for corporate governance. We focused our research in the case of Spain. In this 
work, we describe the main theoretical foundations behind codes of good governance, and 
the main characteristics of those that were applied to Spanish listed firms. We also match 
theories to principles and recommendations, and identify key concepts that are shown 
across different codes, which is particularly important so as to perform longitudinal 
analyses of Spanish listed firms. Finally, we analyze and validate the theoretical constructs 
supporting the recommendations in their benchmarking role via the degree of compliance 
for the period between 2007 and 2016. We found ‘traditional’ topics such as supervision, 
internal controls or board independence, but also found others like human capital or 
transparency in flow of information related issues, explaining a great proportion of the 
difference in compliance. We suggest that these topics are to be distinguishing among 
companies, beyond regulatory streams that frame and steer ordinary corporate governance 
issues.  
KEYWORDS 
Board of directors, corporate governance, codes of good governance, degree of 
compliance, human capital. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Corporate governance has been the main topic of a great number of researches over the last 
decades. In the rise of corporate prosperity, just after the World War II, there was not such 
a concern for corporate governance (Cheffins, 2012), but for the last three decades it 
became a central topic in research literature. Initially conceived as a development of 
governing styles (Stoker, 1998) and the creation of a non-imposed structure that results 
from influence governing actors (Kooiman, 1993), this subject became a research subject 
that was approached from many angles: law, accounting, finance, strategy, etc.  
The relatively slow path of maturity in this field for decades gave yield to the need of 
improving governance, fostered by increasing markets globalization, the demand across 
companies’ stakeholders and the rising number of corporate scandals not only in America 
but also in Europe or Australia (Vuontisjärvi, 2013). Financial markets incumbents saw a 
need of improving it in order to avoid future troubles, asking for an enhanced supervision, 
control and protection of shareholders’ rights. Soon in the aftermath of these events, 
regulation sharply increased, staring in the US (Chhaochharia & Yaniv Grinstein, 2007). 
Agency issues appeared to be at the core, and likely to be addressed in the first place, as a 
clear result of the separation between the ownership and control exercised by the 
management in the firm (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983), or referred as the main cause 
(Jensen, 2004). And the Board of Directors was there a key player in the conflict as the 
most relevant governance mechanism. 
For almost three decades, a key tool for improving governance in organizations were the 
Codes of Good Governance. In the aim of providing a highest degree of transparency and 
avoiding negative governance issues, codes spread in most countries. The Cadbury Code, 
issued in UK in 1992 took the lead to subsequent codes in France (Vienot Report, 1995), 
the Netherlands (Peters Report, 1997), and Spain (Olivencia Report, 1998). The above-
mentioned scandals lead to a peak in the issuing of codes across the world in 2002. The 
second peak was reached after the financial crisis, which led to numerous revisions and 
new issuances (Cuomo, Mallin, & Zattoni, 2016). Although there are authors that think of 
codes as a mere way to protect from governance (Carver, 2007), we give them some space 
due to the role they played, their diffusion and the spreading of concepts likely to be linked 
to good governance regardless their implementation. 
Codes of good governance also played a key role in the evolution of the research. 
Although the lack of accomplishment or information on these matters was not under grave 
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penalties in many countries, a significant number of companies started, and continued, 
providing information on corporate governance because of them. Market regulators 
adopted specific formats to show the information on corporate governance. The 
information codes triggered helped building indices of corporate governance. Issuers of 
Codes established principles of corporate governance and built recommendations based on 
them, where the Board was at the core.  
Therefore, it is relevant to analyze them and, in our study, we set the focus on the case of 
Spain. The principles they were inspired on, the recommendations they established, the 
degree of detail, and the way they evolve over years are issues that are relevant for the 
study of corporate governance itself. Also, through the information they make available for 
research in the reports, they could frame discussion topics, and investigation directions, 
and set comparable points of study in further longitudinal analysis. 
Spanish Codes have been studied from the ethical perspective of the Olivencia Report 
(Fernández- Fernández, 1999), looking at the effect of some recommendations (Pala-
Laguna & Esteban-Salvador, 2016), or the impact of news on governance (Fernández-
Rodríguez, Gómez-Ansón, & Cuervo-García, 2004; Utrero-Gonzalez & Callado-Munoz, 
2016). The information provided by the companies in their annual reports on governance 
yielded more studies, e.g regarding remuneration (Baixauli-Soler & Sanchez-Marin, 2011, 
2014; López-Iturriaga, García-Meca, & Tejerina-Gaite, 2015), size and independence 
(Villanueva-Villar, Rivo-López, & Lago-Peñas, 2016), ownership structure and board 
composition (Acero Fraile & Alcalde Fradejas, 2014), combining and indexing boards 
characteristics (García Lara, Osma, & Penalva, 2007), or including characteristics in an 
international context (De Andres, Azofra, & Lopez, 2005). To our knowledge, there is a 
gap on research of the framework and evolution of the Spanish Codes of Good 
Governance, focused in the Board of Directors, specially as regards to the degree of 
compliance of recommendations, and to what extent they channeled existing literature 
configuring constructs that may combine in a measure of governance. Therefore, we aim to 
fill that gap analyzing the codes issued in Spain in the last two decades, from the Olivencia 
Report to the last Code of Governance. We try to describe how the codes were organized, 
the theories embedded, their principles, their recommendations, and how they evolve as 
necessary steps prior to properly analyze the degree of compliance. Once this frame is set, 
we will validate whether the code recommendations compliance meet the intellectual 
constructs so as to be considered a benchmark, an index of corporate governance likely to 
be linked to performance in other studies. We chose the period of analysis, between 2007 
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and 2016, because it provides a continuous source of information. Consequently with 
changes performed in the code, we consider the three different sets of recommendations in 
that period, where the Board plays a central role. 
This article is composed of four further sections. After this introduction, we review the 
literature on codes and corporate governance with this point of view, show the 
methodology we followed, describe how the Spanish Good Governance Code evolved, 
and, analyzing the evolution of compliance of recommendations in Spanish listed firms 
from 2007 to 2016, we validate the intellectual constructs to consider them as measures of 
governance. Finally, we conclude and show potential future lines of research based on our 
study. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES FORMULATION 
According to scholars, practitioners, and lawmakers, codes of good governance are 
structured so as to improve governance of firms  and also to serve as a legitimation 
(Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008) or as a formal demand (Werder, Talaulicar, & Kolat, 2005). 
Through a set of principles and norms, they aim to increase transparency and 
accountability (Fernández-Rodríguez et al., 2004). The codes were originally set as 
voluntary in nature, as opposed to hard regulation, and applied the ‘comply or explain’ 
principle (Haxhi & Aguilera, 2015). The rationale behind the principles is that a company 
must be allowed to have a certain degree of flexibility while keeping the goal of 
transparency (Cuomo et al., 2016). In this sense, Codes are supposed to complete other 
mechanisms such as legislation and markets when they fail to protect shareholders’ rights 
(Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004). Following existing studies at the time, and sometimes 
skipping them (Romano, 2004), codes tried to address prevailing deficiencies and 
problems of governance. They usually set up a wide-ranging list of indications grouped on 
big topics such as the board (e.g. board composition), relationship to shareholders, 
disclosure and transparency, directors (e.g. appointment, dismissal, remuneration), or 
responsibility before stakeholders’ interests (Barton, Coombes, & Chiu-Yin Wong, 2004; 
Gregory & Simmelkjaer, 2002). But, in certain occasions, there has been also criticism on 
the timing or their mandatory force they followed in their implementation (Romano, 2004). 
The origins of the first code go back to 1978 in the US, although it was not issued with that 
format. Just a few new codes were issued in the following decade. In 1992, The Cadbury 
Report was released and it triggered a fast growing movement on corporate governance 
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codes adoption across many countries (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004; Weil, Gotshal, 
& Manges, 2002). In fact, there were successive modifications and reforms in many of 
them, and different rationales behind their diffusion such as the national culture (Haxhi & 
Ees, 2010). 
Almost all countries that issued codes addressed to all listed companies. However, there 
were some developed for specific types of companies (Continuum AG & Prager Dreifuss, 
2008), financial institutions (The Monetary Authority of Singapore MAS, 2013) or NGOs 
(CGAI, 2008). Compliance adoption increased over time although firms differed in path 
and explanations (MacNeil & Li, 2006). In the UK, almost all the listed companies already 
complied with a great number of recommendations before 1999 (Weir & Laing, 2000).  
The classification of the codes according to the issuer and the legal framework where they 
are developed has been relevant topic of research. The European Commission established 
seven categories: Governmental or quasi-governmental entities, Committees or 
commissions organized or appointed by governments; Stock exchange-related bodies; 
Hybrid committees related to both stock exchanges and business, industry, investor and/or 
academic associations; Business, industry and academic associations; Associations of 
directors and Various (Weil Gottshal and Manges Llp, 2002). Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra 
(2004) identify six categories: Stock Exchange, Government, Directors’ Association, 
Managers’ Association, Professional Association, and Investors Association. Each one has 
advantages and disadvantages in terms of pressure to adoption, isomorphism, and 
endorsement. In the case of Spain, Government and Managers’ Association jointly 
elaborated the different codes but, as we will overview in a further section of this work, the 
government initiative led and special commission followed in the elaboration.  
The legal tradition or system adds relevant features to codes. Two main traditions are often 
identified in building legal systems. The common-law system and civil-law system. The 
first system was adopted in the UK, the US, and other English-influenced countries. On the 
opposite, the civil-law system was adopted in the continental Europe. The system is linked 
to the purpose in pursuing compliance, that is, whereas companies under civil-law tended 
to legitimate their governance practices, common-law provides a more suitable space for 
obtaining more transparency and accountability (Zattoni & Cuomo, 2008). Protection to 
stakeholders and creditors drives a similar way (La Porta, Lopez‐de‐Silanes, Shleifer, & 
Vishny, 1998), pointing at diverse causes embedded in the legal tradition. 
As regards to the main components of the codes (i.e. Board of Directors, Committees, 
General Meetings), all of them have been studied at the level the indicators and variables 
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that their recommendations provide, under commonly used international theories, and 
following the principles showed at that time (Merendino, 2013). The theoretical framework 
is posed to be at the grounds of different typologies of codes we mentioned before and 
contributing to set the rationale of their provisions. Thus, variables like the functions, the 
composition, or the dimension of the board are addressed from different angles. Therefore, 
we will briefly overview some of this theories, such as the Agency Theory, the 
Stakeholders Theory, the Resource Dependence Theory, or the Stewardship Theory, and 
show integrative approaches as well. 
Under the Agency Theory perspective (Berle & Means, 1932; Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Mitnick, 1976; Ross, 1973), problems of compensation 
contracting (incentives) and institutions formed around agency may explain many of the 
issues. This theory approaches the extent to which managers acts in the interests of 
shareholders of the firm and do not use the information asymmetries to heir one 
convenience (Rediker & Seth, 1995). Accordingly, governance mechanisms aim to deal 
with the threat of takeover (Jensen, 1986; Shivdasani, 1993), the issue of monitoring 
(Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Fama, 1980), the incentives (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
In this context, the Board of Directors develops its role through monitoring, controlling 
and preventing manager interference that may cause shareholders loses. As managers gain 
the control in the firm, they may act to benefit only for themselves, and this conflict of 
interest should be face with control mechanisms (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 
1998). This monitoring control, also referred as “control role”, has been approached by 
many relevant and frequently quoted works (from the seminal, review and proactive 
visions) (Johnson, Daily, & Ellstrand, 1996; Mace, 1971; Pearce & Zahra, 1992; Zahra & 
Pearce II, 1989) and points directly to the board among his primary duties. In that sense, 
we may check how the vast majority of the recommendations and provisions provided by 
the code are clearly inspired by this theory. Codes use to dedicate a section to the Board 
and its organization where these topics appear everywhere, and many recommendations 
are drenched with this kind of control traits. Since they are at the origins of the creation of 
the codes, they are backed by regulators, and they are highly demanded by external 
mechanisms, they are supposed to be always met at a high level of compliance by all 
companies. As a result, they could not be considered as differential traits for indices. 
Therefore, pose the following hypothesis: 
H1: Recommendations linked to Agency Theory are always met. 
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If variance in the degree of compliance appears they would pave the way for further 
hypotheses considering different constructs as distinctive, suitable to be good measures of 
governance. In this sense, we should consider some factors that may frame their effect. 
Agency problems have led to develop mechanisms to monitor executives and align 
interests (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). But contracts derived from the principles that bring 
those mechanisms are affected by the institutional and regulatory context of corporate 
governance (La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999). Equity ownership 
concentration can accentuate the relationship between small and larger shareholders 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997; Villalonga & Amit, 2009), and trigger principal-principal issues 
(Hartzell & Starks, 2003; López-Iturriaga, García-Meca, & Tejerina-Gaite, 2015; Young, 
Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008). Besides, it leads to a less active market for 
corporate control (Weimer & Pape, 1999). As a result, compensation, remuneration, and 
internal controls  may appear as relevant elements to consider in the recommendations that 
must be complied  by the firms under our scope.  
In particular, since the ownership structure of Spanish listed firms is highly concentrated, 
with a short list of dominant shareholders (Acero Fraile & Alcalde Fradejas, 2014; 
Gutiérrez Urtiaga & Saez Lacave, 2012; Lorca, Sánchez-Ballesta, & García-Meca, 2011; 
Salas Fumás, 2002), it may lead to limit the powers of the Board for adjusting 
compensation (Baixauli-Soler & Sanchez-Marin, 2011), and introduce incentives that can 
reduce the effectiveness of monitoring and increase the possibility of firm’s rent extraction 
(Baixauli-Soler & Sanchez-Marin, 2014). These issues may turn into a lack of compliance 
and, therefore, significant variance among listed firms. On the other hand, the absence of a 
relationship between performance and compensation has been a problem for long 
(Bebchuk, Cohen, & Ferrell, 2004), specially in Latin countries (Weimer & Pape, 1999). 
The appearance of variance in the degree of compliance of the related recommendations 
would provide strong support for validating the mentioned constructs, and consider those 
recommendations as a valid part of an index-like code. Therefore, we suggest the 
following hypothesis: 
H2: The degree of compliance of recommendations validates the existence of the Agency 
Theory constructs on compensation in Spanish Corporate Governance Codes. 
The Stakeholders Theory (ST) set a mission of facilitation and coordination for the Board 
of Directors, taking into account all that might have interests in the company and trying to 
balance them over time (Freeman, 1984, 2004). This is a descriptive theory where the 
corporation is a “constellation of cooperative and competitive interests possessing intrinsic 
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value” (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). As an instrumental theory, it argues that it can prove 
successful in conventional performance terms. As a normative theory, implies the 
acceptance of the legitimate and intrinsic value of the interest of persons in their 
relationship with the corporation (Figure 3), which should be properly identified (Mitchell, 
Wood, & Agle, 1997). As a managerial theory recommends attitudes, structures and 
practices. In that sense, it may address some matters that also key for other theories and 
whose interaction might drive further research. Accordingly, boards role is posed to 
facilitate, coordinate and address all who might have interests in a certain company 
(Merendino, 2013). In this framework, codes follow an efficiency rationale in their 
diffusion, where stakeholders balance legitimation actors (Haxhi & Ees, 2010). 
A mechanism that can serve both, Agency Theory (AT) and Stakeholders Theory (ST), is 
the implementation of internal controls (Lorca et al., 2011). At the same time, it is a 
significant constraint for companies the cost of its implementation as required by the codes 
(Sneller & Langendijk, 2007), that can be relatively high for small of medium companies. 
Although the benefit of compliance is meant to be higher than the cost associated to it in 
the long run (Rose, 2016), given the differences in firm size, it is foreseeable that we think 
that there will be significant differences in the degree of compliance of those related 
provision. Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis:  
H3. The degree of compliance of recommendations validates the existence of AT and ST 
based constructs on internal controls in Spanish Corporate Governance Codes. 
The Resource Dependence Theory (RDT) is linked to the board function of provision of 
resources (Boyd, 1990). The resource is understood as “anything which could be thought 
of as a strength or weakness of a given firm” (Wernerfelt, 1984). This framework sets the 
board of director as a key piece in the ability of bringing all the resources the firm needs or 
is lacking. It is originally built on a view of the individual contributions to the board made 
by the directors it terms of supporting, problem solving and aid to the issues concerning 
the firm, and where director interlocks help to achieve this aims (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978). Thus, four possible benefits could be identify: 1) the advise and counsel, 2) source 
of legitimacy, 3) channels for communication outside the firm, 4) referential access to 
external support. As a result, the view suggests that there is a reduction of the dependence 
to external contingencies, less uncertainty, and lower transactions costs (Williamson, 
1984). In this context human capital is a key factor to outperform other companies (Acedo, 
Barroso, & Galan, 2006; Barney, 1991; Barney, 2001; Crook, Todd, Combs, Woehr, & 
Ketchen, 2011). RDT asserts that skills are path dependent, that is, likely to evolve over 
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time (Coff, 1997; Grant, 1996; Penrose, 1959), as well as knowledge and experience. 
Besides, RDT suggest to distinguish to types of human capital: firm-specific (Kor & 
Mahoney, 2005) and general (Coff, 1997). This distinction is important for considering 
whether human capital market acts efficiently or not (Barney, 1986). Besides, RDT warns 
on the consequences of positive effects on profits: competition to appropriate a share of 
them shown by stakeholders may affect final outcomes for the firm (Coff, 1999; Crook et 
al., 2011). 
As regard to corporate governance matters, human capital has been approached as the 
antecedent of board provision of resources (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003a). RDT has discussed 
terms like directors expertise, experience, knowledge, reputation or skills, that were 
originally included in that concept (Becker, 1964). As resource providers, directors give to 
the firm advice and counsel in strategy, access to information, a source of legitimacy, 
skills, experience and connections (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Likewise, some authors 
studied the ties to external organizations, configuring a “sum of actual and potential 
resources embedded within, available through, and derived from the network of 
relationships possessed by an individual or social unit” (Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). To 
this extent, the board as a whole and the directors individually could properly fit in the 
provision of resources via their networking and social trait (Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 
1997; Mizruchi & Stearns, 1994). Both, human and social capital, become the board 
capital, an antecedent of resources provision for the firm, and ultimately related to firm 
performance. Trying to understand what kind of skills are behind board human capital, 
directors have been classified according to this role in terms of their knowledge and 
previous background (Baysinger & Butler, 1985), providing thirteen categories that were 
grouped into three major components: executive, instrumental and monitoring. In our 
opinion, this approach dismisses most of the potential of expertise and knowledge by 
utilizing only a primary role. Directors’ classification was also made out of previous 
experience as CEO, director, university professor, or government officer (Jermias & Gani, 
2014). Other possible approach combines some of them in skills sets (Adams, Akyol, & 
Verwijmeren, 2013).  
In the context of board capital, the advising role is a relevant element to improve advising 
and getting resources (Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003). But besides advice and counsel, the 
link of board capital to the provision of legitimacy and reputation (Hambrick & D’Aveni, 
1992) probed to turn into better performance for the companies (Certo, Covin, Daily, & 
Dalton, 2001).  
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Adding up these views on board capital we think that integrative approaches could lead to 
a better understanding of board functioning. Thus, we agree on integration or intended 
complementary of frameworks, where knowledge, skills or proactive traits are in place, 
could lead to more effective boards (De Andres & Santamaria, 2010). 
Since the majority of the provisions are influenced by Agency issues, we expect that the 
codes do not show a significant number of recommendations related to human capital and, 
if so, they are approached from the mentioned theory. Despite this, the path dependence 
may cause differences in compliance due to the process of adaptation to provisions 
requests. 
H4: The degree of compliance of recommendations validates the existence of RDT based 
constructs on human capital in Spanish Corporate Governance Codes. 
The Stewardship Theory (Donaldson & Davis, 1991) (ST) points out that the Board may 
act as a facilitator, after being  empowered, under an on-going organization where the 
coalition between owners and managers is kept, maximizing at the same time the 
organizational performance and the shareholder returns. This view counterbalances the 
Agency Theory which tends to handle managers behavior in a reductionist manner, by 
adding a pro-organizational model of man (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). Thus, 
the interests of directors and managers do not necessarily collide (Muth & Donaldson, 
1998) and the board may facilitate managers’ tasks and empower them (Pugliese et al., 
2009). Psychological factors, such as motivation, identification or and use of power, as 
well as situational factors such as management philosophy or culture, play a key role for 
the steward. Nevertheless, it lacks of necessary dynamics, as that derived from learning 
processes (Pastoriza & Arino, 2008). In that sense, it would be useful to perform some 
empirical research on the basis of active-reactive agent learning process in organizations 
(Pérez López, 1991), and in the context of corporate governance.  
Since Stewardship Theory plays a secondary role, company may diverge in their degree of 
compliance in those related provisions. Therefore, we propose the following hypothesis: 
H5: The degree of compliance of recommendations validates the existence of ST based 
constructs in Spanish Corporate Governance Codes. 
Integrative visions of the above mentioned theories have also been developed. The agency 
theory and the resource dependence theory were linked to propose the relationship between 
board capital and both, monitoring and resource provision functions (Hillman & Dalziel, 
2003b). Other research, integrates the same theories around the engagement in board 
different tasks (Pugliese, Minichilli, & Zattoni, 2014). Recent holistic proposals for 
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framing corporate governance have been developed on the inclusion of some of the 
formerly explained theories (Young & Thyil, 2008). 
The referred works in this literature review provide us a useful guidance to depict and 
analyze the way the Spanish Code of Governance evolved and showed the influence of 
different possible frameworks in its principles. The report issued by every listed company 
reflects the degree of compliance in each one of the recommendations. The result of this 
study, if positive, would set the basis of a further analysis of the impact of the degree of 
compliance, considered as an index of good governance, on firm performance. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Empirical context: Spanish codes of good governance  
There have been several codes in Spain throughout the last three decades: The Olivencia 
Code (embedded in the Olivencia Report), the Aldama Report, the Unified Code of Good 
Governance, the Unified Code of Good Governance (reformed) and the Code of Good 
Governance, which is the current one for Spanish firms. The evolution of these codes may 
help to understand the guiding principles and, for the aim of our research, to study the type 
of information that could be utilized, how it evolves, and to determine whether there are 
different periods of time that should be separately analyzed.  
 
The Olivencia Report (1998-2002) 
The first Code in Spain was issued in 1998. Although it was named ‘The governance of 
listed companies’, it was commonly referred as ‘Informe Olivencia’, taking the surname of 
the president of the group of people that issued the report. This group was configured as 
commission of experts. The profiles of its members shows a prevalence of law 
background, combined with large experience, both in state-owned and public companies 
(see Appendix Table 1).  
It is noticeable that the group was called ‘Special Commission for the study of a Listed 
Companies Board of Directors Ethic Code’. The Board was at the center of the study and it 
was initially framed into an ethics perspective. It is commonly understood that it 
“developed an approach to corporate governance which emphasized the responsibility of 
management and Boards of Directors to the company's shareholders” (Special Commission 
To Foster Transparency And Security In The Markets And In Listed Companies, 2003). 
This approach clearly fits into the framework of the theory of agency (Fama & Jensen, 
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1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), as it is referred as the main cause for the demand of 
reforming corporate governance in Spain (Comisión Especial para el Estudio de un Código 
Ético de los Consejos de Administración de las Sociedades, 1998). The report is composed 
of three sections: introduction, a report on the board of directors, and a good governance 
code. 
The introduction section included the origin and aims of the study group, the influence of 
the demand for reforms, the nature and methods for the work and a description of the 
associated movement of reforms in Spain. In this section of the report we may infer the 
principles inspiring the Code out of a wide rationale: Balance of powers, transparency, 
information, and accountability. The report on the board of directors had twelve chapters. 
First, there is a study of the board of directors’ mission, its supervisory function, its 
faculties and need of value creation for the shareholder. Then, the composition of the 
Board is analyzed, depicting the directors’ types and duties, with special focus on the 
independent director, and the board size. Afterwards, the structure of the board is studied, 
exploring the President, the Secretary, and the Committees. Functioning of the board 
description comes before the chapters on appointment and renewal of directors, the board 
and the information, directors’ remuneration, and loyalty duties. The last chapters refer to 
the board and different institutions (shareholders, markets, and audit firms) and the 
willfulness and publicity in the code adoption. All this chapters provide an extensive 
rationale for forthcoming recommendations based of the implicit principles that were 
asserted in the introduction. The last section of the report is called ‘Good Governance 
Code’ and includes a chapter on ‘General Considerations’ and a list of 23 
recommendations (see Appendix Table 2). 
As it may be checked, there is no sections or internal structuring for the recommendations 
but just a list of them. Besides, since the reasoning is not linked to each provision, is harder 
to frame the angle that should lead to meet the requirements. The degree of precision and 
the style of writing allow a broad margin for interpretation and meeting what they demand, 
giving to the principles and responsibility of the board a central role for managing them. 
The recommendations show pursuing of the balance of power and independence (2, 3, 5, 6, 
7); the search for effectiveness in functioning through size (4), correct structuring (8), 
information flow  and meeting preparation (9, 14), and meeting participation (10); the 
transparency in selection an renewal of the directors (11), delegation of vote (18),  
reliability of the information provided to the markets (19), unified criteria of reporting 
(20), explanation before the general meeting (22) and provision of corporate governance 
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information in their annual reporting (22); the preservation of corporate reputation (12); 
the moderation and transparency in remuneration (15); loyalty duties (16, 17); and the 
independence of external auditors (21). As asserted before, the grounds of Agency Theory 
is backing most of the recommendations. It is true that, in the case of the information 
provided to the markets, it could be inferred some concern for stakeholders but it is 
circumstantial. In fact, it fits more in the need of link towards external mechanism of 
control. 
 
The Aldama Report (2003-2006) 
The Aldama Report was the also the result of a mandate given by the Spanish Government. 
This mandate was performed by a group of experts and public executive officers (see 
Appendix Table 3). The Special Commission was configured with two objectives: provide 
criteria and guidelines for corporate governance. The targeted companies where  
“companies which issue securities and instruments admitted to listing on organized 
markets in their relations with consultants, financial analysts and other companies, persons 
or entities which assist them or provide professional services to them”, seeking to increase 
“transparency and security of financial markets” (Special Commission To Foster 
Transparency And Security In The Markets And In Listed Companies, 2003). These aims 
where set into a context of structural changes, a increasingly globalized economy, capital 
markets integration, and the trends of international markets, an keep appearing in the 
following codes.  
The report strengthen the need of “the application of a coherent philosophy as regards 
regulation or coordination of the economy around three criteria or principles: effective rule 
of law, self-regulation by the markets as far as possible, and maximum transparency”. This 
is code is aligned with the previous in this sense. Trying to know what the experts and the 
shareholder think about these aims, they found that they think that “the information which 
listed companies provide to the markets and their shareholders is grossly insufficient”, 
especially when they refer to the Shareholders' Meeting. They “took it for granted that this 
lack of transparency conceals conflicts of interest and the use of inside information by 
executives and directors, to the detriment of the company. They expressed some interest in 
the idea of independent directors, but doubted that they would really be independent in 
practice”. Therefore, fragmented and insufficient information, as well as the lack of 
awareness by shareholders triggered the elaboration of this new code. 
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The Report is composed of six sections. After the preamble, sections two and three face the 
problems in the application of the principles of transparency and the duty of loyalty. The 
following section approaches the governing bodies, that is, the shareholders’ meeting, the 
board, the directors, the chairman, remuneration issues  and the committees.  Section five 
surely assumes the aftermath of corporate scandals when deals with ‘Professional services 
providers’, which where relevant players in a few cases. Finally, the last section make 
some reflections on the scope and application of the recommendations. This Code opens its 
recommendations, initially addressed to listed companies, to other companies regardless 
their presence in a secondary market. Besides it joints rationale and recommendations in 
four sections. On one hand, this clarifies the structure, but, in the other, it does not list the 
recommendations themselves (there are 26 chapters and subchapters across the four 
sections, sometimes called ‘Other measures’), which make them harder to track and report. 
It is remarkable that the text highlights that best law and codes are not enough in the aim of 
obtaining the good corporate governance. The relevant factor is, in this regard, the degree 
of professional competence and the ethical behavior in place. According to this view, 
directors and managers must look to the long-term corporate interest above their own. The 
ethical values are posed to be a condition to effectiveness, and exemplariness lead to the 
creation of a culture of good governance (Special Commission To Foster Transparency 
And Security In The Markets And In Listed Companies, 2003). Going beyond a mission 
that has to be fulfilled in a framework of law, this code distinguish between two levels of 
responsibilities the firm must pursue: the first is the company’s long-term continuity, 
which implies making profits, complying with law, and avoiding unethical actions. In this 
context, side effects of the business activity, i.e. environmental or organizational 
restructuring issues, have to be addressed as well. The second level of responsibilities 
“entails positive actions with all the parties directly or indirectly involved with the 
company”. This directly connects with stakeholder theory. Although is declared to be 
voluntary, since it varies from one country to another, it is clear a subject to pay attention 
in corporate governance. Despite this, as we will see further, only recently the code has 
included provision clearly focus on these matters. 
 
The Unified Code (2007-2012) 
The Unified Good Governance Code of Listed Companies (Unified Code) was approved 
by the Board of the CNMV (Securities and Markets Regulatory Agency in Spain) in 2006 
following the demand of the Ministry of Economy (Comisión Nacional del Mercado de 
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Valores, 2006), asking for a ‘single text with existing corporate governance 
recommendations’ (ECO/3722/2003. Section 1, clause f.). A new commission of experts 
help writing the Unified Code. This is as slight but significant change. The experts switch 
their role to advising the regulatory agency, who plays a double role (issuer-supervisor) 
and centralizes the official reporting on corporate governance. Consequently, self-
regulation principle was set aside in the elaboration of this version. As regards to the 
experts’ profile, as in the last two occasions, the commission combined different ones: 
lawyers, Public executive Officers, Directors, and Corporate Governance Experts (see 
Appendix Table 4).  
This version of the code followed the review of the Principles of Corporate Governance 
made by the OECD in 2004, and the promotion of good governance that the European 
Commission encouraged over the same period. It included some of their recommendations, 
aimed to establish a clearer concept of independent director, and expanded the functions of 
the audit, and nomination and remuneration and committees (Comisión Nacional del 
Mercado de Valores, 2005).  
The first section of the code is called ‘Core Principles’ but immediately introduces a single 
subsection called ‘Characteristics of the Code’. In this subsection, defines voluntariness 
subject to the principle of ‘comply or explain’, starting with a regulatory rationale. Other 
characteristic calls for respecting binding definitions made at the code (i.e. ‘independent 
director’). Then, gives the power of evaluate the degree of compliance to the market, 
always under the abiding regulatory requests on information, and agencies monitoring and 
supervision. Finally, it addresses the recommendations to all listed companies, reckoning 
the burdens they might imply in small companies, and taking the ‘freedom of decision and 
organizational autonomy’ as guaranteed. Other principles may be found mentioned through 
the rationale that precedes each recommendation: balance of power and proportionality, 
board should pursue maximizing economic value over time in all its actions, adopt social 
responsibility principles, transparency, committees independence, publicity. The call for 
these principles-characteristics is usually framed by regulation, and there is scarce room 
for governance of companies themselves. This bent towards law may lead to the 
companies to adopt a ‘defensive position’ when dealing with reports on corporate 
governance, if not a formally one (Werder et al., 2005).  
After the characterization of the code, 58 recommendations are defined and briefly 
explained (see Appendix Table 5). There is a first set of recommendations regarding the 
shareholding’s meeting procedures and the way the Corporate Bylaws are set up. The 
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second group gathers key recommendations on the board of directors such as the size, 
competences, functional structure, board meetings and gender diversity. The third set of 
items refers to directors, especially the selection, independence directors’ assurance, 
disclosures and remuneration matters. Finally, the recommendations items deal with 
committees’ issues. This structure remained for more than ten years and recently included 
slight changes in the details and the order of disclosure.  As it may be easily notice, the 
majority of the recommendations could be framed under the role of monitoring and 
supervising that has been traditionally adopted by agency theory contributions. These 
would be the one regarding the board independence, mechanism of disclosure, 
information, CEO/Chairman duality, participation in other boards, and size. The items that 
can be analyzed under a resource dependence theory, helping to assess the board capital, 
are just a few. These items can be studied as matters of social capital.  
We may notice that the recommendations introduce Corporate Social Responsibility 
policies under the powers of the board (Recommendations 7 and 8). Although there are no 
recommendation items explicitly devoted to the human capital of the board, we identify 
those who might qualify as that. Recommendation 14 requires to explain the nature of each 
director to foster transparency and avoid discriminant management of comparable interests 
amongst shareholders. That implies an explanation that should go beyond external and 
obvious observable characteristics. Recommendation 15 requires gender diversity in the 
board, and the rationale the code provides is based on demographic variables as well as 
confirmed experience of women in the business world for decades. Besides, aims to the 
process of selection and points to independent directors vacancies as a way to meet the 
recommendation. We excluded Recommendation 24 since the rationale for this 
recommendation refers to exceptional situations and controversial nature of a particular 
decision subject. Therefore, we do not consider it as human capital related, but 
information-channeling and procedural related. Recommendation 25 requires from the 
companies induction programs and refresher ones when they are convenient. This is related 
to build those necessary skills a director should have. We considered Recommendation 27 
aligned with previous recommendations, since it points to the selection process and 
proposal of candidates steered by the Nominations Committee. Accordingly, 
Recommendations 42, 46 and 49 go in the same way but in the case of the committees, 
with specific remarks on the needed skills and knowledge. This list of recommendation 
was modified in 2013 so as to include further disclosure of several items.  
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Unified Governance Code (Reformed) (2013-2014) 
In 2013, the Unified Governance Code was updated so as to reflect that some provisions 
have already been incorporated into legislation or, being needed in other countries do not 
apply to Spain (CNMV, 2013). The characterization or principles’ setting remained as in 
the former version of the code. But the premises affected the recommendations, whose 
number diminished to 53 (Recommendations 11, 29, 35, 40, and 41 were removed from 
the code). The list of them, keeping the previous structure, is shown in Appendix Table 6.  
As regard to the contents, this reform distinguished and identified principles inspiring each 
recommendation. Some of them were taking out or modified in its contents since they were 
incorporated in diverse regulation, such as the exclusive competences of the general 
meeting or the board of directors, the splitting of votes, the separate voting agreements, or 
the definition of different categories among directors. The recommendations removed dealt 
with the explanation on ‘other external directors’ category, rotation of independent 
directors, remuneration approval, general meeting vote on remuneration statement, and 
disclosure of individual remuneration.  The Ministerial Order ECC/461/2013 requested an 
annual report on remuneration. This might explain the remuneration recommendations 
restructuring in the reformed code during this period. We suggest that this change, may 
lead to a misunderstanding of the degree of compliance, since it derives this topic to other 
reports and diminishes the expected contents in terms of corporate governance. As regards 
to human capital related recommendations (13, 14, 24, 26, 37, 41, and 49), they were kept 
in their previous definitions (numeration changed due to some mentioned eliminations of 
recommendations). 
 
The Good Governance Code (2015-present) 
The current Code of Good Governance was issued in 2015. The Spanish Government 
formed the ‘Experts on Corporate Governance Committee’. The aim was twofold, to 
improve ‘the efficiency and accountability of Spanish firms’ governance and ensuring that 
national standards attain maximum levels of compliance with international good 
governance principles and practices’. The objectives were ‘to ensure the proper 
functioning of the governing and administrative bodies of Spanish companies in order to 
maximize competitiveness, build trust and transparency for shareholders and domestic and 
foreign investors, improve internal control and corporate responsibility systems, and 
ensure the correct internal distribution of functions, duties and responsibilities under 
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standards of maximum rigor and professionalism’ (CNMV, 2015). By including this aims, 
it confirmed that codes try to spread practices and principles across countries. 
The Good Governance Code introduced significant changes over the former codes. Firstly, 
it employed a new format that linked recommendations to the principles. Besides, some 
recommendations were omitted since they were included in legislation and now are 
compulsory. Corporate Social Responsibilities recommendations were included due to the 
increasing acknowledgement in many countries. 
The Good Governance Code is based on 25 principles. They are grouped in three 
categories: general arrangements (1-5), Shareholders’ General Meeting (6-8), and Board of 
Directors (9-25). The definition of each one of them and the match to the recommendations 
are shown in Appendix Table 7. The Good Governance Code contains 64 
recommendations. The complete list and definition of the recommendations may be seen in 
the Appendix Table 8. This is a remarkable novelty in the Code. The current code includes 
new provisions so as to comply with the foresight vision of the first codes regarding the 
social responsibility. This code hosts new recommendations aimed to clarify remuneration 
issues. 
In the Table 1 we visualize the matching between the principles and the theoretical 
approaches we summarized in the last section of this work, that is, the Agency Theory, the 
Stakeholders Theory, the Resource Dependence Theory and the Stewardship Theory. The 
matching is based on the description and aims of each one of the principles. In some cases, 
the orientation of the recommendations that followed the principles helped to properly 
qualify them under certain categories. This is relevant because same variables or similar 
provisions may take different directions depending on the given orientation of the theory 
that inspires the principle. For example, differing theories can make the size of the board 
set its goal towards opposite directions (reduced vs. numerous), or the composition of the 
board in terms of types of directors may aim to a majority of independent, or convey a 
balance of non-executive and executive (Merendino, 2013). 
Table 1: Principles and theoretical frameworks 
 
Principle 
Number Recommendations Agency Stakeholders 
Resource 
Dependence Stewardship 
General Arrangements 
1 1 x    
2 2 x x   
3 3  x   
4 4  x   
5 5 x x   
Shareholders' General 6 6, 7, 8  x x   
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Meeting 7 9, 10 x x   
8 11 x x   
Board of Directors 
9 12 x    
10 13, 14 x  x x 
11 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 x    
12 20, 21, 22, 23, 24 x    
13 25 x    
14 26, 27, 28 x    
15 29, 30, 31, 32 x x x x 
16 33, 34 x   x 
17 35 x   x 
18 36 x    
19 37, 38 x  x  
20 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44 x x x  
21 45, 46 x    
22 47, 48, 49, 50, 51 x  x  
23 52, 53 x x   
24 54, 55  x   
25 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63,64 x    
 
The majority of the principles (80%) have a clear orientation from the Agency Theory 
framework. On the contrary, we weighted just two of them that might have the influence of 
the Stewardship Theory. Many principles may share complementary visions, by combining 
two or more grounding theories. In our opinion, this is important since it gives the chance 
for a further developing of recommendations, with changes they might require in the 
future. Thus, recommendations that might be settled for a long time could be improved in 
the aim of better firm governance. As we previously said, the current code includes some 
provision regarding the corporate social responsibility, and this clearly fits in the 
Stakeholders Theory. Strengthened principles regarding remuneration reinforce control and 
supervision functions framed in the Agency Theory. Board capital, embedding human and 
social capital, underlies in some principles. Despite their inclusion, the future research 
based on the information demanded in annual corporate governance reports may vary 
significantly. The recommendations that were built under these principles provide a narrow 
window for common variables. It is not the case for other recommendations, where 
indicators and thresholds are clearly defined.  
It is interesting how the provision regarding the duality Chairman-CEO disappears and the 
rationale behind. The code recognizes that it has benefits, when it comes to exercise power, 
provide information, and coordinate, but it also points out the potential disadvantages of 
the concentration of the power in a single person. Divergences in international practice 
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and, in the opinion of the issuers, the lack of empirical evidence lead not to demand the 
separation of the offices. It recommends that, in the case of concentration, it should be 
balanced. The measures go in line with the required vote majority for the chairman 
election, the abstaining position of the executive directors in that vote or the appointment 
of a lead director. 
 
Report On Corporate Governance Obligation according to current law 
The obligation of publishing and notifying as a significant event towards regulatory 
agencies of an Annual Corporate Governance Report is defined in the Capital Companies 
Act (Ley de Sociedades de Capital, herein CCA). This law was approved in 2010. The 
Securities Market Act, approved in 2015, extended the obligation to other issuers of listed 
securities.  
CCA requires issuers to show their degree of compliance with recommendations of the 
code and, in case it is appropriate, to explain why they have not been fulfilled. The reports 
the companies make are published in Agency websites, calling them a valid source on 
information. 
 
 
Recommendations Comparison 
Once we summarized the codes issued in Spain in the last two decades, it is convenient to 
compare them for the purpose of our research. A table showing some of the characteristics 
previously reviewed is shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2: Codes Comparison. Some characteristics 
 Olivencia Aldama Unified Code Unified Code (Reformed) 
Code of Good 
Governance 
Denomination Olivecia Report Aldama Report Unified Good Governance Code of Listed Companies 
Código Unificado de buen gobierno de las 
sociedades cotizadas 
Good Governance Code of 
Listed Companies 
Denomination Type Report-Code Report-Code Code Code Code 
Years 1998 - 2002 2003 - 2006 2007 - 2012 2013 - 2014 2015 - 
Number of Principles 4 3 10 10 25 
Principles 
(explicit/implicit) I E I I E 
Principles linked to 
recommendations N N N N Y 
Principles 
Self-regulation, Balance 
of powers, transparency, 
information, 
accountability 
Effective rule of law, 
Self-regulation by the 
markets as far as 
possible, and 
maximum 
transparency 
Comply or explain, voluntariness, markets 
(transparency), binding definitions, balance of 
power and proportionality, board should 
pursue maximizing economic value over time 
in all its actions, adopt social responsibility 
principles, transparency, committees 
independence, publicity. 
Comply or explain, voluntariness, markets 
(transparency), binding definitions, balance of 
power and proportionality, board should pursue 
maximizing economic value over time in all its 
actions, adopt social responsibility principles, 
transparency, committees independence, 
publicity. 
(See Appendix Table 6) 
Sections of the Report-
Code 
introduction, a report on 
the board of directors, and 
a good governance code 
 Core principles, recommendations, Definitions, Appendix   
Sections of the 
recommendations 0 4 4 4 
3 (Board of Directors has 6 
subsections) 
Number of 
Recommendations 23 Not Listed 58 53 64 
Recommendations 
(explicit/implicit) E I E E E 
Recommendation 
follows explanation N N Y Y Y 
Reasons for elaboration Need of CG 
Fragmented  and 
insufficient 
information, lack of 
shareholders 
awareness 
Unify principles and recommendations Adapt to regulatory changes 
Reporting Supervision None None CNMV CNMV CNMV 
Code issuer Experts Group Experts Group CNMV CNMV CNMV 
Code advisor None None Experts Group Experts Group Experts Group 
External events affecting Markets Demand, Context First big corporate scandals OECD Principles Corporate Governance Regulation adaption CCA, other regulation 
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We will focus in the evolution of the recommendations that each one has proposed, in the 
period between 2007, when the Aldama just landed in the Spanish listed firms, and 2016, 
after two years of the implementation of the current code. During these years there is a 
continuity in listed clear recommendations, under analogous points for comparison. This is 
particularly useful so as to determine and structure variables and data for further studies.  
We listed recommendation topics and checked their presence/absence from 2007 to 2016 
in the reported information, according to the codes (See Appendix Table 9). We started 
listing those that were valid in 2007 and added new ones if they substantially deferred from 
the already counted. The table matches the recommendation item number of each topic in 
each code. 
As regards to the frequencies, given that the first 58 listed topics prevailed during the first 
six years, they account for highest appearances across the time span. Amongst them, 21 
topics are recommended in all years. They deal with corporate bylaws, societal interest, 
size of the board, independence of the board, gender diversity, chairman functions, director 
attendance, board evaluation, external advise, public information on directors, executive 
committee issues, audit committee issues (profiles of the members, supervision, reporting), 
control and risk policy, and profiles of the members of the audit committee. It is noticeable 
that, despite they kept names quite closely in all cases, thresholds and indicators scope 
changed in some of them (as to the issue of comparability they are not computable). These 
recurrent topics keep the same underlying theoretical approaches, where the agency theory 
prevails over others.  
The current code introduces a group of provisions for the general meetings. The 
availability of technological infrastructure enables the company to give more information 
and do it with more transparency. Besides, it makes room to the corporate governance 
report. 
The recommendations on Board and on Director individually are at the core of ever code. 
It is noticeable that the Spanish firms operate a one-tier board system in which all directors 
manage and supervise (In Germany, for instance, there is a two-tier board system). The 
one-tier structure has evolved along with a high ownership concentration, multiple 
director-manager roles, leading to a lack of independence and supervisory effectiveness 
(Baixauli-Soler & Sanchez-Marin, 2014). In this regard, the companies would lose an 
opportunity to balance the functions linked to the Agency Theory and the peril of 
concentrating to much power. 
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The requirements regarding gender diversity are across all the codes. Nevertheless, in the 
current formulation, the provisions aim to set a quota in a timeline horizon (supported also 
by legal requirements) and are linked to truly human capital topics, like experience, or 
skills. These topics were already in recommendations on the selection policy and in the 
committees’ composition, but they were approached under a clear monitoring function. 
The enrichment of the data in the light of different theoretical backgrounds could give 
interesting opportunities for investigation. In our opinion, we expect to have more 
information in the coming years to analyze, with this kind of valuable material, issues 
regarding the board capital, human and social. 
We notice that some provisions are set with a guidance range indicator (e.g. board size). 
This has to be taken into account in research, since it would presumably change the shape 
of the association to other indicators: the relevance would lose power while approaching 
the range, and be not significant within the established range. Indicators referring to quotas 
(e.g. gender diversity) should be treated differently. Besides, changes in the threshold of 
these indicators may lead to have a distinctive effect on firm performance measures. 
The three provisions regarding the corporate social responsibility appear in the last code 
along with specific mention to the role of the lead director. CSR have been in place for 
many years, but the degree of disclosure increased following social demands. Special 
mention could be made to the reputation that appear more remarkably in the need of 
information when someone is under investigation in the court. Knowledge update training 
program is detailed and, at the same time connected with the recommendations linked to 
human capital. They should imply a previous definition of the desired skills for the board, 
and how the profiles of the directors contribute to it, and which are subject to formal or on-
going learning. Some companies provide skill matrix based on different areas: strategy, 
policy development, financial performance, risk and compliance oversight, ITC, executive 
management, commercial experience, service delivery, product development, innovation, 
industry knowledge, community and stakeholder management, etc. There is also a new 
trend to include common personal attributes to all profiles at the board, such as integrity, 
constructiveness, commitment or collegiality. Other countries like Australia, where the 
recommendation 2.2 clearly points to the skills matrix as a tool, have decided to provide 
better instruments to evaluate not only compliance but also deeper impact of board capital 
in governance and firm performance (ASX Corporate Governance council, 2014). The 
guide on governance issue by the New York Stock Exchange similarly recommends it use 
(NYSE Governance Services, 2014). 
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Once we have reviewed the evolution of Spanish Good Governance Codes, and following 
the methodology we proposed, it is appropriate to have an outlook of the context and the 
general outcomes. 
 
3.2. Data and methods 
Once we overviewed research literature on codes, governance and the main theories 
supporting those fields, we show the following steps we will follow in the methodology we 
have designed. 
As one of our objectives refers to the evolution of the Spanish codes of governance 
themselves, we set a first block of steps we denominated ‘Frame’. Framing provides 
context to situations and problems, and serves to identify changes, some fixed elements, 
etc. Therefore, considering the previous intellectual background reviewed in the previous 
section, we identify and characterize the text of the codes, with special focus on 
recommendations. Then, we compare them. In some cases, we are able to identify changes 
in provisions, new types of disclosures that might be helpful for further analysis. Besides, 
since these tasks are performed across different periods of time, we can match 
recommendations among them. This is relevant and very important so as to perform 
longitudinal studies. Finally, we are able to cross-reference information that the code itself 
give us with the frameworks for corporate governance. That way we may follow topics 
such as human capital through the recommendations elaborated for that aim.  
The second block of activities of our methodology focus on analyzing degree of 
compliance on Spanish listed firms. We should highlight that were are not studying 
indicators behind each recommendation (e.g. directors’ ratios, women on board ratios) but 
whether they qualify as compliance of the intended recommendation or not. In this block, 
we start retrieving data on each Spanish listed company from CNMV public information 
regarding each recommendation, which turned to be 1,400 firm-year observations during 
the period we previously set (2007-2016). As the degree of compliance is a key element 
for testing hypotheses, we built it for each observation. Thus, in each case-
recommendation, we computed compliance as 2, partial compliance as 1, and not 
compliance as 0. This way, we do not loose information on the progress of compliance, 
which might be relevant in cases of changes or reforms of certain recommendations. In the 
following step, we split the sample based on the periods the codes were in place, so as to 
give a detailed explanation of the degree of compliance in each one of them. Descriptive 
statistics give us general information, are used to test the first hypothesis,  helping to 
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answer some of our questions on the frequency of compliance, top ranked and low ranked 
recommendations, and serving as a context for the following step. Then, in order to test 
hypotheses 2 to 5, where we have to validate different constructs, we utilized two 
techniques. First, we performed exploratory factor analysis with Principal Components 
Analysis as extraction method in order to detect which factors might be acting behind the 
degree of compliance and, as we aimed, if they have to do with specific theoretical 
frameworks, such as the one we provided for human capital or those supporting 
remuneration or control. Since the elements are aggregated according to statistical 
properties, we are able to analyze the validity of the constructs based on previous literature 
by checking whether the loadings on the elements fit into a framework or topic. Analogous 
techniques have been already performed for construct validity of corporate governance 
indices (Black, de Carvalho, Khanna, Kim, & Yurtoglu, 2017). Thus, the loadings of 
components, through the variance explained, help us to answer the hypotheses where we 
try to check if they respond to the underlying grounding provided by existing literature, 
serving as a channel towards listed firms and helping to measure good governance. We 
decided to use Kaiser stopping rule to choose the number of factors with an eigenvalue 
over 1. Factor loadings with values over 0.7 were considered as a core contribution to the 
factor, whereas those below 0.3 were dismissed (Diez-Vial & Montoro-Sanchez, 2017). In 
this regard, it is expected that the components load mostly on the recommendations whose 
construct is being tested. Second, in order to check the reliability of the analysis, we 
obtained the Cronbach’s Alpha of the whole set of recommendations and the group of 
provisions included in the process of testing the hypotheses, in each one of the periods 
(Larcker, Richardson, & Tuna, 2007; Ruiz, Esteban, & Gutiérrez, 2014; Zahra, Neubaum, 
& Huse, 2000). If a determined set of recommendations contribute to measure the same 
element of governance, they are supposed to generate a sensible high and positive 
Cronbach’s Alpha (Black et al., 2017). Since there are three different sets of 
recommendations in the period of analyses, we performed the mentioned techniques for 
each one of them. 
Finally, in the last block of activities of this methodology, we summarize our conclusions 
of the analysis and, under our humble point of view, we provide possible lines for future 
research. 
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4. RESULTS: COMPLIANCE OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
EVOLUTION AND VALIDITY OF CONSTRUCTS 
Once we have framed and compared the different codes produced for Spanish listed 
companies, we may analyze how has been the evolution of the compliance of the 
recommendations. For that aim, we had two restrictions. The first, the availability of 
systematized data. Then limited the period span and we retrieved data on recommendations 
compliance of Spanish listed firms for 10 years, from 2007 to 2016. The second constraint 
was derived from the previous analyses. Given that there are three sets of 
recommendations during the years of study, in order to analyze compliance we should do it 
for each period of time. Then we established period 1, from 2007 to 2012, period 2, from 
2013 to 2014, and period 3, from 2015 to 2016. 
We detailed our aims in some questions: Are the recommendations suitable for the 
companies? Is there any recommendation that is not complied for any company? Are there 
recommendations that are complied by all? Which recommendations set at the top and at 
the bottom of the rank? What is the rationale behind this behavior? These questions will 
lead us to understand whether the issuer of the code has provided provisions that were 
proper to drive best practices of good governance. 
Then we took data from degree of compliance of recommendations by company by year 
from the data provided by the companies and the CNMV from 2007 to 2016. We 
computed 2, when the recommendation was met; 1, when it was partially met; and 0 when 
it was not. This way we may also gather information from those who are in progress of 
complying.  Our sample was composed of 1,459 firm-year registers, split in three periods 
(firm-observations): 2007-2012 (906), 2013-2014 (282) and 2015-2016 (271). For each 
period we obtained some descriptive statistics, as well as factors from analyzing the way 
the recommendations behave in order to know if they validate the underlying constructs 
that may pose them as factors for measuring good governance.  
 
2007-2012 
During this period, the vast majority of the recommendations are usually complied. There 
is just one recommendation (R02) where the provisions don’t apply for the majority of the 
companies (88.28%). This means that the recommendations are plausible fitted for the 
cases of listed companies, even in the exceptions facilitated.  
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There are significant exceptions in recommendations 13 (mode =0) and 26 (mode =1). The 
first pints to the director independence issue and the second to the dedication. The average 
and standard deviation can be checked in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Compliance of Recommendations by period. Descriptive Statistics.  	
2007 - 2012 2013 - 2014 2015 - 2016 
Recommendation 
Number Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Recommendation 
Number Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Recommendation 
Number Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
1 1,84 0,54 1 1,90 0,43 1 1,87 0,49 
2 1,40 0,83 2 1,26 0,99 2 1,22 1,00 
3 1,60 0,74 3 1,64 0,72 3 1,65 0,68 
4 1,76 0,65 4 1,87 0,49 4 1,57 0,68 
5 1,90 0,37 5 1,97 0,22 5 1,72 0,63 
6 1,82 0,57 6 1,90 0,43 6 1,30 0,75 
7 1,99 0,15 7 2,00 0,00 7 0,64 0,94 
8 1,69 0,52 8 1,78 0,46 8 1,98 0,14 
9 1,68 0,73 9 1,69 0,72 9 1,99 0,12 
10 1,78 0,55 10 1,83 0,50 10 1,88 0,41 
11 1,59 0,81 11 1,54 0,84 11 1,78 0,63 
12 1,43 0,90 12 1,18 0,98 12 2,00 0,00 
13 0,97 1,00 13 1,87 0,44 13 1,87 0,50 
14 1,82 0,48 14 1,40 0,78 14 1,41 0,75 
15 1,11 0,87 15 1,92 0,32 15 1,91 0,36 
16 1,89 0,33 16 1,45 0,82 16 1,63 0,78 
17 1,19 0,88 17 1,83 0,43 17 1,43 0,90 
18 1,74 0,50 18 1,91 0,36 18 1,74 0,49 
19 1,92 0,33 19 1,89 0,36 19 1,94 0,28 
20 1,91 0,31 20 1,97 0,24 20 1,95 0,27 
21 1,99 0,14 21 1,65 0,67 21 1,99 0,17 
22 1,53 0,71 22 1,97 0,23 22 1,96 0,27 
23 1,98 0,19 23 1,90 0,43 23 1,99 0,10 
24 1,85 0,53 24 1,72 0,61 24 1,92 0,36 
25 1,67 0,66 25 1,34 0,68 25 1,50 0,59 
26 1,17 0,73 26 1,84 0,53 26 1,74 0,52 
27 1,72 0,66 27 1,68 0,54 27 1,84 0,42 
28 1,53 0,65 28 1,81 0,58 28 2,00 0,00 
29 1,30 0,95 29 1,86 0,51 29 1,99 0,17 
30 1,79 0,58 30 1,85 0,50 30 1,87 0,49 
31 1,63 0,77 31 1,96 0,26 31 1,96 0,24 
32 1,75 0,60 32 1,81 0,50 32 1,93 0,34 
33 1,89 0,40 33 1,62 0,77 33 1,93 0,31 
34 1,73 0,57 34 1,86 0,51 34 1,53 0,67 
35 1,59 0,74 35 1,81 0,59 35 1,98 0,21 
36 1,44 0,90 36 1,90 0,44 36 1,61 0,63 
37 1,84 0,54 37 1,44 0,69 37 1,37 0,69 
38 1,82 0,57 38 1,65 0,76 38 1,84 0,41 
39 1,97 0,25 39 1,49 0,67 39 1,87 0,38 
40 1,03 0,85 40 1,84 0,55 40 1,66 0,69 
41 1,01 0,86 41 1,90 0,43 41 1,81 0,55 
42 1,32 0,71 42 1,62 0,79 42 1,74 0,50 
43 1,59 0,81 43 1,59 0,79 43 1,99 0,12 
44 1,40 0,67 44 1,89 0,38 44 1,95 0,31 
45 1,74 0,68 45 1,78 0,48 45 1,90 0,39 
46 1,98 0,21 46 1,89 0,46 46 1,73 0,64 
47 1,57 0,83 47 1,86 0,46 47 1,82 0,43 
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2007 - 2012 2013 - 2014 2015 - 2016 
Recommendation 
Number Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Recommendation 
Number Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Recommendation 
Number Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
48 1,53 0,82 48 1,96 0,29 48 0,69 0,96 
49 1,87 0,44 49 1,23 0,97 49 1,98 0,21 
50 1,63 0,55 50 1,74 0,52 50 1,91 0,35 
51 1,90 0,43 51 1,91 0,37 51 1,94 0,33 
52 1,85 0,43 52 1,89 0,39 52 1,72 0,55 
53 1,99 0,15 53 1,91 0,42 53 1,62 0,63 
54 1,08 1,00 
	 	 	
54 1,48 0,80 
55 1,68 0,54 
	 	 	
55 1,38 0,89 
56 1,87 0,46 
	 	 	
56 1,90 0,45 
57 1,88 0,40 
	 	 	
57 1,66 0,72 
58 1,89 0,45 
	 	 	
58 1,81 0,53 
	 	 	 	 	 	
59 1,73 0,68 
	 	 	 	 	 	
60 1,80 0,60 
	 	 	 	 	 	
61 1,26 0,92 
	 	 	 	 	 	
62 1,30 0,86 
	 	 	 	 	 	
63 1,11 0,95 
	 	 	 	 	 	
64 1,57 0,73 
 
 
Frequencies in individual compliance, as well as in sets, could provide us with the basis for 
understanding the points in common in all companies, the elements that should be 
supervised due to their low level of achievement, and those that can be included under 
continuous monitoring. Looking at those that were mostly followed for the companies, the 
recommendations 7, 21, 53, 23, 46, 39, 19, 20, 05, and 51 ranked at the top. As a result, we 
may conclude that compliance is not linked to any group of provisions of the code, or any 
topic in particular. 
Among the less complied recommendations, we must highlight the following:  
a) The independence of the board of directors is the worst performer (R13, R29). In 
average, we should conclude that listed companies comply partially, that is they are in 
the process of including independent directors. 
b) The remuneration recommendations qualify at the bottom of the compliance (R40, 
R41). There is a lack of transparency and disclosure of individual remuneration. 
Besides, this ‘black box’ is extended, or, we might say, originated by other fails in 
compliance as those regarding the nomination and remuneration committees (R54). 
c) The third issue, points out to gender diversity directly (R15). Although there has been 
improvement, it is far from being properly suitable. 
d) The fourth issue shows that dedication to governance is poorly explained (R26). 
e) The fifth issue stresses the concentration of power in many listed companies in Spain, in 
terms of Chairmen adoption of executive roles. Despite this matter is always a point of 
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controversy, we think that it should be studied along with controlling power at the board 
(R17). 
Then, as regards to the first hypothesis we can’t conclude that the agency theory related 
recommendations are always met since, at the same time the is a high degree of 
accomplishment and some provisions among significant poor performers. Therefore, H1 is 
only partially met. 
Factor analysis of the recommendations compliance (see Tables 4 and 5) gave fourteen 
factors with an eigenvalue over 1. These factors represent 62.827% of the variance of the 
sample.  
Table 4: Degree of compliance 07-12. Components and variance explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
 Total % of Variance Cumulative % Total % of Variance Cumulative % 
1 9,303 19,793 19,793 9,303 19,793 19,793 
2 2,463 5,241 25,034 2,463 5,241 25,034 
3 2,232 4,749 29,783 2,232 4,749 29,783 
4 1,966 4,182 33,965 1,966 4,182 33,965 
5 1,675 3,563 37,528 1,675 3,563 37,528 
6 1,592 3,387 40,915 1,592 3,387 40,915 
7 1,561 3,322 44,238 1,561 3,322 44,238 
8 1,43 3,043 47,28 1,43 3,043 47,28 
9 1,361 2,895 50,175 1,361 2,895 50,175 
10 1,339 2,848 53,024 1,339 2,848 53,024 
11 1,313 2,794 55,818 1,313 2,794 55,818 
12 1,13 2,403 58,221 1,13 2,403 58,221 
13 1,094 2,328 60,549 1,094 2,328 60,549 
14 1,071 2,278 62,827 1,071 2,278 62,827 
15 0,989 2,103 64,93 
   16 0,964 2,052 66,982 
   17 0,936 1,992 68,974 
   18 0,809 1,722 70,696 
   19 0,798 1,698 72,394 
   20 0,779 1,656 74,051 
   21 0,738 1,569 75,62 
   22 0,734 1,563 77,183 
   23 0,68 1,446 78,629 
   24 0,67 1,425 80,054 
   25 0,646 1,375 81,429 
   26 0,631 1,342 82,771 
   27 0,621 1,321 84,093 
   28 0,588 1,251 85,344 
   29 0,562 1,197 86,54 
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Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
30 0,532 1,132 87,673 
   31 0,512 1,089 88,761 
   32 0,497 1,057 89,818 
   33 0,469 0,998 90,816 
   34 0,452 0,962 91,778 
   35 0,432 0,92 92,698 
   36 0,418 0,889 93,588 
   37 0,399 0,85 94,437 
   38 0,386 0,821 95,258 
   39 0,38 0,809 96,067 
   40 0,329 0,699 96,766 
   41 0,313 0,666 97,432 
   42 0,3 0,638 98,07 
   43 0,282 0,6 98,67 
   44 0,236 0,502 99,172 
   45 0,207 0,441 99,613 
   46 0,097 0,207 99,82 
   47 0,085 0,18 100 
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Table 5: Degree of compliance 07-12. Components matrix 
Recommendation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
CGGRN01 -0,029 -0,058 -0,036 -0,088 -0,127 -0,219 0,387 0,228 -0,061 0,462 0,254 0,205 0,146 0,155 
CGGRN03 0,198 0,311 -0,057 0,408 -0,243 0,105 -0,007 -0,014 0,109 -0,093 -0,311 -0,046 0,398 -0,041 
CGGRN04 0,317 -0,317 0,128 0,200 -0,168 0,114 -0,114 -0,330 0,241 0,165 0,199 -0,045 -0,174 0,198 
CGGRN05 0,274 0,180 0,011 0,461 0,049 0,105 0,049 -0,107 0,075 0,385 -0,119 -0,190 -0,102 -0,036 
CGGRN06 0,518 0,226 -0,124 0,331 -0,099 -0,003 0,002 -0,094 0,232 -0,044 0,003 0,059 0,037 -0,226 
CGGRN07 0,270 0,359 0,198 -0,043 0,263 -0,018 0,166 0,139 0,545 0,066 -0,026 -0,068 -0,122 0,018 
CGGRN08 0,498 0,037 0,168 -0,019 -0,093 -0,099 -0,084 -0,042 0,202 0,291 -0,139 -0,097 0,294 0,142 
CGGRN09 0,111 0,027 0,064 0,008 0,122 -0,035 0,286 0,615 -0,001 0,047 -0,016 0,266 0,200 0,120 
CGGRN10 0,495 -0,066 -0,193 0,246 0,006 -0,007 0,040 0,124 -0,125 -0,321 0,070 -0,127 0,081 0,137 
CGGRN12 0,433 -0,363 -0,211 0,163 0,147 -0,131 0,072 0,113 0,060 -0,179 0,093 -0,140 0,059 0,155 
CGGRN13 0,343 -0,402 -0,070 -0,007 0,427 0,156 -0,222 0,132 0,087 -0,033 -0,195 -0,091 0,044 0,073 
CGGRN14 0,442 -0,247 -0,009 0,094 0,030 0,000 0,296 -0,233 0,007 -0,057 0,093 0,243 -0,069 -0,171 
CGGRN15 0,392 -0,087 -0,077 0,229 -0,028 -0,017 0,070 -0,113 0,049 0,100 -0,038 0,311 0,101 0,282 
CGGRN16 0,384 -0,206 0,143 0,204 0,070 0,386 0,173 0,036 -0,116 0,328 -0,160 -0,005 -0,107 -0,249 
CGGRN18 0,634 -0,093 0,069 -0,286 0,092 -0,247 0,176 -0,078 0,088 0,071 0,007 -0,087 -0,100 -0,068 
CGGRN19 0,190 -0,103 0,170 -0,171 -0,047 0,443 0,089 0,070 0,068 -0,130 0,340 -0,044 -0,040 -0,257 
CGGRN20 0,179 -0,088 0,274 0,006 -0,014 0,400 0,369 0,012 0,121 0,005 0,188 0,048 0,231 -0,220 
CGGRN22 0,568 -0,147 0,121 -0,162 0,139 0,150 -0,019 -0,151 -0,141 0,327 -0,048 0,057 -0,097 0,004 
CGGRN23 0,319 -0,013 0,528 -0,281 -0,357 0,157 0,061 0,118 -0,065 -0,084 -0,027 0,055 -0,090 0,121 
CGGRN24 0,422 -0,033 0,215 -0,246 -0,110 -0,013 -0,047 0,149 -0,085 -0,107 -0,433 0,087 -0,288 -0,149 
CGGRN25 0,384 -0,021 0,066 0,201 -0,269 0,264 -0,074 0,365 -0,264 0,017 -0,166 0,060 -0,108 0,051 
CGGRN26 0,550 -0,240 -0,117 0,007 -0,097 0,200 -0,083 -0,240 -0,025 -0,063 -0,071 0,095 0,068 0,053 
CGGRN27 0,646 -0,296 0,114 -0,124 0,055 -0,353 -0,089 -0,005 -0,019 0,015 0,244 -0,003 -0,077 -0,141 
CGGRN28 0,546 -0,099 -0,074 -0,011 -0,184 0,174 -0,176 -0,016 0,333 -0,077 0,118 0,131 -0,157 0,082 
CGGRN29 0,281 -0,154 -0,045 0,150 -0,326 -0,177 0,231 0,283 -0,040 0,089 -0,051 -0,239 -0,326 0,183 
CGGRN30 0,490 -0,159 -0,234 -0,018 -0,198 -0,014 0,216 -0,040 0,128 -0,264 0,017 0,032 0,117 0,178 
CGGRN31 0,490 -0,229 -0,088 0,350 -0,101 -0,217 0,245 0,037 -0,084 -0,120 -0,103 -0,108 -0,235 0,003 
CGGRN32 0,566 -0,001 -0,025 -0,132 -0,153 -0,080 0,111 -0,130 -0,007 -0,185 -0,089 0,320 -0,017 -0,070 
CGGRN35 0,646 -0,021 -0,103 -0,137 -0,237 -0,153 -0,291 0,123 0,049 0,124 0,039 -0,113 0,134 -0,201 
CGGRN36 0,514 0,097 -0,273 -0,293 -0,230 0,041 -0,027 0,023 0,165 -0,061 -0,199 -0,112 -0,017 0,068 
CGGRN37 0,488 0,182 -0,158 -0,147 -0,030 -0,106 -0,103 0,398 0,227 -0,082 0,043 -0,144 0,027 -0,383 
CGGRN40 0,535 -0,043 -0,177 -0,092 -0,141 -0,003 -0,151 0,038 0,135 0,282 -0,070 0,047 0,154 -0,028 
CGGRN44 0,577 -0,339 0,007 -0,060 0,367 -0,180 -0,035 0,024 0,044 0,013 0,033 0,147 0,105 -0,012 
CGGRN45 0,501 0,065 -0,188 -0,226 0,153 -0,192 0,221 -0,266 0,006 -0,078 -0,132 -0,078 0,101 -0,092 
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Recommendation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
CGGRN46 0,246 0,046 0,263 -0,119 0,044 0,324 0,275 -0,027 0,064 -0,281 0,183 -0,384 0,136 0,247 
CGGRN47 0,446 0,308 -0,580 -0,185 0,096 0,237 -0,024 0,047 -0,233 0,126 0,242 -0,058 -0,090 0,089 
CGGRN48 0,463 0,286 -0,597 -0,163 0,082 0,226 -0,036 0,039 -0,188 0,114 0,239 -0,013 -0,132 0,034 
CGGRN49 0,399 0,451 0,118 -0,045 -0,032 -0,013 -0,110 -0,016 -0,078 -0,160 0,127 0,408 0,015 0,093 
CGGRN50 0,545 0,285 -0,175 -0,044 0,014 0,212 0,029 -0,104 -0,168 0,054 -0,144 -0,012 0,063 0,087 
CGGRN51 0,311 0,384 0,078 -0,121 0,256 0,004 0,218 -0,158 -0,028 -0,135 -0,324 0,121 -0,205 0,094 
CGGRN52 0,452 0,047 0,106 -0,048 0,220 -0,097 0,327 -0,109 -0,396 0,027 -0,139 -0,224 0,238 -0,129 
CGGRN53 0,216 0,438 0,153 0,057 0,409 0,014 0,022 0,103 0,266 0,064 0,030 -0,008 -0,206 0,228 
CGGRN54 0,234 -0,441 0,044 0,014 0,402 0,253 -0,350 0,226 -0,035 -0,086 -0,160 0,105 0,083 0,102 
CGGRN55 0,509 0,159 0,379 -0,086 -0,024 -0,081 -0,263 -0,035 -0,162 0,081 0,058 -0,104 0,186 0,106 
CGGRN56 0,548 0,301 0,197 0,429 0,121 -0,101 -0,169 0,038 -0,082 -0,110 0,219 0,152 -0,024 -0,143 
CGGRN57 0,559 0,168 0,441 -0,223 -0,106 -0,124 -0,212 -0,089 -0,178 0,018 0,110 -0,153 0,048 0,178 
CGGRN58 0,574 0,160 0,241 0,461 0,112 -0,157 -0,128 0,032 -0,241 -0,102 0,235 -0,075 -0,080 -0,054 
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 The first factor explains a significant proportion of the variance (over 19%) and points to 
the role played by the supervision and control committees (44, 45), circulation of relevant 
information in board functioning (32, 52) and board definitions (14) jointly with the 
criteria for selection (27). On one hand, traditional issues triggered by agency problems are 
addressed with those recommendations, where the search on control and supervision are 
key. The link to a clear human capital variable is aligned with the need of introducing 
control mechanisms trough directors selection and appointment. 
The second factor relates to audit recommendations (47, 48, 50). Internal mechanisms of 
control and supervision are targeted in this case. The third factor joints remuneration 
functions, nomination functions and board powers (57, 55, 8), aiming at the articulation 
and balances of power across internal mechanisms of control. The fourth factor refers to 
the way the information flows and decision are made with the government principles of 
consulting and prudence, in particular for the case of the nomination and remuneration 
committees (56, 58) and risk management and control policies (49). The fifth factor 
regards to independence at the board in general (12, 13) and the composition of the 
committees in this respect (54, 44). As we mentioned, this is a ‘traditional’ element of 
discussion and study across literature and listed companies try to adapt to it, specially in 
the early stages of code implementation. But, if the situation persists, given the legal 
framework and the foreseeable bond to shareholders’ interests protection, this provision is 
likely to be incorporated or, at least, reinforced through regulation. 
The sixth factor relates to several topics on remuneration (35, 36, 37, 40). It is particularly 
relevant that these recommendations fail to be achieved, once the hardest period of the 
crisis occurred. Then, this factor, along with factor three and four, would provide support 
to confirm H2 in this period.  
The seventh factor refers again to independence but, in this case, from the point of view of 
the rotation and removal of independent directors (29, 31), in what we may name ‘test of 
independence’. The willing of keep the rationale behind the introduction of independent 
directors is put to the test in the case of renewal (excessive tenure could lead to loose of 
independence), and ‘harmful for proprietary director’ situations (where removal of 
directors could be the easiest way to steer the board towards an determined decision). The 
eighth factor is related to the precirculation and disclosure of information on dedication 
and particulars of directors (4, 28). The ninth factor is related to corporate interest 
treatment and audit qualifications before general meeting and employees (7, 51, 53). The 
Chapter 4: Board of Directors and Codes of Corporate Governance in Spain: Framework, 
Validity and Evolution 
	242 
tenth factor relates external advice, induction programs and information (23, 24, 25), 
targeting director’s readiness to perform its role. Then, it would give some support to, at 
least, confirm partially H4.  
The eleventh factor is related to board functioning in terms of proceedings and directors 
absence. The twelfth factor focuses on the functions of the chairman and the separation of 
voting, issues centered in the power allocation. The thirteenth factor is linked to the 
previous one, focusing on the general meeting powers. Finally, the fourteenth factor is led 
by the recommendation on corporate bylaws restrictions. Remuneration is clearly shown in 
factors 3, 4, and 6. Control in present mostly in factors 1, 2, 9, 12, 13, and 14; information 
in 4, 8 and 10. Gender diversity has a low weight in the factors which means that is not 
linked with the overall variance in the degree of compliance. This result, characterizing a 
pattern in the lack of compliance, would have been extremely dangerous for the purpose of 
corporate governance and equality in general. 
We think that given the factors, companies that not comply are moved by the lack of 
transparency and disclosure in remuneration, and the insufficient balancing the powers in 
favor of their concentration.  
 
2013-2014 
In this two-year period, the recommendation 7 was the one complied by all registers of the 
sample. This recommendation was followed As in the previous period, a small number of 
recommendations showed a great number of missing information, because they were not 
applicable to them. That is the case of R2, 37, 36, 38, or 39. Executive committee is 
missing in some companies as well as variable remuneration, and therefore those 
recommendations were not pertinent for them (see Table 3). 
Looking at the mean and the standard deviation, 64.15% of the recommendations have am 
average degree of compliance over 1.75 (where 2 is the maximum). Most of the 
recommendations at the top of the rank are grounded on Agency Theory (7, 5, 22, 31, 48, 
15, 18, 51, 53). Two recommendations related to human capital also rank among the best 
(41, 26), showing a rising accomplishment of selection policies and setting the basis for 
gathering resourceful directors at the board. 
As regards to the worst ranked according to the descriptive statistics, we may assert: 
a) The independence of the board (12) poorly qualifies again. 
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b) Given the importance of risk policies and management, it is surprising the low rank of 
compliance in the related recommendation (49). In the same vein, it is also surprising 
the presence at the bottom of the supervision and control recommendation (39). 
c) Gender diversity is still a low performer recommendation (14) . 
As in the previous period, we found AT related recommendations both, at the top and at 
the bottom of the rank according to their mean of compliance. Therefore, we just can 
confirm partially H1.  
Looking at the factors that made the difference in the degree of compliance in this period, 
we performed a factor analysis of the compliance of the recommendations. We obtained 12 
factors, with eigenvalue over 1, that explain 70.43% of the variance. Since there were a 
high number of factors, the individual loadings were usually low (see Tables 6 and 7). 
 
Table 6: Degree of compliance 13-14. Total variance explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
 Total % of Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 11,303 26,911 26,911 11,303 26,911 26,911 4,980 11,858 11,858 
2 2,792 6,647 33,559 2,792 6,647 33,559 4,440 10,572 22,430 
3 2,229 5,307 38,866 2,229 5,307 38,866 3,433 8,173 30,603 
4 2,140 5,095 43,960 2,140 5,095 43,960 2,680 6,381 36,983 
5 1,832 4,361 48,322 1,832 4,361 48,322 2,222 5,291 42,274 
6 1,575 3,751 52,072 1,575 3,751 52,072 2,127 5,064 47,338 
7 1,535 3,656 55,728 1,535 3,656 55,728 2,034 4,843 52,180 
8 1,365 3,249 58,977 1,365 3,249 58,977 1,777 4,232 56,412 
9 1,288 3,066 62,043 1,288 3,066 62,043 1,585 3,773 60,185 
10 1,248 2,972 65,015 1,248 2,972 65,015 1,545 3,679 63,864 
11 1,193 2,842 67,856 1,193 2,842 67,856 1,393 3,318 67,181 
12 1,082 2,577 70,433 1,082 2,577 70,433 1,366 3,252 70,433 
13 0,980 2,333 72,766       
14 0,946 2,253 75,019       
15 0,887 2,112 77,131       
16 0,830 1,975 79,106       
17 0,774 1,843 80,949       
18 0,690 1,642 82,591       
19 0,648 1,543 84,134       
20 0,612 1,457 85,591       
21 0,555 1,320 86,912       
22 0,531 1,264 88,175       
23 0,490 1,167 89,343       
24 0,478 1,137 90,480       
25 0,446 1,063 91,543       
26 0,395 0,940 92,482       
27 0,374 0,889 93,372       
28 0,367 0,875 94,247       
29 0,335 0,798 95,045       
30 0,300 0,715 95,760       
31 0,259 0,617 96,377       
32 0,253 0,603 96,980       
33 0,239 0,569 97,549       
34 0,210 0,499 98,048       
35 0,166 0,396 98,444       
36 0,157 0,375 98,819       
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Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
37 0,127 0,303 99,121       
38 0,109 0,260 99,381       
39 0,095 0,225 99,606       
40 0,069 0,165 99,771       
41 0,061 0,146 99,917       
42 0,035 0,083 100,000       		
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Table 7: Degree of compliance 13-14. Component Matrix 
Recommendation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
D2CGCR01 0,026 -0,033 -0,071 -0,03 -0,092 -0,012 -0,155 0,095 0,133 0,06 0,087 0,79 
D2CGCR03 -0,205 -0,064 0,378 0,173 0,099 -0,016 -0,105 -0,147 0,284 -0,033 -0,377 -0,283 
D2CGCR04 0,091 0,005 0,044 0,076 0,004 0,056 0,105 0,869 -0,107 0,061 -0,019 0,123 
D2CGCR05 0,045 0,074 0,108 0,03 0,312 -0,101 0,185 0,544 0,296 -0,418 -0,272 0,003 
D2CGCR06 0,141 -0,011 -0,185 0,06 0,832 -0,082 0,041 0,104 0,091 0,106 -0,041 -0,163 
D2CGCR08 0,137 -0,114 0,11 -0,044 0,041 0,111 0,05 0,015 0,766 0,044 0,132 0,188 
D2CGCR09 0,013 0,149 0,036 0,055 0,149 -0,012 0,164 -0,114 0,156 -0,032 0,634 0,053 
D2CGCR10 0,099 0,133 0,021 0,06 0,123 0,745 0,178 0,07 0,065 0,098 -0,037 0,127 
D2CGCR11 0,012 0,123 0,049 0,088 0,015 0,669 0,12 -0,075 0,287 -0,054 0,071 -0,105 
D2CGCR12 0,229 0,05 -0,044 0,031 0,052 0,093 0,722 0,216 0,047 0,128 0,107 -0,144 
D2CGCR13 0,591 0,088 0,335 -0,076 -0,074 0,187 0,22 0,111 -0,116 0,008 0,098 -0,007 
D2CGCR14 0,031 -0,007 0,055 0,205 0,09 0,274 -0,032 0,455 0,338 0,354 0,008 -0,021 
D2CGCR15 0,21 0,559 0,37 0,147 -0,013 0,126 0,302 0,016 -0,026 -0,155 0,097 0,048 
D2CGCR17 0,785 0,152 0,273 0,12 0,17 0,131 0,03 0,082 0,039 0,119 0,144 0,087 
D2CGCR18 -0,025 0,523 0,334 0,021 0,291 0,032 0,104 -0,02 -0,212 0,39 -0,132 0,142 
D2CGCR19 0,033 0,812 0,119 0,005 0,068 0,065 0,035 0,025 -0,066 0,123 0,054 0,036 
D2CGCR21 0,565 -0,041 0,214 0,279 0,117 0,048 0,236 0,019 0,236 0,127 0,124 0,036 
D2CGCR22 0,267 0,789 0,298 0,031 0,046 0,22 0,043 -0,066 -0,124 0,011 0,137 0,076 
D2CGCR23 0,561 0,052 0,243 -0,007 0,445 0,294 0,073 -0,08 -0,196 -0,027 0,215 -0,04 
D2CGCR24 0,036 0,14 0,193 0,276 0,242 0,158 0,364 0,047 0,048 -0,165 -0,166 0,482 
D2CGCR25 0,293 0,238 -0,036 0,22 -0,017 0,106 0,223 0,095 0,045 0,476 -0,058 -0,098 
D2CGCR26 0,683 0,254 0,302 0,01 -0,086 0,201 -0,025 0,182 0,124 0,144 0,146 -0,15 
D2CGCR27 0,183 0,045 0,401 0,218 0,4 0,221 0,214 0,262 -0,058 0,053 0,094 0,134 
D2CGCR28 0,298 0,3 0,099 0,418 0,104 0,253 0,079 0,241 0,067 -0,224 0,305 0,097 
D2CGCR29 0,291 0,139 0,166 -0,027 0,019 0,639 -0,011 0,133 -0,152 0,03 -0,038 0,006 
D2CGCR30 0,672 0,37 -0,005 0,118 0,054 0,1 -0,051 0,153 0,022 0,041 0,049 -0,111 
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Recommendation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
D2CGCR34 0,031 0,233 0,117 0,148 0,744 0,21 -0,001 0,001 -0,036 -0,086 0,191 0,083 
D2CGCR39 0,431 -0,052 0,24 0,31 0,025 0,1 0,261 0,039 0,084 0,394 0,294 -0,085 
D2CGCR40 0,609 0,192 0,092 0,124 0,057 0,066 0,151 -0,078 0,127 -0,011 -0,402 0,231 
D2CGCR41 0,242 0,76 -0,012 0,087 0,156 0,059 -0,018 0,022 0,11 0,178 -0,036 -0,146 
D2CGCR42 0,109 0,109 0,135 0,886 0,101 0,04 0,055 0,047 0,043 0,081 0,017 -0,039 
D2CGCR43 0,145 0,039 0,156 0,891 0,054 0,018 0,029 0,104 -0,054 0,093 -0,005 0,028 
D2CGCR44 0,642 0,187 0,082 0,103 0,12 -0,002 -0,038 -0,236 0,073 0,022 -0,284 0,118 
D2CGCR45 0,151 0,284 0,095 0,449 0,372 0,078 0,19 -0,138 0,168 0,205 -0,111 0,11 
D2CGCR46 0,205 0,339 0,3 0,126 0,111 -0,088 0,016 0,045 0,15 0,519 -0,085 0,189 
D2CGCR47 0,629 0,479 0,052 0,195 0,064 -0,172 0,077 0,152 0,106 0,07 -0,153 0,082 
D2CGCR48 0,302 0,81 0,223 0,104 -0,035 0,172 -0,036 0,011 0,045 -0,084 0,074 -0,005 
D2CGCR49 -0,011 0,03 -0,004 0,071 0,038 0,128 0,871 -0,018 -0,001 0,011 0,078 0,014 
D2CGCR50 0,21 0,287 0,482 0,195 -0,135 0,124 -0,022 -0,047 0,458 0,067 -0,082 -0,034 
D2CGCR51 0,241 0,274 0,77 0,089 -0,006 0,134 -0,037 -0,085 0,099 0,074 0,031 -0,094 
D2CGCR52 0,308 0,228 0,731 0,162 0,008 0,015 -0,012 0,133 0,078 0,29 0,044 0,137 
D2CGCR53 0,293 0,236 0,777 0,151 0,031 0,047 0,01 0,125 0,051 -0,112 -0,044 -0,029 
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The first factor weights the transparency and the control supervised by the audit committee 
as well as those facts that might harm the company (linking risk control and PR), and the 
selection of new directors considering their experience and the balance within the board.  
The second factor refers to the skills (41) and information (22, 47) of directors as well as 
the functioning of the board (18, 19). The flow of information in corporate governance is 
key, this factor is rising the need of a clear flow of information providing a certain skills’ 
set to be able to process the information before taking any decision. 
The third factor points to the nomination and remuneration committees (51, 52, 53). As in 
the previous period, remunerations and nomination issues are one of the main drivers of 
variance in degree of compliance. Then, we can confirm H2  for this period as well.  
The fourth factor shows the weight of recommendations on internal controls and their 
supervision by the board structure (42, 43, 45, 39). Internal controls have played a key role 
in regulation and business practice in the aftermath of corporate scandals. The presence of 
this factor gives the support necessary to confirm H3.  
The fifth shows the split vote (6) at the top, and it could be due to the changes made during 
that period but also appears jointly with other elements. External directors remuneration 
(34), the disclosure of director particulars, and the external advice, are connected with the 
lack of transparency and checkings with external parts. The sixth factor points to the 
functional structure of the board. The seventh factor is related to independence at the 
board. The eight factor weights the issues regarding the general meeting and the diversity. 
The ninth factor relates gender diversity to the powers of the board. The tenth factor has no 
significant loadings above 0.7 and the remaining point to committees’ supervision. The 
eleventh factor has only one loading close to the threshold we establish a points directly to 
the recommendation on size. Lastly, the twelfth factor could be denominated by the 
corporate bylaws requirements.  
Control and supervision are still originating the majority of the variance, as well as the 
issues regarding remuneration and the flow of information. Diversity finds a small place 
for explaining differences, whereas human capital variables are linked to control 
mechanisms. 
Many of the factors have just a few high loadings, what leads to think that variance in the 
compliance is not due to a whole solid topic regarding corporate governance but just an 
specific issue. Besides, since most of the loadings of the recommendations are very spread 
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across factors, we suggest that combination of other current recommendations won’t lead 
to further explanation of the degree of compliance. 
 
2015-2016 
During these two years, there were two recommendations that were met in all cases, 12 and 
28. The first refers to the corporate interest. It is reasonable the lack of variance since the 
explanation of this recommendation includes that the company should follow obligations 
made by the laws. Any variance from full compliance of this, should trigger a major alarm 
in the markets, and multiple shareholders complaints. A great number of recommendations 
are mostly fulfilled by all companies. That is the case for recommendations on shareholder 
conditions to attend general meetings (9), or the seek of external advise (29). 54.68% of 
recommendations have an average degree of compliance over 1.75 (see Table 3).  
Recommendations on remuneration issues (61, 62, 63, 64) are have a low average of 
compliance, showing again one of the biggest problems in the corporate governance of 
Spanish listed firms. Diversity, along with other human capital variables (14) is still in this 
period lacking of optimal compliance. The modification of this recommendation, 
broadening the scope may lead to a higher difficulty to meet and to create an opportunity 
for differentiation, following the contributions of the directors’ profiles to the firm. CSR 
related recommendations are detailed in a new set for the case of this code (53, 54, 55) and 
they are far from the top of the degree of compliance. As in the case of human capital 
related variables and recommendations, it might set an item for differentiation of firms that 
could be perceived by the markets. Internal controls supervision (40, 52) have still room 
for improvement, and the should converge soon, due to their importance to anticipate, 
mitigate and handle risks.  
The presence of important agency theory related recommendations among those with low 
average of degree of compliance lead us to say that the hypothesis H1 is partially 
confirmed.  
As regards to the factors that might cause the variance in the (lack of) compliance amongst 
companies, we took the results from the factor analysis we performed for those years. We 
found 14 factors with an eigenvalue over 1, which explained 68.458% of the variance (see 
Tables 8 and 9). 
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Table 8: Degree of compliance 15-16. Total Variance explained 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared Loadings 
Rotation Sums of Squared 
Loadings 
 Total % of Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% Total 
% of 
Variance 
Cumulative 
% 
1 6,346 15,865 15,865 6,346 15,865 15,865 3,684 9,211 9,211 
2 3,150 7,875 23,741 3,150 7,875 23,741 3,214 8,036 17,247 
3 2,195 5,487 29,228 2,195 5,487 29,228 2,310 5,776 23,023 
4 2,024 5,060 34,288 2,024 5,060 34,288 2,254 5,635 28,658 
5 1,960 4,901 39,189 1,960 4,901 39,189 1,972 4,929 33,587 
6 1,697 4,243 43,432 1,697 4,243 43,432 1,925 4,813 38,400 
7 1,538 3,844 47,276 1,538 3,844 47,276 1,764 4,410 42,810 
8 1,470 3,676 50,952 1,470 3,676 50,952 1,579 3,948 46,758 
9 1,349 3,372 54,324 1,349 3,372 54,324 1,549 3,871 50,630 
10 1,212 3,030 57,353 1,212 3,030 57,353 1,504 3,760 54,389 
11 1,205 3,013 60,367 1,205 3,013 60,367 1,498 3,745 58,135 
12 1,153 2,883 63,250 1,153 2,883 63,250 1,496 3,741 61,876 
13 1,050 2,626 65,876 1,050 2,626 65,876 1,398 3,496 65,372 
14 1,033 2,582 68,458 1,033 2,582 68,458 1,235 3,086 68,458 
15 0,943 2,357 70,815       
16 0,898 2,244 73,059       
17 0,868 2,169 75,228       
18 0,823 2,056 77,285       
19 0,757 1,893 79,178       
20 0,707 1,768 80,946       
21 0,690 1,726 82,672       
22 0,660 1,650 84,322       
23 0,624 1,560 85,882       
24 0,593 1,483 87,365       
25 0,556 1,389 88,754       
26 0,548 1,371 90,125       
27 0,503 1,259 91,383       
28 0,411 1,027 92,410       
29 0,379 0,949 93,359       
30 0,357 0,892 94,251       
31 0,325 0,813 95,064       
32 0,322 0,806 95,870       
33 0,312 0,780 96,651       
34 0,285 0,712 97,363       
35 0,257 0,644 98,007       
36 0,224 0,561 98,567       
37 0,209 0,523 99,090       
38 0,182 0,455 99,545       
39 0,136 0,339 99,885       
40 0,046 0,115 100,000       
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Table 9: Degree of compliance 15-16. Component Matrix 
Recommendation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
D3CGCR01 0,099 -0,013 -0,083 -0,041 0,002 -0,038 0,129 0,076 -0,680 0,004 -0,007 -0,021 -0,073 -0,045 
D3CGCR03 0,174 0,263 0,357 -0,139 0,171 0,054 0,321 0,320 0,094 0,119 0,007 -0,162 -0,064 -0,057 
D3CGCR04 0,266 0,091 0,664 0,062 -0,032 -0,005 0,007 0,109 0,077 -0,033 0,085 -0,074 -0,121 -0,045 
D3CGCR05 0,114 0,170 0,277 -0,102 -0,085 -0,099 0,096 0,009 0,391 0,579 -0,065 0,034 -0,026 -0,095 
D3CGCR06 0,201 0,091 0,291 0,004 0,070 0,145 0,554 -0,210 0,247 -0,184 -0,173 0,211 0,089 0,069 
D3CGCR07 0,182 0,030 0,356 0,079 0,125 0,050 -0,089 0,001 0,351 -0,427 -0,057 0,279 0,089 0,092 
D3CGCR08 0,262 0,147 -0,164 -0,023 0,662 0,026 0,145 0,030 0,166 -0,143 0,038 -0,045 -0,151 -0,077 
D3CGCR09 -0,021 0,827 0,111 0,004 -0,135 0,017 0,081 -0,082 -0,082 0,070 -0,013 -0,014 0,005 0,027 
D3CGCR13 -0,039 0,128 -0,144 0,063 0,141 0,081 0,022 0,070 -0,046 0,645 0,026 0,071 0,043 0,035 
D3CGCR14 0,205 0,174 0,657 0,041 -0,049 0,017 0,137 0,064 0,009 -0,061 0,095 0,067 -0,071 0,262 
D3CGCR15 0,107 0,020 0,076 -0,002 0,236 -0,028 -0,131 -0,024 0,049 0,031 0,820 -0,016 0,020 0,113 
D3CGCR16 0,144 0,229 0,279 0,011 -0,185 0,311 -0,141 -0,242 -0,461 -0,053 0,034 0,071 -0,028 -0,081 
D3CGCR17 -0,051 -0,093 0,512 0,110 0,017 0,289 0,151 0,207 -0,007 0,070 0,017 0,109 0,339 -0,185 
D3CGCR18 -0,013 0,128 0,260 0,103 -0,046 0,165 0,458 -0,208 -0,129 -0,074 0,548 0,154 -0,003 -0,096 
D3CGCR21 -0,058 -0,024 0,028 -0,023 -0,013 0,014 -0,023 -0,028 0,031 -0,013 0,037 -0,013 -0,032 0,909 
D3CGCR22 0,017 -0,020 0,077 0,000 -0,020 -0,161 0,055 -0,036 -0,087 0,068 -0,023 0,826 0,040 0,003 
D3CGCR25 0,158 0,055 0,415 -0,053 -0,022 0,200 0,199 -0,118 0,418 -0,073 0,248 0,198 -0,172 -0,104 
D3CGCR26 0,107 -0,043 -0,080 0,073 0,018 0,282 0,054 0,124 0,259 0,001 0,111 0,632 -0,155 -0,037 
D3CGCR27 0,148 -0,005 0,036 0,014 0,037 0,070 0,763 0,135 -0,159 0,180 -0,005 0,020 -0,055 -0,007 
D3CGCR29 0,132 -0,007 -0,131 -0,068 -0,053 0,092 -0,046 0,005 0,076 -0,006 0,014 -0,056 0,841 -0,013 
D3CGCR31 -0,110 -0,013 0,051 0,047 -0,067 0,014 0,001 0,777 -0,053 0,019 -0,020 0,033 0,064 -0,018 
D3CGCR32 0,360 -0,020 0,225 -0,055 0,169 0,196 0,031 0,583 -0,016 0,030 -0,101 0,023 -0,104 0,034 
D3CGCR33 0,271 0,755 0,015 0,025 0,103 0,017 -0,006 0,188 -0,072 -0,028 0,298 -0,049 -0,072 0,038 
D3CGCR35 0,018 0,868 0,024 0,029 0,046 0,002 0,009 -0,020 0,131 0,021 -0,099 -0,010 -0,014 -0,048 
D3CGCR36 0,467 0,214 0,061 0,059 -0,063 -0,024 0,273 0,217 0,172 0,037 0,219 -0,005 0,240 0,396 
D3CGCR39 0,070 0,049 0,043 0,077 0,175 0,765 -0,021 -0,082 0,025 0,046 0,048 0,003 0,228 0,000 
D3CGCR40 0,737 -0,018 0,007 0,028 0,096 -0,041 0,125 -0,016 0,132 -0,077 0,148 0,125 0,042 -0,059 
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Recommendation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
D3CGCR42 0,582 0,181 0,045 0,419 -0,094 0,226 0,014 0,210 0,023 -0,178 0,080 0,131 0,139 -0,054 
D3CGCR43 0,042 0,032 0,061 0,159 0,854 0,167 -0,020 0,003 -0,072 0,194 0,195 0,029 0,052 0,026 
D3CGCR45 0,574 -0,081 0,128 0,016 0,045 0,085 0,034 -0,144 -0,150 0,416 -0,071 0,051 -0,127 0,057 
D3CGCR46 0,733 -0,030 0,152 0,156 0,068 0,050 -0,021 0,008 -0,066 0,105 0,058 -0,043 -0,126 -0,049 
D3CGCR47 0,002 0,040 0,074 0,002 0,024 0,783 0,159 0,207 -0,007 0,013 -0,035 -0,031 -0,087 0,026 
D3CGCR49 -0,024 0,742 0,118 0,140 0,470 0,126 -0,006 -0,052 -0,008 0,200 0,048 0,046 0,100 0,019 
D3CGCR50 0,163 0,048 0,093 0,760 0,285 -0,058 -0,107 0,125 -0,130 -0,016 -0,027 0,049 -0,030 0,006 
D3CGCR51 -0,062 0,461 0,086 0,697 0,303 -0,017 -0,065 -0,026 0,016 0,138 -0,067 -0,059 0,060 0,022 
D3CGCR53 0,618 0,236 0,200 -0,040 0,029 0,077 0,055 0,059 -0,139 -0,015 -0,028 -0,071 0,220 -0,042 
D3CGCR54 0,519 -0,025 0,320 0,130 0,148 -0,064 0,320 -0,125 -0,072 -0,171 -0,247 -0,051 0,300 0,152 
D3CGCR55 0,534 0,099 0,200 0,155 0,140 -0,165 0,228 -0,049 -0,016 -0,259 -0,012 0,253 0,298 0,156 
D3CGCR56 0,128 -0,091 -0,076 0,750 -0,221 0,308 0,138 -0,149 0,140 0,012 0,030 -0,022 -0,105 -0,021 
D3CGCR57 0,295 -0,081 0,093 0,491 -0,129 -0,179 0,252 0,013 0,134 -0,120 0,294 0,198 0,012 -0,032 
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The first factor refers to internal controls (40,46), audit (42) and risk policies (45), and the 
overall supervision (53). Internal controls matters continue being a key fact in this period. 
Supervision recommendations spread its contents (53) and are likely to have a period for 
adapting to it. In the same vein, Corporate Social Responsibility have a relevant role in that 
supervision and should be clearly defined in policies and reporting with international 
methodology (54, 55). This factor provides support to confirm H3 and H5. 
The second factor has a high presence of the ‘endogenous recommendation’: the need of 
inform on governance recommendations in every action or decision taken by the board 
(35). Although, as we mentioned, it ranks high in the degree of compliance, is linked to the 
disclosure of information before the general meetings (9) and before the board (33), and to 
two ‘consulting’ recommendations towards the chairman (49, 51). We suggest that the 
underlying concept here is the flow of information regarding board functioning.  
The third factor implies the need of suitable (14), independent (17), and dedicated (25) 
directors. Diversity and skills are still a great reason for not complying, along with 
‘traditional issues’ like the director independence. Based on this factor, we can confirm H4 
for this period. 
The fourth points to the remuneration committee functioning (50, 51) and the remuneration 
offers to directors (56, 57). Remuneration’s matters still are driving lack of the disclosure 
and structuration. Changes made in the code in this period aiming to improve them, have 
led to more disclosure but higher demands of information. Then, it is one of the main 
reasons behind dissimilarities in the degree of compliance, confirming H2. 
The fifth factor joins the power of the audit committee (43) with the responsibilities 
presenting company’s accounts in the general meeting (8). Again, accountability before 
shareholder in general and the power the audit committee holds show the need of 
balancing powers using mechanisms beyond board internal caveats. 
The sixth refers to human capital related recommendations in the nominations and 
remuneration committee (47) and audit committee (39). Knowledge, experience and skills 
center the attention in this case. We suggest that a convenient increase in the disclosure of 
this provision may drive new horizon for improving governance. 
The seventh deals with the Directors’ absence and delegation of vote (27) as well as the 
transparency and public disclosure at their websites on the information regarding various 
reports and the Directors’ profile (06, 18). New requirements in the last reform of the code 
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may certainly explain a deteriorated compliance temporarily. But we suggest that other 
reasons might be acting behind the scenes. Timing in reporting and profiling according to 
human capital variables design could be affecting their publicity. 
The eight factor denotes the importance of agendas (31) and flows of information (32) in 
board normal functioning. The way of preparing, informing and dealing directly affects 
decision making and efficiency within a work group. And a board of directors is a 
significant one that needs much of those characteristics for governing effectively.  
The ninth factor is mostly related with other provisions on the general meeting preparation 
(5,7). The tenth factor relates to the size of the board (13), which has been a subject of 
study for decades. The fact of being accomplished for the vast majority of the companies 
but not all them might be related to past board configuration, and should be understood as 
a process of reaching the required levels. The eleventh factor is related to the proportion of 
proprietary and independent directors (15). The issue of board independence is still a 
mainstream topic in corporate governance and listed companies are still struggling to cope 
with its demands. The twelfth points to preserve the reputation of the firm from 
circumstances originated by their directors (22) and the need of board meetings (26). 
The thirteenth factor represents the advice availability that all directors should have (29). It 
is indirectly related to human capital variables, since this advice is supposed to be an 
accompaniment or supplement of the experience, knowledge and skills each director brings 
to the board once appointed. The absence of adequate channels may constrain the capacity 
of analyzing and taking decisions at the board. The fourteenth factor shows the importance 
of preserving the independence throughout the accorded tenure (21). This factor is quite 
linked to the eleventh in the need of confirming and establishing mechanism to secure the 
demanded level of independence within the firms. But, in this case, the vast majority of 
companies comply with it (for this reason, it only explains just a few fails in the sample) 
This analysis suggests keeping the recommendations on internal controls, since they are 
still far from being accomplished and they are a key element for diverse reasons, specially 
for managing risks, ensuring information, and avoiding big threats on time. Public 
disclosure of remuneration and board functioning are still points to improve in the 
governance of the companies. Finally, given these factors, it is noticeable how human 
capital related recommendations explain 9,3% of the variance. That is, the degree of 
compliance of the human capital provisions is explaining a significant part of the ‘poor 
governance’ practices of the companies during this period of time. 
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We tested the reliability via the Cronbach’s Alpha. The results shows us values over 0.8 
for the entire code in every period of time. As for the values for the provisions 
recommendations related to the validation of the hypotheses that are included in the current 
analysis (remuneration, internal controls,  Stewardship related, and human capital), 
although they vary from 0.545 to 0.821, they are right enough to be considered 
appropriated in terms of reliability for the purpose of this validation (Black et al., 2017). 
 
Table 10: Cronbach’s Alpha per code and recommendations group included in 
hypotheses 	
 
2007 - 2012 2013 - 2014 2015 - 2016 
   Code 0,879 0,859 0,866 
    
Remuneration 0,570-0,545 0,676 0,652 
Internal Controls 0,845 0,841 0,718 
Human Capital  0,737-0,555 0,464 
Stewardship Theory   0,718-0,821 
 
 
Factor comparison across periods 
Control and supervision are the main factor during the period of our analysis, although 
internal controls have gained the most relevant position in the last two years. We suggest 
that this is due to the increasing preventive demands that are being established by the 
issuer, and accompanied by a tighter regulation. Claims on responsibilities can be 
mitigated through the implementation and monitoring of proper internal control 
mechanisms. Remuneration issues have a high presence, although they are losing 
importance in terms of the variance explained. Companies are converging in this respect. 
Human capital elements gain importance, pointing at a potential source of resources and 
advantages. Besides, gender diversity has been embedded in this context, giving an 
opportunity for different theoretical perspectives on the compliance of this particular issue 
and for the research based on detailed information companies might provide. Despite this, 
there is still a strong presence of Agency Theory envisioning. Information has two main 
roles: facilitator inside the board, improving functioning; and transparency channel 
towards other, setting a bond to control mechanisms both, inside and outside the firm. The 
provisions on General Meeting increase their relevance and, at the same time independence 
ones loose it. Board size is still a factor of variance but the analysis should be made along 
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with the high average degree of compliance. Then, is still a matter of differentiation, but it 
is not a great concern in terms of compliance.  
We summarize the results for the hypotheses we formulated and the comparison of the 
factors in Table 10. Although we initially thought that Agency Theory related 
recommendations were to be met by all firms, given the regulatory context and the legal 
system, we found significant elements that were unachieved. The usual temptation in this 
case, following some of codes’ rationales, is to take those provisions to the regulatory side. 
And, as we said, this is not new in Spain. Remuneration and internal controls are a great 
source of dissimilarities specially in the last years. This ‘traditional’ issues, derived from 
Agency Theory, and are clear exponents of what can give into the ‘legalization 
temptation’. Finally, human capital related recommendations are gaining presence, and the 
fact of being a big cause of variance among companies degree of compliance can be a 
valuable element for the markets. 
Table 11: Hypotheses summary and factors comparison across years 
Factors 2007-2012 2013-2014 2015-2016 
1 
Control and supervision through 
internal mechanisms, risk 
management and selection 
Control and supervision through 
internal mechanisms, flow of 
information and selection 
Internal controls and 
reporting (including CSR) 
2 Control and supervision through audit 
Information, directors skills and 
board functioning 
Disclosure and flow of 
information in board 
functioning 
3 Remuneration, nomination in the perspective of balance of powers 
Nomination and remuneration 
Committees 
Suitable, dedicated and 
independent directors 
4 
Remuneration, nomination in the 
perspective of flow of 
information 
Supervision and Internal controls  Remuneration issues 
5 Independence at the board and its committees Accountability before GM 
Balance of powers between 
Audit C and GM 
6 Remuneration disclosures Functional Structure of the Board Human capital variables in committees composition 
7 Test of independence Independence at the Board Public disclosure of information 
8 Disclosure of information Balancing powers through GM and diversity 
Board functioning: agendas 
and information 
9 Accountability before shareholders and employees 
Balancing composition of the 
Board through diversity  GM preparation 
10 Information sourcing and training (Director readiness) Supervision through Committees Board Size 
11 board functioning Board size Board independence 
12 Power allocation in chairman and GM Corporate bylaws Corporate reputation 
13 GM powers  
Information sourcing and 
training (Director readiness) 
14 Corporate bylaws  Test of independence 
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Hypothesis 2007-2012 2013-2014 2015-2016 
1 Partially Partially Partially 
2 Yes Yes Yes 
3 NA Yes Yes 
4 NA Partially Yes 
5 NA NA Yes 
 
As in Black et al. (2017), PCA supports the idea of considering a broad set of constructs to 
capture components well. The analysis of the factors we made points to the main elements 
of differentiation, in terms of degree of compliance, when listed companies approach 
corporate governance compliance. They also help to validate the constructs the hypotheses 
formulated. This is a good starting point to see if the firm performance is affect by the 
degree of compliance, since they are likely  to be considered as subindices of corporate 
governance. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Providing the intellectual framework, the principles and the goals across the all the codes 
in Spain, almost all variables that could be studied from the reported data coming from 
recommendations compliance are framed under the agency theory intellectual framework. 
This is consistent with the references employed by the vast majority of researches that 
have traditionally aimed to study topics. 
In spite of this long track record of intellectual framing, new approaches have been 
included throughout these years. Thus, resource dependence theory, stakeholder theory and 
stewardship theory have applied to ground the basis of corporate governance research and 
practice.  
The codes of good governance incorporated elements from these frameworks so as to build 
their principles and set the provision or recommendations they require to listed firms. 
Principles have increased in number over years and have been made explicitly linked to 
recommendations. We provided a matching the principles of the Spanish Code of 
Governance and the main theories that serve as  intellectual framework for corporate 
governance. This matching shows us that the majority of principles could be enclosed in 
the agency theory. But, maybe because of the pressure of regulation, which assumes a part 
of the matters, or because of an increasing trend towards wider and improved corporate 
governance, there have been more room for other approaches recently. In that sense, we 
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identified those principles that could be under the influence of other theoretical 
frameworks, such as the Stakeholders Theory, the Resource Dependence Theory and the 
Stewardship Theory. Some of the recently implemented recommendations can be framed 
under them, e.g. the incorporation of provisions regarding the corporate social 
responsibility. These approaches may open a window for further changes in 
recommendations that enrich the standards of corporate governance in listed firms. 
Recent requests include a more detailed disclosure for the issues regarding remuneration, 
which was further analyzed along with other topics. The approach aims to provide a 
enhanced control and better supervision. The codes have evolved considering parallel 
regulation, dismissing some provisions, and incorporating new owns for the benefit of 
markets transparency, shareholders protection and accountability before community. 
Besides remuneration disclosure, more provisions regarding general meetings performance 
and the three recommendations on corporate social responsibility are a clear example.   
While performing our study, we provide a very useful table to compare recommendations 
topics across different codes. This is quite relevant for the case of longitudinal studies of 
the mentioned recommendations and the subjects they ultimately refer to. We also depicted 
some of the comparable characteristics of the code as summary of some evolving topics. 
We checked that the Agency Theory related recommendations are met by Spanish listed 
companies but not always nor in all the cases. The positive side of this is that they become 
a differentiation element. In fact, at the same time, we confirmed that remuneration 
provisions as well as internal controls are making a difference among firms. The analysis 
of the degree of compliance using PCA validate these constructs in the configuration of the 
different codes. The Cronbach’s Alpha analysis confirmed the reliability of the degree of 
compliance of codes’ recommendations in each period of time as a measure of overall 
governance, conversely to what it happens when considering indices for partial aspects of 
governance. The indicator for the case of each one of the hypotheses shows signs of the 
use of a smaller number of recommendations. 
As a result of the analysis on the components behind the degree of compliance of the 
recommendations of the code we reached some other findings. First, in each period there is 
high number of factors explaining the variance. This has two sides. On one hand, it leads to 
think that there are no big groups of recommendations feeding one each other and showing 
great opposition to compliance, which is certainly positive for the purpose of the code. 
Besides, it helps to validate hypotheses we formulated on the validity of the formulation of 
the code as it reflects prior knowledge base constructs of existing research literature on the 
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topic. On the other hand, it is hard to name the rationale upon those factors, which is 
negative so as to center an action plan to cope with those recommendations that failed to 
comply.  
Internal controls are gaining presence but, under our view, are likely to be incorporated to 
legislation, specially in Spain, if the situation of deteriorated compliance persists. This 
would be aligned with the explanation on the legal systems and their relation to codes, 
widely discussed in research literature. But, until that happens to be, they may be 
considered a good differential measurement of governance. 
As mentioned, Corporate Social Responsibility, have evolved towards a higher degree of 
disclosure on policies and implementation, and the lack of full compliance in last periods 
may suggest two causes: a) a need to adapt to new provisions or b) an absence of concrete 
and properly monitored action plan on this regard. The first cause is relatively easy to 
overcome in one or two periods, whereas the second takes more time and might last. Then, 
it would confirm that it can trigger differences among firms that could be perceived by the 
markets as distinctive. 
Human capital related recommendations have a great proportion of the difference among 
companies’ compliance in the last years. Following existing literature, despite the 
mentioned constrains of this kind of resources, are perceived at performance. We do not 
foresee the same behavior under the same premises. Companies will try to comply, at least 
formally, but the market will have to look at further disclosures to interpret advantages and 
profits coming out of a certain company’s human capital variable. In this vein, current 
required disclosures, and likely future ones to come, can provide rich information 
repository for further analyses.  
Traditional recommendations on independence are losing a differentiation trait since they 
are close to be present in all companies. Therefore, the validity for measurement of 
governance is likely to decrease in the future. 
Remuneration issues are among the main drivers of disparities in compliance. The code 
issuer evolved the code so as to provide more information on this regard. In fact, as we 
mentioned, recent studies for the case of Spain revealed arguably behavior in the listed 
companies, what may suggest that the lack of compliance might be driven for those aiming 
to hide or avoiding to put remuneration, specially in the context of overall company 
performance. In this regard, this construct is valid for measure governance in the firm. 
The double role of information leads to differences between companies. The flow of 
information facilitates a better functioning of the board, increasing its efficiency. On the 
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other hand, the flow, and disclosure of information is essential for the best purpose of other 
mechanisms like the General Meeting, or the markets, or other stakeholders in general. 
Finally, overall outcome from code compliance shows that 1) Spanish listed firms have 
made an effort in all the aspects, 2) they are still far from a complete accomplishment, 3) 
the recommendations pushed some changes in trends, 4) ownership and cultural context 
sets a quite influent frame. 
We think that the codes are certainly playing a good role spreading good practices, and that 
role might have effects on performance when challenge companies in their compliance. 
The virtue, in our opinion, is to keep doing that over time. The results of compliance 
should reflect non-dangerous differences, that is, those that go beyond the protection of 
shareholders’ interests. Accordingly, a great number of recommendations are likely to stay 
at the code though they are always (or almost always) met. In our opinion, the code issuer 
should push disclosure in those soft, hardly measurable elements. This would lead more to 
a better government than to a good code compliance. In this sense, codes would act as 
indices of corporate governance. 
As a result of reviewing the Spanish Codes we may take different angles for the future 
research. Since a great number of recommendations are stated under the Agency Theory 
perspective, differential compliance will tend to rise under other views. 
Although cross-sectional studies could be performed to analyze the impact of the variables 
on a given year, this kind of researches may lead to inconsistent outcomes or, at least, to 
misleading interpretations. On one hand, some relevant factors may be hidden, and in other 
hand corporate governance issues should consider time, and very often it is spread over 
the, by definition, short-term cross-sectional analysis. Then, a longitudinal study might be 
worthwhile. In that case, it would be necessary to consider comparable information and 
context. For that aim, the table we used to compare recommendations topics could useful 
for performing longitudinal analyses staged in three periods of time (2007-2012, 2013-
2014, and 2015-2016). 
These analyses we performed and their results could help to determine whether the degree 
of compliance of the provisions as a whole, and those referred to specific matters, are 
associated or not to the firm performance. The validation of different constructs underlying 
the recommendations makes them potential components of a good measure of governance. 
We make this remark, since we are not just pointing out to a few variables but considering 
a wider range of corporate governance compliance across periods. 
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Besides, since the study of human capital variables contained in codes of good governance 
provisions is partial, as it is shown by the Cronbach’s Alpha in the potential limitation of 
capturing the underlying construct, it would be necessary to compute the data of every 
director in each one of the companies for elaborating further analyses. Data on training 
programs, concrete selection policies is still not available for study, but some human 
capital variables could be obtained from corporate governance reports that are produced by 
listed firms but they use to be unstructured and are embedded in wider purpose description.  
Diversity concept is being approached in a wider way in the last version of the code, and 
included in human capital variables that could be highly resourceful to perform further 
researches. Other intellectual frameworks could easier support this perspective, such as 
Resource Dependence Theory. 
The study of governance of family business non-listed companies under the later 
frameworks may lead to attractive conclusions. The use of family councils might provide 
some light to governance.  
Despite many studies address corporate governance and board of directors in listed 
companies, it might be useful to broaden the scope to Spanish non-listed companies. The 
number, weight and presence of them in the economic structure could help to create a 
culture of good governance. Medium and big non-listed companies could benefit from 
these researches. For small companies, the problem of access to data would be greater in 
most cases due to associated costs and the lack of a proper framework for easily reporting 
this information. Nevertheless, the study of governance in technological startups could be 
interesting. The potential growth of these companies configures a good angle of study. 
Although codes, recommendations, and report forms vary depending on the country, they 
all may have a common base of principles. Hence, it could be useful to compare those 
variables that are shared among different companies from various global areas and use 
validation of constructs techniques as employed in this article. 
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Figure 1: Hypotheses summary across years 	
		 	
Recommendations linked to Agency Theory are always met  
The degree of compliance of recommendations validates the 
existence of the Agency Theory constructs on compensation in 
Spanish Corporate Governance Codes  
The degree of compliance of recommendations validates the 
existence of AT and ST based constructs on internal controls in 
Spanish Corporate Governance Codes  
The degree of compliance of recommendations validates the 
existence of RDT based constructs on human capital in 
Spanish Corporate Governance Codes  
The degree of compliance of recommendations validates the 
existence of ST based constructs in Spanish Corporate 
Governance Codes 
2007 - 2012 2013 - 2014 2015 - 2016 
✓ ✓ ✓ 
✓ ✓ ✓ 
✓ ✓ ✓ 
✓ ✓ 
✓ 
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APPENDIX 
Appendix Table 1: Olivencia Commission Composition 
Chairman Manuel Olivencia Ruiz Professor of Law 
Vice-Chairman Luis Ramallo García Former MP 
Secretary Antonio J. Alonso Ureba Professor of Law 
Members 
Pedro Ballvé Lantero Chairman Campofrío 
Eduardo Bueno Campos Professor of Management. Central 
Bank of Spain Director 
José Mª López de Letona y 
Núñez del Pino 
Former Central Bank of Spain 
Governor. Director  
Cándido Paz Ares Professor of Law 
Víctor Pérez Díaz Professor of Sociology, ASP Director 
Enrique Piñel López AEB Counsel 
Jesús Platero Paz  
 
 
Appendix Table 2: List of Recommendations. Olivencia Code 
Number Recommendation 
1 
That the Board of Directors should expressively assume that its core mission is the 
general function of supervision, exercise without delegation the due responsibilities that it 
implies, and establish a catalog of matters reserved for its knowledge 
2 
That a reasonable number of independent directors joins the board, being their profile 
according to prestige and absence of links to the executive team and the significant 
shareholders 
3 
That the Board composition includes a broad majority of external directors, and the ratio 
independent to proprietary considers the relationship between significant ownership 
capital and the rest 
4 That the Board adjusts its size to achieve a effective and participative functioning. As an starting point it could vary from five to fifteen members 
5 That in case of Chairman-CEO at the company, the Board adopts necessary caveats to diminish the risks associated to the concentration of power in one person 
6 That the Secretary takes a more relevant role, reinforcing its independence and stability, and highlighting his function of preserving legality in all board actions  
7 
That the executive committee, in case it exists, shows the same equilibrium between 
director types a in the Board, and that the relationship between the two organs has to be 
inspired by the principle of transparency, so as to the Board knows all discussed topics 
and decision taken in the Committee 
8 
That the Board compose a Control and Audit committee (only with external directors), 
for information and accounting control; an Nomination Committee, for selecting 
Directors and top executives; a Remuneration Committee, to determine and review 
remuneration policy; a Compliance Committee, to evaluate the governance system. 
9 
That the Board takes the necessary steps to secure availability of sufficient information, 
specifically elaborated and oriented to prepare board meetings, in advance, without any 
exception due to the nature or relevance of the information, except for the case of 
exceptional circumstances. 
10 That the Board should meet with the necessary frequency to ensure the adequate functioning of its activities and comply its mission; that the Chairman should encourage 
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Number Recommendation 
participation and free positioning of all directors; that the minutes should be carefully 
written; that the Board should be evaluated on the quality and efficiency of its deeds at 
least annually. 
11 
That the involvement of the Board in the selection and renewal of it members complies a 
formal and transparent procedure, from the reasoned proposal of the Nominations 
Committee 
12 That the corporate bylaws includes the obligation of resignation for directors in the cases that may lead to affect negatively the board functioning or the company reputation 
13 That the Board establishes a limit in the ages of the directors, that could be 65 years old for executive directors and the Chairman and more flexible for the rest 
14 
That it should be acknowledge the right to gather and obtain information and advise for 
the fulfilling of supervisory functions by any director, and that the adequate procedures to 
exercise this right should be implemented, including external advise in case of special 
circumstances 
15 
That the directors' remuneration policy (proposed, evaluated and reviewed by the 
Nominations Committee), meets the criteria of moderation, link to corporate 
performance, and individualized and detailed information 
16 
That the corporate bylaws specify the obligations coming from the diligence and loyalty 
of directors, specifically considering conflicts of interests, confidentiality, business 
opportunities and company's assets use. 
17 That the Board promotes the adoption of measures to extend loyalty duties to significant shareholders, specifying caveats for special transactions between those and the company 
18 
That the Board should mediate measures to provide transparency to the delegation of vote 
mechanism, and to foster communication between the company and its shareholders, and 
with the institutional investors in particular 
19 
That the Board, beyond meeting law provisions, should provide quick, precise and 
reliable information to the markets, specially as regard to the ownership structure, to 
substantial modifications of governance rules, to related transactions and to treasury stock 
20 That all financial reporting, besides de annual statements, should be elaborated with the same principles and practices, and verified by the Audit Committee 
21 
That the Board and the Audit Committee monitor situations that may risk the 
independence of external auditors, verifying the percentage of fees that their work implies 
for their revenue, and notifying professional services different from audit activities fees 
periodically. 
22 
That the Board strives to avoid qualifications in annual statements shown at the General 
Meeting, and, in case they exist, the Board and the external audit firm should clearly 
explain the contents and reach of them before the shareholders 
23 
That the Board includes corporate governance information in their annual reporting, 
providing reasonable explanation in case it doesn't meet the recommendations of this 
code 
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Appendix Table 3: Aldama Commission Composition 
Chairman Enrique de Aldama CEOE Vice-Chairman and Director at Repsol 
Vice-Chairman Carlos Bustelo García del Real Círculo de Empresarios 
Secretary José María Garrido Professor of Law, CNMV Counsel 
Members 
Alberto Bercovitz Professor of Law 
Jordi Canals IESE Business School Dean, PhD in 
Economics 
Federico Durán Professor of Law, Garrigues 
Alejandro Fernández De Araoz Schröeder and Electrolux Chairman 
Antonio Hernández Professor of Law. Repsol Vice-Chairman 
Juan Iranzo Professor of Economics, Director at CEOE 
Cándido Paz Ares Professor of Law, member of the Olivencia 
Special Commission 
Carlos Pérez De Bricio CEPSA Chairman, CEOE Vice-Chairman 
Víctor Pérez Díaz Professor of Sociology, ASP Director 
Miquel Roca Junyent Lawyer, Spanish Constitution author, former 
MP 
Fernando Sánchez Professor of Law 
Antonio Zoido Madrid Stock Exchange Chairman 
 
Appendix Table 4: Unified Code Commission Composition 
Chairman Manuel Conthe CNMV Chairman, former Secretary at the 
Ministry of Finance, former World Bank 
Managing Director 
Secretary Javier R. Pellitero CNMV Counsel 
Members 
Soledad Nuñez Secretary at the Ministry of Economy 
Vicente Salas Professor of Law 
Carmen Tejera Director at the Ministry of Economy, State 
Lawyer, former secretary at two state owned 
company boards (EFE, GIF)  
Jesús M. Caínzos Instituto de Consejeros Administradores, former 
BBVA Vice-Chairman 
José M. Garrido Professor of Law, former CNMV Counsel, 
Garrigues Director, Foro Europeo de Gobierno 
Corporativo 
Enrique Piñel AEB Counsel, Director at several Boards 
Cándido Paz Ares Professor of Law, member of the Olivencia Special 
Commission, Uría 
Aldo Ocese Instituto de Analistas Financieros 
José M. Gómez de Miguel Bank of Spain representative, Head of Division 
(FIB) 
Joaquín de Fuentes Head of Spanish State Lawyers. Former Director at 
Renfe and Telefonica Board of Directors 
Pilar Blanco Managing Director at the Ministry of Justice. 
Professor of Law. 
Ana M. Llopis Director at several Boards, former CEO at Open 
Bank, former MD at several companies. 
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Appendix Table 5: Unified Code Recommendation Item list 
Area Number Recommendation 
Bylaws and 
shareholders’ 
meeting 
1 Bylaw restrictions 
2 Listed companies from the same group 
3 General meeting powers 
4 Pre-circulation of general meeting proposals 
5 Separate voting 
6 Split votes 
The Board of 
Directors 
7 The corporate interest 
8 Board powers 
9 Size 
10 Functional structure 
11 Other external directors explained 
12 Ratio of proprietary to independent directors 
13 Sufficient number of independent directors 
14 Nature of directors explained 
15 Gender diversity 
16 Functions of chairman 
17 Chairman/CEO Duality 
18 The secretary 
19 Board proceedings 
20 Director absences 
21 Objection to proposals 
22 Regular evaluation 
23 Director information 
24 External advice 
25 New director induction courses 
26 Dedication 
Directors 
27 Director selection, appointment and renewal 
28 Disclosure of director particulars 
29 Rotation of independent directors 
30 Removal and resignation 
31 Removal of independent at the end of tenure 
32 Disclosure of circumstances harmful to the company's reputation 
33 Director opposition to proposals harmful to the corporate interest 
34 Reasons for resignation before end of tenure 
35 Remuneration approval and disclosure 
36 Delivery of shares, options or financial instruments solely to executives 
37 External directors remuneration 
38 Remuneration as % of earnings 
39 Technical controls on variable remuneration 
40 General meeting vote on remuneration statement 
41 Disclosure of individual remuneration 
Committees 
42 Executive committee membership 
43 Boards kept informed of executive committee business 
44 Supervision and control committee membership 
45 Internal codes of conduct overseen by supervision and control committees  
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46 Audit committee skills and experience  
47 Audit committee oversight of internal audit function  
48 Head of internal audit reporting to audit committee  
49 Risk management and control policy  
50 Audit committee functions  
51 Any employee or manager able to call audit committee meeting  
52 Audit committee pre-report to board  
53 Annual accounts presented without qualifications  
54 Nomination and Remuneration committee membership  
55 Nomination committee functions  
56 Nomination committee consulted on matters concerning executive directors  
57 Remuneration committee functions  
58 Remuneration committee consulted on matters concerning executive directors and senior officers  
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Appendix Table 6: Unified Code Recommendations list (Reformed in 2013) 
Number Recommendation 
1 Bylaw restrictions 
2 Listed companies from the same group 
3 General meeting powers 
4 Pre-circulation of general meeting proposals 
5 Separate voting 
6 Split votes 
7 The corporate interest 
8 Board powers 
9 Size 
10 Functional structure 
11 Ratio of proprietary to independent directors 
12 Sufficient number of independent directors 
13 Nature of directors explained 
14 Gender diversity 
15 Functions of chairman 
16 Chairman/CEO 
17 The secretary 
18 Board proceedings 
19 Director absences 
20 Objection to proposals 
21 Regular evaluation 
22 Director information 
23 External advice 
24 New director induction courses 
25 Dedication 
26 Director selection, appointment and renewal 
27 Disclosure of director particulars 
28 Removal and resignation 
29 Removal of independent at the end of tenure 
30 Disclosure of circumstances harmful to the company's reputation 
31 Director opposition to proposals harmful to the corporate interest 
32 Reasons for resignation before end of tenure 
33 Delivery of shares, options or financial instruments solely to executives 
34 External directors remuneration 
35 Remuneration as % of earnings 
36 Technical controls on variable remuneration 
37 Executive committee membership 
38 Boards kept informed of executive committee business 
39 Supervision and control committee membership 
40 Internal codes of conduct overseen by supervision and control committees  
41 Audit committee skills and experience  
42 Audit committee oversight of internal audit function  
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43 Head of internal audit reporting to audit committee  
44 Risk management and control policy  
45 Audit committee functions  
46 Any employee or manager able to call audit committee meeting  
47 Audit committee pre-report to board  
48 Annual accounts presented without qualifications  
49 Nomination and Remuneration committee membership  
50 Nomination committee functions  
51 Nomination committee consulted on matters concerning executive directors  
52 Remuneration committee functions  
53 Remuneration committee consulted on matters concerning executive directors and senior officers  
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Appendix Table 7: Spanish Good Governance Code Principles and Recommendations 
Area Number Principle Principle 
Number 
Recommendation 
General 
Arrangements 
1 In general, companies should avoid bylaw clauses whose underlying purpose is to hinder possible takeover bids 1 
2 
When various listed companies belong to the same group, they should 
take appropriate steps to safeguard the legitimate interests of all 
interested parties and to resolve conflicts of interest should they arise  
2 
3 
Companies should give clear information to the general meeting 
concerning their degree of compliance with Good Governance Code 
recommendations  
3 
4 
Listed companies should maintain a publicly disclosed policy for 
communication and contacts with shareholders, institutional investors 
and proxy advisors  
4 
5 
Boards should make limited use of the delegated power to issue shares 
or convertible securities without pre-emptive subscription rights and 
inform shareholders appropriately about such use  
5 
Shareholders' 
General 
Meeting 
6 The general meeting should be conducted according to principles of transparency and with appropriate information provided  6, 7, 8  
7 The company should aid shareholders in exercising their rights to attend and participate in general meetings in conditions of equality  9, 10 
8 The policy on general meeting attendance payments should be disclosed in full  11 
Board of 
Directors 
9 
The board of directors will be directly responsible individually and 
collectively for steering the company and supervising its management, 
with the shared goal of promoting the corporate interest  
12 
10 
The board of directors should have the optimal size to facilitate its 
efficient functioning, the participation of all members and agile 
decision-making. Director selection policy should seek a balance of 
knowledge, experience and gender in the board’s membership  
13, 14 
11 
The board of directors should have a balanced membership, with a 
large majority of non-executive directors and an appropriate mix of 
proprietary and independent directors, with the latter occupying, as a 
rule, at least half of board places  
15, 16, 17, 18, 19 
12 
The grounds for director removal or resignation should not impinge 
upon their freedom of judgment. They should protect the company’s 
name and reputation, allow for changing circumstances and ensure 
independent directors a stable mandate as long as they retain their 
independent status and are not in breach of their duties  
20, 21, 22, 23, 24 
13 
Directors should allocate sufficient time to the company to discharge 
their responsibilities effectively and to gain a solid grasp of the 
company’s business and the governance rules to which it is subject, 
taking part to this effect in induction and refresher courses organised 
by the company 
25 
14 
The board of directors should meet with the necessary frequency to 
properly perform its management and oversight functions with the 
attendance of all members or an ample majority. 
26, 27, 28 
15 
Directors should be equipped with sufficient information to operate 
effectively, and should be entitled to call on the company for any 
guidance they require  
29, 30, 31, 32 
16 
The chairman is responsible for the leadership and efficient running of 
the board. Where he or she is also a company executive, additional 
powers should be given to the lead independent director  
33, 34 
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Number 
Recommendation 
17 The work of the board secretary is to facilitate the efficient running of the board  35 
18 
The board should periodically evaluate its overall performance and 
that of its members and committees. This evaluation should be 
externally facilitated at least every three years  
36 
19 
The executive committee, where one exists, should have a 
composition mirroring that of the board of directors, and keep the 
board regularly informed of its decisions 
37, 38 
20 
As well as its legally defined functions, the audit committee should be 
formed by a majority of independent directors. Its members, 
particularly the chair- man, should be appointed with regard to their 
knowledge and experience in accounting, auditing or risk management 
matters, while its terms of reference should reinforce its remit, 
independence and scope 
39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 
44 
21 
The company should maintain a risk control and management function 
in the charge of an internal unit or department, supervised directly by 
the audit committee or, where appropriate, another dedicated board 
committee 
45, 46 
22 
As well as its legally defined functions, the nomination and 
remuneration committee, which in large cap companies should be split 
into two separate committees, should have a majority of independent 
members. Its members should be appointed with regard to their 
knowledge, skills and experience, while its terms of reference should 
reinforce its remit, independence and scope 
47, 48, 49, 50, 51 
23 
The membership and organisation of any committees established by 
the board under its powers of self-organisation should be similarly 
configured to those of mandatory committees 
52, 53 
24 
The company should deploy an appropriate corporate social 
responsibility pol- icy, as a non-delegable board power, and report 
transparently and in sufficient detail on its development, application 
and results  
54, 55 
25 
The remuneration of board members should suffice to attract and 
retain the right people and to sufficiently compensate them for the 
dedication, abilities and responsibilities that the post demands, but 
should not be so high as to compromise the independent judgment of 
non-executive directors. Remuneration policy should seek to further 
the corporate interest, while incorporating the necessary mechanisms 
to avoid excessive risk-taking or rewarding poor performance  
56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 
61, 62, 63,64 
 
  
Chapter 4: Board of Directors and Codes of Corporate Governance in Spain: Framework, 
Validity and Evolution 
	280 
 
Appendix Table 8: Good Governance Code (2015) Recommendations Definitions. 
Source: CNMV 
Number Recommendation 
1 
The bylaws of listed companies should not place an upper limit on the votes that can be cast 
by a single shareholder, or impose other obstacles to the take- over of the company by 
means of share purchases on the market 
2 
When a dominant and subsidiary company are both listed, they should provide detailed 
disclosure on:  
a) The activity they engage in and any business dealings between them, as well as between 
the listed subsidiary and other group companies. 
b) The mechanisms in place to resolve possible conflicts of interest. 
3 
During the annual general meeting the chairman of the board should verbally inform 
shareholders in sufficient detail of the most relevant aspects of the company’s corporate 
governance, supplementing the written information circulated in the annual corporate 
governance report. In particular:  
a) Changes taking place since the previous annual general meeting. 
b) The specific reasons for the company not following a given Good Governance Code 
recommendation, and any alternative procedures followed in its stead.  
4 
The company should draw up and implement a policy of communication and contacts with 
shareholders, institutional investors and proxy advisors that complies in full with market 
abuse regulations and accords equitable treatment to shareholders in the same position.  
This policy should be disclosed on the company’s website, complete with de- tails of how it 
has been put into practice and the identities of the relevant interlocutors or those charged 
with its implementation.  
5 
The board of directors should not make a proposal to the general meeting for the delegation 
of powers to issue shares or convertible securities without pre-emptive subscription rights 
for an amount exceeding 20% of capital at the time of such delegation. 
When a board approves the issuance of shares or convertible securities without pre-emptive 
subscription rights, the company should immediately post a report on its website explaining 
the exclusion as envisaged in company legislation 
6 
Listed companies drawing up the following reports on a voluntary or compulsory basis 
should publish them on their website well in advance of the annual general meeting, even if 
their distribution is not obligatory: 
a) Report on auditor independence. 
b) Reviews of the operation of the audit committee and the nomination and remuneration 
committee. 
c) Audit committee report on third-party transactions. 
d) Report on corporate social responsibility policy. 
7 The company should broadcast its general meetings live on the corporate website. 
8 
The audit committee should strive to ensure that the board of directors can present the 
company’s accounts to the general meeting without limitations or qualifications in the 
auditor’s report. In the exceptional case that qualifications exist, both the chairman of the 
audit committee and the auditors should give a clear account to shareholders of their scope 
and content. 
9 
The company should disclose its conditions and procedures for admitting share ownership, 
the right to attend general meetings and the exercise or delegation of voting rights, and 
display them permanently on its website. 
Such conditions and procedures should encourage shareholders to attend and exercise their 
rights and be applied in a non-discriminatory manner. 
10 
When an accredited shareholder exercises the right to supplement the agenda or submit new 
proposals prior to the general meeting, the company should: 
a) Immediately circulate the supplementary items and new proposals. 
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b) Disclose the model of attendance card or proxy appointment or remote voting form duly 
modified so that new agenda items and alternative proposals can be voted on in the same 
terms as those submitted by the board of directors. 
c) Put all these items or alternative proposals to the vote applying the same voting rules as 
for those submitted by the board of directors, with particular regard to presumptions or 
deductions about the direction of votes. 
d) After the general meeting, disclose the breakdown of votes on such supplementary items 
or alternative proposals. 
11 In the event that a company plans to pay for attendance at the general meeting, it should first establish a general, long-term policy in this respect. 
12 
The Board of Directors should perform its duties with unity of purpose and independent 
judgment, according the same treatment to all shareholders in the same position. It should be 
guided at all times by the company’s best interest, understood as the creation of a pro table 
business that promotes its sustainable success over time, while maximizing its economic 
value. 
In pursuing the corporate interest, it should not only abide by laws and regulations and 
conduct itself according to principles of good faith, ethics and respect for commonly 
accepted customs and good practices, but also strive to reconcile its own interests with the 
legitimate interests of its employees, suppliers, clients and other stakeholders, as well as 
with the impact of its activities on the broader community and the natural environment. 
13 
The board of directors should have an optimal size to promote its efficient functioning and 
maximise participation. The recommended range is accordingly between five and fifteen 
members. 
14 
The board of directors should approve a director selection policy that: 
a) Is concrete and verifiable; 
b) Ensures that appointment or re-election proposals are based on a prior analysis of the 
board’s needs; and 
c) Favours a diversity of knowledge, experience and gender. 
The results of the prior analysis of board needs should be written up in the nomination 
committee’s explanatory report, to be published when the general meeting is convened that 
will ratify the appointment and re-election of each director. 
The director selection policy should pursue the goal of having at least 30% of total board 
places occupied by women directors before the year 2020. 
The nomination committee should run an annual check on compliance with the director 
selection policy and set out its findings in the annual corporate governance report. 
15 
Proprietary and independent directors should constitute an ample majority on the board of 
directors, while the number of executive directors should be the minimum practical bearing 
in mind the complexity of the corporate group and the ownership interests they control. 
16 
The percentage of proprietary directors out of all non-executive directors should be no 
greater than the proportion between the ownership stake of the shareholders they represent 
and the remainder of the company’s capital. 
This criterion can be relaxed: 
a) In large cap companies where few or no equity stakes attain the legal threshold for 
significant shareholdings. 
b) In companies with a plurality of shareholders represented on the board but not otherwise 
related. 
17 
Independent directors should be at least half of all board members. 
However, when the company does not have a large market capitalization, or when a large 
cap company has shareholders individually or concertedly controlling over 30 percent of 
capital, independent directors should occupy, at least, a third of board places. 
18 
Companies should disclose the following director particulars on their web- sites and keep 
them regularly updated: 
a) Background and professional experience. 
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b) Directorships held in other companies, listed or otherwise, and other paid activities they 
engage in, of whatever nature. 
c) Statement of the director class to which they belong, in the case of proprietary directors 
indicating the shareholder they represent or have links with. 
d) Dates of their first appointment as a board member and subsequent re-elections. 
e) Shares held in the company, and any options on the same. 
19 
Following verification by the nomination committee, the annual corporate governance report 
should disclose the reasons for the appointment of proprietary directors at the urging of 
shareholders controlling less than 3 percent of capital; and explain any rejection of a formal 
request for a board place from shareholders whose equity stake is equal to or greater than 
that of others applying successfully for a proprietary directorship. 
20 
Proprietary directors should resign when the shareholders they represent dispose of their 
ownership interest in its entirety. If such shareholders reduce their stakes, thereby losing 
some of their entitlement to proprietary directors, the latters’ number should be reduced 
accordingly. 
21 
The board of directors should not propose the removal of independent directors before the 
expiry of their tenure as mandated by the bylaws, except where they find just cause, based 
on a proposal from the nomination committee. In particular, just cause will be presumed 
when directors take up new posts or responsibilities that prevent them allocating sufficient 
time to the work of a board member, or are in breach of their fiduciary duties or come under 
one of the disqualifying grounds for classification as independent enumerated in the 
applicable legislation. 
The removal of independent directors may also be proposed when a takeover bid, merger or 
similar corporate transaction alters the company’s capital structure, provided the changes in 
board membership ensue from the proportionality criterion set out in recommendation 16. 
22 
Companies should establish rules obliging directors to disclose any circumstance that might 
harm the organization’s name or reputation, tendering their resignation as the case may be, 
and, in particular, to inform the board of any criminal charges brought against them and the 
progress of any subsequent trial. 
The moment a director is indicted or tried for any of the offences stated in company 
legislation, the board of directors should open an investigation and, in light of the particular 
circumstances, decide whether or not he or she should be called on to resign. The board 
should give a reasoned account of all such determinations in the annual corporate 
governance report. 
23 
Directors should express their clear opposition when they feel a proposal submitted for the 
board’s approval might damage the corporate interest. In particular, independents and other 
directors not subject to potential conflicts of interest should strenuously challenge any 
decision that could harm the interests of shareholders lacking board representation. 
When the board makes material or reiterated decisions about which a director has expressed 
serious reservations, then he or she must draw the pertinent conclusions. Directors resigning 
for such causes should set out their reasons in the letter referred to in the next 
recommendation. 
The terms of this recommendation also apply to the secretary of the board, even if he or she 
is not a director. 
24 
Directors who give up their place before their tenure expires, through resignation or 
otherwise, should state their reasons in a letter to be sent to all members of the board. 
Whether or not such resignation is disclosed as a material event, the motivating factors 
should be explained in the annual corporate governance report. 
25 
The nomination committee should ensure that non-executive directors have sufficient time 
available to discharge their responsibilities effectively. 
The board of directors regulations should lay down the maximum number of company 
boards on which directors can serve. 
26 The board should meet with the necessary frequency to properly perform its functions, eight 
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times a year at least, in accordance with a calendar and agendas set at the start of the year, to 
which each director may propose the addition of initially unscheduled items. 
27 
Director absences should be kept to a strict minimum and quantified in the annual corporate 
governance report. In the event of absence, directors should delegate their powers of 
representation with the appropriate instructions. 
28 
When directors or the secretary express concerns about some proposal or, in the case of 
directors, about the company’s performance, and such concerns are not resolved at the 
meeting, they should be recorded in the minute book if the person expressing them so 
requests. 
29 
The company should provide suitable channels for directors to obtain the advice they need to 
carry out their duties, extending if necessary to external assistance at the company’s 
expense. 
30 Regardless of the knowledge directors must possess to carry out their duties, they should also be offered refresher programmes when circumstances so advise. 
31 
The agendas of board meetings should clearly indicate on which points directors must arrive 
at a decision, so they can study the matter beforehand or gather together the material they 
need. 
For reasons of urgency, the chairman may wish to present decisions or resolutions for board 
approval that were not on the meeting agenda. In such exceptional circumstances, their 
inclusion will require the express prior consent, duly minuted, of the majority of directors 
present. 
32 Directors should be regularly informed of movements in share ownership and of the views of major shareholders, investors and rating agencies on the company and its group. 
33 
The chairman, as the person charged with the efficient functioning of the board of directors, 
in addition to the functions assigned by law and the company’s bylaws, should prepare and 
submit to the board a schedule of meeting dates and agendas; organize and coordinate 
regular evaluations of the board and, where appropriate, the company’s chief executive 
officer; exercise leadership of the board and be accountable for its proper functioning; 
ensure that sufficient time is given to the discussion of strategic issues, and approve and 
review refresher courses for each director, when circumstances so advise. 
34 
When a lead independent director has been appointed, the bylaws or board of directors 
regulations should grant him or her the following powers over and above those conferred by 
law: chair the board of directors in the absence of the chairman or vice chairmen give voice 
to the concerns of non-executive directors; maintain contacts with investors and 
shareholders to hear their views and develop a balanced understanding of their concerns, 
especially those to do with the company’s corporate governance; and coordinate the 
chairman’s succession plan. 
35 
The board secretary should strive to ensure that the board’s actions and decisions are 
informed by the governance recommendations of the Good Governance Code of relevance 
to the company. 
36 
The board in full should conduct an annual evaluation, adopting, where necessary, an action 
plan to correct weakness detected in: 
a) The quality and efficiency of the board’s operation. 
b) The performance and membership of its committees. 
c) The diversity of board membership and competences. 
d) The performance of the chairman of the board of directors and the company’s chief 
executive. 
e) The performance and contribution of individual directors, with particular attention to the 
chairmen of board committees. 
The evaluation of board committees should start from the reports they send the board of 
directors, while that of the board itself should start from the report of the nomination 
committee. 
Every three years, the board of directors should engage an external facilitator to aid in the 
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evaluation process. This facilitator’s independence should be verified by the nomination 
committee. 
Any business dealings that the facilitator or members of its corporate group maintain with 
the company or members of its corporate group should be detailed in the annual corporate 
governance report. 
The process followed and areas evaluated should be detailed in the annual corporate 
governance report. 
37 
When an executive committee exists, its membership mix by director class should resemble 
that of the board. The secretary of the board should also act as secretary to the executive 
committee. 
38 
The board should be kept fully informed of the business transacted and decisions made by 
the executive committee. To this end, all board members should receive a copy of the 
committee’s minutes. 
39 
All members of the audit committee, particularly its chairman, should be appointed with 
regard to their knowledge and experience in accounting, auditing and risk management 
matters. A majority of committee places should be held by independent directors. 
40 
Listed companies should have a unit in charge of the internal audit function, under the 
supervision of the audit committee, to monitor the effectiveness of reporting and control 
systems. This unit should report functionally to the board’s non-executive chairman or the 
chairman of the audit committee. 
41 
The head of the unit handling the internal audit function should present an annual work 
programme to the audit committee, inform it directly of any incidents arising during its 
implementation and submit an activities report at the end of each year. 
42 
The audit committee should have the following functions over and above those legally 
assigned: 
1. With respect to internal control and reporting systems: 
a) Monitor the preparation and the integrity of the financial information prepared on the 
company and, where appropriate, the group, checking for compliance with legal 
provisions, the accurate demarcation of the consolidation perimeter, and the correct 
application of accounting principles. 
b) Monitor the independence of the unit handling the internal audit function; propose the 
selection, appointment, re-election and removal of the head of the internal audit service; 
propose the service’s budget; approve its priorities and work programmes, ensuring that it 
focuses primarily on the main risks the company is exposed to; receive regular report-
backs on its activities; and verify that senior management are acting on the findings and 
recommendations of its reports. 
c) Establish and supervise a mechanism whereby staff can report, confidentially and, if 
appropriate and feasible, anonymously, any significant irregularities that they detect in the 
course of their du- ties, in particular financial or accounting irregularities. 
2. With regard to the external auditor: 
a) Investigate the issues giving rise to the resignation of the external auditor, should this 
come about. 
b) Ensure that the remuneration of the external auditor does not com- promise its quality or 
independence. 
c) Ensure that the company notifies any change of external auditor to the CNMV as a 
material event, accompanied by a statement of any disagreements arising with the 
outgoing auditor and the reasons for the same. 
d) Ensure that the external auditor has a yearly meeting with the board in full to inform it of 
the work undertaken and developments in the company’s risk and accounting positions. 
e) Ensure that the company and the external auditor adhere to cur- rent regulations on the 
provision of non-audit services, limits on the concentration of the auditor’s business and 
other requirements concerning auditor independence. 
43 The audit committee should be empowered to meet with any company employee or 
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manager, even ordering their appearance without the presence of another senior officer. 
44 
The audit committee should be informed of any fundamental changes or corporate 
transactions the company is planning, so the committee can analyse the operation and report 
to the board beforehand on its economic conditions and accounting impact and, when 
applicable, the exchange ratio proposed. 
45 
Risk control and management policy should identify at least: 
a) The different types of financial and non-financial risk the company is exposed to 
(including operational, technological, financial, legal, social, environmental, political and 
reputational risks), with the inclusion under  financial or economic risks of contingent 
liabilities and other off- balance-sheet risks. 
b) The determination of the risk level the company sees as acceptable. 
c) The measures in place to mitigate the impact of identified risk events should they occur. 
d) The internal control and reporting systems to be used to control and manage the above 
risks, including contingent liabilities and off-balance- sheet risks. 
46 
Companies should establish a risk control and management function in the charge of one of 
the company’s internal department or units and under the direct supervision of the audit 
committee or some other dedicated board committee. This function should be expressly 
charged with the following responsibilities: 
a) Ensure that risk control and management systems are functioning correctly and, 
specifically, that major risks the company is exposed to are correctly identified, managed 
and quantified. 
b) Participate actively in the preparation of risk strategies and in key decisions about their 
management. 
c) Ensure that risk control and management systems are mitigating risks effectively in the 
frame of the policy drawn up by the board of directors. 
47 
Appointees to the nomination and remuneration committee – or of the nomination 
committee and remuneration committee, if separately constituted – should have the right 
balance of knowledge, skills and experience for the functions they are called on to discharge. 
The majority of their members should be independent directors. 
48 Large cap companies should operate separately constituted nomination and remuneration committees. 
49 
The nomination committee should consult with the company’s chairman and chief 
executive, especially on matters relating to executive directors. 
When there are vacancies on the board, any director may approach the nomination 
committee to propose candidates that it might consider suitable. 
50 
The remuneration committee should operate independently and have the following functions 
in addition to those assigned by law: 
a) Propose to the board the standard conditions for senior officer contracts. 
b) Monitor compliance with the remuneration policy set by the company. 
c) Periodically review the remuneration policy for directors and senior officers, including 
share-based remuneration systems and their application, and ensure that their individual 
compensation is proportionate to the amounts paid to other directors and senior officers in 
the company. 
d) Ensure that conflicts of interest do not undermine the independence of any external advice 
the committee engages. 
e) Verify the information on director and senior officers’ pay contained in corporate 
documents, including the annual directors’ remuneration statement. 
51 The remuneration committee should consult with the company’s chairman and chief executive, especially on matters relating to executive directors and senior officers. 
52 
The terms of reference of supervision and control committees should be set out in the board 
of directors regulations and aligned with those governing legally mandatory board 
committees as specified in the preceding sets of recommendations. They should include at 
least the following terms: 
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a) Committees should be formed exclusively by non-executive directors, with a majority of 
independents. 
b) They should be chaired by independent directors. 
c) The board should appoint the members of such committees with regard to the knowledge, 
skills and experience of its directors and each committee’s terms of reference; discuss 
their proposals and reports; and pro- vide report-backs on their activities and work at the 
first board plenary following each committee meeting. 
d) They may engage external advice, when they feel it necessary for the discharge of their 
functions. 
e) Meeting proceedings should be minuted and a copy made available to all board members. 
53 
The task of supervising compliance with corporate governance rules, internal codes of 
conduct and corporate social responsibility policy should be assigned to one board 
committee or split between several, which could be the audit committee, the nomination 
committee, the corporate social responsibility committee, where one exists, or a dedicated 
committee established ad hoc by the board under its powers of self-organization, with at the 
least the following functions: 
a) Monitor compliance with the company’s internal codes of conduct and corporate 
governance rules. 
b) Oversee the communication and relations strategy with shareholders and investors, 
including small and medium-sized shareholders. 
c) Periodically evaluate the effectiveness of the company’s corporate governance system, to 
confirm that it is fulfilling its mission to promote the corporate interest and catering, as 
appropriate, to the legitimate interests of remaining stakeholders. 
d) Review the company’s corporate social responsibility policy, ensuring that it is geared to 
value creation. 
e) Monitor corporate social responsibility strategy and practices and assess compliance in 
their respect. 
f) Monitor and evaluate the company’s interaction with its stakeholder groups. 
g) Evaluate all aspects of the non-financial risks the company is exposed to, including 
operational, technological, legal, social, environmental, political and reputational risks. 
h) Coordinate non-financial and diversity reporting processes in accordance with applicable 
legislation and international benchmarks. 
54 
The corporate social responsibility policy should state the principles or commitments the 
company will voluntarily adhere to in its dealings with stake- holder groups, specifying at 
least: 
a) The goals of its corporate social responsibility policy and the support instruments to be 
deployed. 
b) The corporate strategy with regard to sustainability, the environment and social issues. 
c) Concrete practices in matters relative to: shareholders, employees, clients, suppliers, 
social welfare issues, the environment, diversity, fiscal responsibility, respect for human 
rights and the prevention of illegal conducts. 
d) The methods or systems for monitoring the results of the practices referred to above, and 
identifying and managing related risks. 
e) The mechanisms for supervising non-financial risk, ethics and business conduct. 
f) Channels for stakeholder communication, participation and dialogue. 
g) Responsible communication practices that prevent the manipulation of information and 
protect the company’s honour and integrity. 
55 The company should report on corporate social responsibility developments in its directors’ report or in a separate document, using an internationally accepted methodology. 
56 
Director remuneration should be sufficient to attract individuals with the desired pro le and 
compensate the commitment, abilities and responsibility that the post demands, but not so 
high as to compromise the independent judgment of non-executive directors. 
57 Variable remuneration linked to the company and the director’s performance, the award of 
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shares, options or any other right to acquire shares or to be remunerated on the basis of share 
price movements, and membership of long-term savings schemes such as pension plans 
should be confined to executive directors. 
The company may consider the share-based remuneration of non-executive directors 
provided they retain such shares until the end of their mandate. This condition, however, 
will not apply to shares that the director must dis- pose of to defray costs related to their 
acquisition. 
58 
In the case of variable awards, remuneration policies should include limits and technical 
safeguards to ensure they reflect the professional performance of the beneficiaries and not 
simply the general progress of the markets or the company’s sector, or circumstances of that 
kind. 
In particular, variable remuneration items should meet the following conditions: 
a) Be subject to predetermined and measurable performance criteria that factor the risk 
assumed to obtain a given outcome. 
b) Promote the long-term sustainability of the company and include non-financial criteria 
that are relevant for the company’s long-term value, such as compliance with its internal 
rules and procedures and its risk control and management policies. 
c) Be focused on achieving a balance between the delivery of short, medium and long-term 
objectives, such that performance-related pay re- wards ongoing achievement, maintained 
over sufficient time to appreciate its contribution to long-term value creation. This will 
ensure that performance measurement is not based solely on one-off, occasional or 
extraordinary events. 
59 A major part of variable remuneration components should be deferred for a long enough period to ensure that predetermined performance criteria have effectively been met. 
60 Remuneration linked to company earnings should bear in mind any qualifications stated in the external auditor’s report that reduce their amount. 
61 A major part of executive directors’ variable remuneration should be linked to the award of shares or financial instruments whose value is linked to the share price. 
62 
Following the award of shares, share options or other rights on shares de- rived from the 
remuneration system, directors should not be allowed to transfer a number of shares 
equivalent to twice their annual fixed remuneration, or to exercise the share options or other 
rights on shares for at least three years after their award. 
The above condition will not apply to any shares that the director must dis- pose of to defray 
costs related to their acquisition. 
63 
Contractual arrangements should include provisions that permit the company to reclaim 
variable components of remuneration when payment was out of step with the director’s 
actual performance or based on data subsequently found to be misstated. 
64 
Termination payments should not exceed a fixed amount equivalent to two years of the 
director’s total annual remuneration and should not be paid until the company confirms that 
he or she has met the predetermined performance criteria. 
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Appendix Table 9:  Corporate Governance Codes' Recommendations topics, 
equivalences by year 
For each recommendation topic we show its recommendation number in each reporting year 
 
N Recommendation Topic 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
1 Corporate Bylaws voting limitations /restrictions 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
2 Listed companies in the same group disclosure 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
3 General Meeting powers 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3   
4 Pre-circulation of general meetings proposals 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4   
5 Separate voting 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5   6 Split votes 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6   
7 
Unity of purpose and independent 
judgment, good faith, ethics, good 
practices corporate interest and 
shareholders’ interest reconciliation 
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 12 12 
8 Board powers 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8   9 Size 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 13 13 
10 Functional structure 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10   11 Other external directors explained 11 11 11 11 11 11       
12 Ratio of proprietary to independent directors 12 12 12 12 12 12 11 11 15 15 
13 Sufficient number of independent directors 13 13 13 13 13 13 12 12 17 17 
14 Nature of directors explained 14 14 14 14 14 14 13 13   
15 Gender diversity 15 15 15 15 15 15 14 14 14 14 
16 Chairman functions 16 16 16 16 16 16 15 15 33 33 
17 Chairman-CEO 17 17 17 17 17 17 16 16   18 The secretary 18 18 18 18 18 18 17 17   19 Board proceedings 19 19 19 19 19 19 18 18   20 Director absences 20 20 20 20 20 20 19 19 27 27 
21 Objection to proposals 21 21 21 21 21 21 20 20   22 Regular evaluation 22 22 22 22 22 22 21 21 36 36 
23 Director information 23 23 23 23 23 23 22 22   24 External advice 24 24 24 24 24 24 23 23 29 29 
25 New director induction courses 25 25 25 25 25 25 24 24   26 Dedication 26 26 26 26 26 26 25 25 25  
27 Director selection, appointment and renewal 27 27 27 27 27 27 26 26   
28 
Public information on directors’ 
background and experience, paid 
activities, other board seats, first 
appointment and re-election dates, 
shares held 
28 28 28 28 28 28 27 27 18 18 
29 Rotation of independent directors 29 29 29 29 29 29       
30 Removal and resignation 30 30 30 30 30 30 28 28   
31 Removal of independent at the end of tenure 31 31 31 31 31 31 29 29   
32 Disclosure of circumstances harmful to the company's reputation 32 32 32 32 32 32 30 30   
33 Director opposition to proposals harmful to the corporate interest 33 33 33 33 33 33 31 31 23 23 
34 Reasons for resignation before end of tenure 34 34 34 34 34 34 32 32   
35 Remuneration approval and disclosure 35 35 35 35 35 35       
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36 Delivery of shares, options or financial instruments solely to executives 36 36 36 36 36 36       
37 External directors remuneration 37 37 37 37 37 37 34 34   38 Remuneration as % of earnings 38 38 38 38 38 38 35 35   
39 Technical controls on variable remuneration 39 39 39 39 39 39 36 36   
40 General meeting vote on remuneration statement 40 40 40 40 40 40       
41 Disclosure of individual remuneration 41 41 41 41 41 41       42 Executive committee membership 42 42 42 42 42 42 37 37 37 37 
43 Boards kept informed of executive committee business 43 43 43 43 43 43 38 38 38 38 
44 Supervision and control committee membership 44 44 44 44 44 44 39 39   
45 Internal codes of conduct overseen by supervision and control committees  45 45 45 45 45 45 40 40   
46 Audit committee skills and experience  46 46 46 46 46 46 41 41 39 39 
47 Audit cttee. oversight of internal audit function  47 47 47 47 47 47 42 42 40 40 
48 Head of internal audit reporting to audit committee  48 48 48 48 48 48 43 43 41 41 
49 Risk management and control policy  49 49 49 49 49 49 44 44 45 45 
50 Audit committee functions  50 50 50 50 50 50 45 45   
51 Any employee or manager able to call audit committee meeting  51 51 51 51 51 51 46 46   
52 Audit committee pre-report to board  52 52 52 52 52 52 47 47   
53 Annual accounts presented without qualifications  53 53 53 53 53 53 48 48   
54 Nom. & remun. cttee. membership  54 54 54 54 54 54 49 49 47 47 
55 Nomination committee functions  55 55 55 55 55 55 50 50   
56 Nomination committee consulted on matters concerning executive directors  56 56 56 56 56 56 51 51 49 49 
57 Remun. committee functions  57 57 57 57 57 57 52 52   
58 
Remun. committee consulted on 
matters concerning executive directors 
and senior officers  
58 58 58 58 58 58 53 53 51 51 
59 
Variable remuneration through shares, 
options, or other financial instruments 
should be confined to executive 
directors 
         33 33 57 57 
60 
Board duty of information at general 
meeting on corporate governance 
matters 
           3 3 
61 
Communication and contact to 
shareholders policy implementation 
and disclosure at company’s website 
           4 4 
62 
Board limitation power of issuance of 
securities without pre-emptive 
subscription rights at 20% 
           5 5 
63 
Duty of publishing reports in the 
website in advance of the general 
meeting 
           6 6 
64 Live web broadcasting of the general meeting at the company’s website            7 7 
65 
Presentation of company’s accounts 
without limitations or qualifications at 
the general meeting 
           8 8 
66 Permanent disclosure of conditions            9 9 
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and procedures for admitting share 
ownership, the right to attend general 
meetings and the exercise or 
delegation of voting rights at the 
website 
67 
Duties of the company before the right 
of supplement the agenda or submit 
new proposals prior to the general 
meeting 
           10 10 
68 Long-term policy for general meeting paid attendance            11 11 
69 Director selection policy            14 14 
70 Proportion between proprietary and non-executive directors            16 16 
71 
Disclosure of the reason for 
appointment proprietary director by 
shareholders controlling less than 3% 
           19 19 
72 Proprietary directors resignation upon disposal of ownership            20 20 
73 
Not to propose removal of independent 
directors before the expiry of their 
mandate unless just cause 
           21 21 
74 
Criminal charges and trials 
information to the board and 
subsequent actions 
           22 22 
75 Board meetings minimum: 8 a year            26 26 
76 Recording in the minute book of not resolved concerns            28 28 
77 
Explanation of reasons for resignation 
before the tenure expires through letter 
to all directors 
           24 24 
78 Offer of refresher knowledge program to directors            30 30 
79 
Agendas of board meetings clearly 
showing points of decision and given 
in advance 
           31 31 
80 
Information on movements in share 
ownership, views of major 
shareholders, investors and rating 
agencies should be given to directors 
regularly 
           32 32 
81 Additional powers of lead independent director            34 34 
82 
The board secretary should strive to 
ensure that the board’s actions and 
decisions are informed by the 
governance recommendations of the 
Good Governance Code of relevance 
to the company. 
           35 35 
83 Additional functions of the audit committee            42 42 
84 Comisión auditoría pueda convocar a cualquier empleado o directivo            43 43 
85 
Comisión auditoría tenga información 
sobre modificaciones estructurales o 
corporativas 
           44 44 
86 Existencia función de control y gestión de riesgos            46 46 
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87 Comisión de nombramientos y de retribuciones separadas            48 48 
88 Funciones adicionales de la comisión retribuciones            50 50 
89 
Que las reglas de las comisiones de 
supervisión y control sean consistentes 
con las del resto de comisiones 
obligatorias 
           52 52 
90 
Supervisión cumplimiento reglas gob. 
corp., códigos internos conducta y 
política RSC 
           53 53 
91 CSR policy contents            54 54 
92 CSR information on management report or special report            55 55 
93 
Retribución adecuada pero que no 
comprometa independencia de los no 
ejecutivos 
           56 56 
94 Variable remuneration linked to professional personal performance            58 58 
95 Variable remuneration deferral            59 59 
96 
Remuneration linked to earnings 
should consider any qualifications 
made by the auditors 
           60 60 
97 
Major part of executive directors’ 
variable remunerations linked to share 
price through shares or financial 
instruments 
           61 61 
98 
Limits to transmission of shares, share 
options or other rights derived from 
remuneration system 
           62 62 
99 Claw-back clauses            63 63 
100 
Two year remuneration limit on 
termination payments upon met 
criteria 
           64 64 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CODES OF GOOD 
GOVERNANCE AND 
PERFORMANCE IN SPANISH 
LISTED FIRMS 
 
ABSTRACT 
Codes of good governance have been widely used in many countries to spread best 
practice in corporate governance. Codes used to provide a group of recommendations to 
check the compliance and the adoption of the corporate governance principles. Based on 
those recommendations, we analyze the relation between the degree of compliance and the 
performance in Spanish listed firms in period 2007-2016. We aim to enlighten whether the 
outcomes follow the effort made by firms in this respect, in a time span with three different 
sets of recommendations that were originated by successive code of good governance 
modifications, deepening in the relationship through the analysis of past compliance. We 
also found interesting results considering the size of the firms, and the degree of 
compliance of recommendations related to human capital, that may serve for future code 
developments as well as for companies governance policies. 
 
KEYWORDS  
Board, corporate governance, codes of good governance, degree of compliance, 
performance, human capital. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The research on different topics of corporate governance has been increasing over the last 
decades. From an initial conception on baseline agreement on the meaning of governance 
referring to the development of governing styles (Stoker, 1998) and the creation of a non-
imposed structure that results from influence governing actors (Kooiman, 1993), this 
subject became a research subject that was approached from many angles: law, accounting, 
finance, strategy, etc. In fact, many studies were published in journals like Corporate 
Governance: An international Journal,  Journal of Business Ethics, Journal of Corporate 
Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, Business Lawyer, Journal of Business Finance 
and Accounting, Strategic Management Journal, Academy of Management Journal, 
Journal of Business Research or the Journal of Management Studies. Thus, the Web of 
Science main collection database gathers over 3,000 articles written on topics related to 
this specific field. 
Corporate Governance was also developed in practice encompassing various roles that 
were mainly originated in the agency theory. Control and supervision have driven most of 
the boards’ execution since their creation although other roles have been addressed by 
companies once the former ones were secured. Despite this, the need of improving 
governance was continuously fostered by the demands of companies’ stakeholders and the 
rising number of corporate scandals (e.g. Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, HealthSouth, Fannie 
Mae, AIG, in the US; Parmalat, Swissair in Europe; or HIH Insurance in Australia).  
On the scholars’ side, a great number of studies tried to analyze the boards of directors, the 
differences that they might have, so as to link them to the way companies perform or fulfill 
expected roles. The differences that any researcher would like to observe are those related 
to the behavior. Since it is not easily approachable, the empirical work focused on 
differences that may be quantified out of external observations, and that might lead to link 
to underlying differences in terms of behavior (Adams, Hermalin, & Weisbach, 2010). In 
this context, a key tool for improving governance in organizations were the Codes of Good 
Governance. In the aim of providing a highest degree of transparency and avoiding 
negative governance issues, Codes were built in many countries channeling these demands 
across different companies on the same country, and sharing provisions with other 
globalized geographies. The Cadbury Code, issued in UK in 1992 took the lead to 
subsequent codes in France (Vienot Report, 1995), the Netherlands (Peters Report, 1997), 
and Spain (Olivencia Report, 1998). 
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But the above-mentioned scandals lead to a peak in the issuing of codes across the world in 
2002. The second peak was reached after the financial crisis, which led to numerous 
revisions and new issuances (Cuomo, Mallin, & Zattoni, 2016). So, codes of good 
governance have also played a key role in the evolution of the research. The demand of 
information, though in many cases was voluntary, helped to obtain valuable information on 
corporate governance. In fact, companies’ reports provided useful data that sourced 
researches on the field. Literature used the information like the one provided through these 
channels so as to study particular topics on corporate governance and, in some cases try to 
link them to performance, such as board size (Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2008; De Andres, 
Azofra, & Lopez, 2005; Eisenberg, Sundgren, & Wells, 1998; Yermack, 1996a), 
composition (Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003; Erhardt, Werbel, & Shrader, 2003; 
Hermalin & Weisbach, 2003; Pearce & Zahra, 1992) or ownership structure (La Porta, 
Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). In some cases the 
authors even claim to analyze the whole code or corporate governance, but they just focus 
in a subset of recommendations or variables (Bebchuk, Cohen, & Ferrell, 2004; Bhagat & 
Bolton, 2008; Black, de Carvalho, Khanna, Kim, & Yurtoglu, 2017; Gompers, Ishii, & 
Metrick, 2003; Shaukat & Trojanowski, 2018). To our knowledge, there is no research that 
consider the whole set of provisions, considering partial compliance, for the case of Spain, 
and taking into account different Codes over time. Therefore, it is worthwhile to 
understand whether the degree of compliance shown in the information provided by the 
code has an impact on firm performance. 
We analyzed corporate governance compliance data from Spanish listed firms aiming to 
know whether the variables that were introduced trough corporate governance codes were 
actually effective in terms of firm performance [and the other objectives set for the code]. 
In this respect, we took the information regarding the compliance of each corporate 
governance recommendation. The companies were analyzed over an interesting period. 
The Aldama report configured a restructured recommendation set in 2006, and we take the 
data from the following year to 2016. Ten years of firm observations that covered three 
different sets of recommendations were established during that time. We found a positive 
relationship between the degree of compliance of recommendations and the firm 
performance. Besides, the positioning within the level of compliance and the size of the 
firms have a key role in this link, whereas past performances and human capital 
recommendations did not lead to conclusive statements. 
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This article is composed of four further sections. After this introduction, in the following 
section, we review the literature on codes and corporate governance compliance. 
Afterwards, we briefly describe how the Spanish Good Governance Code evolved as 
previous and necessary step to formulate the hypotheses. Then, we describe the 
methodology we used to carry out the analysis. Subsequently, we show the results we 
obtained and, finally, we point out the conclusions and future lines of research on this 
topic.  
 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Literature review 
According to scholars and legislators, codes of good governance are structured so as to 
improve governance of firms through a set of recommendations. Following existing studies 
at the time, codes tried to address prevailing deficiencies and problems of governance, and 
have the objective of improving accountability and governance as a whole. They usually 
set up a wide-ranging list of indications on topics such as the board (e.g. board 
composition), relationship to shareholders, disclosure and transparency, directors (e.g. 
appointment, dismissal, remuneration). Codes are supposed to complete other mechanisms 
such as legislation and markets when they fail to protect shareholders’ rights (Aguilera & 
Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004).  
The origins of the first code go back to 1978 in the US, although it was not issued with that 
shape. Just a few new codes were issued in the following decade. In 1992, The Cadbury 
Report was released and it triggered a fast growing movement on corporate governance 
codes adoption across many countries. 
Codes were voluntary by definition, structured in a non-binding way, using widely the  
‘comply or explain’ principle (Haxhi & Aguilera, 2015), so as to allow listed companies  a 
suitable market oriented environment that have traditionally tended to respond to 
recommendations. Almost all countries that issued codes addressed to all listed companies. 
However, there were some developed for specific types of companies, financial institutions 
or NGOs. 
Compliance adoption increased over time although firms differed in path and explanations 
(MacNeil & Li, 2006). For instance, although in the UK almost all the listed companies 
complied with recommendations before 1999 (Weir & Laing, 2000), they were studied 
over the following changes in the code (Pass, 2006). 
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Some authors classify codes according to the issuer (Aguilera & Cuervo-Cazurra, 2004) 
identify six categories: (a) Stock Exchange, (b) Government, (c) Directors’ Association, 
(d) Managers’ Association, (e) Professional Association, (f) Investors Association. Each 
one has advantages and disadvantages in terms of pressure to adoption, isomorphism, and 
endorsement. In the case of Spain, Government and Managers’ Association elaborated 
different codes.  
Legal tradition adds relevant features to codes. Two main traditions are often identified in 
building legal systems. The common-law system and civil-law system. The first system 
was adopted in the UK, the US, and other English-influenced countries. On the opposite, 
the civil-law system was adopted in the continental Europe. We think that when the code 
becomes government-steered recommendations become covered legal request. When 
Government Code follows the one set up by Managers’ there is a faster adoption amongst 
requested firms and differential impact is diminished. This would be a motive that supports 
the lack of impact on performance once a certain level of compliance is reached. 
The study of different topics related to codes is spread for the case of many countries. The 
case for Portuguese firms was analyzed (Alves & Mendes, 2004), using as units of analysis 
all the recommendations and sets and subsets of recommendations, in a dichotomous 
classification of compliance. They found positive association between the degree of 
compliance and the return, from 1998 to 2001. 
The reaction of the stock market to the introduction of best practices codes was studied for 
the case of Spanish listed firms (Fernández-Rodríguez, Gómez-Ansón, & Cuervo-García, 
2004). As the title pointed out, the work focused on the short-term effect. They utilized the 
CNMV (Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores) as a valid source of data of listed 
firms over a period of three years. They found positive association between announcement 
of adoption of recommendations in the Olivencia Code of Best practice and abnormal 
returns in the financial markets. Earnings manipulation and code effectiveness was also 
studied from a survey of Spanish listed companies, finding positive effects of the existence 
and composition of the nominations committee (Osma & Noguer, 2007). 
The level of compliance was also studied in the case of German companies. Whereas some 
focused in a set of recommendations (Werder, Talaulicar, & Kolat, 2005), others aimed to 
the whole list (Goncharov, Werner, & Zimmermann, 2006). The former pointed out the 
role of the company size and help to support the idea of the importance of soft law as a 
proper way to spread best practices amongst firms. The later used deviations from the year 
median as a way to value the degree of compliance in each recommendation. (Talaulicar & 
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Werder, 2008) and made also an interesting contribution trying to find patterns of code 
recommendation observance in those 24 recommendations that were considered critical 
(with a level of compliance under 80%). This characterization may help supporting a 
grouping in the level of compliance. 
A cross-section study for Danish listed firms (Rose, 2016). This study found a positive 
relationship between ROE/ROA and Danish firm total corporate governance ‘comply or 
explain’ disclosure scores. For this goal, the author suggested four categories to classify 
compliance: complies, complies poorly, explains and explains poorly. 
In the case of UK, besides the already mentioned works, a longitudinal study was made for 
the case of UK listed firms from 1999 to 2008 (Shaukat & Trojanowski, 2018). In this 
work, they found a positive association between the board governance index construct they 
made and the operational performance of the firms. And Italian firms were studied from 
2000 to 2008, checking the relationship between seven variables and corporate 
performance (Abatecola, Caputo, Mari, & Poggesi, 2012).  
Through these studies, researches usually tried to relate a subset of variables that were at 
the code recommendations to the performance of the company and, to our knowledge, 
there were no variations in the number of considered when performing a longitudinal 
analysis. 
Other way of approach the issue was performed through indices. The construction of 
indexes has been established as a way to analyze this type of relationship. Thus, the 
majority of the authors build indexes on the basis of some provisions obtained from the 
demanded recommendations at the codes. The utilization of indices as an object of study 
has been also approached. A constructed Governance Index to proxy the level of 
shareholders rights and link it to equity prices in several investment strategies and found a 
positive relationship  was developed (Gompers et al., 2003). This index was built from 
governance characteristics from 1,000 firms in the US compiled by the Investor 
Responsibility Research Center (it is noticeable that the aim of this institution against 
takeover defenses bias the racking items in favor of defensive tactics-related items).  
There had also been researches that had argued against existence of a consistent relation 
between the governance indexes and the corporate performance, setting the environment 
and context of each firm as the main factors to determine the most effective governance 
(Bhagat & Bolton, 2008). Although there were other angles to study this topic, it is 
remarkable how authors deferred trying to agree on whether the degree of compliance in 
positively related to operating performance (measured by Return on Assets). Thus, while 
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Bauer, Guenster and Otten (2004) found it negatively associated, others revisited the 
relationship (Bauwhede, 2009), with opposite outcomes. Since the Codes 
recommendations deal with different types of functions and aspects, gravitating around the 
central role of the board of directors, it could be discussed whether the recommendations 
included in codes can be equally weighted or not for the purpose of the index construction. 
We agreed with those in favor (Bebchuk, Cohen, & Ferrell, 2009; Gompers et al., 2003; 
Shaukat & Trojanowski, 2018), mainly because we are treating the factor as a whole. 
 
2.2. Hypotheses  
Given the existing literature research, this article aims to understand and deepen in the 
research gap on the relationship between the degree of compliance and the firm 
performance. On one hand, financial performance is relatively easy to measure through 
different variables. But the relationship with the degree of compliance and performance 
has not been sufficiently explained, because, in most cases and providing the changes over 
a wide period of time, the whole set of recommendations was not considered and applied 
to a single market, and the degree of compliance skipped the partial compliance status. 
Besides, we want to elaborate in the implications of that relationship through the analysis 
of the past degree of compliance, the degree of compliance in those recommendations that 
are related to human capital and the relative size of the firms.. 
Although there is a discussion on whether codes should eventually become laws, there is a 
consensus on taking the compliance of several disclosures stated at the codes as a sign for 
the markets, for the investors, that impacts firms’ performance. Investor tolerance might 
mitigate some non-compliance (MacNeil & Li, 2006), but the fact of reporting such a case 
to regulators is always relevant and may lead to immediate effect in valuation, financing, 
even without an actual fine or investigation. The issue, then, is whether degree of 
compliance of code’s recommendations becomes beneficial for the company in the long 
run, despite the costs associate to compliance disclosure, which might be diminished 
through improving internal control systems (Sneller & Langendijk, 2007). This proposition 
goes beyond considering just a group or subset of recommendations (Alves & Mendes, 
2004; Bebchuk et al., 2009; Karpoff, Schonlau, & Wehrly, 2017) and, at the same time, it 
takes from previous researches the foundations of the relationship between some 
provisions and firm performance. Studies gave a positive sign to that relationship. Thus, 
the first hypothesis, and starting point of our research, gravitates around the possible 
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association between the firm performance and the degree of compliance of the 
recommendations provided in the code. Therefore we propose our first hypothesis: 
H1: The degree of compliance of the recommendations of the code is positively associated 
with the firm performance of the Spanish listed firms. 
Some authors found a lagged effect in a number of elements such as board composition 
(Baysinger & Butler, 1985). Considering the lag effect, it might also help to prevent 
endogeneity (Shaukat & Trojanowski, 2018). We think that, since almost all 
recommendations aim to provide the markets with right information through transparency 
and disclosure, they are published during the financial year. Some of the amendments and 
corrections are also required to be communicated immediately to the regulation agency in 
Spain (CNMV), who can take immediate action to ensure its values: publish the issue at 
the website, suspend the trading of the company in stock markets, etc. Therefore, the 
foreseen perception of accomplishment is mainly derived from current actions and past 
degree of compliance does not imply a positive association with financial performance in 
the present, and if it happens it will be not significant, leading to inconclusive effects. 
Thus, we formulate the hypothesis 
H2: The degree of compliance of past years does not have significant relationship with the 
performance of the firms.  
Considering a broad concept of governance and giving to the Board a relevant role, Human 
Capital must be considered in order to fulfill the potential responsibilities towards 
stakeholders (McIntyre, Murphy, & Mitchell, 2007), to create shared leadership 
(Vandewaerde, Voordeckers, Lambrechts, & Bammens, 2011), and to become a key factor 
in board composition in its relationship with firm outcomes (Johnson, Schnatterly, & Hill, 
2013). Eventually, Human Capital has been related to firm performance among firms with 
homogeneous growth options (Coles et al., 2008). Diversity has been also study under this 
perspective (Singh, Terjesen, & Vinnicombe, 2008). But, since the recommendations are 
primary based on the principles we analyzed, human capital related premises are mainly 
aimed to comply before the eyes of investor protection. Therefore, there are no profound 
details on those provisions that are usually required to set the company to a ‘comply’ or 
‘partially comply’ score. This is more noticeable once, for instance, diversity is embedded 
among other requirements as a targeted quota, or trainings programs could qualify if they 
are just offered, etc. Skills at committees is a different case, but, to our knowledge, there is 
a lack of matrix skills in almost any listed company in Spain. Therefore, although it would 
be a differential element to be perceived by investors and to be shown in the overall 
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outcomes, we do not expect that a subset of recommendations on human capital could have 
a significant relationship with the firm value, and formulate the following hypothesis. 
H3: Degree of compliance on subset of human capital related recommendations do not 
have a positive relationship with firm performance 
 
It’s been already mentioned that disclosure and explaining has a cost for the firms (Sneller 
& Langendijk, 2007). Besides, the lack of resources may lead to smaller companies to 
postpone their duties in recommendations. In these cases, any variation is going to be 
reckoned in terms of performance, providing the size (big vs. small) a role in the 
relationship. Besides, it’s been suggested that some provisions are detrimental for smaller 
companies (Chhaochharia & Grinstein, 2007). Firm size has been pointed out as one of the 
main factors in terms of compliance for the case of US firms (Khemakhem & Dicko, 
2013), having a significant effect on firm performance (Van Essen, Engelen, & Carney, 
2013). Therefore, we suggest the following hypothesis: 
H4: Difference in size of the firms lead to different type of association between the degree 
of compliance and the firm performance of the firms. 
 
Figure 1: Summary of Hypotheses 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Empirical context 
Our empirical context is Spain. So, in this section we briefly depict the recent Spanish 
Code of Good Governance history so as to be able to frame the principles, 
recommendations and their changes that were established. There have been several codes 
in Spain throughout the last three decades. We may highlight these: The Olivencia Code 
(embedded in the Olivencia Report), the Aldama Report, the Unified Code of Good 
Governance, the Unified Code of Good Governance (reformed) and the Code of Good 
Governance, which is the current one for Spanish firms. The evolution of these codes their 
guiding principles and, for the aim of our research, their contents and the different 
recommendations they propose should be considered. 
 
The Olivencia Report 
The first Code in Spain was issued in 1998. The Board was at the center of the study and it 
was initially framed into an ethics perspective. It is commonly understood that it 
“developed an approach to corporate governance which emphasized the responsibility of 
management and Boards of Directors to the company's shareholders” (Special Commission 
To Foster Transparency And Security In The Markets And In Listed Companies, 2003). 
This approach clearly fits into the framework of the theory of agency (Fama & Jensen, 
1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The report is composed of three sections: introduction, a 
report on the board of directors, and a good governance code. The report on the board of 
directors had twelve chapters. First, there is a study of the Board of Directors mission, its 
supervisory function, its faculties and need of value creation for the shareholder. Then, the 
composition of the Board is analyzed, depicting the directors’ types, with special focus on 
the independent director, and the board size. Afterwards, the structure of the board is 
studied, exploring the President, the Secretary, and the Committees.  There is a subsequent 
chapter that studies how the boards work, in terms of organizing, preparation, and 
developing the meetings, how they should be reflected in minutes, and the performance 
evaluation.  
 
The Aldama Report 
The Aldama Report was the result of a mandate given by the Spanish Government. The 
goals of this code were set into a context of structural changes, a increasingly globalized 
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economy, capital markets integration, and the trends of international markets, an keep 
appearing in the following codes. It highlighted three main criteria: effective rule of law, 
transparency and self-regulation by the markets (Special Commission To Foster 
Transparency And Security In The Markets And In Listed Companies, 2003). New 
emphasis was posed on Shareholders’ Meeting.  
 
 
The Unified Code 
The Unified Good Governance Code of Listed Companies (Unified Code) was approved 
by the Board of the CNMV (Securities and Markets Regulatory Agency in Spain) in 2006 
following recommendations of the Ministry of Economy (Comisión Nacional del Mercado 
de Valores, 2006). This version of the code followed the review of the Principles of 
Corporate Governance made by the OECD in 2004, and the promotion of good governance 
that the European Commission encouraged over the same period. It included some of their 
recommendations, aimed to establish a clearer concept of independent director; it 
expanded the functions of the audit, and nomination and remuneration and committees 
(Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores, 2005).  
The Spanish Unified Code was depicted in 58 recommendations. There is a first set of 
recommendations regarding the shareholding’s meeting procedures and the way the 
Corporate Bylaws are set up. The second group gathers key recommendations on the board 
of directors such as the size, competences, functional structure, board meetings and gender 
diversity. The third set of items refers to directors, especially the selection, independence 
directors’ assurance, disclosures and remuneration matters. Finally, the recommendations 
items deal with committees’ issues. This structure remained for more than ten years and 
recently included slight changes in the details and the order of disclosure. As it may be 
easily notice, the majority of the recommendations could be framed under the role of 
monitoring and supervising that has been traditionally adopted by agency theory 
contributions. The items that can be analyzed under a resource dependence theory, helping 
to assess the board capital, are just a few. These would be the one regarding the 
CEO/Chairman duality, participation in other boards, and, secondarily, the size. These 
items can be studied as matters of social capital. There are no recommendation items 
explicitly devoted to the human capital of the board. 
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In 2013, the Unified Governance Code was updated so as to reflect changes in legislation 
that were related to several recommendations.  This change resulted in changes in the 
number and definition of the recommendations. 
 
The Good Governance Code (2015) 
The current Code of Good Governance was issued in 2015. The Spanish Government 
formed the ‘Experts on Corporate Governance Committee’. The aim was twofold, to 
improve ‘the efficiency and accountability of Spanish firms’ governance and ensuring that 
national standards attain maximum levels of compliance with international good 
governance principles and practices’. The objectives were ‘to ensure the proper 
functioning of the governing and administrative bodies of Spanish companies in order to 
maximize competitiveness, build trust and transparency for shareholders and domestic and 
foreign investors, improve internal control and corporate responsibility systems, and 
ensure the correct internal distribution of functions, duties and responsibilities under 
standards of maximum rigor and professionalism’ (CNMV, 2015). By including this aims, 
it confirmed that codes try to spread practices and principles across countries.   
The Good Governance Code introduced significant changes over the former codes. Firstly, 
it employed a new format that linked recommendations to the principles. Besides, some 
recommendations were omitted since they were included in legislation and now are 
compulsory. Corporate Social Responsibilities recommendations were included due to the 
increasing acknowledgement in many countries. The Good Governance Code is based on 
25 principles. They are grouped in three categories: general arrangements (1-5), 
Shareholders’ General Meeting (6-8), and Board of Directors (9-25). As we previously 
mentioned, recommendations were linked to the established principles. The Good 
Governance Code contains 64 recommendations.  
 
Report On Corporate Governance Obligation according to current law 
We liked to briefly reckon the report on Corporate Governance Issues obligation under 
current law. For the goals of this study, this is relevant for two reasons: it provides 
legitimacy to the data obtained and it frames the recommendation compliance. The 
obligation of publishing and notifying as a significant event towards regulatory agencies of 
an Annual Corporate Governance Report is defined in the Capital Companies Act (Ley de 
Sociedades de Capital, herein CCA). This law was approved in 2010. The Securities 
Market Act, approved in 2015, extended the obligation to other issuers of listed securities. 
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CCA requires issuers to show their degree of compliance with recommendations of the 
code and, in case it is appropriate, to explain why they have not been fulfilled. 
 
3.2. Data collection 
Accordingly with what we found in the analysis of the literature and the Spanish good 
governance codes we retrieved data from different sources. Companies’ Corporate 
Governance Data was obtained from Companies Corporate Governance Report for each 
year of the study, from the Corporate Governance Report of Entities with Securities 
Admitted to Trading on Regulated Markets (Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores, 
2007, 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2016). We also retrieved data of 
corporate governance variables, board variables and financial performance from the 
CNMV agency (Spanish SEC), official reports on corporate governance available both at 
CNMV and companies websites, and the SABI database. We selected data from companies 
covering the period from 2007 to 2016. We utilized 1,139 firm-year observations in our 
research. Since companies varied  during this period in listing, reporting and scope, they 
configured an unbalanced panel of data. The distribution of the sample based on the 
industry (NACE classification) may be checked in Table 1. Companies belong to a great 
variety of industries (16). Although they are unevenly distributed in each one, we ensure 
the best degree of representativeness amongst listed firms. 
Table 1: Distribution of companies by industry and year 
Industry Total 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
B – Energy Mining 30 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
C - Manufacturing 395 39 39 39 41 41 41 40 40 41 34 
D – Energy Electricity Gas 71 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 7 
E – Water, waste management 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
F - Construction 71 7 7 7 8 8 8 7 7 6 6 
G – Wholesale and Retail 42 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 4 4 
H - Transportation 2         1 1 
I - Host 23 2 2 2 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 
J - ITC 76 7 7 7 8 8 8 7 7 9 8 
K – Banking and Insurance 147 14 14 14 15 15 15 16 16 15 13 
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L – Real Estate 148 14 14 14 16 16 16 17 17 15 9 
M – Tech Sci Prof Serv 25 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 4 
N – Admin Aux Services 20 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Q - Health 12 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 
R – Entertainment Art 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
S – Other Services 35 2 2 2 2 2 2 6 6 6 5 
Total firm-observations 1139           
 
The use of different sources of information is helpful but it also raises several issues 
regarding how to combine all data to suit the aims of the research. We dealt with to kinds 
of issues. There where format issues that we managed to systematize with the help of some 
simple coding and software. We also had issues regarding the consistency of the contents. 
Thus, we use the above-mentioned sources to double-check data, and eliminate some 
inconsistencies.  
After the data preparation, we created a database so as to include data from different 
sources, combine them and obtain files that allowed a further analysis. The database we 
created has corporate governance and financial information of the Spanish listed firms. We 
entered all variables comprising company corporate governance compliance data from 
2007 to 2016. We also fed the database with financial data for the same period. Then, we 
loaded that information into SPSS for additional treatment. Finally, we proceeded to 
analyze the outcomes of the results we obtained. In order to test our model, we used 
regression analysis. This method requires identifying a variable in terms (as a function of) 
some other variables. 
 
3.3. Measurement  
Dependent variable 
There are different approaches to measure firm performance. The multidimensional nature 
of the firm makes any type of measurement of performance a limited one, and, as a result, 
it could be addressed in different ways (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; Keats, 
1988). Accordingly, operational performance and organizational performance have been 
distinguished (Combs, Russell Crook, & Shook, 2005), and the use of financial 
performance has been built based on accounting measures (e.g. Return on Assets, Return 
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on Equity, Return on Invested Capital) or based on market performance (e.g. Market-to-
book value, Tobin’s Q, stock performance, shareholders return) (Post & Byron, 2015). 
While accounting-based measures were assumed to be aiming to past success, market-
based ones were more focused on the future, the expectations and growth opportunities on 
the groundings of present data (Hillman, 2005; Keats, 1988; Keats & Hitt, 1988). We 
decided to use a market-based measure. Some authors refer to different versions of Tobin’s 
Q ratio (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Bhagat, Black, Bhagat, & Black, 1999; Brainerd & 
Tobin, 1977; Lindenberg & Ross, 1981; Tobin, 1967; Weir, Laing, & Mcknight, 2002; 
Yermack, 1996b). But accuracy and precision measurement of Tobin’s Q has been under 
discussion for long (Barnhart, Rosenstein, & Marr, 1994; Whited & Erickson, 2006), and, 
since the use of data from debt would distort and make hard to adapt observations from the 
banking and insurance industries, and in periods where regulation requested specific 
thresholds in related indicators, we decided to use the market-to-book ratio as measure for 
firm performance (FV) (Ararat, Aksu, & Tansel Cetin, 2015; Barnhart et al., 1994; Black 
et al., 2017; Brush, Bromiley, & Hendrickx, 2000; Carpenter & Sanders, 2004; De Andres 
et al., 2005; Francoeur, Labelle, & Sinclair-desgagné, 2008). This ratio is defined as the 
market value of equity divided into the book value of equity, and, consequently, it does not 
take into account firm’s debt.   
Independent variables 
To check the degree of compliance, we use a variable (DC). To build this variable, we 
consider the compliance in each recommendation. The degree of compliance is built upon 
the full set of recommendations issued at each period of time for the years of our research.  
There is a discussion on how many categories should be used so as to show whether a 
company complies:  two, representing comply or not comply (Abatecola et al., 2012; Alves 
& Mendes, 2004; Bebchuk et al., 2009; Gompers et al., 2003; Shaukat & Trojanowski, 
2018); three, including partial compliance (Akkermans et al., 2007); four, including poorly 
comply, explains well, and poorly explains (Rose, 2016). The possibility of weighting 
recommendations based of experts criteria was also performed for the case of Pakistani 
firms (Tariq & Abbas, 2013). We decided to establish three for our research. We keep 2 in 
the case of compliance, 1 for the case of partial compliance and 0 for those who do not 
comply. This keeps more information on the value of the progress that would be lost 
otherwise. This decision is derived from the classification items established by the 
regulatory agency in Spain. In the annual reports, companies are required to fill de 
information so as to fit only in one of three possibilities: comply, partially comply, not 
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comply (with some exception for the recommendations where the ‘not apply’ category 
could be adopted). Since this is the classification that is communicated to the markets, we 
took it as a reference for our investigation.  
Then, we add the punctuation of each recommendation. We equally weighted each one 
following existing research, which gives the power of building the degree of compliance to 
what is considered as a key and relevant issue for corporate governance, that is the 
recommendation. Since the number of recommendations is different across the years, we 
weighted the sum of punctuation by the total number of recommendations in that period 
(58, in the period 2007-2012; 53, in the period 2013-2014; 64, in the period 2015-2016). 
That way, potential values of the variable would range from 0, in the case of not 
compliance at all, to 2, for the case or full compliance of all recommendations. Then, we 
standardized each period subtotal to mean 0 and standard deviation 1. Finally, we added 
standardized subtotals and, again, standardized the result to mean 0 and standard deviation 
1 in the variable we used in the model. Literature on this regard fail to adopt the whole set 
of recommendations. In all referred cases and word, a construct was made up for the goals 
of the research, with some exceptions like (Pass, 2006). This is interesting when you are 
trying to find potential causes of performance within corporate governance items. But, 
reversely, do not consider whether the market is valuing what is considered the benchmark 
and reference as a whole, and that is shown through a set of recommendations in the code. 
Data on some particular recommendations is missing, normally because the suggestions 
the code is aiming do not apply to that particular case. Whereas setting that 
recommendation to 0 would punish the degree for that observation, and setting to 2 is 
complicated to base and might overestimate compliance, we computed for these cases the 
average of non-missing values. That way we do not loose information and add firm-year 
observations to the sample of our study (Black et al., 2017).  
For the purpose of validating the hypothesis we formulated in H2, we also created a lagged 
variable of the degree of compliance (DC-1). Following the mentioned works of Gompers, 
Black and others, we created a subset of recommendations for those related to human 
capital (DCHC). We checked the rationale and principles behind each recommendations in 
every period so as to select those that were related to topics like skills, experience or 
training. Since they varied from one period to other, we computed them by period to come 
up with the final variable. The weight and criteria we followed is the same as the one we 
established for the overall set of recommendations. 
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In our study, we took size variable (SIZE), that was proxied by the sales of the companies, 
given its potential role (Andres, Azofra, & Lopez, 2005). For the validation of the 
hypothesis that gives this variable a main role in the relationship with firm performance, 
we also separated the size into groups based on deciles so as to perceive different 
behaviors in each one of them (Francoeur, Labelle, & Sinclair-Desgagné, 2008; Murphy, 
1999; O’Connell & Cramer, 2010). 
As regard to the human capital, we created a variable that includes the degree of 
compliance of those recommendations related to the topic. We measured it analogously to 
the measurement of the overall degree of compliance. 
Control variables 
Regarding the control variables, literature often proposes industry, firm debt and country 
as the most relevant. The operational performance measured by the return on assets (ROA) 
has been included in some models as a control variable because it has a potential impact in 
the dependent variable (Carter et al., 2003; Rodríguez-Domínguez, García-Sánchez, & 
Gallego-Álvarez, 2012; Villanueva-Villar, Rivo-López, & Lago-Peñas, 2016). As a 
measure of efficiency of management, it shows how well the resources of the company 
(their assets) are handled to generate a certain level of profit, turning into higher equity 
value (Andres et al., 2005). Some authors give ROA a mediator role in relation to firm 
performance. In order to check, and follow dismiss the possibility of a mediator role of 
ROA, we performed the model without founding the relationship of that variable 
significant (See appendix tables for that analysis ).  
Some research works use the level of debt or leverage or other debt related variable to 
meet some works that pointed out its relationship with the managerial control and decision. 
Since the companies in the finance industry do not have a proper equivalent to reflect 
exactly in the same way that concept (the use of capital ratios or their transformation could 
be problematic and embed hidden relationship to regulation), we decided not to use that 
variable and keep financial firms in the sample. Due to the time span of our research, we 
include some years in a context of deep financial crisis. In those years, changes in 
regulation ad markets necessities demanded recapitalization of the firms, which was 
especially significant in financial companies. Finally, given that we focused our research in 
Spanish listed companies, we did not use country control variables  
Besides, we created dummy variables for the years of the study (2007 to 2016) and the 
different industries of the firms, based on NACE classification. 
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4. RESULTS 
We performed OLS on six models so as to test the hypotheses we previously formulated. 
The first four models (A, B, C, and D) were defined for the first two hypotheses. Model A 
included control variables. Model B included degree of compliance (DC) as independent 
variable. Model C included past degree of compliance (DC-1), and Model D included DC 
and DC-1 for the purpose of the second hypothesis. Model E was designed to test 
hypothesis 3 and included the degree of compliance of human capital recommendations 
(DCHC) as independent variable. Finally, Model F was created to test the last hypothesis. 
In all multiple regression models we introduced dummy variables for years and industries, 
and the operational performance (ROA). The descriptive statistics and correlations of the 
variables are shown in Table 2. The correlation matrix is a necessary step when performing 
OLS so as to check possible multicolinearity. In our study, the coefficient for ROA, 
although it is high, it is not so relevant to avoid considering it. It happens the same for the 
case of the size. In both cases is below 0.5. Therefore, the model could be suitable for our 
objectives. Correlation matrix of this model only shows outstanding correlation between de 
degree of compliance and the same variable for the past year, and for the case of human 
capital degree of compliance analogously. This is foreseeable since companies do not 
change dramatically their compliance from one year to other. There are provisions whose 
difficulty of compliance is focused in the first time and once they have been implemented 
there is a sort of inertia. That is the case of those regarding procedures (e.g. for general 
meetings) or reached ratios (where it is relatively easy to keep complying). 
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Table 2: Descriptive and Correlations statistics 
  
Mean Std 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Y2008 0,103 0,304 1 -0,116** -0,116** -0,122** -0,117** -0,118** -0,122** -0,130** -0,122** 0,022 
2 Y2009 0,105 0,306 -0,116** 1 -0,117** -0,123** -0,118** -0,119** -0,123** -0,131** -0,123** 0,021 
3 Y2010 0,105 0,306 -0,116** -0,117** 1 -0,123** -0,118** -0,119** -0,123** -0,131** -0,123** 0,021 
4 Y2011 0,115 0,320 -0,122** -0,123** -0,123** 1 -0,124** -0,126** -0,130** -0,139** -0,129** -0,011 
5 Y2012 0,106 0,308 -0,117** -0,118** -0,118** -0,124** 1 -0,120** -0,124** -0,132** -0,123** -0,006 
6 Y2013 0,109 0,311 -0,118** -0,119** -0,119** -0,126** -0,120** 1 -0,126** -0,134** -0,125** -0,007 
7 Y2014 0,115 0,320 -0,122** -0,123** -0,123** -0,130** -0,124** -0,126** 1 -0,139** -0,129** -0,011 
8 Y2015 0,129 0,335 -0,130** -0,131** -0,131** -0,139** -0,132** -0,134** -0,139** 1 -0,138** -0,017 
9 Y2016 0,114 0,318 -0,122** -0,123** -0,123** -0,129** -0,123** -0,125** -0,129** -0,138** 1 -0,010 
10 B Energy Mining 0,029 0,166 0,022 0,021 0,021 -0,011 -0,006 -0,007 -0,011 -0,017 -0,010 1 
11 C Manufacturing 0,414 0,493 0,005 0,028 0,037 -0,002 0,015 -0,001 -0,019 -0,027 -0,033 -0,144** 
12 D - Energy Electricity Gas 0,076 0,265 0,004 0,002 0,002 -0,007 0,001 -0,001 -0,007 -0,003 0,010 -0,049 
13 E - Water waste Air 0,012 0,110 0,003 0,002 0,002 -0,001 0,002 0,001 -0,001 -0,006 -0,001 -0,019 
14 F Construction 0,087 0,282 0,006 0,005 0,021 0,009 0,019 0,001 -0,006 -0,032 -0,020 -0,053 
15 G Retail and Wholesale 0,034 0,181 0,010 0,010 -0,015 0,003 0,009 0,007 0,003 -0,027 0,004 -0,032 
16 H Transportation 0,003 0,052 -0,018 -0,018 -0,018 -0,019 -0,018 -0,018 -0,019 0,058 0,063 -0,009 
17 I Host 0,023 0,150 0,007 0,007 0,007 0,001 0,006 -0,025 0,001 -0,005 0,002 -0,026 
18 J ITC 0,064 0,245 0,003 -0,017 0,002 -0,007 0,000 -0,002 -0,007 0,016 0,011 -0,045 
19 K Finance 0,105 0,306 -0,087* -0,088* -0,088* 0,029 0,012 0,080* 0,057 0,041 0,031 -0,058 
20 L Real Estate 0,060 0,237 0,065 0,045 -0,011 -0,001 -0,049 -0,033 0,017 0,006 -0,036 -0,043 
21 M Sci Tech Pro 0,026 0,159 -0,027 -0,028 0,000 -0,005 0,000 -0,002 0,022 0,014 0,022 -0,028 
22 N Admin Aux 0,019 0,137 0,018 0,017 0,017 0,012 -0,016 -0,017 -0,019 0,006 -0,019 -0,024 
23 Q Health 0,015 0,121 -0,005 -0,005 -0,005 -0,009 -0,006 -0,007 -0,009 0,019 0,026 -0,021 
24 R Entertrainment Art 0,008 0,090 0,019 0,018 0,018 0,015 0,018 -0,032 -0,033 -0,035 0,015 -0,016 
25 S Other Services 0,027 0,163 -0,002 -0,002 -0,002 -0,034 -0,030 -0,031 -0,008 0,060 0,045 -0,029 
26 ROA 4,204 9,857 0,021 -0,035 0,015 -0,025 -0,070 -0,056 0,036 0,047 0,062 0,006 
27 DC 0,200 0,855 -0,108** -0,083* -0,053 0,062 0,099** 0,026 0,042 -0,030 0,039 0,008 
28 DC-1 0,155 0,876 -0,156** -0,085* -0,057 0,011 0,083* 0,115** 0,028 0,051 0,001 -0,001 
29 DCHC 0,194 0,898 -0,070 -0,044 -0,011 0,043 0,078* 0,027 0,009 -0,040 0,007 0,022 
30 SIZE 13,565 2,527 -0,039 -0,057 -0,039 0,045 0,064 0,042 0,020 -0,030 -0,008 0,163** 
31 FV 0,330 0,933 0,034 0,047 -0,029 -0,084* -0,113** 0,013 -0,001 0,047 0,083* -0,018 
 ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).          
 * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).          DC=Degree of compliance; DC-1 = Degree of Compliance t-1; DCHC = Degree of Compliance HC recommendations; FV = Firm performance 
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Table 2: Descriptive and Correlations statistics (cont) 
  
Mean Std 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 
1 Y2008 0,103 0,304 0,005 0,004 0,003 0,006 0,010 -0,018 0,007 0,003 -0,087* 0,065 
2 Y2009 0,105 0,306 0,028 0,002 0,002 0,005 0,010 -0,018 0,007 -0,017 -0,088* 0,045 
3 Y2010 0,105 0,306 0,037 0,002 0,002 0,021 -0,015 -0,018 0,007 0,002 -0,088* -0,011 
4 Y2011 0,115 0,320 -0,002 -0,007 -0,001 0,009 0,003 -0,019 0,001 -0,007 0,029 -0,001 
5 Y2012 0,106 0,308 0,015 0,001 0,002 0,019 0,009 -0,018 0,006 0,000 0,012 -0,049 
6 Y2013 0,109 0,311 -0,001 -0,001 0,001 0,001 0,007 -0,018 -0,025 -0,002 0,080* -0,033 
7 Y2014 0,115 0,320 -0,019 -0,007 -0,001 -0,006 0,003 -0,019 0,001 -0,007 0,057 0,017 
8 Y2015 0,129 0,335 -0,027 -0,003 -0,006 -0,032 -0,027 0,058 -0,005 0,016 0,041 0,006 
9 Y2016 0,114 0,318 -0,033 0,010 -0,001 -0,020 0,004 0,063 0,002 0,011 0,031 -0,036 
10 B Energy Mining 0,029 0,166 -0,144** -0,049 -0,019 -0,053 -0,032 -0,009 -0,026 -0,045 -0,058 -0,043 
11 C Manufacturing 0,414 0,493 1 -0,241** -0,093* -0,259** -0,157** -0,044 -0,129** -0,219** -0,287** -0,212** 
12 D - Energy Electricity Gas 0,076 0,265 -0,241** 1 -0,032 -0,088* -0,054 -0,015 -0,044 -0,075* -0,098** -0,072* 
13 E - Water waste Air 0,012 0,110 -0,093* -0,032 1 -0,034 -0,021 -0,006 -0,017 -0,029 -0,038 -0,028 
14 F Construction 0,087 0,282 -0,259** -0,088* -0,034 1 -0,058 -0,016 -0,047 -0,080* -0,105** -0,078* 
15 G Retail and Wholesale 0,034 0,181 -0,157** -0,054 -0,021 -0,058 1 -0,010 -0,029 -0,049 -0,064 -0,047 
16 H Transportation 0,003 0,052 -0,044 -0,015 -0,006 -0,016 -0,010 1 -0,008 -0,014 -0,018 -0,013 
17 I Host 0,023 0,150 -0,129** -0,044 -0,017 -0,047 -0,029 -0,008 1 -0,040 -0,052 -0,039 
18 J ITC 0,064 0,245 -0,219** -0,075* -0,029 -0,080* -0,049 -0,014 -0,040 1 -0,089* -0,066 
19 K Finance 0,105 0,306 -0,287** -0,098** -0,038 -0,105** -0,064 -0,018 -0,052 -0,089* 1 -0,086* 
20 L Real Estate 0,060 0,237 -0,212** -0,072* -0,028 -0,078* -0,047 -0,013 -0,039 -0,066 -0,086* 1 
21 M Sci Tech Pro 0,026 0,159 -0,137** -0,047 -0,018 -0,050 -0,030 -0,008 -0,025 -0,042 -0,056 -0,041 
22 N Admin Aux 0,019 0,137 -0,117** -0,040 -0,015 -0,043 -0,026 -0,007 -0,021 -0,036 -0,048 -0,035 
23 Q Health 0,015 0,121 -0,103** -0,035 -0,014 -0,038 -0,023 -0,006 -0,019 -0,032 -0,042 -0,031 
24 R Entertrainment Art 0,008 0,090 -0,076* -0,026 -0,010 -0,028 -0,017 -0,005 -0,014 -0,024 -0,031 -0,023 
25 S Other Services 0,027 0,163 -0,140** -0,048 -0,019 -0,052 -0,031 -0,009 -0,026 -0,044 -0,057 -0,042 
26 ROA 4,204 9,857 0,081* 0,040 -0,023 -0,107** 0,002 0,020 -0,034 0,092* -0,091* -0,103** 
27 DC 0,200 0,855 -0,191** 0,098** 0,094* -0,002 -0,102** -0,066 -0,049 0,087* 0,265** -0,167** 
28 DC-1 0,155 0,876 -0,191** 0,097** 0,098** 0,008 -0,132** -0,045 -0,046 0,087* 0,248** -0,168** 
29 DCHC 0,194 0,898 -0,160** 0,101** 0,024 0,010 0,036 -0,007 0,018 -0,010 0,204** -0,212** 
30 SIZE 13,565 2,527 -0,272** 0,248** 0,002 0,271** -0,050 0,033 -0,018 0,144** 0,166** -0,304** 
31 FV 0,330 0,933 -0,074* 0,037 -0,042 -0,036 0,084* 0,055 -0,085* 0,239** -0,073* -0,052 
 ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).          
 * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).          DC=Degree of compliance; DC-1 = Degree of Compliance t-1; DCHC = Degree of Compliance HC recommendations; FV = Firm performance 
Chapter 5: Codes of Good Governance and Performance in Spanish Listed Firms 
 313 
Table 2: Descriptive and Correlations statistics (cont) 
  
Mean Std 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 
1 Y2008 0,103 0,304 -0,027 0,018 -0,005 0,019 -0,002 0,021 -0,108** -0,156** -0,070 -0,039 0,034 
2 Y2009 0,105 0,306 -0,028 0,017 -0,005 0,018 -0,002 -0,035 -0,083* -0,085* -0,044 -0,057 0,047 
3 Y2010 0,105 0,306 0,000 0,017 -0,005 0,018 -0,002 0,015 -0,053 -0,057 -0,011 -0,039 -0,029 
4 Y2011 0,115 0,320 -0,005 0,012 -0,009 0,015 -0,034 -0,025 0,062 0,011 0,043 0,045 -0,084* 
5 Y2012 0,106 0,308 0,000 -0,016 -0,006 0,018 -0,030 -0,070 0,099** 0,083* 0,078* 0,064 -0,113** 
6 Y2013 0,109 0,311 -0,002 -0,017 -0,007 -0,032 -0,031 -0,056 0,026 0,115** 0,027 0,042 0,013 
7 Y2014 0,115 0,320 0,022 -0,019 -0,009 -0,033 -0,008 0,036 0,042 0,028 0,009 0,020 -0,001 
8 Y2015 0,129 0,335 0,014 0,006 0,019 -0,035 0,060 0,047 -0,030 0,051 -0,040 -0,030 0,047 
9 Y2016 0,114 0,318 0,022 -0,019 0,026 0,015 0,045 0,062 0,039 0,001 0,007 -0,008 0,083* 
10 B Energy Mining 0,029 0,166 -0,028 -0,024 -0,021 -0,016 -0,029 0,006 0,008 -0,001 0,022 0,163** -0,018 
11 C Manufacturing 0,414 0,493 -0,137** -0,117** -0,103** -0,076* -0,140** 0,081* -0,191** -0,191** -0,160** -0,272** -0,074* 
12 D - Energy Electricity Gas 0,076 0,265 -0,047 -0,040 -0,035 -0,026 -0,048 0,040 0,098** 0,097** 0,101** 0,248** 0,037 
13 E - Water waste Air 0,012 0,110 -0,018 -0,015 -0,014 -0,010 -0,019 -0,023 0,094* 0,098** 0,024 0,002 -0,042 
14 F Construction 0,087 0,282 -0,050 -0,043 -0,038 -0,028 -0,052 -0,107** -0,002 0,008 0,010 0,271** -0,036 
15 G Retail and Wholesale 0,034 0,181 -0,030 -0,026 -0,023 -0,017 -0,031 0,002 -0,102** -0,132** 0,036 -0,050 0,084* 
16 H Transportation 0,003 0,052 -0,008 -0,007 -0,006 -0,005 -0,009 0,020 -0,066 -0,045 -0,007 0,033 0,055 
17 I Host 0,023 0,150 -0,025 -0,021 -0,019 -0,014 -0,026 -0,034 -0,049 -0,046 0,018 -0,018 -0,085* 
18 J ITC 0,064 0,245 -0,042 -0,036 -0,032 -0,024 -0,044 0,092* 0,087* 0,087* -0,010 0,144** 0,239** 
19 K Finance 0,105 0,306 -0,056 -0,048 -0,042 -0,031 -0,057 -0,091* 0,265** 0,248** 0,204** 0,166** -0,073* 
20 L Real Estate 0,060 0,237 -0,041 -0,035 -0,031 -0,023 -0,042 -0,103** -0,167** -0,168** -0,212** -0,304** -0,052 
21 M Sci Tech Pro 0,026 0,159 1 -0,023 -0,020 -0,015 -0,027 -0,084* 0,030 0,062 0,001 -0,010 -0,099** 
22 N Admin Aux 0,019 0,137 -0,023 1 -0,017 -0,013 -0,023 0,006 0,040 0,041 0,107** 0,006 0,105** 
23 Q Health 0,015 0,121 -0,020 -0,017 1 -0,011 -0,021 0,251** 0,098** 0,107** 0,043 -0,097** 0,198** 
24 R Entertrainment Art 0,008 0,090 -0,015 -0,013 -0,011 1 -0,015 -0,031 0,031 0,069 0,037 -0,021 0,031 
25 S Other Services 0,027 0,163 -0,027 -0,023 -0,021 -0,015 1 -0,003 -0,008 -0,018 0,007 -0,154** -0,061 
26 ROA 4,204 9,857 -0,084* 0,006 0,251** -0,031 -0,003 1 -0,018 -0,059 -0,014 0,059 0,390** 
27 DC 0,200 0,855 0,030 0,040 0,098** 0,031 -0,008 -0,018 1 0,849** 0,668** 0,375** 0,140** 
28 DC-1 0,155 0,876 0,062 0,041 0,107** 0,069 -0,018 -0,059 0,849** 1 0,562** 0,356** 0,110** 
29 DCHC 0,194 0,898 0,001 0,107** 0,043 0,037 0,007 -0,014 0,668** 0,562** 1 0,256** 0,020 
30 SIZE 13,565 2,527 -0,010 0,006 -0,097** -0,021 -0,154** 0,059 0,375** 0,356** 0,256** 1 0,090* 
31 FV 0,330 0,933 -0,099** 0,105** 0,198** 0,031 -0,061 0,390** 0,140** 0,110** 0,02 0,090* 1 
 ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).           
 * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).           DC=Degree of compliance; DC-1 = Degree of Compliance t-1; DCHC = Degree of Compliance HC recommendations; FV = Firm performance 
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In the case of the first hypothesis we included the degree of compliance (DC), making the 
firm value (FV) depend on them.. We run the OLS model and, first of all, obtained the 
descriptive statistics (Table 3, models A and B). Dummy variables (in the case of the year 
and the industry) were omitted to avoid dummy trap.  
 
Table 3: Models A, B, C, D, E, F Summary 
 
Models. Dependent variable: FV 
 
A B C D E F 
Y2008 -0,094* -0,1* 0,011 -0,003 -0,095 -0,101* 
Y2009 -0,074* -0,083* 0,026 0,016 -0,076 -0,076 
Y2010 -0,151** -0,163** -0,060 -0,07 -0,153** -0,155** 
Y2011 -0,173** -0,2** -0,089* -0,108** -0,176** -0,207** 
Y2012 -0,182** -0,213** -0,11** -0,126** -0,185** -0,219** 
Y2013 -0,079* -0,099* -0,002 -0,001 -0,082 -0,107* 
Y2014 -0,112** -0,137** -0,026 -0,04 -0,115** -0,144** 
Y2015 -0,087* -0,103* 
 
 -0,089* -0,11* 
Y2016 -0,061 -0,084* 0,032 0,016 -0,063 -0,089* 
C Manufacturing -0,021 0,001 0,020 0,027 -0,017 0,021 
D - Energy Electricity Gas 0,044 0,032 0,039 0,039 0,043 0,036 
E - Water waste Air -0,023 -0,037 -0,035 -0,036 -0,023 -0,032 
F Construction 0,027 0,031 0,036 0,04 0,027 0,033 
G Retail and Wholesale 0,076 0,094 0,121** 0,122 0,076 0,101 
H Transportation 0,04 0,05 0,055 0,06 0,040 0,051 
I Host -0,055 -0,045 -0,046 -0,042 -0,055 -0,041 
J ITC 0,19** 0,178** 0,21** -0,042** 0,191** 0,186** 
K Finance -0,058 -0,081 -0,057 -0,064 -0,059 -0,042 
L Real Estate -0,013 0,013 0,030 0,035 -0,009 0,028 
M Sci Tech Pro -0,049 -0,051 -0,058 -0,054 -0,049 -0,045 
N Admin Aux 0,095* 0,088* 0,111** -0,054** 0,094* 0,094* 
Q Health 0,115** 0,098** 0,107** 0,111** 0,114** 0,108** 
R Entertainment Art 0,044 0,041 0,043 0,049 0,044 0,045 
S Other Services -0,102* -0,097* -0,044 -0,044** -0,102* -0,087* 
ROA 0,311** 0,319** 0,328** 0,323** 0,312** 0,322** 
DC 
 
0,165**  0,174**  0,144** 
DC-1 
  
0,153** 0,006  
 DCHC 
    
0,019 
 SIZE 
     
0,034 
              
R 0,521 0,542 0,534 0,541 0,521 0,541 
R2 0,271 0,293 0,285 0,293 0,271 0,293 
DW  2,161 2,162 2,162 2,138 2,133 
DC = Degree of Compliance; DC-1= Degree of compliance t-1; DCHC = Degree of compliance of Human 
Capital related recommendations. SIZE = Size of the firm proxied by sales; DW = Durbin – Watson. ** 
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level. 
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In the following step we observed that the model has an explanatory power of 0.293 at 
acceptable values of the Durbin-Watson statistic (2.161). It is worth to reckon here that 
DW is around 2 in all models. This fact along with VIFs and correlations, and supported 
by literature would prevent us from considering endogeneity problems in them. The second 
thing we notice in the model summary is that the introduction of the degree of compliance 
variable is significant (0.000), and enriches the model (0.022 in R Square change). 
Therefore, we may conclude that we build a model that might explain the association 
between the variables at a relevant explanatory level (See models  A, B summary in Table 
3) 
Return on Assets (ROA) has a clear and positive effect on firm performance (0,319**), 
which is consequent with the groundings suggesting its introduction as a control variable. 
That way, we confirm that operating efficiency positively affects the performance of 
Spanish listed firms. The degree of compliance measured by the variable of our model 
(DC) is positive (0.144) and significant (0.000). Therefore, we can confirm the first 
hypothesis (H1). There is a positive association between the degree of compliance, 
measured by the recommendations that are fulfilled, and the firm value in Spanish listed 
firms during the period 2007-2016.  
As regard to the second hypothesis, we created a lagged variable for past degrees of 
compliance of the firm (DC-1) and modified the model, defining models C and D in Table 
3. Model D includes both, present and past degree of compliance. The modified model do 
not implies positive changes in the explanatory power of the previous model. Besides, the 
Durbin-Watson statistic shows a concerning value under 1 (see model C and D summary in 
Table 3). These two elements serve as starting reasons for questioning the effect of the 
introduction of the variable representing the past degree of compliance of the company. 
The coefficients of the model led us to highlight two relevant elements. First, the degree of 
compliance still positively affects firm value (0.174) and is significant (0.005), improving 
figures from the previous model. The degree of compliance of the past year  (DC-1) offers 
an extremely weak relationship (0.006) and it is entirely not significant (0.922). Besides, in 
this case, there is a great increase in VIF, pointing to a multicolianearity problem. As for 
just this model, we can’t conclude that, as we asserted, past degrees of compliance have a 
posterior effect given the market and regulators dynamics. Nevertheless, we analyzed the 
model including only past degree of compliance (Model C) and it brought us a complete 
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different result. The relationship was in this case positive (0.153) and significant (0.000), 
being the Durbin Watson indicator (2.162). A recent past degree of compliance might be 
driving an inertia that lead to consider either that one or the current, since there would be 
slight changes on it. The values of the coefficients would suggest that that situation favours 
the current degree of compliance. As a result we can’t conclude that the hypothesis H2 is 
confirmed as stated. 
In order to verify the third hypothesis, we designed a new model (Model E in Table 3) and  
created a variable to test the impact of the degree of compliance of human capital related 
recommendations (DCHC). These recommendations, while referring to skills, experience, 
etc., were reported in a certain degree of compliance in the codes. We run the model and 
found that that variable did not add explanatory power to the initial model (R2=0.521). 
Besides, the coefficient for the variable (0.019) was not significant (0.557) . Therefore, we 
can confirm the hypothesis H3, since the significance level prevent us from reaching a 
conclusion on the particular. We suggest that the lack of detail in the requested items in 
human capital related provisions makes easy to waive difficulties in comply with that 
recommendations. It might be reasonable that a certain degree of further disclosure on the 
topics linked to human capital could be harmful for the strategy of the companies, but they 
should balance the upsides of the transparency that investors demand at the stocks markets, 
and the caring for the interest of other stakeholders.  
In order to test whether given different sizes of the companies the relationship between 
degree of compliance and firm value changes, we classified firm-year observations in 
deciles (1 to 10). Then we run the regression only for cumulative segments of size of the 
companies. We found that as the size of the companies increases: a) the explanatory power 
decreases, b) the positive effect is maintained, c) the positive effect declines as the 
considered companies embed greater sizes in the first half of the them, and d) significance 
of the coefficients keeps at high level in any case (Table 4). Therefore, we confirm the 
fourth hypothesis we formulated on the size (H4).  
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Table 4: Summary of changes in R square, Coefficients, and Significance depending on Size's cumulative decile 
  
Cumulative Deciles 
  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Y2008 0,095 0,087 -0,002 0,011 0,004 -0,034 -0,046 -0,061 -0,079 -0,095* -0,101 
Y2009 0,018 -0,013 -0,049 -0,036 -0,003 -0,049 -0,029 -0,032 -0,050 -0,071 -0,075 
Y2010 -0,041 -0,076 -0,150 -0,097 -0,071 -0,095 -0,083 -0,104 -0,125** -0,146** -0,155** 
Y2011 -0,031 -0,010 -0,021 -0,095 -0,080 -0,166 -0,144 -0,167** -0,195** -0,196** -0,206** 
Y2012 -0,072 -0,051 -0,212* -0,158* -0,109 -0,172** -0,15** -0,159** -0,185** -0,217** -0,218** 
Y2013 0,023 0,058 0,000 -0,043 -0,006 -0,088 -0,064 -0,078 -0,080 -0,105* -0,106** 
Y2014 -0,104 -0,075 -0,088 -0,076 -0,049 -0,114 -0,101 -0,127* -0,126** -0,137** -0,143** 
Y2015 -0,170 -0,049 -0,021 0,036 0,036 -0,038 -0,051 -0,082 -0,086 -0,097* -0,109** 
Y2016 -0,027 0,082 0,038 0,058 0,086 0,008 -0,019 -0,052 -0,063 -0,072 -0,089** 
C Manufacturing     1,138** 1,256** 1,299** 1,378** -0,160 -0,232 0,001 D - Energy Electricity Gas     0,139* 0,178** 0,171** 0,609** 0,029 -0,009 0,034 E - Water waste Air       0,357** 0,345** -0,073 -0,09* -0,036 F Construction   -0,051 -0,043 0,28** 0,275** 0,251** 0,239** -0,051 -0,094 0,032 G Retail and Wholesale 0,394** 0,445** 0,366** 0,148* 0,584** 0,605** 0,573** 0,54** -0,053 -0,020 0,094 
H Transportation         0,039 0,028 0,051 I Host -0,106 -0,060 -0,103 -0,089 0,162* 0,159* 0,136* 0,446** -0,103 -0,12* -0,046 
J ITC     0,254** 0,367** 0,695** 0,795** 0,133 0,083 0,181** K Finance -0,219 -0,259* -0,233** -0,040 0,409** 0,726** 0,673** 0,698** -0,054 -0,153* -0,049 
L Real Estate 0,228 0,192 0,053 0,100 0,916** 0,902** 0,852** 0,846** -0,075 -0,111 0,012 
M Sci Tech Pro   -0,109 -0,050 0,355** 0,363** 0,377** 0,433** -0,008 -0,129* -0,050 N Admin Aux -0,006 -0,082 -0,137 0,012 0,35** 0,361** 0,346** 0,333** 0,040 0,027 0,089** 
Q Health    0,314** 0,742** 0,713** 0,61** 0,562** 0,085 0,055 0,099** R Entertainment Art    -0,008 0,269** 0,263** 0,272** 0,306** 0,017 0,001 0,041 S Other Services -0,466** -0,345** -0,358** -0,28** 0,375** 0,394** 0,369** 0,355** -0,204** -0,18** -0,097** 
ROA 0,054 0,017 -0,061 -0,056 0,045 0,080 0,239** 0,311** 0,315** 0,296** 0,325** 
DC  0,486** 0,409** 0,333* 0,236** 0,179** 0,171** 0,088* 0,12** 0,148** 0,152**             
R 0,718 0,834 0,68 0,631 0,604 0,564 0,571 0,591 0,562 0,539 0,541 
R2 0,515 0,696 0,463 0,398 0,364 0,319 0,326 0,349 0,316 0,291 0,292 
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Figure 2: Summary of Tested Hypotheses 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
We analyzed the relationship between firm performance and the degree of compliance of 
code of governance recommendations for Spanish listed firms. We obtained data of 
companies from 2007 to 2016. We set up a group o models to test the hypotheses and use 
multiple regression models with several adaptions to cope with diverse issues we faced in 
our investigation.  
We could confirm that, although through low levels of contribution, the degree of 
compliance is positively associated with the firm performance of the Spanish firms in the 
period of our study. But this type of relationship has some characteristics. It is controlled 
by usual variables like the operational performance, measured by the ROA, the industry 
and the years of study. ROA has a positive and significant effect in all cases. As a 
consequence, we may conclude three things: a) degree of compliance is providing an 
positive effect on Spanish listed companies; b) since this study covers different period of 
time and different codes, successive changes in recommendations are effective in keeping 
that positive relationship, and support the idea behind the role of the codes spreading 
suitable ways of facing relevant topics on corporate governance, among which a significant 
part is focus on the board; and c) considering this fact along with the descriptive results of 
the degree of compliance, we may suggest that they have reached a remarkable level, 
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although there is room for improvement. Consequently, we think that codes issuers should 
keep the track of reforming recommendations in a continuous process, embracing new 
provisions and disclosures for the good purpose of governance. This will imply new 
research explorations.  
As regards to past levels of compliance, our research confirms that we can’t take their 
values into account along with the present ones, due to the lack of significance. Market and 
regulatory dynamics seems to be bringing the impact to current period of time. We remind 
that we are dealing with recommendations of the codes and not with government of 
organizations as a whole. If government were analyzed, lagged values turning into long-
term effects could be expected, given that the nature of the topic. The positive link between 
past levels of compliance and firm performance considered alone might point to be closely 
interchangeable with present values, which may suggest that it could be a sort of inertia 
that leans on recent degree of compliance but rather favours the current ones. 
We tested that there were differences in the association depending on the size of the firm. 
With few exceptions, the impact on firm value shows a decreasing trend as the size of the 
considered companies increases. Our suggestion is that the rationale behind is the 
following: when a company is small, the market is more sensible to notice good governed 
companies, what will turn into diminishing risks and counterbalancing traditional issues 
linked to small size companies when are listed. Conversely, as the company is bigger, good 
governance is still considered and valued, but some other variables have an effect on the 
company’s firm value, providing nuances that can blur the overall effect. 
We also found the lack of statistical significance in subsets of recommendations regarding 
human capital. The importance of this topic, widely supported in research literature, meets 
a easy way of showing compliance. In this context, going beyond what is required by 
regulation or by provisions in codes could build relevant groundings for long-term 
government of the firm. Also, this is quite interesting in terms of markets, need of detailed 
demands of information at disclosures, future performance and future role of the code as a 
useful tool to spread best practices and to achieve its core principles. 
Despite many studies address corporate governance and board of directors in listed 
companies, it might be useful to broaden the scope to Spanish non-listed companies. The 
number, weight and presence of them in the economic structure could help to create a 
culture of good governance. Medium and big non-listed companies could benefit from 
these researches. For small companies the problem of access to data would be greater in 
most cases. Nevertheless, setting the focus on the study of governance in technological 
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startups could be interesting. The potential growth of these companies configures a good 
angle of study and research might find suitable sources of information to feed the analysis. 
It will be interesting to check whether the relationship shape change over years and reaches 
a stable level when approaching the highest values of the degree of compliance. This could 
be provide a sign of the sensibility of the markets. It could also give the opportunity of 
making improvements in the governance mechanisms in the recommendations, or as a way 
to ground long-term government of the firm.  
Our analysis has the advantage of considering the degree across different codes, but it 
would be also interesting to replicate the analysis we made for the case of each period time 
associated to the presence of a certain code.  
Although codes, recommendations, and report forms vary dependent on the country, they 
all may have a common base of principles. Hence, it could be useful to compare those 
variables that are shared among different companies from various countries or global areas, 
paying attention to the evolution the codes experience during a wide time span. 
Since the study of human capital variables contained in codes of good governance is 
limited, it would be necessary to compute the data of every director of each one of the 
companies through this angle. Human capital variables could be obtained from corporate 
governance reports that are issue by listed firms but they use to be unstructured and are 
embedded in wider purpose description.  
Diversity concept could be approached in a wider way, and included in human capital 
variables. Other intellectual frameworks could easier support this perspective, such as 
resource dependence. This kind of research might provide differential advantages for the 
firm based on a board composition centered in the person, and working a governing group. 
The study of governance of family business non-listed companies under the later 
frameworks may lead to attractive conclusions. Some specific traits of that type of 
companies, such as the use of family councils or the presence of protocols, might provide 
some light to governance processes and mechanisms of other firms. Strategic vision, 
succession, management of family members in business are topics addressed with a 
different angle that allowed those firms to adapt, evolve, and, eventually, survive for 
generations. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The Introduction Chapter of this Thesis set the general objective and depicted four specific 
objectives whose development has been completed in four different chapters, structured in 
article-shaped format. Therefore, in this chapter we summarize the conclusions that were 
denoted throughout the respective sections of the previous chapters, in the way they serve 
to the purpose and the objectives we address. 
The first of the specific objectives aimed to analyze the studies on Boards of Directors that 
shape the existing intellectual framework. Through our study, we described, analyzed and 
mapped the research on the topic realized up to 2017 in 3,021 research articles. We 
identified several stages over this period of time, that were triggered or influenced by 
major events like the issuing of the Cadbury Report, the spreading of Codes of 
Governance, or the impulse of Regulators and International Organizations and the 
incorporation of new journals to the study of the topic. Thus, we took these periods for our 
analyses: up to 1991, from 1993 to 2005, and 2006 onwards. Contributions on the first 
period would show the initial grounding of the topic. The second one would deploy in 
parallel to the codes progressive implementation in many countries, the raising interest on 
corporate governance, and also fostered by worldwide known corporate scandals. In the 
third period, contributions are built upon the previous seeding and grounding stages, 
spreading the analyses related to the board to a broader range of topics as a sign of 
maturity. 
We confirmed the multidisciplinary interest from the point of view of the editors, since the 
board of directors has been addressed in journals of several scientific disciplines, and that 
includes management or finance, but also accounting ethics, psychology, law or sociology. 
Despite the number of published works, 41 of these journals concentrate 52% of the total. 
Distribution of articles is consistent with the variety of approaches and the presumed 
evolution of the studies they gather. 
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As in other research arenas, although there are a great number of contributors, only a few 
of them recurrently produced studies over time. Similarly, a small group of them 
concentrates the citation count. That is the case of Dalton, Westphal, Daily, Zajac, or Zahra 
amongst others. Nevertheless, is remarkable the way this group is consistently referred 
across the literature. These conform a true nuclear set of knowledge or reference point for 
the topic. 
Across the quoted references we may note the main theories help providing the building 
blocks for their approaches. Despite the use of the Institutional Theory or the Resource 
Dependent theory, framed the investigation of some of the articles, the Agency Theory 
constitutes the core intellectual framework for many works on the board of directors, as it 
was confirmed through the analysis of the components of cited references. We mapped a 
geographical distribution of researches where US, UK-Commonwealth, Continental 
Europe and Asia group investigations, and US research institutions are highly represented.  
Journals have been co-cited mostly based on close research arenas. We may identify four 
big groups. The first one groups business and management journals, the second pivots 
around finance, the third is centered in accounting, and the fourth on law studies. 
Corporate Governance and Ethics journals serve as a bridge among different areas. 
The analysis of the abstracts and the keywords provides some facts. Regarding the topics 
related to the board of directors, gender diversity in all its forms is at the top of the ranks. 
Although it relatively recent in the literature it is clearly a trending issue for research. 
Board structure, CEO compensation and duality, and firm performance are commonly 
approached to check different hypotheses as well, and confirmed the prevalence of Agency 
Theory approaches (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
As regards to the cited references, we provided two analyses: First, the overall picture, and 
second, the study of each period. As for the first, principal component analysis of 250 top 
ranked co-cited references provides a clear picture of the intellectual framework and is 
consistent with the topics and angles detected in the process of our methodology. This 
way, we found five main factors that build most of the research on board of directors: the 
Agency Theory (Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976), main topics based on that (CEO duality, ownership structure, boards’ 
independence, compensation) (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998, 2003; Klein, 2002; La Porta, 
Lopez‐de‐Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1999; Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988; 
Murphy, 1999; Weisbach, 1988; Westphal, 1998), diversity (setting the focus on gender) 
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(Bear, Rahman, & Post, 2010; Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003; Goodstein, Gautam, & 
Boeker, 1994; Hillman, Shropshire, & Cannella, 2007; Miller & del Carmen Triana, 2009; 
Torchia, Calabrò, & Huse, 2011), resource dependence views (Boyd, 1990; Hillman, 
Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000), strategy and other angles on composition (Baysinger & 
Hoskisson, 1990; Bebchuk & Cohen, 2005; Certo, 2003; Daily & Dalton, 1994; Mallette & 
Fowler, 1992), and other theoretical perspectives (Bebchuk, Fried, & Walker, 2002; Davis, 
Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997; Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Judge & Zeithaml, 1992; Lynall, 
Golden, & Hillman, 2003). The majority of the references were originated in the second 
stage of publications, configuring it period of consolidation of groundings and topics. 
Despite the prevalence of Agency related matters, there is also room for new or integrative 
approaches (Zahra & Pearce II, 1989). Thus, stewardship, institutional, or resource 
dependence models provide are drawn in this context, supporting a number of articles. The 
detail provided by performing the analysis in the different periods of time supports the idea 
of a maturation process in the literature, and confirms the previous findings. The first 
period is characterized by early foundations of the discipline of corporate governance, 
where it is reckoned the separation of ownership and control, in the context of so-called 
‘modern organizations’ (Berle & Means, 1932; Stone, 1976), being directors at the core of 
the research agenda. The Agency Theory gives the Board a central role solving the 
conflicts described at that time (Fama, 1980; Herman, 1981; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Mizruchi, 1983; Pfeffer, 1973). Some of the issues raised are developed during the second 
stage under a similar basis (Brown, 1976; Mace, 1976; Pfeffer, 1972; Vance, 1983; Zald, 
1969). Thus, board composition, independence, ownership structure, etc. (Baysinger & 
Butler, 1985; Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991), combine in 
configuring a solid basis of references for the second period. Finally, the third period 
shows that maturation in the topic comes through a broadening in the intellectual 
perspective, including integrative ways for different theories (Hillman et al., 2000; Hillman 
& Dalziel, 2003), and the addressing of new subtopics such as diversity (Carter et al., 
2003; Erhardt, Werbel, & Shrader, 2003). Human capital related topics, although at a slight 
approximation, have a new vision, but they are still under a huge influence of Agency 
Theory.  
The Codes of Governance have an underlying presence in the research. First, they 
triggered interest, investigation. Second, the indicators and recommendations gathered by 
the reporting of most of them are very often studied in the articles, and, reversely, may 
Chapter 6: Conclusions 
 332 
impact on their evolution. That is the case of CEO duality, independence, or compensation, 
among others.  
Although the study of the influence of human capital in boards has been pursued under 
different aspects, it is still very limited in terms of the number of articles, themes or 
subtopics (e.g. experience categorization, missing government skills). Considering human 
capital at the board would lead to link it to the training of the board, recently at the spot of 
the lack of proper response to disruptive changes in business models o market 
configuration. Finally is remarkable the lack of core and relevant presence of ethical 
frameworks and topics.  
The second specific objective aimed to analyze the studies on Board of Directors, carrying 
out this same analysis for the journal that has a greater presence in the field. As we noticed 
in the second chapter, the leading contributor was the Journal Corporate Governance An 
International Review. Then, we utilized the bibliometrics techniques for mapping and 
analyzing the research on the topic from 2000 to 2017, over 190 articles that were 
published in that journal.  
The frequency of publications shows that the topic is relevant and constant element 
amongst the articles published in that period in the journal. We identified three different 
periods: 2000-2004, 2005-2011 and 2012-2017. Different number of articles, issues, and 
length evolved accordingly to the expressed goals of the different editors-in-chief in every 
stage. Thus, it is noticeable the growth, maturation, and consolidation of the produced 
literature. The combination of these elements positively affected the impact of the journal 
according to different rankings, and the overall amount of contributions on the topic. 
Geographical origins and collaboration among research organizations show a prevalence of 
European affiliations in a context of a high degree of institutional diversity. The field of 
Corporate Governance always demands a growing collaboration among diverse countries 
and institutions. There is a need of spreading knowledge and practice, and also different 
cultures, societal and legal backgrounds give the opportunity of face issues in a different 
way. Besides, that kind of collaboration, especially when it is international, leads to 
matters that are focused on governance beyond local regulation. 
The analysis of the 377 unique contributors give as a first rationale for the intellectual 
framework they built. As in other journals, a small group of authors account for a 
significant number of articles, although it is wide enough not to be considered as 
endogamic. The variety of authors is also supported by a ratio unique authors to total 
authors that it is close to 1. Besides, the mapping and analysis of co-authorship shows, at 
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same time, several nodes of collaboration and a diverse community of authors. Both, the 
analysis of the impact through Hirch index and the number of citations of their articles in 
this sample shows the need of supporting traditional agency issue, like board independence 
or ownership structure, as well as diversity approaches. In that sense, the analysis of the 
keywords agrees with these statements, confirms a rising role of codes and indices, and 
shows recent evolution of research towards disclosure, family firms, or shareholder 
activisms. In spite of this, we found a lack of presence of board capital and ethics related 
studies.  
Although the study of the influence of human capital in boards has been pursued under 
different aspects, it is still very limited in terms of the number of articles, themes or 
subtopics. Thus, the factor analysis of the top ranked references shows that it’s been 
mentioned but at a relatively low relevant level. Nevertheless, the relevant presence in the 
components suggests strong foundation and an open range of theoretical frameworks that 
support new researches related to this topic. 
The analysis of the components provides us with the main grounds the articles used in 
aims. We identify five great factors that were mapped and analyzed. The first factor 
focuses on the relationship between the board and the strategy (Forbes & Milliken, 1999a; 
Golden & Zajac, 2001; McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999; Rindova, 1999), and the impact of 
diversity (Bilimoria & Piderit, 1994; Conyon & Mallin, 1997; Farrell & Hersch, 2005; Van 
der Walt, Ingley, Shergill, & Townsend, 2006; Westphal & Milton, 2000). The second 
factor contents foundation for board composition researches (Baysinger & Butler, 1985; 
Baysinger & Hoskisson, 1990; Bhagat, Black, Bhagat, & Black, 1999; Boone, Casares 
Field, Karpoff, & Raheja, 2007; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991). The third factor gives 
support for ownership structure matters (Baysinger, Kosnik, & Turk, 1991; Rafael La 
Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; McConnell & Servaes, 1990; Morck et al., 
1988; Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000). We suggest that the fourth factor is set to be a bridge 
trying to introduce other theories, such as the stewardship theory, and new angles on board 
and characteristics, such as experience or tenure (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988; Kesner, 
1988; Kroll, Walters, & Wright, 2008; Vafeas, 2003). The fifth factor focuses on the 
family firms as regards to the composition (Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Claessens, Djankov, 
& Lang, 2000; Faccio & Lang, 2002; Belén Villalonga & Amit, 2009) or ownership 
structure (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Filatotchev & Bishop, 2002; Yeh, 2005), or their impact 
on firm value. The construction of a corporate governance index out of the provision so as 
to check the impact on equity prices (Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, 2003) as well as other 
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works, is congruent with the analysis on keywords we made. Governance indices play a 
key role as for the governance matters, spreading practices, getting information based on 
recommendations, fostering transparency, accountability and giving signals to investors 
and markets in general. In this sense, Gompers work has been referred in further 
researches. 
Given the analysis of the factors, we think that the theoretical foundation of the works has 
a deep root in Agency Theory framework and issues but, at the same time, it is open to 
new theories, such as the Resource Dependence or the Stewardship Theory. Likewise, the 
presence of studies aiming to strategy topics provides a wider scope to the field. In this 
sense, we think that it sets new tracks, far from the original law or financial oriented 
researches. Accordingly with this rationale, the journal ranks high in the indices in those 
arenas. Regarding the topics, we think that they are diverse and wider in scope, if we 
compare with the overall published articles, and set a mark in the most relevant ones: 
composition, structure, diversity, family ownership, board capital, etc. The foundation for 
diversity studies grows over time and it reaches a prevalent position in the last of the 
periods we analyzed.  
The analysis we performed draws an evolution of the mentioned pillars of knowledge 
across the different stages of time. In the first period of time, ownership and control issues 
(Boyd, 1994; Cotter, Shivdasani, & Zenner, 1997; Ezzamel & Watson, 1993; Gedajlovic & 
Shapiro, 1998; Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 1997; Greenbury, 1995; Holderness & Sheehan, 
1988; Shivdasani, 1993; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986), the Agency Theory (Dalton, Daily, 
Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama, 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; J. L. 
Johnson, Daily, & Ellstrand, 1996) and strategy (Forbes & Milliken, 1999a; Lorsch, 1989; 
McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999; Tricker, 1994; Zahra & Pearce II, 1990), and the Resource 
Dependence Theory (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978a) and issues on 
corporate governance including board capital (Kesner, 1988; Pennings, 1980; Pettigrew & 
McNulty, 1995), diversity (Burke, 1997; Carter et al., 2003; Goodstein et al., 1994; 
Milliken & Martins, 1996; Westphal & Milton, 2000) and board composition (Barnhart, 
Rosenstein, & Marr, 1994; Bathala & Rao, 1995; Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Beasley, 
1996; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1988; Kosnik, 1987; Pfeffer, 1972) configure the main 
components. The second period embraces three main factors: board composition and 
remuneration (Bebchuk & Fried, 2003; Bebchuk & Fried, 2004; Conyon & Peck, 1998; 
Core, Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999; Hartzell & Starks, 2003; Hermalin & Weisbach, 1991; 
Mehran, 1995; Yermack, 2004); board composition and ownership structure (Anderson, 
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Mansi, & Reeb, 2003; Anderson & Reeb, 2003, 2004; Claessens, Djankov, Fan, & Lang, 
2002; Claessens et al., 2000; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986; Belen Villalonga & Amit, 2006); 
RDT, behavior and strategy at the board (Forbes & Milliken, 1999b; Gabrielsson & Huse, 
2005; Gabrielsson & Winlund, 2000; Golden & Zajac, 2001; Huse, 2005; Judge & 
Zeithaml, 1992; McNulty & Pettigrew, 1999; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978b). The last period 
gathers three main factors: Diversity (Renée B. Adams, de Haan, Terjesen, & van Ees, 
2015; Ahern & Dittmar, 2012; Hillman et al., 2007; Nielsen & Huse, 2010; Singh & 
Vinnicombe, 2004; Terjesen, Sealy, & Val, 2009; Terjesen & Singh, 2008; Torchia et al., 
2011), effectiveness in monitoring and diversity (Renée B Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Carter 
et al., 2003; Erhardt et al., 2003; Ferris, Jagannathan, & Pritchard, 2003; Fich & 
Shivdasani, 2006; Kang, Cheng, & Gray, 2007; Terjesen, Aguilera, & Lorenz, 2015), and a 
theoretical backbone (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Jensen & Meckling, 
1976; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978a; Zahra & Pearce II, 1989) linked to the investor protection 
(Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2008; La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, 
Shleifer, & Vishny, 2002; La Porta, Lopez‐de‐Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998; 
Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). 
The Board of Directors is a central element in Corporate Governance and it should be 
faced taking into account different perspectives, studying various topics, and relating to 
other disciplines that might enlighten that reality. We think that the kind of coverage CGIR 
built conveys to a leading position amongst other journals.  
Once we reviewed the existing literature on the topic of the Board of Directors we were 
more suitable to continue to the following step, addressing the third specific objective we 
proposed. Now that we identified relevant contributions, theoretical frameworks and issues 
related to the topic, we may verify the evolution and how the codes in Spain have 
channeled key issues of the corporate governance, mostly focused on the Board, towards 
listed firms, and via the degree of compliance, with special attention to those that may refer 
to human capital. 
Providing the intellectual framework, the principles and the goals across the all the codes 
in Spain, almost all variables that could be studied from the reported data coming from 
recommendations compliance are framed under the agency theory intellectual framework. 
This is consistent with the references employed by the vast majority of researches that 
have traditionally aimed to study topics. 
In spite of this long track record of intellectual framing, new approaches have been 
included throughout these years. Thus, resource dependence theory, stakeholder theory and 
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stewardship theory have applied to ground the basis of corporate governance research and 
practice.  
The codes of good governance incorporated elements from these frameworks so as to build 
their principles and set the provision or recommendations they require to listed firms. 
Principles have increased in number over years and have been made explicitly linked to 
recommendations. We provided a matching the principles of the Spanish Code of 
Governance and the main theories that serve as intellectual framework for corporate 
governance. This matching shows us that the majority of principles could be enclosed in 
the agency theory. But, maybe because of the pressure of regulation, which assumes a part 
of the matters, or because of an increasing trend towards wider and improved corporate 
governance, there have been more room for other approaches recently. In that sense, we 
identified those principles that could be under the influence of other theoretical 
frameworks, such as the Stakeholders Theory, the Resource Dependence Theory and the 
Stewardship Theory. Some of the recently implemented recommendations can be framed 
under them, e.g. the incorporation of provisions regarding the corporate social 
responsibility. These approaches may open a window for further changes in 
recommendations that enrich the standards of corporate governance in listed firms. 
Recent reporting requests include a more detailed disclosure for the issues regarding 
remuneration, which was further analyzed along with other topics. The approach aims to 
provide a enhanced control and better supervision. The codes have evolved considering 
parallel regulation, dismissing some provisions, and incorporating new owns for the 
benefit of markets transparency, shareholders protection and accountability before 
community. Besides remuneration disclosure, more provisions regarding general meetings 
performance and the three recommendations on corporate social responsibility are a clear 
example.   
While performing our study, we provide a very useful table to compare recommendations 
topics across different codes. This is quite relevant for the case of longitudinal studies of 
the mentioned recommendations and the subjects they ultimately refer to. We also depicted 
some of the comparable characteristics of the code as summary of some evolving topics. 
We confirmed that Agency Theory related recommendations are highly met by Spanish 
listed companies. But, at the same time, we also confirmed that remuneration provisions as 
well as internal controls are making a difference among firms and show lasting concerns in 
this key elements of corporate government of the firms. The analysis of the degree of 
compliance using PCA validate these constructs in the configuration of the different codes. 
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The Cronbach’s Alpha analysis confirmed the reliability of the degree of compliance of 
codes’ recommendations in each period of time as a measure of overall governance, 
conversely to what it happens when considering indices for partial aspects of governance. 
The indicator for the case of each one of the hypotheses shows signs of the use of a smaller 
number of recommendations. 
As a result of the analysis on the components behind the degree of compliance of the 
recommendations of the codes we reached some findings. First, in each period there is a 
high number of factors explaining the variance. This has two sides. On one hand, it leads 
two think that there is no big groups of recommendations feeding one each other and 
showing great opposition to compliance, which is certainly positive for the purpose of the 
code. Besides, it helps to validate hypotheses we formulated on the validity of the 
formulation of the code as it reflects prior knowledge base constructs of existing research 
literature on the topic. On the other hand, it is hard to name the rationale upon those 
factors, which is negative so as to center an action plan to cope with those 
recommendations that failed to comply in a certain group of companies. In this regard, 
internal control are gaining presence but, under our view, are likely to be incorporated to 
legislation, specially in Spain, if the situation of deteriorated compliance persists. This 
would be aligned with the explanation on the legal systems and their relation to codes, 
widely discussed in research literature. In the meantime, until that happens to be, they may 
be considered a good differential measurement of governance. 
As it was mentioned before, Corporate Social Responsibility have evolved towards a 
higher degree of disclosure on policies and implementation, and the lack of full 
compliance in last periods may suggest two causes: a) a need to adapt to new provisions or 
b) an absence of concrete and properly monitored action plan on this regard. The first 
cause is relatively easy to overcome in one or two periods, whereas the second takes more 
time and might last. Then, it would confirm that it can trigger differences among firms that 
could be perceived by the markets as distinctive. Human capital related recommendations 
have a great proportion of the difference among companies’ compliance in the last period 
of time. Following existing literature, despite the mentioned constrains of this kind of 
resources, are perceived at performance. We do not foresee the same behavior under the 
same premises. Companies will try to comply, at least formally, but the market will have to 
look at further disclosures to interpret advantages and profits coming out of a certain 
company’s human capital variable. In this vein, current required disclosures, and likely 
future ones to come, can provide rich information repository for further analyses.  
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Recommendations on traditional topics based on the Agency Theory (Fama, 1980; Jensen 
& Meckling, 1976) provide different outcomes. While independence is losing its 
differentiation trait, since they are close to be present in all companies, issues on 
remuneration (Baixauli-Soler & Sanchez-Marin, 2011, 2014; Lucian Bebchuk, Cohen, & 
Ferrell, 2004; Weimer & Pape, 1999) are among the main drivers behind code’s 
compliance. Agency Theory and Stakeholders Theory give grounding for the presence of 
internal controls (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; Robert Eduard Freeman, 1984; Robert 
Edward Freeman, 2004; Haxhi & Ees, 2010; Lorca, Sánchez-ballesta, & García-meca, 
2011; Mitchell, Wood, & Agle, 1997; Sneller & Langendijk, 2007), which played a 
relevant role across different periods of our study. Human capital is present in codes and 
appears as a key element, specially in the last period of the study, and aims to a greater 
influence in various areas such as strategic resources sourcing, reputation, better 
performance or effectiveness (Adams, Akyol, & Verwijmeren, 2013; Certo, Covin, Daily, 
& Dalton, 2001; de Andres & Santamaria, 2010; Hambrick & D’Aveni, 1992; 
Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003). In this vein, the need of suitable, independent, and 
dedicated directors, that facilitate the board dynamics in a learning process which helps 
organizations,  contributes decisively and is reflected in codes’ compliance (Davis et al., 
1997; Donaldson & Davis, 1991; Muth & Donaldson, 1998; Pastoriza & Arino, 2008; 
Pérez López, 1991; Pugliese et al., 2009). The code issuer evolved the code so as to 
provide more information on this regard. In fact, as we mentioned, recent studies for the 
case of Spain revealed arguably behavior in the listed companies, what may suggest that 
the lack of compliance might be driven for those aiming to hide or avoiding to put 
remuneration, specially in the context of overall company performance. In this regard, 
these constructs are valid for measure governance in the firm. 
We suggested that the double role of information leads to differences between companies. 
The flow of information facilitates a better functioning of the board, increasing its 
efficiency. On the other hand, the flow, and disclosure of information is essential for the 
best purpose of other mechanisms like the General Meeting, or the markets, or other 
stakeholders in general . 
Finally, overall outcome from code compliance shows that 1) Spanish listed firms have 
made an effort in all the aspects, 2) they are still far from a complete accomplishment, 3) 
the recommendations pushed some changes in trends, 4) ownership and cultural context 
sets a quite influent frame. 
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We think that the codes are certainly playing a relevant role, disseminating practices, 
challenging companies in the pursuing of a better governance setting. The validation of the 
constructs based on the information provided by the degree of compliance, helps to 
consider them as a good measure of corporate governance. This is a convenient step in 
order to study potential effects on performance, as we make in the last one of the chapters. 
The virtue, in our opinion, is to keep doing that over time. The results of compliance 
should reflect non-dangerous differences, that is, those that go beyond the protection of 
shareholders’ interests. Accordingly, a great number of recommendations are likely to stay 
at the code though they are always (or almost always) met. In our opinion, the code issuer 
should push disclosure in those soft, hardly measurable elements. This would lead more to 
a better government than to a good code compliance. In this sense, codes would act as 
indices of corporate governance. 
The validation of different constructs underlying the recommendations makes them 
potential components of a good measure of governance. We make this remark, since we 
are not just pointing out to a few variables but considering a wider range of corporate 
governance compliance across periods. 
The last of the specific objectives linked the previous findings of chapter 4 to the firm 
performance. Once we validated the constructs in the last chapter, we analyzed the impact 
of the degree of compliance in the recommendations of good governance on the 
performance of companies, and tried to determine whether those related to human capital 
have an effect on it, in the case of Spanish listed firms. The results gave us a positive and 
significant relationship and that led us to confirm the degree of compliance is positively 
associated with the firm performance of the Spanish firms in the period of our study, going 
beyond considering just a subset of recommendations and diminishing the costs associated 
to compliance disclosure (Alves & Mendes, 2004; Lucian Bebchuk, Cohen, & Ferrell, 
2009; Gompers et al., 2003; Karpoff, Schonlau, & Wehrly, 2017; Shaukat & Trojanowski, 
2018; Sneller & Langendijk, 2007; Vander Bauwhede & Willekens, 2008). This outcome 
considered the Return on Assets, the industry and the years of study as control variables. 
ROA has a positive and significant effect in across all time span. As a consequence, we 
may conclude three things: a) degree of compliance is providing an positive effect on 
Spanish listed companies; b) since this study covers different period of time and different 
codes, successive changes in recommendations are effective in keeping that positive 
relationship, and support the idea behind the role of the codes spreading suitable ways of 
facing relevant topics on corporate governance, among which a significant part is focus on 
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the board; and c) considering this fact along with the descriptive results of the degree of 
compliance, we may suggest that they have reached a remarkable level, although there is 
room for improvement. Accordingly, we think that codes issuers should keep the 
idiosyncrasy in the approach followed for reforming recommendations, aiming to build a 
continuous process, embracing new provisions and disclosures for the good purpose of 
spreading the best practices that might have a positive impact on the governance of the 
firms.  
As regards to past levels of compliance, our research confirms that we can’t take their 
values into account along with the present ones, due to the lack of significance. Market and 
regulatory dynamics seems to be weighting the impact to current period of time. We 
remind that we are dealing with recommendations of the codes and not with government of 
organizations as a whole. If government were analyzed, lagged values turning into long-
term effects could be expected, given that the nature of the topic. The positive link between 
past levels of compliance and firm performance considered alone might point to be closely 
interchangeable with present values, which may suggest that it could be a sort of inertia 
that leans on recent degree of compliance but rather prefers the current ones. 
We tested that there were differences in the association depending on the size of the firm. 
With few exceptions, the impact on firm value shows a decreasing trend as the size of the 
considered companies increases. We suggested that the rationale behind is the following: 
when a company is small, the market is more sensible to notice good governed companies, 
what will turn into diminishing risks and counterbalancing traditional issues linked to 
small size companies when are listed. Conversely, as the company is bigger, good 
governance is still considered and valued, but some other variables have an effect on the 
company’s firm value, providing nuances that can blur the overall effect (Chhaochharia & 
Grinstein, 2007; Khemakhem & Dicko, 2013; Van Essen, Engelen, & Carney, 2013). 
We also found the lack of statistical significance in subsets of recommendations regarding 
human capital. The importance of this topic, widely supported in research literature (Coles, 
Daniel, & Naveen, 2008; S. G. Johnson, Schnatterly, & Hill, 2013; McIntyre, Murphy, & 
Mitchell, 2007; Singh, Terjesen, & Vinnicombe, 2008; Vandewaerde, Voordeckers, 
Lambrechts, & Bammens, 2011), meets a easy way of showing compliance in the 
recommendations. In this context, going beyond what is required by regulation or by 
provisions in codes could build relevant groundings for long-term government of the firm 
and gain envision and advantages for competing. Also, this is quite interesting in terms of 
markets, need of detailed demands of information at disclosures, future performance and 
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future role of the code as a useful tool to spread best practices and to achieve its core 
principles. 
 
A landscape for future research 
We hope that this study will be helpful for forthcoming investigation works. Therefore, we 
proposed potential questions, topics and angles that can take part of this work as an starting 
point for investigation. Hence, we summarize  those we mentioned in the corresponding 
section of  each one of the chapters. 
As for the chapter 2, the mapping of the intellectual structure and quantitative study of the 
topic we made has some implications for future research. Besides being a good starting 
point to cover gaps and new angles of investigation, it provides the necessary weight to 
perform further meta-analyses. For the practice of corporate governance, this study gives 
ideas to incorporate in the work of board of directors, considering the main and relevant 
empirical works that influence the research, codes and regulation. 
Our contribution provides a solid basis to perform a meta-analysis on the board of directors 
since it delivers a deeper understanding of the qualified contributions identified that shaped 
the investigation over the years. As the main angles and approaches to the analysis of the 
board have been identified throughout this article, the gaps and the lack of deep 
understanding from other points of view, and some topics related for further research 
appear clearer for scholars. Amongst them we may identify some related to human capital 
and codes relationship, or human capital and the board, diversity human capital. 
Experience, knowledge, tenure, skills have already been approached but there are 
perspectives still low developed. We also would like to mention training, combined with 
digital strategies or ethics as themes to be included. We reckon the difficulties to obtain 
information suitable for research in issues regarding actual inside board dynamics, their 
relation to market and nonmarket strategy definition or selection-evaluation processes 
relationship, but we think that it would be worthwhile as to analyze and improve 
government of organizations beyond their corporate governance. 
Likewise in most researches of this kind, our techniques did not link the references to 
places where they were mentioned within the articles (i.e. introduction, methodology, 
results). Although their position within the articles could drive a deeper understanding, we 
pointed to the use of an accurate natural language processing software so as to analyze the 
actual meaning in a sample of articles as big as ours, while reducing the level of 
subjectivity. Despite that, this sort of study could be approached when performing a meta-
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analysis of a reduced, meaningful number of articles. Finally, we reckon that it may be 
interesting to analyze the role and characteristics of the published works in leading 
journals, considering their impact on the evolution of the research topic. We performed 
that task for the most relevant one in order to frame the groundings of its importance, and 
to offer a pattern for developing new angles or approaches to the topic while keeping a 
significant level of contributions. 
 
Derived from the results, discussion and results from chapter 2, our work shows a 
quantitative basis to assert the relevance of works, authors and topics in the literature on 
board of directors, which is a proper starting point to quote researches in any literature 
review and meta-analysis on the topic. At the same time, this study shows the less studied 
subjects or points of view, serving as a way to identify future lines of investigation. 
Although we studied the topic of board of directors in the journal that contributes the most, 
it would be appropriate to apply the same type of analysis to other top journals on this 
field, and compare the results to improve the research. This angle would show how 
different journals are approaching the topic and the way they are impacting and 
configuring the intellectual framework as top performers in the arena. 
A meta-analysis on the board of directors would have a solid basis in these studies since it 
would explain and explore the qualified contributions that shaped the investigation over 
the years and were quantitatively identified using bibliometric techniques. Besides, as the 
main angles and approaches to the analysis of the board have been identified throughout 
this article, the gaps and the lack of deep understanding from other points of view or topics 
related for further research appear clearer for scholars. Amongst them we may identify 
some related to human capital and codes relationship, or human capital and the board, 
which, in our opinion, are underrepresented in research studies. As a relevant element of 
the board capital, it should be studied more in depth. 
Similarly to the proposed research for the case of the whole set of contributions, our study 
could be utilized when performing a meta-analysis of a reduced, meaningful number of 
articles. 
 
The results and conclusions we obtained in the fourth chapter open a varied set of 
questions and topics to be referred. Since a great number of recommendations are stated 
under the Agency Theory perspective, differential compliance will tend to rise under other 
views. 
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As for the periods of time for the analyses, although cross-sectional studies could be 
performed to analyze the impact of the variables on a given year, this kind of researches 
may lead to inconsistent outcomes or, at least, to misleading interpretations. On one hand, 
some relevant factors may be hidden, and in other hand corporate governance issues 
should consider time, and very often it is spread over the, by definition, short-term cross-
sectional analysis. Then, a longitudinal study might be worthwhile. In that case, it would 
be necessary to consider comparable information and context. For that aim, the table we 
used to compare recommendations topics could useful for performing longitudinal 
analyses staged in three periods of time (2007-2012, 2013-2014, and 2015-2016). 
These analyses could help to determine whether the degree of compliance of the provisions 
as a whole, and those referred to specific matters, are associated or not to the firm 
performance. We make this remark, since we are not just pointing out to a few variables 
but considering a wider concept or corporate compliance. 
Deepening on the contents and the provisions, since the study of human capital variables 
contained in codes of good governance provisions is limited, it would be necessary to 
compute the data of every director in each one of the companies through this angle. Data 
on training programs, concrete selection policies is still not available for study, but some 
human capital variables could be obtained from corporate governance reports that are issue 
by listed firms but they use to be unstructured and are embedded in wider purpose 
description. Diversity concept is being approached in a wider way in the last version of the 
code, and included in human capital variables. This situation could be highly resourceful to 
perform further researches. Other intellectual frameworks could easier support this 
perspective, such as Resource Dependence Theory. 
The study of governance of family business non-listed companies under the later 
frameworks may lead to attractive conclusions. Thus, i.e. the use of family councils in 
these firms might provide some light to governance in other firms’ typologies.  
Despite many studies address corporate governance and board of directors in listed 
companies, it might be useful to broaden the scope to Spanish non-listed companies. The 
number, weight and presence of them in the economic structure could help to create a 
culture of good governance. Medium and big non-listed companies could benefit from 
these researches. For small companies, the problem of access to data would be greater in 
most cases due to associated costs and the lack of a proper framework for easily reporting 
this information. Nevertheless, the study of governance in technological startups could be 
interesting. The potential growth of these companies configures a good angle of study. 
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Although codes, recommendations, and report forms vary dependent on the country, they 
all may have a common base of principles. Hence, it could be useful to compare those 
variables that are shared among different companies from various global areas and use 
validation of constructs techniques as employed in this article. 
 
The outcomes of our research in chapter 5, in response to the fourth specific objective, 
might lead to different researches as well. Firstly, it might be useful to broaden the scope 
to Spanish non-listed companies. The number, weight and presence of them in the 
economic structure are relevant in countries like Spain, and, as a result, it could help 
creating a culture of good governance. Medium and big non-listed companies could benefit 
from these researches. The issue of data availability could be initially skipped by setting 
the focus on the study of governance in technological startups could be interesting. The 
potential growth of these companies configures a good angle of study and research might 
find suitable sources of information to feed the analysis. Secondly, it will be interesting to 
check whether the relationship shape changes over years and reaches a stable level when 
approaching the highest values of the degree of compliance. This could provide a sign of 
the sensibility of the markets and pave the way for making improvements in the 
governance mechanisms through the recommendations, or serve as a way to establish long-
term envision and government of the firm. Besides, it could be useful to compare those 
variables that are shared among different companies from various countries or global areas, 
paying attention to the evolution the codes and considering that they all may have a 
common base of principles and benchmarked practices of good governance. 
As for the topics related, since the scope and depth of human capital variables contained in 
codes of good governance is limited, it would be necessary to compute the data of every 
director of each one of the companies through this angle. Human capital variables could be 
obtained from corporate governance reports that are issue by listed firms but they use to be 
unstructured and are embedded in wider purpose description. Diversity, a concept with 
high levels of presence in research literature, could be approached in a wider way, and, for 
instance, be included along with human capital variables. Other intellectual frameworks 
could easier support this perspective, such as the Resource Dependence Theory. This kind 
of research might provide differential advantages for the firm based on a board 
composition centered in the person, and working a governing group. 
The study of governance of family business non-listed companies under the later 
frameworks may lead to attractive conclusions. Some specific traits of that type of 
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companies, such as the use of family councils or the presence of protocols, might provide 
some light to governance processes and mechanisms of other firms. Strategic vision, 
succession, management of family members in business are topics addressed with a 
different angle that allowed those firms to adapt, evolve, and, eventually, survive for 
generations. 
Consequently, we expressed some potential directions in this regard and we will try to 
accomplish them within our future research. 
 
 
 
The study of Corporate Governance as a discipline gave a central role to the Board of 
Directors. Throughout this work we humbly contributed to map the structure of the 
intellectual framework behind the research literature, the basis for obtaining relevance in 
the investigation of the topic. On these grounds, we analyzed how codes serve as an 
instrument to channel the main angles, perspectives and issues to the Spanish listed firms 
for a long period of time. The spreading of the practices, showing the foundation on 
several intellectual frameworks and the need and the need of addressing key issues that are 
primarily focused on the board, have a positive impact on the firms’ performance. Then we 
can conclude that we addressed the general objective of this Thesis, and we properly 
answered to the research question that were at the origin of its conception. 
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